REPORT: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang — The Three Spectators Calculating the Iran Deal

Introduction: The Iran Agreement Seen from Adversarial Capitals

Three Regimes, One Question: What Is the Price?

When the USA-Iran MOU was signed at Versailles on June 17, 2026, three capitals were watching the scene with particular attention: Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang. Not to applaud, not to condemn — but to calculate. To calculate what this agreement means for their own geopolitical position, their own leverage over the West, and their own cost-benefit ratio in their respective confrontations with Washington. According to the analysis by 19FortyFive published June 19, 2026, these three regimes are carefully observing the Iranian precedent — and what they conclude from it could shape global geopolitics for years to come.

The calculation is simple in its brutality: if Iran obtains the lifting of all UN and U.S. sanctions, the release of its frozen assets, and potentially a reconstruction plan worth more than 300 billion dollars in exchange for a partial nuclear concession and a military ceasefire — then what would the terms of an equivalent agreement for Russia, China, or North Korea look like? Every American concession in one file immediately becomes a precedent that the adversaries of the United States study, analyze, and prepare to reproduce.

The Iranian Precedent as a Geopolitical Manual

The Iran agreement is not merely a bilateral USA-Iran event — it is a test of Western resolve in the face of authoritarian regimes seeking to challenge the established international order. The terms obtained by Tehran — or perceived as obtained — immediately become a reference in the parallel negotiations that Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang conduct with Washington. If the West accepts diplomatically rehabilitating Iran without solid nuclear guarantees, it sends a signal that will be interpreted, in Moscow as in Beijing, as a demonstration of flexibility that each will exploit in its own way.

That is the subject of this report: to examine, from available open-source data, what the three great authoritarian powers that are watching the Iran agreement truly think — and what they will do with it. An exercise in geopolitical analysis that is not in any way speculative — because the behavior of these regimes since June 17, 2026 already provides valuable indications of their intentions.

Moscow: Russia Calculates Its Own Dividends

Putin Between Satisfaction and Vigilance

Vladimir Putin watched the USA-Iran MOU with a mixture of calculated satisfaction and strategic vigilance. Satisfaction, because American attention and diplomatic resources are dividing: Washington must now simultaneously manage the Ukrainian file, the Iranian file, and growing Chinese pressure in the Pacific. Every additional file the United States must manage is a potential distraction from support for Kyiv — and Putin is counting on that.

But Putin is also vigilant about an Iran agreement that could weaken his ad hoc strategic ally. Iran had been a crucial supplier of Shahed drones to the Russian army since 2022 — drones that have terrorized Ukrainian cities and played an important role in the Russian strategy of harassing Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. A diplomatically rehabilitated Iran, in pursuit of investment and international recognition, could progressively distance itself from these arms deliveries to Moscow to avoid compromising its chances of a final agreement.

Russian Oil Under Pressure from Returning Iranian Oil

The prospect of Iranian oil returning to global markets is directly bad news for the Russian budget. According to The National, Trump had clearly declared at the G7 that the United States would be able to "increase the pressure on Russia because the oil is flowing now" — an economically clear formulation. Every additional Iranian barrel on the markets puts downward pressure on prices, reducing Russian oil revenues. And the Bank of Russia, which cut its key rate to 14.25% according to Euronews, is already operating in an economic context weakened by war costs and Western sanctions.

This oil pressure could prove more effective against Russia than some of the direct sanction mechanisms that have shown their limits. This is the Trumpian logic of the Iran agreement: using Tehran's economic rehabilitation as an indirect pressure tool on Moscow. If this logic works, it is a strategic gain for Ukraine — indirectly, but really. Zelensky does not have to publicly celebrate this effect, but Ukrainian economic services have certainly modeled it.

What Moscow Expects from an Iranian Precedent

The Model of Negotiated De-escalation

The scenario that most concerns Western analysts is that of a Putin who decides to use the Iran agreement as a model for proposing his own negotiated de-escalation in Ukraine. The logic would be simple: if Iran can obtain massive concessions in exchange for a ceasefire and a nuclear promise, why wouldn't Putin propose a freeze of the conflict in Ukraine in exchange for a partial lifting of Russian sanctions?

This is precisely the most dangerous scenario for Ukraine. A freeze of the conflict along the current front line would allow Russia to consolidate its territorial gains, rebuild its army, and prepare the next offensive — as it did after the Minsk freeze of 2014-2015 that preceded the total invasion of 2022. Zelensky has understood this for a long time and resists fiercely any freeze that would consecrate Russian territorial conquests.

