REPORT: Ankara Barricades Itself — 70,000 Agents, Red Zones, and a Rearmed Airport for NATO

When an Entire City Becomes a Maximum Security Zone

Some summits are held in a conference room. And then there are summits that transform an entire capital into an open-air bunker. Ankara, July 7-8, 2026, will be the epicenter of the Atlantic Alliance for a forty-eight-hour period that, according to Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Güler, will mark a decisive turning point for NATO. This isn't empty rhetoric: what Turkey is preparing in its capital is, according to Bloomberg, one of the most extensive security operations in the history of NATO summits.

The 36th Alliance Summit will bring together the heads of state and government of the 32 members at the Beştepe Presidential Complex, the residence and offices of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This will be only the second time Turkey has hosted such an event—the first being in Istanbul in 2004. In two decades, the world has changed, the threat has changed, and the security apparatus has followed suit. This report dives into the behind-the-scenes of this colossal mobilization.

A Summit Shaping Up to Be Historic for the Alliance

Secretary General Mark Rutte officially confirmed the summit's location in Ankara as early as August 19, 2025, thanking Turkey and emphasizing that the country has been a key member of the Alliance for over 70 years. The agenda is heavy: the war in Ukraine, European security architecture, instability in the Middle East, energy security, and defense industrial cooperation—a litany of burning issues that will land on the table at the Beştepe Presidential Complex.

President Erdoğan announced in June 2025 that Turkey would host the summit, stating that it will pave the way for major decisions. Since then, preparations have taken on a staggering scale. This is no longer just a diplomatic summit; it is a national security operation of exceptionally rare proportions.

I’m not in Ankara, and I don’t have sources in the hallways of Beştepe. But the figures circulating in official dispatches hit me with a particular force: a city of five million people put in a state of preemptive siege for two days of diplomacy. It’s both impressive and, I’ll admit, a bit dizzying. Does NATO deserve such a mobilization? I believe so—and in the current climate, that question isn’t even rhetorical anymore.

A Force Larger Than the Armies of Many NATO Allies

The most striking figure, coming from sources close to the matter cited by Bloomberg on June 19, 2026, is this: approximately 70,000 law enforcement officers—uniformed police, plainclothes officers, and gendarmes—will be stationed in Ankara to guarantee the summit's security. For its part, the Anadolu Agency had put forward an initial figure of 40,000 police and gendarmes on June 12, a number confirmed by Daily Sabah, suggesting that total personnel, including reinforcements and specialized units, far exceeds that floor.

Bloomberg doesn't pull any punches: this security force surpasses the military capabilities of many Alliance member nations. To put things in perspective, several NATO countries do not even have 70,000 men under arms. Turkey is mobilizing a full army on its own for two days. The agents will include uniformed units, plainclothes teams mixed into the crowds, anti-drone systems, bomb disposal units, and rapid response forces.

The Turkish Interior Ministry in Maximum Mobilization Mode

Interior Minister Mustafa Çiftçi presided over a meeting of top security officials dedicated to the summit as early as May 25. The General Directorate of Security and the Gendarmerie General Command presented their plans. Çiftçi stated: "We are meticulously continuing all our preparations so that this important meeting organized by our country takes place in peace and security."

Beyond the human headcount, Turkish authorities will deploy a network of caméras de surveillance à 100 points critiques supplémentaires, complementing the existing urban video protection network. These new high-tech cameras, referred to as "observer cams" in official documents, will be added to the CCTVs already installed across the capital. Electronic surveillance, radio signal restrictions, and airspace monitoring complete this multi-layered security web.

Seventy thousand agents. The number echoes in my head like a collective admission of the state of the world. You don’t mobilize a force like this for some turnip summit—you do it because the threats are real, hybrid, and unpredictable, and because the presence of Trump, an allied Zelensky, and decision-makers from 32 nations in a single location creates a target that the enemies of the West would dream of hitting. I understand the scale. I respect it.

