TESTIMONY: Southern Lebanon Between Two Fires — The IDF Holds, Iran Advances in the Shadows

Introduction: A Withdrawal That Isn't One, a War That Dare Not Speak Its Name

The stage for an impossible negotiation

On June 26, 2026, Israel and Lebanon signed, after four days of intense negotiations in Washington, a tripartite framework agreement brokered by the United States. On paper, it represents a first step toward ending hostilities. In reality, it is the story of a security vacuum stretching on, of a 10-kilometer buffer zone that the Israeli army refuses to abandon, and of an Iran watching it all with the patience of a seasoned chess player.

Since June 4, 2026, the date on which the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) took control of Dibbine, in the Marjaayoun district, following a first partial withdrawal of the IDF, every centimeter of ground has become the subject of an exhausting diplomatic battle. The Washington negotiations stretched an additional four days. No definitive agreement on withdrawal was announced. The deadlock is total.

What I understood following this crisis hour by hour

I must be honest: I was not there. I did not cross the rubble fields of the Nabatieh district, I did not watch LAF soldiers take up positions under threat. But I read every communiqué, every analysis, every contradictory statement — and what I can attest to is the profound strategic confusion that characterizes this historical moment. Israel says it is not withdrawing. An American official says it already has. Lebanon says Israeli soldiers are doing precisely the opposite.

The Withdrawal Timeline: A Perpetually Deferred Promise

From Dibbine to Beaufort Castle: the milestones of an incomplete disengagement

On June 4, 2026, the IDF handed control of Dibbine to the Lebanese army and UNIFIL — a symbolic gesture, the very first since ground operations began in March 2026. Negotiations then resumed in Washington, from June 23 to 26, around the idea of «pilot zones»: restricted perimeters where the LAF would replace Israeli soldiers, if and only if Hezbollah was disarmed beforehand. The American proposal specifically targeted the vicinity of Beaufort Castle, in the Nabatieh district, seized by Israel on June 1, 2026.

But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held an unwavering line: «the IDF will remain in the security zone in Lebanon for as long as necessary.» Defense Minister Israel Katz added that troops would not withdraw «even if the United States demands it.» These statements are not political theater. They reflect a deep conviction that Hezbollah, stripped of its underground infrastructure, reconstitutes its arsenal the moment any space is conceded.

The pilot zones: an innovative concept or a dangerous illusion?

The framework agreement signed on June 26 provides for two pilot zones near the Yellow Line — an imaginary line extending 8 kilometers inside Lebanese territory from the border. Within these zones, the LAF would be expected to dismantle Hezbollah's infrastructure before any transfer of control. Israel insists: this is not a withdrawal, it is a verification. The logic is defensive, not political. The Israeli army wants first to observe whether Lebanese forces are capable of preventing a terrorist resurgence.

The problem is structural: according to several Israeli sources cited by the Times of Israel, the IDF has discovered and dismantled significant terrorist infrastructure throughout southern Lebanon since operations began. Even a partial withdrawal risks giving these forces time to reconstitute what months of operations have destroyed. This is a classic counterinsurgency dilemma: you win the ground but cannot hold it indefinitely.

Iran's Role: The Discreet Strategist of a Calculated Void

The deconfliction cell: an instrument of Iranian influence

This is where the story becomes truly troubling. As part of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the United States and Iran on June 17, 2026 in Versailles, a deconfliction cell was created to monitor the ceasefire in Lebanon. It includes the United States, Iran, Qatar, Pakistan, and the Lebanese government. It explicitly excludes Israel. This is not an administrative detail: it is a major strategic decision.

According to analysis by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), this cell has the practical effect of eliminating the post-ceasefire monitoring mechanism from November 2024, which allowed Israel to act against Hezbollah violations under certain circumstances. By directly integrating Tehran into this mechanism while excluding Tel Aviv, one gives Iran an indirect supervisory capacity over what happens in southern Lebanon — precisely where its proxies operate.

