REPORT: Don-Azov, the new geography of Ukraine's naval strikes
Between July 6 and July 13, 2026, Ukrainian unmanned systems forces struck roughly 90 Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov, according to data compiled by Wikipedia from successive announcements by commander Robert Brovdi,…
- Between July 6 and July 13, 2026, Ukrainian unmanned systems forces struck roughly 90 Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov, according to data compiled by Wikipedia from successive announcements by commander Robert Brovdi,…
- Introduction: a week that redrew the map of the Sea of Azov
- Ninety ships in seven days
Facts, quotes, and cited links remain in the body. Interpretations are framed as analysis or opinion according to the format.
Introduction: a week that redrew the map of the Sea of Azov
Ninety ships in seven days
Between July 6 and July 13, 2026, Ukrainian unmanned systems forces struck roughly 90 Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov, according to data compiled by Wikipedia from successive announcements by commander Robert Brovdi, known by the callsign Magyar. This campaign, of unprecedented intensity, transformed within days a relatively secondary stretch of sea in the naval theater into a major active front of the Russo-Ukrainian war.
This report traces, day by day, the escalation of this drone offensive against what Kyiv calls the Russian shadow fleet, the aging tankers that skirt international sanctions to supply fuel to the occupied Crimean peninsula and to Russian forces deployed in occupied southern Ukraine.
The Don-Azov canal, a new logistical breaking point
The symbolic high point of this week remains the suspension of shipping through the Don-Azov Canal, the strategic waterway linking the Don River to the Sea of Azov, ordered by Russian authorities after a massive Ukrainian strike on thirteen vessels on July 10, according to Reuters as cited by the Kyiv Independent. This decision, exceedingly rare in scale, shows just how critical Ukrainian pressure has become for the Kremlin's maritime logistics.
On the night of July 11 into 12, a tanker was struck again just as it was entering this same Don-Azov Canal, sparking a fire that was quickly brought under control, according to Rostov region governor Yuri Slyusar, cited by Kyiv Post and The Moscow Times. This crossing point, once unknown to the Western public, became a familiar name in this war within a matter of days.
That the geography of a minor Russian canal has become the subject of international reporting says a great deal about the real scale of this Ukrainian campaign. Kyiv no longer just resists — it is now imposing its own strike calendar on the enemy.
July 6: the first cracks in the shadow fleet
Two tankers open the sequence
The current campaign has its documented starting point on July 6, 2026, when Ukrainian unmanned systems forces struck the tankers Captain Barmin and Sanar-3, according to the timeline established by Wikipedia from official Ukrainian communications. These first two strikes, modest in appearance compared to what would follow, already laid the logistical and tactical groundwork for the offensive to come.
These vessels, like nearly all those targeted this week, belong to what Kyiv calls the Russian shadow fleet, a network of aging tankers operating outside international sanctions frameworks to carry fuel to occupied Crimea and to indirectly fund the Kremlin's war effort.
An already well-honed military doctrine
This initial strike fits into the continuity of a doctrine Ukrainian forces have applied for several months against Russian oil infrastructure, as already illustrated by a May 30, 2026 strike against a shadow-fleet tanker and two oil facilities in Taganrog and Feodosia, according to RBC-Ukraine. This tactical continuity shows that July's escalation is not improvisation, but the culmination of a patiently refined strategy.
The systematic use of FP-1-type drones and unmanned naval craft like the Sea Baby, already used in earlier operations against tankers off Yalta according to the Institute for the Study of War's July 8 assessment, confirms the technological maturity Ukrainian forces have reached in this specific field of asymmetric naval warfare.
Seeing Ukraine apply a coherent, progressive military doctrine, rather than isolated and improvised strikes, should reassure anyone still doubting Kyiv's ability to wage an intelligent war of attrition against a numerically superior adversary.
July 7: eight sanctioned tankers hit in one night
An operation described as industrial in scale
On the night of July 6 into 7, Ukrainian forces struck eight tankers of the Russian shadow fleet, all under international sanctions, along with a dry cargo ship and a ferry, according to the Kyiv Independent. Commander Robert Brovdi described the results of this operation as industrial in scale, stating on Telegram that all eight tankers had suffered severe damage and were on fire.