The Geography of the Forbidden in the Heart of the Capital

Ankara's public space will be literally redrawn for July 7 and 8. Turkish authorities have designated several sectors as red zones—high-restriction perimeters for both pedestrians and vehicles. According to the Anadolu Agency, these red zones include: the surroundings of Esenboğa Airport, the Söğütözü district where the Presidential Complex is located, the protocol routes used by motorcades, and the areas surrounding the 15 hotels housing the delegations.

These 15 hotels—including the Meyra Palace, the Radisson Blu, the Four Points Flex by Sheraton, and the Holiday Inn Çukurambar, mentioned in the NATO media advisory—will host thousands of diplomats, advisors, bodyguards, and accredited journalists. Each of these establishments is subject to floor-by-floor security systems, electronic surveillance infrastructure, and controlled access measures. In short, the hotel is no longer a hotel; it’s a secure annex of the summit.

The Ban on Protests: A Fifteen-Day Freeze of Public Space

The most visible aspect for ordinary residents of Ankara remains the ban on all protests and public gatherings in Ankara from July 1 to July 15. Fifteen days. Half a moon cycle during which the Turkish capital lives under an exceptional civil regime. Turkish authorities also announced they would share information with other countries regarding individuals likely to attempt protest actions—those who are the subject of intelligence reports will not be allowed to enter the capital.

Civil servants in nine districts of Ankara will receive administrative leave from July 6 to 12, except for those mobilized for the summit or essential services. Even exams are affected: the ÖSYM has postponed the Ministry of Education Academy entrance exam from July 12 to July 26, and the academic personnel exam to August 2. The signal is clear—during the week of the summit, Ankara belongs to NATO.

The 15-day ban on protests leaves me with an ambiguous feeling. I understand the impeccable security logic behind it. But there is something uncomfortable about the idea of suspending civil liberties to host an alliance whose very raison d'être is to defend those liberties. I’m not saying it’s a mistake—I’m saying it’s a real tension, and it needs to be honestly acknowledged.

Eight Months of Work to Accommodate 44 Aircraft Simultaneously

One of the most emblematic projects in this preparation is that of Etimesgut Airport, a former military base west of Ankara. During eight months of intensive renovation, its runways were extended and its infrastructure modernized to accommodate VIP wide-body aircraft. Its new capacity: 44 aircraft simultaneously on its aprons. A new secure protocol terminal, additional hangars, and modernized radar and air traffic control systems—the old military airfield has become a state airport worthy of receiving the presidential jets of 32 allied nations.

President Erdoğan himself made the inaugural flight from Istanbul to this airport, which will be officially renamed Ankara Airport. According to Daily Sabah, its role is precise: to relieve Esenboğa Airport of the colossal traffic induced by the summit, while serving as an exclusive hub for official delegations. Esenboğa, for its part, will see its international flights restricted throughout the duration of the event.

Airspace Under Sovereign and Allied Control

The management of Ankara's airspace during the summit is itself an extraordinary exercise in coordination. NATO security coordination teams are working in liaison with Turkish agencies to orchestrate the arrivals and departures of delegations. Restrictions on civilian flights, anti-drone surveillance, and controlled airspace operations complete the picture. To borrow an expression from the Eurasian Review analysis of May 30, 2026, Etimesgut will serve as a strategic logistical hub, allowing for the simultaneous management of military, diplomatic, and state aircraft.

Security checkpoints will be installed on all major access roads to Ankara. On the July 7 morning, from the security zone deployed on the roads to the Media Center set up at the Presidential National Library (Millet Kütüphanesi), access will only be possible via official shuttle. Even accredited journalists will only be able to move by shuttle. The capital will be totally gridded.

Etimesgut fascinates me. Transforming a military base into a diplomatic airport in eight months is a demonstration of operational capability that says something profound about what Turkey is today: a country that can—when it decides to—deploy impressive logistical power. Erdoğan understood a long time ago that the host of a major summit isn't just a logistician; he is a political actor in his own right.