Russian Sanctions and the Temptation of Negotiation

Western sanctions against Russia have had significant effects on the Russian economy — but not sufficient to force a military withdrawal from Ukraine. In this context, Putin might be tempted to propose a Trumpian-style deal: a ceasefire in Ukraine in exchange for a partial lifting of sanctions, presented as a victory for all parties. This proposal, if made, would put Washington in a delicate position — especially if the Trump administration, seeking diplomatic successes before the end of its term, were tempted to respond favorably.

That is why maintaining sanctions against Russia without territorial conditionality is not merely a question of moral principle — it is a strategic necessity to discourage any attempt to replicate the Iranian model in Ukraine. The West cannot have two contradictory sanctions policies: one that holds firm (Russia) and one that yields (Iran) without creating a precedent that Moscow will immediately exploit.

Beijing: China Plays a Complex Game

China Between Interest and Risk in the Iran Agreement

Beijing is watching the USA-IranMOU with particularly complex interest. On one side, China is the primary buyer of Iranian oil — during the sanctions years, it used discreet mechanisms to continue importing Iranian crude by circumventing American sanctions. An Iran reintegrated into normal global markets therefore represents a simplification of its energy supply chain — potentially positive for the Chinese economy.

On the other side, China maintains its own strategic relationship with Iran under the framework of the 25-year partnership signed in 2021 — an agreement that provides for massive Chinese investment in Iran in exchange for preferential-price oil and access to Iranian markets. A rehabilitated Iran, less dependent on China to circumvent sanctions, is potentially an Iran less inclined to grant preferential conditions to Beijing. The rehabilitation of Iran by the United States could paradoxically reduce Chinese influence over Tehran.

EU Sanctions and Chinese Components for Russia

A crucial aspect of the Chinese posture in the face of the Iran agreement concerns its own sanction-circumventing activities. The European Union's 20th sanctions package against Russia, adopted around June 15, 2026, explicitly targeted critical components supplied by China to the Russian military-industrial complex — according to data documented by European Relations. Beijing supplies integrated circuits, electronic components, and other dual-use materials that feed into the production of Russian missiles and drones used against Ukraine.

In this context, China is closely monitoring whether the USA-Iran agreement will generate similar American pressure on its own deliveries to Russia. If Washington can negotiate an MOU with Tehran while ignoring Chinese deliveries to Moscow, Beijing will conclude that its activities supporting the Russian war effort do not trigger significant American consequences. That is an important diplomatic signal the Trump administration will need to manage carefully.

Beijing and the Precedent of the Forced Concession

What China Calculates for Taiwan

The most concerning calculation that Beijing is making while watching the Iran agreement concerns Taiwan. If the United States grants substantial concessions to a regime that struck American bases with ballistic missiles, what signal does that send about American determination to defend Taiwan in the event of Chinese military aggression? The logic is not direct — but it exists within Beijing's strategic circles.

The question that China's military establishment is asking itself is: does the Iran agreement demonstrate that Washington prefers negotiation to confrontation even when its direct interests are attacked? If so, could a campaign of progressive coercion against Taiwan — below the threshold of open conflict — produce comparable results? These questions have no certain answers, but the fact that they are being asked in Chinese strategic circles is sufficient to justify sustained diplomatic attention from Washington.

China's Strategy of Calculated Waiting

China is a strategic actor that plays on the long term. Its strategy in 2026 is one of calculated waiting: observing tensions between the United States and Iran, between the United States and Russia, between Europe and its own internal contradictions — and drawing lessons to optimize its own geopolitical positions. The Iran agreement offers it valuable information on the limits of American resolve, the diplomatic calendar of the Trump administration, and the areas in which Washington is prepared to make concessions.

This strategy of calculated waiting is the most formidable for the West — because it generates no immediate incidents that would trigger a response, but patiently accumulates positional gains that will become decisive on a horizon of several years. Xi Jinping thinks in decades. Trump thinks in four-year electoral cycles. This temporal asymmetry is China's fundamental strategic advantage over the United States.

Pyongyang: North Korea and the Nuclear Survival Model

Kim Jong-un Facing the Iranian Precedent

Kim Jong-un watches the Iran agreement with the particular interest of a leader who chose the opposite path to Iran's: Pyongyang crossed the military nuclear threshold instead of using it as a negotiating lever. North Korea today possesses several dozen nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles. And since 2017, it has succeeded in "normalizing" its status as a de facto nuclear state — no American invasion occurred, no denuclearization agreement was signed.