The Iranian demand: a sine qua non condition

Iran's chief negotiator, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, reiterated on June 24, 2026 that «a full Israeli withdrawal is a central condition» for reaching any final agreement with the United States. Tehran is not nuanced: it wants total evacuation. And if the nuclear negotiations progress, Iran could use the Lebanese question as leverage — «give us Lebanon, we give you guarantees on uranium.» This is the commerce of great powers.

The semi-official Iranian agency Tasnim even threatened, on June 21, that Tehran would suspend all negotiations with Washington if Israel did not withdraw from southern Lebanon. Hezbollah, for its part, rejected the June 3 ceasefire plan and continues its attacks. In this context, the deconfliction cell — with Iran inside and Israel outside — looks less like a peace tool than a mechanism for protecting Hezbollah.

The Lebanese Army Confronting Its Own Limits

An expected deployment, uncertain capabilities

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are at the heart of the American strategy for southern Lebanon. Washington has trained and selected specific personnel to occupy Israeli positions. The proposal even includes an American coordination mechanism to oversee LAF deployment in evacuated zones. But a senior Lebanese military official, cited by Reuters, stated that recent events «show the opposite of a withdrawal» — Israeli forces are tightening their grip, including against LAF units.

The tension is real: Israel wants to test the LAF in zones where Israeli forces are not yet present, to assess their capabilities before any transfer of control. Lebanon and the United States want to start with occupied zones. This divergence on the starting point reflects a fundamental deficit of trust. Can the Lebanese army disarm Hezbollah? Netanyahu's reminders from 2024, noting that such a promise had already been made and never honored, ring painfully true.

The 2024 precedent and the recidivism syndrome

Israeli government spokesperson David Mencer said it plainly: «We have already lived through this situation in 2024. Hezbollah was supposed to be disarmed. It was not.» This historical reminder is not bad faith. The November 2024 ceasefire, negotiated under American auspices, provided for LAF deployment south of the Litani River. Hezbollah maintained its positions, rebuilt its infrastructure, and resumed its attacks. Trust, once betrayed, is hard to rebuild.

The question Israeli strategists ask is brutally pragmatic: why would the result be different this time? The answer — if there is one — lies in the transformation of the political environment. Hezbollah has suffered considerable losses. Its aerial arsenal has been largely destroyed. Its underground infrastructure, notably at Ali Taher, is being dismantled. Perhaps this time conditions are different. Perhaps. But «perhaps» is not a foundation for national security.

Hezbollah: Defeated on the Ground, Surviving in the Shadows

A decapitated but not destroyed structure

The Israeli offensive since March 2026 has inflicted severe losses on Hezbollah. Its leader Naim Qassem rejected any Israeli withdrawal in a televised address, demanding the full departure of the «aggressors». But this bellicose rhetoric masks a reality: Hezbollah has lost cadres, command posts, and much of its launch infrastructure. Operationally, the group is weakened.

Yet the 175 projectiles fired at Israeli forces on a single Saturday in violation of the June 3 ceasefire, the lethal attacks that cost the lives of several Israeli soldiers, testify to a persistent capacity for harm. Hezbollah is counting on attrition. It is counting on the fact that Israel cannot remain indefinitely mobilized in Lebanon. And that Iran, behind the scenes, will supply the resources to reconstitute it.

The Ali Taher underground installation: the symbol of a total war

The battle to destroy the strategic underground installation beneath the Ali Taher ridge, near Nabatieh, perfectly illustrates the complexity of this conflict. According to Israeli military intelligence, dozens of Hezbollah operators are still sheltering in these tunnels. The fighting unfolds simultaneously above ground and underground. It is a war in the earth's bowels — invisible, brutal, and with no guarantee of decisive victory.

Staff Sergeant Nir Ben Ari was killed during these operations, and 13 other soldiers were wounded, during Hezbollah's attack at Ali Taher during the week of June 23. These losses are not abstract. They are human lives sacrificed to destroy infrastructure that Hezbollah — with Iranian assistance — is capable of rebuilding. The question of the strategic sustainability of the Israeli operation remains entirely open.

The Washington Negotiations: Four Days for Nothing or for Everything

The fifth session: between progress and disappointments

The fifth session of direct negotiations between Israel and Lebanon in Washington began on June 23 and was initially set to conclude on June 25. It was extended by one additional day under American pressure. According to sources close to the negotiations cited by the Times of Israel, the two parties made significant progress on the final day after «two difficult opening days.» The framework agreement ultimately signed on June 26 creates two pilot zones and preserves Israeli military freedom of action within its buffer zone.

