OPEN LETTER: To a Europe That Still Hesitates — the 21st Package Must Bite, Not Brush

Introduction: A Letter to Those Still Holding the Pen

To you, European leaders, who hold the most powerful instrument of peace in your hands

To you, European leaders, presidents, ministers, commissioners, ambassadors at COREPER who are still debating commas while Kyiv burns. I am writing to you without protocol or useless deference. Because the moment no longer lends itself to diplomatic nuances that are no longer nuances. On June 9, 2026, Ursula von der Leyen presented what the European Union calls its 21st package of sanctions against Russia. It is a serious text, ambitious on paper. And yet, I still feel, reading and listening to you, that characteristic hesitation, that Pavlovian reflex of a Europe that brakes at the precise moment it should accelerate.

This package targets 90 additional banks, 30 new ghost fleet vessels bringing the total to over 660 sanctioned ships, restrictions on cryptocurrency, LNG tankers, fisheries — for the first time in the history of European sanctions — and finally the ban on entry into the EU for any Russian combatant who participated in the war against Ukraine. All of this is good. All of this is necessary. But adoption is still not a given. And it is precisely this breach between the announcement and the act that Moscow exploits more every day.

An open letter, not a polite plea — a warning

This letter is not a tribute to your institutions nor a flattery of your good intentions. It is a factual warning: the adoption of the 21st package before July 15, 2026 is an absolute strategic emergency. The date is not arbitrary. It is the next review of the price cap on Russian oil, established by the G7 and calibrated in coordination with the Union. If the package is not adopted before this deadline, the automatic adjustment mechanism risks releasing economic pressure on Moscow at a precise moment when market shocks — notably tensions in the Strait of Hormuz — could have played in the Kremlin's favor.

The Commission has proposed to suspend this adjustment until January 2027. But this suspension can only take effect if the package is adopted. Every extra week of negotiation at the Council is a week where the machinery of sanctions turns at a snail's pace. Europe cannot afford this luxury. Not now. Not while Russian energy revenues have already dropped by about 40% at the start of 2026 and the Russian sovereign wealth fund's reserves are two-thirds exhausted. You are within striking distance. Land the blow.

The 21st Package: What von der Leyen Actually Put on the Table

A dense text, a real ambition, an unprecedented scope

Let's be precise, because facts matter. The President of the Commission announced, on June 9, 2026, a package with multiple ramifications. On energy, the objective is two-fold: on one hand, suspend the automatic adjustment mechanism of the oil cap until January 2027 to prevent a global market easing — linked to tensions in the Strait of Hormuz — from benefiting Moscow; on the other hand, listing 30 new vessels of the ghost fleet, bringing the total beyond 660 ships, while targeting for the first time the auxiliary vessels of this fleet — those providing fuel and logistics services — and critical infrastructure: ports, airports, and refineries.

On the financial front, the Union proposes extending transaction bans to 31 additional Russian banks and 20 entities in third countries — banks, crypto platforms, oil traders — that have facilitated the circumvention of sanctions. In an unprecedented move, the Commission is introducing the possibility of a total embargo on crypto-asset services from third countries hosting platforms used to dodge European measures. This is a major doctrinal shift. Russia has been using crypto for years to bypass SWIFT. Europe is finally starting to obstruct these channels.

The numbers Moscow would rather you not cite

Von der Leyen laid out, on June 9, a macro-economic picture that is damning for Russia. Russian inflation is around 6%. Key interest rates remain at 14.5%. The federal budget is under increasing pressure. More than two-thirds of the liquid assets of the sovereign wealth fund have disappeared. Energy revenues dropped by about 40% in early 2026. These are not pessimistic projections from Western economists — they are the data that Russia cannot entirely mask. Sanctions are working. The question isn't whether they are effective. The question is whether you will strengthen them or not.

High Representative Kaja Kallas added her own estimate: existing sanctions have already cost the Kremlin between €1,000 and €1,300 billion. "Our sanctions continue to bite hard and cut deep." These are von der Leyen's words, spoken before the international press. They are not rhetorical. They are corroborated by independent data, bank balances, and trade statistics. Europe has built an unprecedented economic pressure machine. It would be suicidal to let it idle now.