The Iranian precedent therefore poses an interesting question to Kim Jong-un: Iran, by threatening to cross the nuclear threshold without having crossed it, may be obtaining more than North Korea, which actually crossed it. Or conversely: Iran demonstrates that regimes that flirt with the nuclear option without fully committing to it are in a stronger negotiating position than those that have definitively entered the camp of military nuclear powers.

Russia-North Korea Cooperation in the 2026 Context

Military cooperation between Russia and North Korea has considerably deepened in 2025-2026 according to analysis by the Asan Institute published June 23, 2026. Moscow and Pyongyang have developed cooperation in the fields of missiles, space, satellites, submarines, electronic warfare, and drones. These technology transfers flow in both directions: North Korea supplies munitions and military workers to Russia in exchange for advanced technologies that Moscow masters better than Pyongyang.

This Russia-North Korea cooperation is an aggravating factor in the global geopolitical equation. It means that Western military resources devoted to countering Russia in Ukraine are indirectly competing with the capabilities North Korea is developing thanks to Russian technology transfers. And if the Iran agreement reduces Shahed drone deliveries to Moscow, Russia could intensify its cooperation with Pyongyang to compensate — which would accelerate military technology transfers toward North Korea.

The 300 Billion and Their Effect on the Calculus of Authoritarian Regimes

A Colossal Financial Precedent

The figure of more than 300 billion dollars in potential Iranian reconstruction aid potentially included in a full final agreement is the most dangerous signal the MOU sends to authoritarian regimes. If Iran can obtain this sum in exchange for a partial nuclear concession — meaning without complete and verifiable denuclearization — then every authoritarian regime that develops or maintains a military nuclear program can present itself as a potential peace partner ready to "sell" its capabilities to the highest bidder.

This is not the non-proliferation logic that has guided disarmament agreements for decades. Non-proliferation logic rests on the principle that states do not develop nuclear weapons, and that those that have them commit to eventual disarmament. An agreement that monetizes nuclear concessions on a grand scale creates a perverse economic incentive for developing these capabilities — exactly what the non-proliferation regime has sought to avoid since the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968.

Pyongyang's Calculation Facing 300 Potential Billions

For Pyongyang, the Iranian precedent of 300 billion raises a simple question: how much would a North Korean denuclearization agreement be worth if Washington is prepared to pay 300 billion for a partial Iranian nuclear concession? North Korea possesses a more developed nuclear arsenal, more advanced ballistic vectors (including ICBMs capable of striking the continental United States), and a strategically significant geographic location in the USA-China rivalry.

Some analysts estimate that Kim Jong-un could use the Iranian precedent to relaunch negotiations with Washington on comparable — or more favorable — terms. This scenario is not imminent, but it is now more credible than it was before June 17, 2026. And if Washington opens serious negotiations with Pyongyang in the wake of the Iran agreement, the question of consistency of American treatment between different proliferating nuclear regimes will arise with redoubled acuity.

The Authoritarian Axis Facing the Western Model

What Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang Have in Common

Beyond their differences — a major nuclear power at war, a rising economic superpower, an isolated regime dependent on external aid — Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang share a fundamental objective: dismantling the U.S.-led international order and creating a multipolar world in which authoritarian regimes can act freely without suffering the consequences of Western hegemony. The CSIS, in its analysis of the CRINK axis (China-Russia-Iran-North Korea), documents this coordination of objectives even in the absence of a formal alliance.

The Iran agreement is therefore perceived by these three regimes as a test of Western model resilience. If the West, facing an Iran that struck American bases with ballistic missiles, responds with a massive diplomatic and economic rehabilitation agreement, the Western model of sanctions and pressure appears less formidable than it claims to be. It is a signal of structural weakness that Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang will each exploit in their own way.

Iran's Reintegration and Its Effects on the Authoritarian Axis

The economic reintegration of Iran into global markets — if the MOU holds and the final agreement is concluded — will have paradoxical effects on the authoritarian axis. On one side, an economically stronger Iran is potentially an Iran more capable of funding its regional proxies and its military cooperation with Russia. On the other, an Iran integrated into global markets develops economic interests that may moderate its most extreme behaviors — as partially occurred with China in the decades following its WTO accession.