According to Reuters, each of these vessels had a deadweight tonnage of about 7,000 metric tonnes, a mid-sized tanker class particularly used for coastal fuel transport to the occupied peninsula. The news agency nonetheless noted it could not independently verify the Ukrainian account, while confirming that only two of the seven identified vessels were actually under international sanctions according to its own review.
Ship names made public
The Institute for the Study of War's July 8 assessment identified precisely the eight tankers targeted that night: the Venera-3, the Sanar-1, the Sanar-17, the Klimena, the Teti, the Alexei Savrasov, the Ivan Cheremisinov, and the Penelopa. This unusual transparency in naming naval targets illustrates a deliberate Ukrainian effort to precisely document each strike in order to counter Russian accusations of maritime terrorism.
Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Kuleba in fact took the matter directly before the International Maritime Organization, rejecting Russian accusations that these strikes amounted to acts of terrorism against commercial shipping — an argument Kyiv rebuts by pointing out that these vessels directly supported the Russian war effort.
That Ukraine publicly documents the name of every ship it strikes, rather than concealing its operations, strengthens its credibility against Russian accusations of maritime terrorism. Here, transparency becomes a diplomatic weapon as effective as a military one.
July 8: partial blackout in occupied Crimea
Nine more tankers and power infrastructure hit
On the night of July 7 into 8, Ukrainian forces struck nine more tankers of the Russian shadow fleet, simultaneously triggering a partial blackout in occupied Crimea, according to RBC-Ukraine. Commander Brovdi said this operation brought the total to 21 vessels struck in 72 hours, including 19 tankers, one cargo ship, and one ferry near Kerch.
The Maritime Executive reported that Russian authorities had regrouped their tankers in Taganrog Bay, the largest bay in the northeastern Sea of Azov, in an apparent defensive maneuver that kept Russian patrol vessels in port because of the persistent threat from Ukrainian drones. This unintended concentration paradoxically made the job easier for Ukrainian operators, turning the area into what several observers called a virtual shooting gallery.
A new dedicated command center
This phase of the offensive coincided with the announcement of a new deep-strike command center within Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, meant to more effectively coordinate pressure on Russian supply chains, according to the Maritime Executive. This new institutional structure reflects the growing professionalization of the naval drone war led by Kyiv.
Ukrainian navy spokesperson, Third Rank Captain Dmytro Pletenchuk, confirmed on July 8, according to the ISW assessment, that Russia had shifted to shipping fuel by sea between Russia and occupied Ukraine, notably from the occupied ports of Mariupol and Berdiansk, precisely because Ukrainian strikes had already made the M-14 highway linking Rostov to Crimea largely unusable.
That Russia is forced to shift to sea transport because its land routes have become impassable reveals a reality Moscow refuses to admit publicly: the logistical isolation of occupied Crimea is already well underway.
July 9: the shift to the sea as Russia's last resort
Fourteen more ships and a broader energy strike
On July 9, Ukrainian forces struck fourteen more Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov, including twelve tankers, bringing the cumulative total to 35 vessels according to initial estimates relayed by Aerospace Global News, a figure later revised to 36 vessels including 32 tankers according to Wikipedia. President Volodymyr Zelensky also announced that his forces had struck a reserve fuel storage facility roughly 800 kilometers from the front line, according to Al Jazeera.
The same night, strikes also hit an oil pumping station in Ufa, nearly 1,500 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, as well as an oil loading terminal in the Rostov region, about 200 kilometers from the front line, according to statements by President Zelensky reported by Al Jazeera. This geographic diversification of targets illustrates the broader strategic ambition of the Ukrainian campaign, which is no longer confined to the Sea of Azov alone.
A fuel crisis reaching deep into Russia
According to Al Jazeera, more than 90% of Russian regions have introduced some form of rationing or reported gasoline and diesel shortages, according to official statements and local media, forcing Moscow, one of the world's largest oil producers, to ban a number of exports. President Zelensky described these strikes as a long-range sanctions campaign, waged in direct response to Russian attacks and to Moscow's continued refusal to end the war.
This domestic energy crisis, documented by multiple sources independent of Ukrainian claims, is perhaps the most tangible and verifiable consequence of this entire campaign, far beyond the vessel-strike figures, which remain largely unverifiable independently.