The Ghost Fleet: 660 Ships and Gaping Holes in the Net

A shadow armada that humiliates international maritime law

Since the start of the full-scale war, Russia has built what experts call the ghost fleet: hundreds of aging tankers with opaque ownership, flying flags of convenience, transporting Russian oil well beyond the price cap imposed by the G7 and the European Union. These ships transit through the Baltic Sea, the Bosphorus Strait, and the Mediterranean, deliberately bypassing all Western control. The 20th package, adopted in April 2026, had already sanctioned 632 vessels. The 21st would add 30 more. This isn't nothing, but it's still not enough.

What changes with this 21st package is the targeting logic. By aiming at vessels that refuel the ghost fleet, the Union is attempting to dismantle the entire ecosystem, not just the visible parts. According to von der Leyen, it is now about targeting the ports, airports, and refineries that process or trade Russian oil. It's a systemic approach. It's what should have been done long ago. But initial reports indicate that Council adoption won't happen before mid-July 2026 at best — partly because some member states are still clinging to sectoral exemptions.

The Bosphorus Strait: a door Turkey can close, and doesn't

You can't discuss the ghost fleet without mentioning Turkey. Ankara is a NATO member that applies the Montreux Convention to allow the transit of Russian tankers loaded to the brim. These ships do not respect the price cap. They transport Russian crude to Asian buyers. And they pass through the Bosphorus with worrying regularity, right under the eyes of an Atlantic alliance that sometimes just shrugs. The 21st package cannot force Ankara's hand. But it can target complicit Turkish companies — which the Commission has already begun to do in previous packages.

According to information gathered, the new designations of the mini-package adopted on June 15, 2026, already included entities registered in Turkey among the targets linked to the ghost fleet. This is a signal. Europe is telling its partners playing both sides: there will be consequences. This signal must be amplified by the 21st package, with longer lists, broader bans, and zero tolerance for flags of convenience that knowingly cover circumvention operations.

90 Banks: The Financial War Europe Hasn't Won Yet

The Russian banking system continues to fund the war machine

Since 2022, the European Union has progressively excluded dozens of Russian banks from the SWIFT system and banned transactions with its establishments. But the Russian banking system, by its size and connections with third countries not aligned with sanctions, has found ways to circumvent them. According to diplomatic sources reported by Ukrayinska Pravda and corroborated by von der Leyen's summary, the 21st package would extend restrictions to 31 additional Russian banks, in addition to 20 entities in third countries — for a total consistent with the estimate of 90 new banking targets cited by several sources. If confirmed in the final version, this would represent the hardest blow ever dealt to Moscow's financial sector.

The approach is doubly innovative. On one side, we hit domestic Russian banks still active in international circuits. On the other, we target for the first time institutions in third countries — notably establishments in Turkey, Central Asia, and the Gulf states — which have served as financial relays to bypass previous measures. This cross-border targeting is an important doctrinal break. Europe is sending a signal: aiding in the circumvention of sanctions will be punished, wherever it takes place. It remains to be seen if this signal will be followed by concrete effects.

Third countries in the crosshairs: a message to Beijing, Ankara, and Astana

The geographical dimension of this package is also a geopolitical one. By targeting banks and platforms in third countries, the Union is sending a message to major economies that have refused to join the sanctions regime but continue to benefit from trade with Europe. China — which remains Russia's top trading partner and whose companies have been sanctioned in previous packages — is directly in the line of fire. The 20th and 21st packages target Chinese companies providing military components, microchips, and drones to the Russian army.

This is not an escalation against Beijing as a whole. It is a targeted message: Chinese companies that choose to supply the Russian war machine will be sanctioned. Europe has no right to remain silent in the face of this industrial complicity. And Korean, Emirati, and Kazakh companies serving as financial bridges must know that their integration into European markets is conditional. The 21st package must formalize this conditionality.

Crypto: The Blind Spot Europe Is Finally Correcting

Billions of rubles laundered on decentralized platforms

Since the first waves of sanctions, financial security analysts have been warning: Russia is using cryptocurrencies — notably stablecoins pegged to the dollar — to bypass asset freezes and bank transaction bans. Platforms operating from countries not aligned with sanctions serve as bridges between Russian rubles and international liquidity. Some of these platforms are hosted in compliant jurisdictions that do not share European blacklists. The problem was known. No one had yet had the political courage to deal with it head-on.

The 21st package marks a break. For the first time, the Union is introducing the possibility of a total embargo on crypto-asset services from third countries hosting platforms used to dodge European measures. This is not yet an automatic measure — it's a new capacity that member states can trigger. But its existence is a strong signal to the host countries of these platforms: if they tolerate the circumvention of European sanctions, they expose their crypto sector to a complete cutoff from Union markets.