The Western bet on the Iran agreement rests partially on this logic of moderation through economic integration: the more Iran is interconnected with global economies, the less it has an interest in destabilizing them. It is a debatable bet — China, despite its economic integration, has not renounced its regional hegemonic ambitions — but not an absurd one. The question is whether the verification and conditionality mechanisms provided for by the final agreement will be sufficient to ensure that Iranian economic integration does not occur at the expense of regional security.

The Week of June 18-25: Each Regime Tests the West

A Revealing Week of the Coordination of Challenges

The week of June 18 to 25, 2026 is remarkable for the simultaneity of challenges posed to the West by members of the authoritarian axis. Iran tests the MOU by declaring the Strait of Hormuz closed on June 20. China reinforces its military-industrial cooperation with Russia despite the 20th European sanctions package. North Korea continues its ballistic developments within its Moscow cooperation framework. And Russia maintains its offensive in Ukraine while carefully observing USA-Iran negotiations.

This simultaneity is not necessarily the result of explicit coordination among the four regimes. But it reflects a convergence of opportunities: each tests the West where it is most solicited, taking advantage of the dispersion of American diplomatic and military resources across multiple simultaneous theaters. It is the strategy of crisis swarming — forcing Washington to react on several fronts at once, hoping that resource dispersion creates exploitable openings.

The Western Response to the Swarming Strategy

Facing this swarming strategy, the West must demonstrate its ability to maintain firm and coherent positions on multiple fronts simultaneously — without sacrificing one file to deal with another. This is the structural difficulty the Atlantic alliance faces in 2026: Ukraine, Iran, North Korea, China — four first-order files that each require sustained attention and significant resources.

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom must play a more active role in this multi-front management. Europe cannot be content to serve as the symbolic respectability guarantee of American initiatives — it must contribute substantially to the solutions. For Ukraine, this means maintaining and increasing military support. For Iran, it means engaging fully in nuclear verification mechanisms. For North Korea, it means tightening sanctions and backing American positions in Asia.

What the Iran Agreement Reveals About the Trump Doctrine

Deal-Making Versus Strategy

The Iran agreement is a perfect demonstration of the Trumpian doctrine in foreign policy: prioritize spectacular, rapid deals over long-term, coherent strategies. Trump obtained a framework agreement with Iran that allows him to announce a major diplomatic success — the cessation of hostilities in the Gulf, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz — without yet having resolved the fundamental questions (nuclear, proxies, permanent sanctions) that justified maximum pressure on Tehran.

This diplomatic style has real advantages: it can create positive dynamics where slower approaches had failed. But it also carries major risks: it can produce incomplete agreements that ultimately strengthen the adversary rather than constraining it. Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang are observing precisely this dimension: does Trumpian deal-making with Iran produce a solid agreement, or a façade agreement? The answer to this question will in large part determine their own negotiating strategies with Washington in the months ahead.

Trump as "Necessary Evil" Seen from Adversaries

Adversarial capitals have their own assessment of Donald Trump as an interlocutor. Putin experienced it during the first term: an unpredictable president, difficult to lock into durable commitments, but also sometimes willing to make concessions his predecessors would not have made. Xi Jinping has a similar view: a negotiator who can be led to quick agreements under time or electoral pressure. Kim Jong-un had experienced the Singapore and Hanoi summits — and had concluded that Trump was prepared to spectacular diplomatic gestures without the technical guarantees that make them durable.

This negotiating profile is double-edged for the West. On one side, it can destabilize adversaries accustomed to predictable, linear diplomatic processes. On the other, it can be exploited by regimes that have understood how to present their concessions in a light favorable to a president who wants quickly-announced victories. This is the permanent risk of Trumpian deal-making: being used for agreements that adversaries have designed to be favorable to their long-term interests.

Ukraine in This Geopolitical Picture

Zelensky Facing Geopolitical Distraction

Volodymyr Zelensky leads a country in total war for more than four years. Every day, his armed forces resist Russian military pressure across hundreds of kilometers of front. And every day, he monitors Western diplomatic agendas with the anxiety of a head of state whose survival depends on maintaining the attention and support of his allies. The Iran agreement represents for him a major geopolitical distraction at the most critical moment of the conflict.

Zelensky intellectually understands the logic of oil pressure on Russia via the Iran agreement. But he also understands that every diplomatic resource devoted to Tehran is a resource potentially subtracted from Kyiv. And that if the Iran agreement leads to a partial lifting of sanctions on Russia — within the framework of a possible Trumpian "grand deal" that would attempt to resolve everything simultaneously — that would be a strategic catastrophe for Ukraine.