Erdoğan’s Palace as the Alliance's World Stage

The Beştepe Presidential Complex, officially the Külliye, will be the beating heart of the summit. This architectural colossus, inaugurated in 2014 in the hills west of Ankara, will become for 48 hours the place where the West's collective response to current threats will be forged—or fractured. The summit will be officially opened there on July 7, before concluding in the afternoon of July 8.

The complex will host redesigned secure conference rooms, an International Media Center operating from the adjacent Presidential National Library, advanced simultaneous translation systems, reinforced cybersecurity infrastructure, and secure corridors dedicated to the movements of heads of state. The renovation work was carried out in parallel with the projects at Etimesgut and the designated hotels—a massive upgrade operation from one end of the capital to the other.

The International Media Center: Fifteen Hundred Journalists Under Total Surveillance

NATO has planned an International Media Center (IMC) for accredited journalists with some 1,500 workstations, 40 editing booths, a full TV set, outdoor positions with a view of the Külliye, and a large 500-seat press theater. TRT, the Turkish state broadcaster, will serve as the summit's host broadcaster. Visual pools, live satellite transmissions, and SRT feeds will allow for real-time global coverage.

But covering this summit will be no journalistic walk in the park. Access to the IMC will be uniquely possible by navette officielle on July 7 and 8. No véhicules de diffusion en direct ne seront pas autorisés near the site except for the host broadcaster. All heavy equipment must be installed by July 6 at 6:00 PM at the latest. The accreditation deadline was set for June 7, 2026—latecomers have zero chance.

I think of my colleagues who will cover this event under this arrangement. Press freedom isn't canceled, but it is severely framed. One can understand the security constraints. What concerns me more is that this coverage under total control inevitably produces a smoothed-over, official, managed image. The real news from Ankara that week will likely happen in the corridors, the unofficial bilaterals, the midnight conversations between advisors. And those, no one will see.

SMEs and Start-ups Alongside Defense Ministers

Parallel to the sessions for heads of state, NATO will organize the Forum de l'Industrie de Défense du Sommet de l'OTAN (NATO Summit Defence Industry Forum). According to NATO's official media advisory dated April 22, 2026, the goal is to faciliter des engagements à haut niveau entre l'OTAN, les ministres alliés, les représentants gouvernementaux et les dirigeants de l'industrie de défense et non-défense, including SMEs and start-ups. This format is significant: NATO is seeking to anchor its strategic thinking in concrete industrial realities, recognizing that the war in Ukraine has exposed urgent capability gaps.

Minister Güler himself mentioned this forum in his statements, noting that plusieurs homologues de l'OTAN avaient spécifiquement demandé à élargir les liens industriels de défense avec Ankara during bilateral meetings in Brussels. Turkey, with its rapidly expanding defense industrial base—Bayraktar drones leading the way—is positioning itself as a credible industrial partner, complementary rather than redundant to major American and European contractors.

Turkey, a Military-Industrial Power at the Heart of the Alliance

Güler was explicit during the Brussels meetings: « Nos systèmes indigènes et nationaux soutiennent l'interopérabilité des alliés et contribuent à la dissuasion globale de l'Alliance. Une industrie de défense forte signifie une dissuasion forte et une OTAN forte. » This is a claim of power. Turkey no longer wants to be just a troop contributor; it wants to be recognized as a nation that façonne la capacité industrielle of the Alliance.

The Atlantic Council, in its April 20, 2026 analysis, points out that the conférence de 5 % du PIB en dépenses de défense adopted in The Hague in 2025 has opened a considerable industrial window of opportunity. Countries like Poland, Romania, Germany, and Finland are signing massive arms contracts. The Ankara Forum will be an opportunity to connect these equipment needs with available production capacities—including Turkish ones.

The Defense Industry Forum is perhaps the least glamorous part of this summit—but it’s the one that will have the most lasting effects. The defense SMEs and start-ups that sign contracts in Ankara this July will be the ones manufacturing the drones, munitions, and sensors that will equip the Alliance's armies ten years from now. Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to fight. The two things are linked in a way that is profound and often underestimated.