Russia and crypto: a structural relationship, not an opportunistic one

It is important to understand that Russian use of cryptocurrencies is not a marginal phenomenon or improvisation. It is a structured strategy, implemented progressively since 2022. Sanctioned oligarchs transferred assets via crypto wallets before converting them in non-SWIFT zone countries. Military transactions have been funded via untraced cryptocurrencies. Platforms based in Central Asia served as relays. It is not crypto itself that is problematic — it is the deliberate use of its decentralized architecture to escape international legal obligations.

The 21st package's response is therefore proportionate and necessary. By introducing the possibility of a third-country ban on crypto-assets, Europe is giving itself a powerful deterrent lever. It tells compliant jurisdictions: hosting platforms that serve to launder Russian war money will have a price. It is exactly the kind of message the European sanctions architecture should have been sending for a long time. The 21st package sends it. Now it must be adopted to give it the force of law.

Fisheries: Finally, a Sector Moscow Didn't Think Was Under Threat

Fish as an economic weapon: a symbolically decisive front

Among the most symbolic measures of the 21st package is the introduction, for the first time in the history of European sanctions against Russia, of restrictions on the fisheries sector. Russia is one of the world's leading exporters of seafood. Europe imports significant quantities of Russian fish and shellfish — notably cod. The 21st package proposes substantial restrictions on certain fishery products and a complete embargo on others, including cod. This is an economically modest but politically strong decision.

Why symbolically decisive? Because every new sector hit by sanctions sends a message to Moscow: there are no longer any guaranteed economic comfort zones protected by Europe's hesitation. For years, Russia relied on asymmetry — striking Ukraine militarily while continuing to profit from its exports to the West. Blocking this trade sector by sector makes this strategy untenable. It also aligns Belarus with the same restrictions, to shut the back door that Minsk represents for Russian commercial exchanges.

Aligning Belarus: closing the back door

The 21st package explicitly provides for aligning the restrictions applicable to Belarus with those imposed on Russia, in order to end the risk of circumvention via Minsk. Lukashenko's Belarus has been an operational satellite of Moscow since 2022 — allowing the transit of sanctioned goods, the re-export of banned European products to Russia, and even the launching of missiles against Ukraine from its territory. That the 21st package closes this loophole is a necessity that the twenty previous packages should have addressed more aggressively.

This Belarusian harmonization is not symbolic. It is operationally critical. Customs audits at the borders of the Baltic States and Poland have regularly revealed flows of European goods to Belarus that ended up in Russia a few weeks later. Closing this channel means plugging a structural breach in the sanctions regime. And it sends a signal to Lukashenko: the price of your complicity with Putin is rising.

Entry Ban for Russian Combatants: An Act of Moral Dignity

Putin's soldiers will no longer have the right to European rights

One of the most anticipated — and symbolically charged — measures of the 21st package is the entry ban into the European Union for any person who has served in the Russian armed forces since the start of the war, which means since February 24, 2022. Von der Leyen formulated it with a clarity rare in European diplomatic language: "Europe is forbidden to anyone who participated in the invasion of Ukraine. As simple as that." The phrase is pithy. It is just. It was overdue.

This measure potentially targets millions of individuals who took up arms against a sovereign European people. It sends a signal to demobilized soldiers who hoped to use their war pay to travel or settle in the West. It also sends a signal to families: the choice to participate in this war has lasting consequences. This is not collective punishment — it's a moral distinction that Europe has had every right to establish for a long time. Belarus will be subject to the same restrictions to prevent any border circumvention.

What this measure says about Europe's identity

The entry ban for Russian combatants has a dimension that goes beyond individual sanction. It is a declaration of identity. Europe is saying: we are not just a common market. We are a community of values. And those who took up arms to destroy those values — by bombing hospitals, torturing prisoners, and deporting Ukrainian children — have no place in this common space. It's not xenophobia. It's moral consistency.

The European Commission specifies that the measure specifically targets those who have served in the Russian armed forces since the start of the total war. It does not target Russian citizens in general, not opponents, and not those who fled mobilization. It targets those who made the active choice to fight for Putin. This distinction is important and just. But it requires rigorous implementation — border verification mechanisms, information sharing between agencies, and cooperation with neighboring countries.