Solidarity with Ukraine Must Not Be Negotiable

Support for Ukraine is the moral and strategic test of Western credibility. Any action that weakens this support — even indirectly, even with valid strategic justifications — must be publicly questioned and contested. This is not political fetishism: it is recognition that Ukrainian resistance is the primary obstacle to the advance of authoritarian ideology in Europe and across the world.

Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang are watching not only the Iran agreement, but also the resilience of Western support for Ukraine. If this support holds despite geopolitical distractions, economic crises, and political fatigue, it is a signal that the West is capable of sustaining its commitments over the long term. That is the signal Zelensky asks his allies to send — not merely in words, but in deeds: arms deliveries, financial support, maintenance of sanctions, and refusal of any deal that would consecrate Russian territorial conquests.

The Lessons for Non-Proliferation Policy

A Precedent That Tests the Non-Proliferation Regime

The Iran agreement tests the solidity of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime in a way few agreements before it have. The NPT rests on a grand bargain: non-nuclear states renounce developing nuclear weapons in exchange for access to civilian nuclear technologies and the commitment of nuclear powers to progressively disarm. This bargain is already weakened by North Korean proliferation and Iranian ambitions. An agreement that monetizes Iranian nuclear concessions on a large scale weakens it further.

If the Iran agreement leads to a solid final agreement with verifiable disarmament and enhanced IAEA access, it could actually strengthen the non-proliferation regime — by demonstrating that diplomacy can produce real results even with the most recalcitrant actors. But if the agreement is partial, barely verifiable, and accompanied by massive, unconditional financial concessions, it could become the worst precedent for non-proliferation since the first North Korean bomb test of 2006.

What Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang Are Really Waiting For

Ultimately, what Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang are waiting for from the Iran agreement is an answer to a simple question: does maximum American pressure always eventually yield in the face of authoritarian perseverance? If the answer is yes — if the Iran agreement demonstrates that sufficiently costly concessions for the West can be obtained by any regime that holds out long enough — then the American pressure model loses a crucial part of its deterrent credibility.

That is the deep geopolitical stake hidden behind the rhetoric about Middle Eastern peace. It is not only an agreement between the United States and Iran. It is a test of the credibility of American power against all the authoritarian regimes watching it. And the result of this test will be read, interpreted, and used in Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang to decide their next move on the global geopolitical chessboard.

The Global Reintegration of Iran: Effects on the Authoritarian Axis

A Richer Iran: For Whom?

The prospect of a complete agreement with Iran that would lift all sanctions, release frozen assets, and open global markets to Iranian oil represents a colossal economic rehabilitation for Tehran. Oil revenues returning to pre-sanctions levels, access to the international banking system, and potentially hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign investment in an economy under-capitalized for decades.

But this enrichment of Iran has implications for members of the authoritarian axis. For Russia, a richer Iran is potentially an Iran less dependent on Moscow's diplomatic support — which reduces Russian influence over Tehran. For China, it is an Iran that can diversify its commercial partners and reduce its dependence on the oil-for-investment relationship of the 25-year Sino-Iranian partnership. And for North Korea, it is an additional signal that the nuclear transaction model can produce significant economic dividends.

The Authoritarian Axis Facing Its Own Contradictions

The Iran agreement reveals the internal contradictions of the authoritarian axis. These regimes cooperate to challenge the American international order — but they also have divergent interests that create tensions. Russia and China compete for influence in the Middle East. China and North Korea have complex relations marked by North Korean dependence and Chinese impatience with Pyongyang's provocations. And a rehabilitated Iran becomes potentially less useful to Moscow and less dependent on Beijing.

These contradictions do not disintegrate the authoritarian axis — but they create diplomatic spaces the West can exploit. A successful Iran agreement could, paradoxically, contribute to weakening the cohesion of the authoritarian axis by pulling Iran out of Russia's orbit and reducing the leverage Beijing exercised over Tehran via circumvented sanctions. That is the optimistic argument — and it deserves to be presented, even if history counsels caution.