The main sticking point concerned the Yellow Line: Israel refuses to withdraw from zones inside this line, including Beaufort Castle. Lebanon demands the complete withdrawal from all villages and towns inside the line — Majdal Zoun, Zibqin, Beit Lif, Tayri, and Kounine. The framework agreement does not resolve this fundamental contradiction. It freezes the positions in time while awaiting a broader political solution.

American pressure and its limits

The Trump administration exerted intense pressure for both parties to emerge from this week with «some kind of agreement.» It obtained one — but at what cost? According to a source close to the negotiations, an American diplomatic maneuver during the opening hours initially led Israel to harden its position. Washington is playing a delicate double game: it simultaneously wants to satisfy Israel, its strategic ally, and Iran, its nuclear interlocutor. These two objectives are structurally contradictory in Lebanon.

American envoy Steve Witkoff, credited with the US-Iranian MoU, needs the Lebanese track to hold for the nuclear negotiations to stay on course. Because Tehran has made the nuclear negotiations conditional on the Lebanon question. This is a direct, explicit link that transforms every square centimeter of southern Lebanese territory into a bargaining chip in a far larger geopolitical game.

The Geopolitics of the Void: Who Profits from Uncertainty?

Iranian calculations in the Lebanese theater

Iran has everything to gain from prolonging this void. The longer the Israeli withdrawal is delayed, the more pro-Iranian forces can reorganize. The faster it proceeds, the more the LAF — sectors of which Tehran hopes to influence — will establish themselves on strategic ground. In either case, Iranian influence in Lebanon remains structural. The presence of Qatar and Pakistan in the deconfliction cell — two countries with complex relationships with Tehran — is insufficient to counterbalance this dynamic.

Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a traditional ally of Hezbollah, proposed that the four cazas of southern Lebanon serve as pilot zones — a proposal that, if accepted, would accelerate the Israeli withdrawal before security conditions have been verified. This position is not naive. It is calculated to create the space that Hezbollah needs to reconstitute itself, with the implicit blessing of Tehran.

France and Italy: an alternative to UNIFIL?

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun welcomed French and Italian efforts to form a coalition to succeed UNIFIL. This is a new development: the prospect of a European force capable of offering credible guarantees in southern Lebanon. Would Paris and Rome have the political and military means to maintain sufficient pressure on Hezbollah in this zone? The question deserves to be asked seriously.

The current UNIFIL has shown its limits: an insufficient mandate, overly restrictive rules of engagement, inability to prevent Hezbollah from rearming between 2006 and 2024. A European force with a robust mandate and enhanced verification capabilities could change the calculus. But it would require political will that neither Paris nor Rome has yet clearly demonstrated.

The June 3 Ceasefire: A Promise Broken Within the Hour

An agreement that Hezbollah rejected from birth

On June 3, 2026, Israel and the Lebanese government concluded a ceasefire under American mediation, providing for Hezbollah's cessation of fire, Israeli withdrawal south of the Litani River, and the creation of security pilot zones. Hezbollah rejected this agreement, demanding a complete Israeli withdrawal as a precondition for any truce. The fighting continued. This sequence reveals a fundamental reality: Hezbollah is not a good-faith actor in this process. It is an instrument of Iranian strategy, and its good faith exists only insofar as it serves Tehran's interests.

Mutual accusations of ceasefire violations proliferated. Hezbollah described Israeli strikes as «flagrant violations.» Israel documented terrorist attacks against its soldiers. On June 25, the group accused Israel of killing three civilians in a strike on a vehicle in Mayfadoun — the Israeli army stating for its part that it had killed five Hezbollah operatives. In this fog of war, truth is always the first casualty.

When peace is impossible and war is too costly

IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir declared during a visit to southern Lebanon that the army's objective «remains clear and unchanged: to defend the communities of the north and the citizens of Israel.» This formulation is precise and revealing: the IDF is not talking about total victory, nor about the complete demilitarization of Hezbollah. It is talking about protecting Israeli civilians. This is a defensive, realistic objective — and fundamentally incompatible with a complete withdrawal.