The Oil Cap: Suspending the Adjustment to Maintain Pressure

A technical decision with major strategic consequences

One of the least publicized but most important aspects of the 21st package is the proposal to suspend the automatic adjustment mechanism of the price cap on Russian oil until January 2027. This mechanism, designed to adapt the cap to global market fluctuations, is indexed to global prices. But tensions in the Sea of Oman and the near-closure of the Strait of Hormuz have disrupted global energy markets exceptionally in 2026. If the mechanism adjusted normally, the cap would rise — reducing the pressure on Russian revenues.

By freezing this adjustment, Europe maintains the cap at its current level — 44.10 dollars per barrel according to the last adjustment in January 2026 — regardless of market shocks. The logic is simple: not to offer Moscow fortuitous relief due to geopolitical tensions it helped generate. The adoption of the 21st package before July 15, 2026 — the date of the next cap review — is therefore an absolute calendar emergency. Every day of delay is another day of additional revenue for the Kremlin.

The dynamics of the cap: an imperfect but vital instrument

The price cap on Russian oil is the subject of legitimate debates among economists. Some believe that at 44.10 dollars per barrel, it remains too high to really hurt Moscow, whose crude production cost oscillates between $20 and $40 depending on the fields. Others argue that the important thing is not the absolute level but the trend: every downward revision increases the pressure. The dynamics of the 21st package — freezing the adjustment during an exceptional market shock — preserves this logic of progressive pressure.

What is indisputable is that the oil cap has helped reduce Russian receipts. Russian energy revenues fell by about 40% at the start of 2026. Russia tried to compensate by selling to Asian customers via the ghost fleet. This is exactly why the cap must be combined with sanctions on the fleet — the two instruments are complementary. One sets the maximum price. The other tracks the ships trying to bypass that price. Together, they work. Separately, each is less effective.

Bulgaria, Orbán, and Internal Brakes: The True Face of Hesitation

When unanimity becomes the enemy of consistency

Let's be honest to the end. Europe's hesitation isn't abstract. It has names and faces. According to information reported by Ukrayinska Pravda, Bulgaria blocked part of the negotiations because the package proposed blacklisting the Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill — a prospect deemed politically unacceptable by Sofia for internal religious and cultural reasons. Hungary, under the Orbán era, long paralyzed previous packages. The 20th package was only adopted after Budapest and Bratislava lifted their veto at a summit in Cyprus in April 2026.

This picture is discouraging but instructive. It illustrates the structural fragility of European foreign policy when it requires the unanimity of the twenty-seven. National interests, sometimes legitimate, sometimes purely electoral, sometimes influenced by pro-Kremlin networks, block decisions that the overwhelming majority of European citizens would approve without hesitation. Europe needs to reform its voting mechanisms on sanctions. This is a long-term project. In the meantime, political pressure on blocking states must be at its maximum.

Unanimity as a weapon of mass destruction of necessary decisions

I understand the attachment of member states to the unanimity rule on foreign policy issues. It reflects sovereign balances built over decades. But in the context of a war at the Union's doorstep, this rule becomes a lever that pro-Kremlin governments use to paralyze the whole. Viktor Orbán doesn't hide it. Neither does Robert Fico. They know their veto or threat of veto gives them disproportionate bargaining power.

The long-term solution is a qualified majority voting mechanism on sanctions — a reform that would, paradoxically, require unanimity to be adopted. It's a catch-22. In the short term, the only answer is bilateral political pressure, conditionalities on European structural funds, and the building of coalitions of the willing capable of isolating recalcitrants. The Ukraine doesn't have the time for Europe to reform its treaties. But Europe has the responsibility to find ways to bypass its own internal blockages.

What Kaja Kallas Demands: Speed as a Strategic Imperative

The High Representative knows that every week counts

Kaja Kallas, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, didn't mince words during the mid-June 2026 summit of European leaders. "We have the 21st sanctions package on the table, and I really hope we can show speed in adopting it, because it goes hand in hand with the deep strikes Ukraine is conducting, so that pressure builds on Russia to stop this war." The wording is sharp. It articulates what too many European leaders still refuse to admit: the sanctions and the Ukrainian military pressure are the two faces of a single strategy of coercion.