A Minister Speaking on Equal Terms with Washington

Yasar Güler does not deal in diplomatic modesty. Interviewed in Brussels on the sidelines of the NATO Defense Ministers' meeting, he uttered a sentence that perfectly sums up the Turkish mindset: « Il existe désormais une réalité très claire : la Turquie n'est pas à la périphérie de l'architecture sécuritaire — elle en est au centre. » And this assertion is not an empty posture. Turkey has the deuxième armée de l'OTAN by volume. It will soon assume command of the Force de réaction alliée (Allied Reaction Force).

On the Ankara summit, Güler was even more direct: « Nous ne considérons pas le sommet d'Ankara comme une simple réunion de dirigeants. Nous pensons qu'il marquera un tournant significatif démontrant la détermination de l'OTAN à s'adapter à l'environnement sécuritaire en évolution et à façonner son orientation stratégique pour l'avenir. » He also set his country's expectations: that the summit renforce les principes de défense collective and reaffirms the allies' commitment to Article 5, the mutual defense clause.

Turkey at the Geostrategy Crossroads of the Alliance

Güler drove the point home by describing Turkey's geographic and strategic position: « La stabilité de la mer Noire est indissociable de la sécurité euro-atlantique. » He reaffirmed the application of the Convention de Montreux and supported regional stability. On the hybrid threat, he was explicit: conventional threats are « de plus en plus accompagnées de guerre hybride, de cyberattaques et de terrorisme » which demand a strengthening of collective deterrence.

This picture does not obscure persistent tensions—notably the critique de l'accord franco-chypriote described by Güler as an initiative "that lacks legitimacy, disrupts the delicate balance, and is contrary to international law." But in the context of the Ankara summit, these intra-Alliance frictions exist against the backdrop of a clear message: la Turquie est indispensable à l'OTAN, and she fully intends for everyone to know it.

I like Güler when he's direct. "Turkey is at the center, not the periphery"—it's sharp, confident, almost insolent compared to usual diplomatic language. And he's not entirely wrong. But I would have liked to hear him speak just as clearly about Ukraine. On that subject, Turkey plays a balancing act that always makes me slightly uneasy—even if the role of mediator can have its strategic value.

A Summit Held in the Shadow of War

Delegations will arrive in Ankara with the war in Ukraine as a permanent backdrop. The Eurasian Review, in its May 30 analysis, lists the major questions on the agenda: the guerre en Ukraine, European security architecture, instability in the Middle East, security of energy supplies, and coopération industrielle de défense. Support for Kyiv—financial, military, diplomatic—will be one of the most scrutinized political markers of the summit.

The Atlantic Council recalls that during the 2025 Hague summit, Trump secured a commitment from allies to devote 5 % du PIB à la défense. Ankara must now show that this commitment is being realized. Several Eastern allies—Poland leading the way—are investing heavily in American equipment: Apache helicopters, F-35s, Standard missiles, AMRAAMs. These purchases are both an act of transatlantic solidarity and a strengthening of the capability to contain Russia.

Turkey Between Kyiv and Moscow: A Particular Position

Turkey maintains its unique position: it is a member of NATO, it has provided Bayraktar drones to Ukraine, but it has not joined the sanctions against Russia and continues to position itself as a médiateur possible. Minister Fidan stated during a press conference on June 11: « Nous recommandons aux parties de cesser les attaques et de revenir à la table des négociations et de finaliser le texte (sur une paix durable) sur lequel elles sont proches de s'entendre. »

This posture of pragmatisme stratégique turc is not without value—a communication channel with Moscow has real utility. But it also creates discomfort within an Alliance that, since February 2022, has chosen moral clarity: Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine has the right to defend itself, and allies have the duty to help it. The Ankara summit will be a test of NATO's ability to manage these internal tensions while maintaining a united front against Putin.

Ukraine’s presence in the Ankara discussions likely won’t be head-on—Zelensky isn't a member of the Alliance, even if he aspires to be. But every decision made in that presidential complex on July 7 or 8 will ripple through the trenches of the Donbas. It is a dizzying responsibility these men and women carry as they arrive at Beştepe. I hope they are fully aware of it.