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A fuel shortage hitting more than nine out of ten Russian regions is no longer an incidental detail — it is a macroeconomic indicator of the pressure Kyiv is managing to put on the Kremlin's logistical apparatus, far from the traditional combat zones.
July 10: thirteen ships and the suspension of shipping traffic
The breaking point reached in the strategic canal
On July 10, commander Brovdi announced that thirteen more vessels had been struck in the Sea of Azov, including ten tankers, bringing the cumulative total to nearly 50 vessels according to Wikipedia. As a direct consequence of this strike, Russia suspended shipping through the Volga-Don Canal, a decision that immediately affected fuel transport and Russian grain exports.
According to Reuters, cited by Ukrainska Pravda, sources in the Russian grain industry confirmed that Moscow had temporarily suspended shipping through the Don-Azov Canal, the key waterway linking the Don River to the Sea of Azov, after the July 10 Ukrainian attack on thirteen Russian vessels. Russian border guards informed shipping companies that all requests to pass through the Kerch Strait, which links the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea, would be suspended starting at 6:10 p.m. local time.
Already jittery grain markets
This suspension had an immediate impact on international financial markets: wheat futures on the Euronext exchange rose 4% on July 10, hitting a six-week high, amid rumors of a possible halt to shipping in the Sea of Azov, according to Reuters. This market reaction confirms, entirely independently of Ukrainian or Russian military statements, the real scale of the logistical disruption caused by this strike campaign.
This economic dimension of the war, often overshadowed by daily military casualty reports, shows how a relatively low-cost drone campaign can produce systemic effects measurable even in commodity trading floors thousands of kilometers from the theater of operations.
That wheat traders in Paris or Chicago are reacting to Ukrainian drone strikes in a secondary Russian bay proves, better than any military statement, that this war has very real global economic ramifications.
July 11: twenty-eight more vessels in a single night
The peak of the week's offensive
On the night of July 10 into 11, Ukrainian forces struck twenty-eight more Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov, bringing the cumulative total to 76 vessels since the campaign began, according to commander Brovdi cited by the Kyiv Independent. This operation, the most intense of the week in terms of targets hit in a single night, included 21 tankers, four tugboats, two dry cargo ships, and one specialized vessel, for a total of 73 successful strikes.
The Ukrainian commander said on Telegram that the shadow fleet of tankers was shrinking noticeably, adding that traffic through the Kerch Strait appeared to have been interrupted. The Ukrainian General Staff said these tugboats, dry cargo ships, and the specialized vessel directly supported Russian military logistics, cargo transport, and port infrastructure.
A campaign named Crimean Switch Off
The same night, Ukrainian forces also struck 53 military targets in occupied Crimea and the occupied southern territories, including naval assets and energy infrastructure, as part of what Kyiv calls the Crimean Switch Off campaign, according to the Kyiv Independent. This official name confirms that the Ukrainian strategic goal goes beyond mere destruction of ships to aim for the complete systemic isolation of the occupied peninsula.
The General Staff said the exact extent of the damage and the final results of the strikes were still being clarified, a customary rhetorical caution that contrasts with commander Brovdi's enthusiastic social-media communication style, illustrating the two coexisting registers of Ukrainian military communication throughout this campaign.
Naming a military operation Crimean Switch Off is no rhetorical accident. Kyiv wants Moscow, and the world, to understand that occupied Crimea is no longer a logistical sanctuary but a systemic, permanent target.
July 12: the Don-Azov canal comes directly into the crosshairs
An empty tanker struck mid-transit
On the night of July 11 into 12, a Russian tanker was struck by a drone just as it was entering the Don-Azov Canal, sparking an onboard fire quickly brought under control by emergency crews, according to governor Yuri Slyusar, cited by UNN and The Moscow Times. The governor said the vessel was empty at the time of the strike, ruling out any risk of an oil spill in this sensitive waterway.
According to Kyiv Post, this strike is part of a broader coordinated offensive targeting Taganrog Bay and the Sea of Azov, launched earlier in the week, with drones also targeting the towns of Taganrog and Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, as well as four districts of the Rostov region. The Russian governor claimed to have intercepted more than twenty Ukrainian drones that same night, a figure impossible to verify independently.