North Korea Draws Its Own Lessons from the USA-Iran Agreement

Pyongyang Watches Tehran as a Negotiation Model

North Korea follows the USA-Iran agreement developments with particular attention. Kim Jong-un and his strategists see in Tehran a potential precedent: if Iran succeeded in obtaining significant economic concessions while retaining substantial nuclear capabilities, why couldn't Pyongyang follow the same path? This nuclear emulation logic is one of the most dangerous effects of the MOU for global non-proliferation.

Analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) have noted that every American agreement perceived as a concession toward a nuclear state reinforces the North Korean conviction that the atomic bomb is the best insurance against regime change. Iraq without weapons of mass destruction was overthrown. Libya without a nuclear program saw Gaddafi's end. North Korea takes note of the lesson.

Washington's Strategic Response to the North Korean Temptation

The White House is aware of this contagion risk. That is why the Trump administration has insisted on the differences between the Iranian case and the North Korean case: Iran has never conducted a successful nuclear test, unlike North Korea whose arsenal is estimated at more than fifty nuclear weapons according to available estimates. Treating these two situations the same would be a major strategic error.

But this distinction — real on the technical level — is difficult to assert politically. If Washington makes concessions to Iran to avoid a conflict, Pyongyang has arguments to demand similar treatment. The credibility of nuclear non-proliferation depends on the consistency of American principles. A USA-Iran agreement that does not resolve the Iranian nuclear question sends a problematic signal to all states aspiring to atomic power.

Conclusion: The Adversaries' Gaze as a Mirror of Western Credibility

What the Three Capitals Are Waiting For

Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang are waiting, over the next 60 days, to find out whether the Iran agreement produces a real nuclear result or a diplomatic facade. If the agreement is solid and verifiable, American credibility is reinforced — and the three capitals will have to recalculate their own strategies accordingly. If the agreement is hollow or if nuclear negotiations fail, American credibility is diminished — and each will draw the conclusions that serve its own interests.

That is why the stakes of the Iran agreement go far beyond the Middle East. It directly touches on the global geopolitics of the confrontation between democracies and authoritarianisms — a confrontation in which Ukraine is on the front line. Zelensky resists the same authoritarian logic that led Iran to strike American bases in the Gulf. His struggle is our struggle. And the success or failure of the Iran agreement is an indicator of Western determination to uphold its principles in every theater where they are being tested.

The Duty of Consistency

In the final analysis, the question posed by Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang through their gaze on the Iran agreement is a question of consistency. Can the West maintain consistent standards in the face of authoritarian regimes — standards that do not fluctuate depending on the American electoral agenda, European diplomatic fatigue, or economic imperatives that make certain concessions tempting? This consistency is the most precious resource the West possesses in its confrontation with authoritarianisms. And it must be preserved with the same vigilance as its military arsenals.

Because it is this consistency that Zelensky invokes every day when he asks his allies to honor their commitments. It is this consistency that Ukrainian peoples defend at the cost of their blood. And it is this consistency that Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang seek to erode — one imperfect agreement at a time, one dangerous precedent after another. Vigilance is not an option. It is an imperative.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Editorial Positioning

This report is based on open-source material published between June 19 and June 25, 2026. Maxime Marquette has no access to classified information on the internal positions of the Russian, Chinese, or North Korean governments. The analyses regarding the intentions and calculations of these regimes are based on their publicly observable behavior and on expert analyses cited in the sources.

Limits of the Analysis

The true intentions of the leaders of Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang in the face of the Iran agreement cannot be known with certainty from open sources. The scenarios presented in this article are plausible analyses based on historically documented behavioral patterns, not certain predictions. The author recommends consulting primary sources for more detailed analyses.

Independence and Method

Maxime Marquette commits to never inventing quotes or figures. Every fact advanced in this article is accompanied by a reference to a verifiable source. The columnist maintains his editorial independence and does not claim direct contacts with governmental sources in the countries analyzed.

Sources

Primary Sources

19FortyFive: "The Iran Deal Doesn't Stop at Iran: Russia, China, and North Korea Are Watching" — June 19, 2026

Holland & Knight Law: "U.S.-Iran Interim Agreement: Implications for the Maritime Industry" — June 18, 2026

Claw Street Journal: "Iran Ceasefire, China NATO Realignment — Three Crises One Week" — June 21, 2026

Secondary Sources

The Automatic Earth: Iran MOU full terms — Debt Rattle June 19 2026 — June 19, 2026

BBC: "Iran says closing Strait of Hormuz" — Live coverage — June 20, 2026

CSIS: "A New CRINK Axis of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea?" — June 25, 2026