Kallas also reminded, in statements to the media on June 9, that existing sanctions had already cost the Kremlin an estimated $1,000 to $1,500 billion depending on the sources. This staggering figure can be read in official Russian statistics: sovereign wealth fund two-thirds exhausted, budget under increasing pressure, and the economy in a marked slowdown. The sanctions are working. This isn't a slogan. It's documented. And it's one more reason not to ease the pressure now.

Kallas and Eastern Europe: those who know what it means to live next to Moscow

Kaja Kallas is Estonian. Her country shares a border with Russia. Her compatriots lived under Soviet occupation. They know, through historical experience passed from generation to generation, what capitulation to Moscow means. It's no coincidence that the Baltic States, Poland, Finland, and Sweden are the most consistent, most inflexible members of the pro-sanctions coalition. It's not geopolitical hysteria. It's historical memory informing a lucid risk analysis.

Central and Eastern Europe look at their Western partners sometimes with an incomprehension tinged with impatience. How can one hesitate on the 21st package? How can one let a discussion on the rights of a patriarch block measures against 90 banks that fund the war? The answer is that the geography of the threat is not the same for Paris or Rome as it is for Tallinn or Warsaw. But the threat itself doesn't recognize these differences in perception. It advances.

Ukraine in the Meantime: Reforms Under the Bombs

A country moving toward Europe even when Europe hesitates

While COREPER ambassadors negotiate amendments and capitals delay their agreement for domestic considerations, Ukraine keeps going. Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his government are leading deep institutional reforms — anti-corruption, rule of law, legislative harmonization with the acquis communautaire — while managing a full-scale war on their territory. Von der Leyen herself acknowledged it on June 9: "Ukraine has delivered." And announced the opening of the first accession cluster with Ukraine and Moldova, opening the door to formal membership negotiations.

In the same week, the European Union paid out nearly €3 billion from the Ukraine Facility and was preparing to disburse the first installment of a €90 billion loan. The two — military support and European integration — are inseparable. Ukraine is fighting to join Europe. Europe must fight with the same intensity to allow this return. Sanctions are not just economic pressure on Moscow. They are also an act of solidarity with Kyiv.

Air raid sirens as the soundtrack of a people building

Von der Leyen found the right words on June 9: "They are carrying out extraordinary reforms while their cities are under attack. While the sky above them is filled with smoke. While air raid sirens echo across the country." These words deserve to be repeated in every European capital, in every Council meeting room. Ukraine isn't asking to be saved. It's asking to be supported while it saves itself.

Ukrainian courage is not an emotional argument. It is a strategic argument. A country capable of carrying out deep institutional reforms in wartime is a reliable partner, a solid future member state, and a precious link in the European security architecture. Supporting Ukraine is investing in the security and coherence of the Union itself. Every euro of support, every sanctions package, every designation on a blacklist — it's an investment in the continent's lasting peace.

What the 21st Package Doesn't Say Yet: The Gaps to be Filled

Entire sectors still preserved by pusillanimity

Let's be rigorous: even if the 21st package is ambitious, it contains real gaps. Russian liquefied natural gas continues to flow toward Europe through channels not yet fully blocked. The Commission is restricting the sale of LNG carriers to Russia, which will limit its future export capabilities, but the embargo on Russian LNG imports will only apply fully in 2027 according to the schedule established by the 19th package. Some member states continue to import significant volumes of Russian gas, creating a structural dependency that sanctions alone cannot resolve overnight.

Similarly, the issue of Russian nuclear energy — Rosatom still supplies several European reactors in Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Czech Republic — remains unaddressed. None of the twenty-one packages adopted or proposed has dared to touch this file. The reasons are energy-related and contractual. They are also political. But this implicit exemption is an admission of weakness that does not escape Moscow. As long as Rosatom is protected, Russia will keep a lever over Europe.

New export restrictions: drones and strategic metals

The 21st package strengthens export restrictions on metals and alloys used in the aerospace and defense sectors. It proposes new export embargos on ground equipment for drones, jamming systems, and launchers. It also introduces import bans on goods worth about €60 million — metals, minerals, car parts. This is not a spectacular amount. But it's a logic of accumulation: every additional restriction complicates the supply chain of the Russian defense industry.

The Russian defense industry has shown worrying resilience despite technological embargos. It resupplies through China, Iran, and North Korea. It recycles components, improvises, and substitutes. Export controls cannot stop this alone. But by raising the cost and complexity of every supply, by forcing Moscow to pay more for second-rate technologies, they help slow down Russian military production capacity. Every missile not manufactured is a Ukrainian life potentially saved.