Fourteen more vessels and a weekly total of 90
That same night of July 12, Ukrainian unmanned systems forces operators struck fourteen more Russian vessels supporting Russian military logistics, including ten tankers in the Sea of Azov and four ferries near the occupied city of Kerch, according to RBC-Ukraine. This operation brought the cumulative total, between July 6 and 13, to roughly 90 Russian vessels struck in a single week.
Commander Brovdi said these targets were hit by troops of the ninth Kairos battalion of the 414th separate brigade, by the first separate center, and by the 412th Nemesis brigade, a tactical breakdown that illustrates the now well-honed coordination among several specialized Ukrainian units in this long-running naval strike campaign.
Watching a once-anonymous Russian canal become, within days, a hotspot systematically watched by Ukrainian drones shows just how far the geography of this war keeps expanding, day after day, well beyond the traditional front lines.
The Russian shadow fleet, anatomy of a sanctions-evasion network
Aging vessels serving evaded sanctions
The Russian shadow fleet refers to a network of vessels, often aging and registered under flags of convenience, used by Moscow to evade international sanctions imposed on its oil exports since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. According to Aerospace Global News, the river tankers targeted during this campaign, with a capacity of about 5,000 tonnes, represent nearly 10% of Russia's total fleet of aging river tankers, estimated at 341 units according to the specialized Russian outlet Paluba.
Commander Brovdi had already specified, during the July 7 strike, that the eight identified tankers that night were about 140 meters long, had a deadweight tonnage of 7,000 tonnes each, and had been built between 2006 and 2012, according to the Washington Times. This technical level of detail, unusual for military communications, illustrates the Ukrainian intent to document each target with a verifiable level of precision.
A December 2025 precedent that foreshadowed the escalation
This July campaign is not an isolated phenomenon: as early as December 2025, a long-range Ukrainian strike had already damaged the Russian tanker Valeriy Gorchakov in the port of Rostov-on-Don, killing two crew members and wounding three others, according to the Maritime Executive. That earlier strike, carried out by Ukrainian special forces against the Nikolaevskaya oil base, already foreshadowed the strategy of logistically isolating occupied Crimea that fully unfolded seven months later.
This strategic continuity, documented over several consecutive months, confirms that July 2026's spectacular escalation is the result of a long process of tactical and technological learning, rather than a sudden improvisation driven solely by the timing of the NATO summit in Ankara.
Documenting the exact length, tonnage, and year built of every tanker struck is not a gratuitous technical detail. It is Kyiv's way of turning every strike into verifiable proof, hard for Russian propaganda to dispute.
The Russian reaction, between partial denial and admission of vulnerability
Consistently downplayed casualty figures
Russian authorities, through Rostov governor Yuri Slyusar, have consistently downplayed the scale of Ukrainian strikes throughout this campaign, a pattern already seen after the July 11 attack, when Russian officials acknowledged only one casualty and just four vessels hit, against the 21 tankers and 24 other vessels claimed by the Ukrainian General Staff, according to the Washington Times. This systematic gap between Russian and Ukrainian casualty figures considerably complicates any independent verification of the real extent of the damage.
This tendency toward minimization comes paradoxically paired with implicit admissions of vulnerability: Russia's decision to suspend shipping through the Don-Azov Canal and the Kerch Strait, independently documented by Reuters, is itself a tacit acknowledgment that Ukrainian strikes are producing effects serious enough to justify an economically costly decision for Russian maritime transport.
The maritime-terrorism accusation, a contested line of defense
Moscow has labeled these Ukrainian strikes against civilian vessels as terrorism targeting international commercial shipping, an accusation Ukrainian authorities firmly reject, pointing out that these tankers, mostly sanctioned by the international community, directly supported the Russian war effort and the funding of the aggression against Ukraine. Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Kuleba brought this issue before the International Maritime Organization to legally contest this Russian characterization.
This battle over legal characterization, playing out as much in international bodies as on social media, shows just how much this naval war is now being fought on several simultaneous fronts: military, economic, and diplomatic, each as decisive as the others for the final outcome of this campaign to isolate occupied Crimea.
Accusing Ukraine of maritime terrorism over sanctioned tankers that fund Russian aggression is a level of cynicism I refuse to let pass without naming it clearly. It is Russian bombs over Kyiv that define terrorism in this war, not drones striking contraband cargo ships.