The First American Presidential Trip to Turkey

U.S. President Donald Trump will make his premier voyage officiel en Turquie during this summit. This fact, mentioned by Daily Sabah on June 4, is not insignificant. Turkish-American relations have seen notable turbulence—the F-35 and S-400 issue, tensions over Syrian Kurds—but since Trump's return in 2025, a pragmatic modus vivendi has taken hold. The Atlantic Council notes that la visite de Trump à Ankara avant le sommet is part of a dynamic of gradual normalization of bilateral relations.

Trump and Erdoğan share a certain style—direct, nationalist, suspicious of multilateral institutions unless they serve their interests. This personal affinity, whether real or performative, has diplomatic value. The Atlantic Council emphasizes that the levier institutionnel du sommet OTAN de juillet 2026 and Trump's visit to Ankara constitute opportunities to transform the pragmatic foundations laid in 2025 into a more durable framework for cooperation.

The West Recentered, Turkey as the Essential Pivot

The Ankara summit also symbolizes a geopolitical reality that Europeans sometimes struggle to integrate: la Turquie est un pivot indispensable. It controls the Straits, borders the Black Sea, shares a border with Syria and Iraq, and is within range of Iran. Güler leaves no doubt about it: « Avec sa capacité militaire, son expérience opérationnelle et ses responsabilités de leadership, (la Turquie) fait partie des nations de premier plan qui façonnent la dissuasion, la résilience et l'avenir de l'Alliance. »

For the West, fully integrating Turkey into the Alliance's strategic vision—including accepting its contradictions, its own interests, and its ambiguities—is a permanent challenge. But refusing this integration would be far more costly. The Ankara summit is an opportunity to reaffirm that NATO is an alliance of diversity, not a club of homogenous values, but one united by a common interest in collective security.

Trump in Ankara for the first time. Erdoğan welcoming him to his palace. It’s a loaded image. Trump is a necessary evil for the West—I stand by that reading. He forced Europe to wake up on defense, he ramped up pressure on Alliance funding, he got what decades of soft diplomacy had failed to achieve. But I also don't forget the institutional fragility he represents. In Ankara, the 32 allies need America to be there, fully, even if imperfectly.

Fifteen Hundred Posts, Zero Access Without a Badge

The media logistics of this summit are a study in themselves. The International Media Center (IMC) will be set up at the Bibliothèque nationale présidentielle, just a few hundred meters from Beştepe. Capacity: environ 1 500 postes de travail, 40 editing booths, a TV set fully equipped for lives, a large 500 places press theater, and outdoor stands with a view of the presidential complex. All operating continuously from 5 juillet au matin du 9 juillet, with tea, coffee, and hot meals included—free of charge.

Journalists had to accredit before 7 juin 2026. Latecomers have no recourse. Heavy cameras, technical equipment, everything had to be installed by 6:00 PM on July 6 at the latest. véhicules de direct ne seront pas admis near the site, except for TRT. Broadcasters wishing for a continuous live position must reserve their stand-up at standup@iletisim.gov.tr before June 30. The coverage is organized, structured, channeled—which produces efficient but formatted reporting.

The Photographic Pool: An Accepted Constraint in the Image War

NATO has set up a système de pool visuel for journalists. Any organization accepting a pool position must immediately share its material with all accredited media requesting it, free of charge and without usage restrictions for journalistic purposes. This material ne peut pas être vendu. It must be identified as pooled with each use. NATO and TRT, along with official photographers, will provide the basic coverage for all public events.

Certain events will only be covered by the host broadcaster—a way to control the images circulating worldwide. This image management is inherent to any summit of this level, but it serves as a reminder that la guerre de la communication est aussi une dimension de la sécurité collective. At a time when Russian disinformation seeks to fracture Western public opinion, a single image or a poorly cut sentence can be transformed into a narrative weapon.

I have a complex relationship with the logistics of media summits. Everything is thought out, optimized, controlled—which produces clarity but also a homogenization of coverage. Great images, the real moments, are often born on the margins, not in organized spaces. That said, in a context where adversary propaganda is active and sophisticated, a minimum of narrative discipline on the allied side seems to me not only understandable, but necessary.

