REPORT: Belarus, Putin's backyard: depots, routes and drone relays

REPORT: Belarus, Putin's backyard: depots, routes and drone relays

Introduction: The silent territory preparing the next strike

A border that looks like a war zone

On the edges of northern Ukraine, where the Belarusian border winds through the forests and marshes of the Chernihiv region, something has changed since the start of the year. It is not troop movements — at least not yet. It is newly built roads pushing toward the Ukrainian border, ammunition and fuel depots rising at an unusual pace, telecommunications towers that look nothing like civilian antennas. Volodymyr Zelensky described it plainly on June 25, 2026: "Along our state border in Belarus, the construction of road infrastructure and storage bases for ammunition and fuel and lubricants is nearing completion. These facilities serve no purpose other than a military one."

Alexander Lukashenko's Belarus has become, whether he likes it or not, the logistical backyard of Putin's war against Ukraine. Not yet a direct belligerent — Lukashenko still resists that full transformation — but a support platform whose contribution to Russian aggression is real, documented, and growing. Understanding what Belarus represents in the architecture of Russia's war is understanding one of the least visible but most strategically significant fronts in this conflict.

The echo of 2022: the ghost of the northern invasion

In February 2022, it was from Belarusian territory that Russian armoured columns drove toward Kyiv — catching the Ukrainian capital off guard from the north. That offensive ultimately failed in the face of Ukrainian resistance and was repelled in March–April 2022. But the memory remains etched into Ukraine's strategic consciousness. Since then, Ukraine has built fortifications along its northern border — anti-tank trenches, concrete "dragon's teeth" obstacles, barbed wire. Ukrainian forces stationed in the Chernihiv region have reported a 20% increase in reconnaissance drone sightings since January 2026.

The fortifications now under construction along Ukraine's northern border are both a practical response and a statement of strategic intent: Ukraine has learned from February 2022, and it will not allow the element of surprise to repeat. Every trench dug, every dragon's tooth set in concrete is a lesson made permanent.

Drone relays: the innovation that changed everything

Antennas on rooftops guiding the Shahed drones

Since the second half of 2025, a new technology has reshaped the geography of Russian drone strikes against Ukraine. Russia installed a network of relay stations on Belarusian territory — camouflaged in television towers or mobile phone antennas — enabling modified Shahed-type drones to be guided over long distances with greater precision. These relays allow the drones to alter their trajectory mid-flight, making them harder to intercept.

In January 2026, this technology became publicly known. In February, the organisation InformNapalm, in collaboration with the cyber centre Fenix, hacked into the accounts of Russian military drone operators and gained access to the surveillance systems used by the operators. This infiltration provided the Ukrainian command with valuable intelligence on how the drones were being guided — and considerably improved the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defences in the Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Volyn regions, directly exposed to strikes routed via Belarusian relays.

Four relays identified in the Homiel and Brest regions

On June 20, 2026, Zelensky announced that Ukraine had identified four relay stations on Belarusian territory — in the Homiel and Brest regions. These systems, he said, had been used to strike energy and railway infrastructure as well as the towns and villages of the Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Volyn oblasts. By March 2026, four stations had been confirmed and reports indicated that Russia was planning to deploy more.

The relay technology itself is a modification of the Shahed drones — Iranian-origin unmanned aerial vehicles that Russia has used on a massive scale since autumn 2022. The relays allow these drones to switch targets mid-flight, perform more sophisticated evasion manoeuvres, and strike targets at distances that onboard guidance alone could not achieve with precision. This is a significant technological evolution in the drone war.

Logistical infrastructure: roads, depots, preparation

Construction that can only serve war

Beyond the drone relays, it is the entire military infrastructure under construction in Belarus that alarms analysts. Since April 2026, Zelensky has repeatedly flagged the construction of roads toward the Ukrainian border and logistical bases in the border regions. On June 25, 2026, he specified that "the construction of road infrastructure and storage bases for ammunition and fuel is nearing completion."