The Call: What I Demand of You, European Leaders

Five clear demands, without rhetoric

So here, European leaders, is what I ask of you with all the clarity I'm capable of. First: adopt the 21st package before July 15, 2026. Not after. Before. The oil cap is revised on that date and every day of delay is a gift to Putin. Second: do not dilute the measures on banks. All 90 targeted banks must be in the final version. Not 60, not 75. All of them. Third: maintain the entry ban for Russian combatants without abusive exemptions. If someone shot at Ukrainians, they have no place on European soil. It's as simple as that.

Fourth: do not let Bulgaria, or any other member state, block the package for domestic religious political considerations. European solidarity cannot be held hostage by local electoral calculations. Fifth: think seriously about expanding the mandate of the IRINI mission to allow the effective boarding of ghost fleet ships in the Mediterranean — a capacity that early reports indicate is already under legal construction. Act. Don't consult. Act.

What history remembers of those who hesitate at the wrong moment

History is cruel to those who hesitated at the wrong moment. It remembers the names of those who signed Munich in 1938 thinking they were buying peace. It remembers the names of those who refused to deliver weapons to Sarajevo in the 1990s while the city burned. It remembers every surrender disguised as pragmatism. I'm not saying the 21st sanctions package is the equivalent of those moments. But I am saying that the pattern — hesitation in the face of documented aggression — is the same.

Europe has the tools. It has the legitimacy. It has the partners. It has proof its instruments work. What it must find now is the political will to apply them without dilution, without delay, and without surrender to special interests. The 21st package has been on the table since June 9, 2026. It is waiting. Ukraine, meanwhile, is not waiting. It is resisting. It is building. It is advancing. Live up to it.

Conclusion: Bite, or Accept the Consequences of Not Doing So

History will judge what you choose now

European leaders, you have an instrument unprecedented in the history of international relations: a sanctions regime built on twenty-one successive packages, each denser and more sophisticated than the last, collectively representing the economic blockade most elaborate ever imposed by a supranational organization. Russian energy revenues have dropped. Sovereign wealth fund reserves are two-thirds exhausted. Western companies have left Russia. The sanctions work. Von der Leyen said it. Kallas said it. Macroeconomic data confirms it.

But working doesn't mean winning. Working means the pressure is there, and it must be maintained, strengthened, and made irreversible. The 21st package must bite — really bite, not brush. It must be adopted quickly, without watering down, and without surrendering to internal political blockages that have no moral legitimacy in the context of this war. Ukraine is resisting. Ukraine is reforming. Ukraine is moving toward you. Live up to its courage. History, I promise you, will remember what you choose now.

A continent defined by its acts, not its declarations

Europe was built on the ruins of its own wars. It learned through pain that diplomacy without firmness is an invitation to recidivism. It learned that solidarity is not an abstract ideal but a necessity for collective survival. These lessons are written in its treaties, its institutions, and its history. The 21st sanctions package is an opportunity to show that these lessons have been learned — not just in texts, but in acts.

It's not about punishing Russia for the fun of it. It's about creating the conditions for a just and lasting peace. A peace that cannot be negotiated from a position of economic or military weakness. A peace that requires the balance of power to tilt clearly in favor of Ukraine and its allies. Every sanction adopted, every bank cut off, and every ghost ship listed is a step toward that peace. This step, Europe must take now, and take it frankly.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary sources

Statement by President von der Leyen on the 21st sanctions package against Russia — EEAS/European Commission, June 10, 2026

EU sanctions 81 new Russian targets, from the shadow fleet to propagandists — EU Insider, June 17, 2026

The EU's 21st sanctions package against Russia — what is known — RBC Ukraine, June 9, 2026

Secondary sources

Kallas calls the Lavra attack a war crime and announces new EU sanctions — Euromaidan Press, June 15, 2026

EU leaders agree to extend sanctions on Russia for a full year — for the first time — Meduza, June 19, 2026

EU diplomacy chief Kallas hopes for rapid adoption of 21st sanctions package — Ukrayinska Pravda, June 18, 2026

EU adopts mini-package of restrictive measures in connection with Russia, Moldova and Libya — Bird & Bird, June 15, 2026

European Commission announces 21st sanctions package targeting energy, financial sector and trade — Baker McKenzie Global Sanctions Blog, June 12, 2026