200,000 residents of northern Israel have been displaced since the hostilities began, according to statements by Minister Katz. These families cannot return home while the threat persists. Any solution that does not guarantee their security is an incomplete one. And yet the international community is pressing Israel to withdraw. The human equation — 200,000 Israelis against occupied Lebanese villages — is one that no one speaks about openly.

The Human Dimension: Lebanese Civilians Caught in the Crossfire

A devastated south, an uncertain return

Behind the geopolitical maneuvering, there are the inhabitants of southern Lebanon. More than 4,000 deaths and massive displacement have marked these months of conflict, according to estimates cited in various analyses. The villages between the Litani River and the Israeli border — Marjaayoun, Nabatieh, dozens of rural localities — have been emptied of their civilian populations. Return is conditional on a security that nobody is yet in a position to guarantee.

Minister Katz said that 200,000 Lebanese residents will not return home as long as the buffer zone exists. This statement, as difficult as it is to hear, reflects an operational reality: the presence of civilians in buffer zones creates security risks — improvised devices, infiltrations, firing positions. This is the brutal calculation that any occupying army must make. And it is what makes the search for a political solution so urgent.

The role of humanitarian organizations in an asymmetric conflict

UNIFIL, with its limited rules of engagement, was unable to effectively protect civilian populations during intensive combat. Humanitarian organizations operate under extremely difficult conditions, with restricted access. The framework agreement of June 26 provides, according to official terms, for the «reconstruction of the south» as a long-term objective. But between the announcement and the reality, the distance is immense — especially when armed non-state actors continue their operations.

President Joseph Aoun, elected in January 2026 after years of presidential vacancy, is trying to restore the authority of the Lebanese state. His wager is colossal: simultaneously neutralizing Hezbollah, meeting Israeli demands, resisting Iranian pressures, and rebuilding a state that never truly existed in the full sense of the term. He deserves the help of the West — not promises, but concrete resources.

The June 26 Agreement: What It Contains and What It Conceals

An ambiguous text, a victory claimed by all

The tripartite framework agreement signed on June 26, 2026 in Washington deserves careful reading. It affirms that Israel will maintain its security zone along the Yellow Line until Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations are disarmed. It creates two pilot zones recommended by the IDF. It preserves Israeli military freedom of action inside the buffer zone. It explicitly rejects the attempt by Iran and Hezbollah to force a unilateral withdrawal while leaving the terrorist infrastructure intact.

On paper, this is a more solid text than expected. Israel can present it as a victory: no imposed withdrawal, freedom of action maintained. Lebanon can present it as a promise of gradual disengagement. The United States can present it as proof that diplomacy works. But Tehran can also read it as a gain: the deconfliction mechanism is in place, and the Lebanese question remains linked to the nuclear negotiations.

The gray zones that could upend everything

The agreement specifies no withdrawal timeline. It does not clearly define what «disarming Hezbollah» means, nor who verifies this condition. It does not specify the exact role of the Iranian deconfliction cell in overseeing incidents. These gray zones — deliberately left vague to allow each party to obtain a signature — are so many time bombs. In six months, if the LAF does not deploy sufficiently, if Hezbollah resumes its attacks, if Israel refuses to transfer the pilot zones, who will have violated the agreement?

Nobody really knows. And this is perhaps, in a certain way, what allows this agreement to exist. Constructive ambiguity is the hallmark of agreements that nobody will fully respect. It allows each signatory to return home claiming victory. But in six months, when tensions resume, this very ambiguity will become the argument justifying the break.

The Iranian Nuclear Question: The Invisible Thread That Ties Everything Together

The MoU as grand strategic calculation

The US-Iranian Memorandum of Understanding signed on June 17, 2026 in Versailles formally launched a cycle of negotiations intended to address the Iranian nuclear program, the progressive lifting of sanctions, and regional security. The negotiations officially began in Switzerland on June 22. Within this framework, Lebanon is a secondary but real issue: Tehran made the Israeli withdrawal a «central condition» and threatened to suspend nuclear negotiations if this condition is not met.