In May 2026, Ukrainian military intelligence had assessed that Belarus was constructing training grounds, transport hubs, and logistical routes that Russia could use for an offensive "at any time." The key specification: "these facilities serve no purpose other than a military one." This type of construction is not built to welcome tourists or develop the local economy — it is war infrastructure, prepared in anticipation of potential use.

Belarus as a rear-area supply base

The Belarusian contribution to the Russian war machine goes beyond visible infrastructure. Zelensky noted on June 20, 2026 that Belarus had multiplied its petrol exports to Russia by a factor of 13 and its diesel exports by a factor of 3 over the first five months of 2026 compared to the same period in 2025. This dramatic surge in fuel exports constitutes a direct contribution to Russian operational capability — the Russian army consumes enormous quantities of fuel in its Ukrainian operations.

The Belarusian Ministry of Industry, according to documents published by BELPOL in June 2026, has actively proposed using idle Belarusian production capacity to support the needs of the Russian defence industrial complex. These documents reveal a "systematic pattern" of the Lukashenko regime's involvement in supporting Russian aggression against Ukraine — an involvement that goes well beyond what Minsk officially acknowledges.

Russian pressure on Lukashenko: financial coercion

Moscow twisting Minsk's arm

According to a Wall Street Journal report cited in June 2026, the Kremlin is exerting intense pressure on Lukashenko to allow Russia to launch drones from Belarusian territory and extend the front westward — which would force Ukraine to redeploy troops from the front line to the northern border. A former Russian intelligence officer familiar with the situation confirmed to the WSJ that the Kremlin was threatening to cut financial support to Belarus if it refused to cooperate.

This pressure illustrates the nature of the Russia-Belarus relationship: Lukashenko depends financially and politically on Moscow for his survival. Without Russian support — subsidised oil, credits, diplomatic cover — his regime would collapse rapidly. But this dependence has its limits: Lukashenko knows that allowing Russia to use his territory fully as a launch platform could provoke a Ukrainian response that would threaten his own survival. He therefore seeks to partially resist Moscow's demands while avoiding an outright break.

Lukashenko's partial resistance

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) noted in its assessment of June 24, 2026 that Lukashenko continues to resist full Belarusian engagement in Russia's war. He has not authorised Belarusian armed forces to operate actively in Ukraine, has not permitted mass recruitment of Belarusians into the Russian army, and has avoided adopting Kremlin rhetoric that portrays Ukraine as a threat to Belarus.

The decision to allow the drone relay stations to go offline on June 22, 2026 — following Zelensky's ultimatum — fits this logic of partial resistance. Lukashenko accepted to deactivate the relays rather than face Ukrainian strikes on his own soil. It was a pragmatic calculation: the relays were not worth the cost of a direct Ukrainian action on Belarusian territory — an action that could have dramatically escalated the situation.

Zelensky and the ultimatum: the diplomacy of strength

June 19: "I am giving one week"

On June 19, 2026, during a press conference with the president of Honduras, Zelensky issued a direct ultimatum to Lukashenko: remove the relay equipment within one week — by June 26 — "otherwise, we will do it ourselves." He repeated this warning on June 20 and 21. This public move was deliberate: Zelensky wanted Lukashenko to grasp the measure of Ukrainian resolve, and for Moscow to understand that Kyiv would not hesitate to strike if necessary.

Zelensky's ultimatum rested on two realities. First, Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities — demonstrated by dozens of successful deep strikes on Russian territory — are sufficiently developed to reach the identified Belarusian targets. Second, Ukraine had previously identified "more than 500 strategic targets in Belarus" in the event of escalation — a foundational warning issued well before the June 19 ultimatum.

The result: a partial but real success

On June 24, 2026, Zelensky announced that the relay stations had ceased operations on June 22 — according to reports from Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky and the intelligence services. A reduction in the intensity of Shahed drone incursions entering through the Belarusian border in the Chernihiv region was confirmed by Ukrainian border guards. The ultimatum had worked — at least partially and at least temporarily.