The Great Promise of The Hague and Its Landing in Ankara

The Hague summit of June 2025 was historic for one reason: Trump got the allies to commit to spending 5 % de leur PIB à la défense et aux dépenses liées à la défense d'ici 2030. It is an unprecedented commitment in the history of the Alliance since the Cold War. Ankara must now show that this commitment has not remained an empty declaration. The Atlantic Council makes an explicit recommendation: instead of looking for a new spectacular announcement, the Ankara summit should se concentrer sur la mise en œuvre concrète de cet engagement.

The list of arms purchases underway in Europe is eloquent. Pologne is acquiring dozens of AH-64 Apache helicopters. Roumanie is acquiring F-35s. Danemark is ordering the P-8 maritime patrol aircraft. Allemagne is investing in Standard and SM-2 missiles. Finlande is buying more than 400 AMRAAM missiles. These contracts, beyond their operational value, send a strong political signal to Washington: Europe is taking its defense seriously, and it is doing so with American equipment—something Trump particularly appreciates.

A Military Parade as a Concrete Symbol of Alliance Solidarity

The Atlantic Council proposes a bold idea for the summit: a défilé de matériels militaires récemment acquis through Ankara, followed by a static exhibition. This parade would serve several objectives simultaneously: send a signal of deterrence to Russia, reassure allied public opinions, allow Trump to see the tangible results of his burden-sharing policy, and promote the American defense industry. In the ultra-tense security context of Ankara in early July, the image of an allied armored column moving through the Turkish capital would have a powerful symbolic resonance.

It remains to be seen if this idea will gain traction. The logistics of such a parade in a city already transformed into a security fortress are considerable. But the intention is clear: to make this summit a moment of solidarité tangible et visible, not just a series of diplomatic communiqués. In 2026, after four years of war in Ukraine, NATO needs symbols that speak to citizens as much as to chancelleries.

A military parade: the idea appeals to me more than I would have imagined. There is something powerful in the concrete materialization of allied solidarity. The tanks, the missiles, the helicopters—these are tangible responses to Putin's rhetoric about Western weakness. And if it pleases Trump and makes him want to stay in the Alliance, then all the better. We take the leverage wherever we can find it.

Cyber, Drones, Signals—The Invisible Threat

The 70,000 agents and physical red zones constitute only the visible layer of the security apparatus. Behind the scenes, a hybrid security architecture of rare sophistication is being deployed. The Eurasian Review of May 30 details the components: restrictions anti-drones, electronic signal monitoring, strengthening of special forces, bomb disposal and rapid response units, and controlled airspace operations. Coordination involves équipes de sécurité de l'OTAN in addition to Turkish agencies, and foreign protection units accompanying each national delegation.

The cyber threat is taken seriously: the Presidential Complex and the IMC have both benefited from a renforcement de l'infrastructure cybersécurité. In 2026, a NATO summit is a natural target for espionage operations, disinformation, or digital sabotage. Russian, Iranian, and North Korean intelligence services have demonstrated their capabilities in this field. The security of the summit is therefore also an intelligence battle, played out long before and long after the official 48 hours.

Threats on Access Routes to the Capital

On land routes, checkpoints sécuritaires on access roads to Ankara constitute a preemptive filter. Turkish authorities have announced they are in contact with their foreign counterparts to identifier des individus susceptibles de tenter des actions de protestation on the occasion of the summit—those who are the subject of intelligence reports will not be allowed to enter the capital during the summit period. A procedure that, while it raises questions regarding individual liberties, reflects the real level of vigilance of the services.

The camera network at 100 points critiques supplémentaires completes the existing urban surveillance system. These high-tech observer cams allow for real-time monitoring by dedicated teams. In a context where a simple unorganized protest could be instrumentalized by hostile actors, this level of surveillance can be read as a proportionate response to a real threat—even if its post-summit use will deserve a critical look.