This direct link between Lebanon and the nuclear question creates a perverse dynamic: the more the nuclear talks progress, the more pressure on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon increases. This is a mechanism of gradual strangulation — designed by Tehran, potentially accepted by Washington in its pursuit of a grand deal. Israel, excluded from this negotiation, faces an impossible choice: resist the pressure and risk isolation, or yield and see Hezbollah reconstitute itself.

What Netanyahu knows but cannot say publicly

Prime Minister Netanyahu understands this mechanism perfectly. His line of conduct — «the IDF stays as long as necessary» — is not merely a security position. It is resistance to the strategic architecture that Tehran is trying to build. As long as the IDF remains in the buffer zone, it constitutes real bargaining power. A premature withdrawal would be interpreted as weakness — and in the Middle East of 2026, weakness invites aggression.

Minister Katz's declaration — «even if the United States demands it» — is a red line that very few of Israel's allies cross publicly. It signals that Tel Aviv is prepared to create friction with Washington on this question. It is a calculated risk. And in this calculation, Tehran's perception — watching every move — is as important as the realities on the ground.

The Role of the United States: Mediator, Guarantor, or Irresolute Arbiter?

Trump's diplomacy between two fires

The Trump administration finds itself in an uncomfortable position: it must simultaneously guarantee Israel's security and advance on the Iranian nuclear deal. These two objectives collide in Lebanon. Washington exerted «significant pressure» on both parties to conclude an agreement this week. According to sources close to the negotiations, this pressure led to moments of tension where each party wondered whether the United States was truly playing for it.

The State Department initially affirmed — then denied, then reaffirmed in an ambiguous formulation — that Israel had already carried out a partial withdrawal. This communicational cacophony is symptomatic of a foreign policy under construction, navigating by sight between contradictory objectives. The capacity of the United States to remain a credible guarantor for Israel while negotiating with Tehran will be the ultimate test of this diplomacy.

Israeli dependency and its structural limits

Israel needs the United States for its armaments, for diplomatic support at the UN, for defense financing guarantees. This structural dependency creates a vulnerability. Washington can exert existential pressure on Tel Aviv simply by slowing arms deliveries or abstaining on its veto at the Security Council. That is why Katz's statement — defying a potential American demand — is both courageous and risky.

In this context, the June 26 framework agreement perhaps represents the best possible outcome for Israel: an agreement that obliges it to nothing immediately, that preserves its military options, and that gives Washington the diplomatic showcase it needs to continue negotiations with Tehran. It is a points victory — not a decisive victory. But in this context, that is already something.

Perspective: What Will Southern Lebanon Look Like in Six Months?

The possible scenarios and their probabilities

Three scenarios are taking shape for the next six months in southern Lebanon. The first — and most optimistic — sees the LAF deploy effectively in the pilot zones, dismantle Hezbollah's infrastructure, and create the conditions for a gradual Israeli withdrawal. This scenario requires massive international aid, rare Lebanese political determination, and effective pressure on Hezbollah. Probability: low but not zero.

The second scenario sees the status quo prolonged: the IDF remains in its buffer zone, the LAF deploys partially, incidents multiply, and Hezbollah slowly rebuilds its capabilities. This is the scenario of conflictual freezing — neither total war nor real peace. Probability: high. The third scenario — the darkest — sees the nuclear negotiations fail, Tehran resume its active support of Hezbollah, and escalation restart. This scenario is not improbable, especially if the Switzerland talks do not produce results within sixty days.

What the international community must do now

The June 26 framework agreement offers a narrow window of opportunity. For it to remain open, several conditions must be met: robust and rapid funding of the LAF by Western and Gulf partners; concrete European commitment to contribute to a credible monitoring force; sustained pressure on Hezbollah via the Qatari and Pakistani diplomatic channels of the deconfliction cell; and constant dialogue with Israel so that any zone transfer is conditioned on concrete verifications.