Zelensky himself was cautious: it is not certain that Belarus definitively dismantled the relays or merely suspended their use. The equipment can be brought back online rapidly — it does not represent heavy physical construction. The real victory of the ultimatum may lie less in the immediate result than in the signal sent: Ukraine is watching, identifying, and prepared to act.

Strategic consequences: a Belarus at a crossroads

Toward a normalisation of Belarus's military role?

The deepest danger in Belarus's evolution is not the relay incident — it is the gradual normalisation of its military role. Every Belarusian logistical construction, every fuel export to Russia, every piece of equipment installed on Minsk's soil creates a precedent and deepens integration into Russia's war machine. As analysts from the Atlantic Council have noted, "Belarus is trapped in a hybrid role, avoiding co-belligerent status while deepening its indirect involvement in Russian aggression."

Ukraine has clearly signalled its red lines. The Baltic states and Poland are watching the situation closely from their geographic proximity to Belarus. NATO is monitoring military activities in the region. But as long as Lukashenko maintains partial resistance to Moscow's demands, the situation will remain in this uncomfortable grey zone — neither fully belligerent nor clearly neutral.

The ongoing militarisation and its implications

Lukashenko officially announced in May 2026 a targeted rotational mobilisation of his military units to "prepare for war" — a measure he presents as a routine annual exercise but which Ukrainian and Western analysts read in the context of growing Russian pressure. The number of Russian drones recorded in Belarusian airspace — 41 Russian UAVs between June 8 and 14, 2026 according to iSANS — illustrates the active use of Belarusian territory for Russian operations.

Belarus is, in the words of the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, "being transformed into an aggression base not only against our nation, but against all of Europe." This is a grave assessment, one that calls for a political and strategic response from all of NATO — not just from Ukraine. The question of how to treat Belarus — sanction more severely, attempt engagement with Lukashenko, or simply monitor — remains open and unanswered satisfactorily at this stage.

Ukrainian response: fortifications and surveillance in the north

A northern front that never sleeps

Faced with Belarusian militarisation, Ukraine has not stood still. Since 2022, significant fortification work has been undertaken along the northern border — in the Chernihiv, Sumy, and Zhytomyr regions. Anti-tank trenches, concrete "dragon's teeth" obstacles, minefields, and in-depth defensive fortifications have transformed this border into an organised defensive zone. These preparations are a direct lesson from February 2022: never again a surprise.

Ukrainian forces in the region have reported a 20% increase in reconnaissance drone sightings since January 2026. The Ukrainian command takes these observations very seriously: every reconnaissance drone is a map being drawn, a plan being prepared. The response is twofold — reinforcing tactical air defence systems in the north, and developing electronic warfare capabilities to jam the guidance systems of incoming drones.

The importance of early warning in northern defence

One of the fundamental lessons of Ukraine 2022 is that early warning is a decisive force multiplier. The Ukrainian forces that succeeded in repelling the northern offensive did not necessarily have more soldiers or more weapons than their adversary — they had better information and better coordination. By 2026, Ukraine's investment in surveillance systems, sensor networks, and open-source intelligence capabilities has transformed the northern defensive posture.

Organisations like InformNapalm — which hacked Russian drone surveillance systems in February 2026 — illustrate how the cyber dimension and open-source intelligence contribute to defence. The ability to anticipate drone routes, identify relay usage patterns, and predict strike windows has considerably improved air defence effectiveness in the Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Volyn regions.

Diplomatic impact: how the international community must respond

Sanctions against Belarus: insufficient?

The international response to Belarusian involvement in Russia's war has taken the form of sanctions — the EU, the United States, and the United Kingdom have imposed several rounds since 2020. These sanctions target the key economic sectors of the regime, Belarusian petroleum product exports, and individuals in Lukashenko's inner circle. But their effectiveness remains limited: Russia largely compensates for the economic losses sanctions impose on Belarus.