Hybrid surveillance worries me in the long term. Will what is deployed for a NATO summit in July 2026 remain only for that summit? The cameras, the intelligence protocols, the anti-drone systems—once a city has these tools, it’s rare for them to just be put back in a closet. This is one of the fundamental tensions of our time: collective security requires tools that threaten individual freedoms. There is no simple answer to this.

The Deterrence Architecture the Summit Must Consolidate

The Ankara summit is not held in a vacuum—it is part of a deterrence architecture in the midst of restructuring. The Atlantic Council recalls the figures: more than 80,000 soldats américains are currently stationed in Europe, the majority of whom were deployed to reinforce the eastern flank after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The eight battle groups of the Présence avancée renforcée (EFP) deployed in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia total environ 25,000 personnels.

The Atlantic Council's recommendation for Ankara is clear: Europe occidentale doivent intensifier leurs contributions in each of the EFP countries, with the goal of reaching the equivalent of a fully operational combat brigade. This reinforcement is necessary not to replace the Americans—whose enabling role (strategic transport, missile defense, aerial refueling, intelligence, satellites) remains irreplaceable in the short term—but to reduce dependence on an American presence that could fluctuate according to the moods of the White House.

The NATO Transition Planning Group: The Big Idea to Validate

The most structurally significant proposal from the Atlantic Council for the Ankara summit is the creation of a Groupe de planification de transition OTAN, with American, European, and Canadian participation. Its mission: to coordonner le rééquilibrage des capacités within the Alliance, define realistic timelines for the transfer to Europe of functions currently dominated by Washington, and answer concrete questions about who assumes what, at what pace, and with what means.

This group would not aim to accelerate the American withdrawal, but to give it a architecture prévisible that reassures the most exposed allies in the East. In other words: transform Trumpian realpolitik on defense spending into coherent strategic planning, instead of letting a vacuum grow between political discourse and capability reality on the ground. Rutte himself called, on April 9 in Washington, for a move from an « codépendance malsaine à un partenariat sain ».

The NATO Transition Planning Group is perhaps the best idea of this summit—and probably the one that will get the least media coverage because it’s too technical for headlines. But it’s the one that will determine if, in five years, Europe can stand without American crutches—or if it collapses the moment American troops first pull back. I’d rather we build it now than discover too late that we should have.

A Summit Matching the Level of Current Threats

On July 7 and 8, 2026, Ankara will not just be the capital of Turkey. It will be, for two intense days, the capitale provisoire de l'Occident en résistance. Resistance to Putin's logic of conquest, resistance to the temptation of abandonment, resistance to the weakening of Atlantic solidarities. The barricaded city, the red zones, the 70,000 agents, the renamed and enlarged Etimesgut Airport—all of this is not for show. It is the logistical translation of a conviction: NATO, in 2026, is an Alliance that deserves to be protected with an intensity proportional to what it represents for liberal democracies.

Minister Güler said it with a frankness I appreciate: this summit will be a tournant. A turning point in the reorganization of burdens within the Alliance, in the transatlantic rebalancing, in the recognition of Turkey's role, and in the consolidation of support for Ukraine. These stakes coexist, sometimes in tension, always in interaction. This is the nature of an Alliance of 32 sovereign members, with different histories and different neighborhoods.

The Future of the Alliance is Played Out at Beştepe

What the heads of state sign—or refuse to sign—at Beştepe on July 7 and 8 will provide the real measure of cohésion alliée face à la Russie and its allies in the authoritarian axis. Support for Ukraine will be the acid test. The implementation of the 5% of GDP will be another. The possible creation of a Transition Planning Group, a third. And in the background, the silent war of civil rights in a capital under maximum surveillance.

Ankara barricades itself. NATO meets. The world watches. And somewhere in the trenches of eastern Ukraine, soldiers hold positions hoping that this meeting will produce more than words. I owe them at least this: to say clearly that this summit carries a responsabilité morale toward them, not just a strategic scope. The West must remain the center of the world not because it deserves it by default, but because it has chosen the side of freedom—and because that choice is paid for in commitment, in courage, and in defense euros.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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