This agenda is ambitious. It requires the kind of coordination that the international community has rarely demonstrated on this file. But the alternative — a southern Lebanon that once again becomes a permanent launch pad against Israel, financed by Tehran — is unacceptable for regional security and for the ambitions of a sovereign Lebanon. The stakes go beyond the interests of all parties. It is the stability of the Middle East as a whole that is at stake.

Lebanon's Future: Between Renaissance and Implosion

The conditions for a viable Lebanese state

Lebanon bears the weight of decades of institutional dysfunction, systemic corruption, and a political confessionalism that paralyzes any structural reform. The framework agreement of June 26 does not erase these deep realities. For a true Lebanese state to emerge — capable of exercising its sovereignty in the south as in the north — deep economic reforms, a restructuring of the banking sector, and sustained international aid that goes beyond symbolic commitments will be needed.

The European Union and Gulf partners have promised tens of billions of dollars in conditional support tied to the implementation of reforms. These funds will only arrive if Beirut demonstrates a minimal institutional capacity to absorb and use them. This is precisely where successive Lebanese governments have always failed. The real battle for Lebanon does not take place in southern Lebanon — it takes place in the ministries of Beirut.

Lebanese civil society: the only capital not yet destroyed

Within this bleak picture, there is a precious asset: Lebanese civil society. The movement of 2019, which mobilized hundreds of thousands of people in the streets of Beirut, demonstrated that a deep aspiration toward a functioning state, free of corruption and foreign interference, truly existed within the population. This aspiration has not disappeared — it has been suppressed, exhausted, discouraged. But it is there.

If the framework agreement of June 26 creates even a two-year window of stability — time for the LAF to deploy, for reconstruction to begin, for refugees to return — this civil society could find the political space to speak out again. This is no guarantee. It is a chance. And in the Lebanese context, a chance is already a great deal.

Conclusion: Between a Fragile Agreement and a Persistent Void

An agreement that closes nothing

The tripartite framework agreement of June 26, 2026 is a first step — and only a first step. It does not resolve the question of the definitive Israeli withdrawal, nor that of Hezbollah's disarmament, nor that of Iran's structural influence in the Lebanese political system. It freezes the current positions and creates dialogue mechanisms. This is better than nothing. But confusing this freeze with a victory would be a major strategic error.

Iran gains time — and time is its ally

The true lesson of these weeks of negotiations is this: Tehran obtained several concrete gains without firing a single shot. It is integrated into the deconfliction cell. Its conditions for nuclear negotiations are partially taken into account. Its ally Hezbollah is protected from a total Israeli offensive by American diplomatic pressure. And the Lebanese question remains the ultimate lever for weighing in on any future negotiation. Iran is running out the clock — and in this game, every day that passes without a definitive solution is a gain for Tehran.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Who I am and where I speak from

I am a columnist and analyst of Middle East geopolitics. I have no source within the Israeli, Lebanese, or American governments. I work from open sources — think tank analyses, wire dispatches, government reports. My analysis is personal and informed, but it may contain interpretive errors in a context where information changes rapidly.

My acknowledged biases and my limitations

I am pro-democracy and pro-state sovereignty. I believe Israel has the fundamental right to defend its citizens. I believe Lebanon deserves a functioning state, free from Tehran's grip. These positions shape my analysis. I make no claim to a neutrality that is impossible on questions where human lives are at stake. What I do not know: the details of secret agreements between Washington and Tehran, the real current capabilities of Hezbollah, and the true intentions of each actor in this multidimensional conflict.

Sources

Primary sources

ISW — Iran Update Special Report, June 24, 2026 — June 24, 2026

Times of Israel — Israel-Lebanon talks extended an extra day — June 26, 2026

JNS — Israel, Lebanon deny claim of partial IDF withdrawal from Southern Lebanon — June 25, 2026

Anadolu Agency — Israel, Lebanon split over south withdrawal in Washington talks — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

Al-Monitor — US, Iran to form 'deconflicting cell' on Lebanon, sidelining Lebanese state — June 22, 2026

Council on Foreign Relations — Conflict With Hezbollah in Lebanon — June 21, 2026

Le Monde — Israel and Lebanon resume negotiations in Washington — June 23, 2026

RTÉ — Israel: No troop withdrawal timeframe from Lebanon, Gaza — June 25, 2026