The figures on Belarusian fuel exports to Russia — multiplied by 13 for petrol and by 3 for diesel in the first five months of 2026 — illustrate how the Belarusian regime adapts to sanctions by redirecting its trade flows toward Russia. Western sanctions deprive Lukashenko of European markets, but Russian demand for his products increases by the same measure. This dynamic creates a substitution effect that reduces the sanctions' effectiveness without eliminating it.

Supporting Belarusian civil society: an underused lever

Beyond sanctions, the West has another lever: support for Belarusian civil society and opposition forces in exile. Organisations like BELPOL — bringing together former Belarusian police and military who fled the regime — play a valuable documentary role: they publish information on the regime's complicity in Russia's war, maintain networks of contacts inside the country, and constitute a government-in-waiting that could play a role after an eventual political transition.

Supporting these structures is political as much as strategic. It sends a message to the Belarusian population — including the 115,000 Belarusians who fled their country after 2020 — that the West has not abandoned hope for a free and sovereign Belarus. And it maintains pressure on Lukashenko by documenting every act of complicity — a pressure that counts, even if its effects are difficult to measure in the short term.

Conclusion: The backyard that can become a front

A structurally unstable situation

The current situation in Belarus — military infrastructure under construction, drone relays activated and deactivated according to the pressures of the moment, massive fuel exports to Russia, partial mobilisation of Belarusian armed forces — is a situation of unstable equilibrium. It cannot persist indefinitely in this configuration. Either Lukashenko will succumb to Russian pressure and engage more deeply in the conflict, or he will find a way to resist that preserves minimal sovereignty — or the situation will be determined by an unforeseen external event.

For Ukraine, Belarus represents a permanent threat to the north — a potential front that forces the maintenance of significant defensive forces in the Chernihiv and Sumy regions. For NATO, it is a reminder that the alliance's eastern boundary runs through countries that share direct borders with this zone of silent militarisation.

Has Zelensky won a lasting victory?

The ultimatum of June 19, 2026 and the relay stations going offline on June 22 represent a real tactical victory for Zelensky. He demonstrated that Ukraine could constrain the behaviour of the Belarusian regime by combining rhetorical pressure with a credible strike threat. But it is a temporary victory — the relays can be reactivated, new military infrastructure continues to be built, and Russian pressure on Lukashenko will not diminish.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My biases and my method

My position is clearly pro-Ukraine and critical of the Lukashenko regime. I have sought to distinguish between documented facts (infrastructure construction, fuel exports, drone relays) and political assessments (the nature of Lukashenko's intentions, the probability of escalation). I acknowledge that Lukashenko's precise motivations are difficult to assess from the outside.

I have tried throughout this report to name clearly what I know, what I assess as probable, and what remains genuinely uncertain. This distinction matters especially in a conflict environment where information is often incomplete, contested, and sometimes deliberately managed by the parties involved.

Sources and limits

My primary sources include Zelensky's public statements, ISW reports, analyses from iSANS specialising in Belarus, and information published by BELPOL and Radio Svaboda. I do not have access to classified intelligence data. All my sources are dated May–June 2026.

I have not been on the ground in Belarus or along Ukraine's northern border. Everything I know comes from published sources — official statements, intelligence assessments made public, investigative journalism, and specialist analysis organisations. This is necessarily an incomplete picture of a complex and sensitive situation.

Sources

Primary sources

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty — What are relay stations stoking Belarus-Ukraine tensions — June 26, 2026

Meduza — Zelensky says relay stations in Belarus went offline after ultimatum — June 24, 2026

ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment June 24, 2026

Secondary sources

Militarnyi — Zelensky: Belarus must remove relay stations — June 20, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — No mass Shahed drone flights along Belarusian border — June 24, 2026

iSANS — Belarus Review June 15, 2026

The Guardian — Ukraine bolsters northern defences amid Belarus fears — June 18, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Lukashenka announces war preparations — May 13, 2026