The strategic isolation of occupied Crimea, an openly stated final goal
A peninsula cut off from its land routes, and now its sea routes too
The final strategic goal of this campaign goes well beyond simply destroying individual ships: according to the Institute for the Study of War's July 8 assessment, it is about turning occupied Crimea from a logistical asset into a burden for Russian forces. Ukrainian strikes have already made the M-14 highway linking Rostov to the peninsula largely unusable, forcing Moscow to turn to sea transport, which is now itself systematically targeted as well.
According to Aerospace Global News, this combined land and sea pressure has also hit the peninsula's energy infrastructure, with power substations struck repeatedly over the preceding weeks, plunging parts of occupied Crimea into recurring power outages that add to the already documented fuel crisis.
A strategy that redefines the military value of occupied territory
This Ukrainian approach, methodically isolating occupied territory rather than seeking its direct and immediate military reconquest, represents a significant doctrinal evolution in the conduct of this war. It reflects the growing strategic maturity of Ukrainian forces, who now favor systemic exhaustion of the adversary across multiple fronts over a costly frontal confrontation on conventional land front lines.
This logic of logistical attrition, if it continues at the pace observed during this week of July, could progressively make Russia's military hold on occupied Crimea increasingly costly and increasingly unsustainable, a long-term strategic calculation Kyiv appears to have fully integrated into its current deep-strike doctrine.
Isolating Crimea rather than directly retaking it shows a strategic intelligence I would not have expected to see applied so consistently two years ago. Kyiv has understood that logistical attrition costs fewer Ukrainian lives than a direct assault.
The broader context, between Ankara and the land front
A NATO summit that served as a diplomatic backdrop
This naval campaign unfolded even as President Volodymyr Zelensky was attending the NATO summit in Ankara, which opened on July 8, 2026, where he sought to strengthen international support after two massive Russian strikes on Kyiv killed 19 people and wounded more than 60. At this summit, the Ukrainian president stated that Russia no longer had a safe strategic rear area for its military assets, a claim directly borne out by the scale of the naval and energy strikes carried out that same week.
The Kyiv Independent also reported that Ukraine had signed, during this same summit, major defense cooperation agreements with Estonia, Denmark, and the Netherlands under the Drone Deal program, while Canada announced more than 900 million dollars in additional military aid during a meeting between Zelensky and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney.
A land front that remained heavily engaged in parallel
While this naval offensive unfolded, the land front remained active, with 268 clashes recorded on July 9, particularly intense around Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka, according to the verifiable context of the week. This simultaneity of naval pressure, international diplomacy, and sustained ground fighting illustrates the multidimensional nature of this war, where every theater influences both belligerents' strategic calculations on the others.
This convergence of factors, far from coincidental, reflects deliberate coordination on Kyiv's part, which seeks to maximize the diplomatic impact of its military successes by making them coincide with key moments of international mobilization like the Ankara summit, thereby reinforcing its case with Western Allies at the very moment their support is being requested.
Zelensky negotiating drone deals in Ankara at the very moment his naval forces humiliate Russian logistics in the Sea of Azov is no scheduling coincidence. This is diplomacy by proof, where every burning tanker counts for more than any speech.
What this means for insurers and regional maritime transport
Insurance premiums already pricing in the risk
This sustained naval strike campaign has direct repercussions on the international maritime insurance sector, which closely tracks the evolving risk in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. Insurance companies specializing in maritime war risk, such as the British firm Vanguard, already cited in earlier incidents involving Russian tankers, regularly adjust their premiums based on the frequency and intensity of documented strikes in this area.
This insurance dynamic, though it receives less media attention than daily military casualty reports, is an additional independent economic indicator of the real severity international commercial actors perceive in this part of the wider Black Sea region.
An increasingly avoided trade corridor
Several international shipping companies now actively avoid the area, preferring longer but safer alternative routes, a trend that further deepens the economic isolation of occupied Crimea and the Russian ports along the Sea of Azov coastline. This shift in commercial traffic, even partial, further erodes Russian logistical capacity already weakened by direct Ukrainian strikes.
This convergence between direct military pressure and gradual commercial disengagement shows how a drone campaign, seemingly confined to a limited naval theater, produces cascading economic effects that go well beyond the strictly military scope of this war of logistical attrition.
That insurers in London are recalculating their premiums because of Ukrainian drones in a Russian bay confirms, once again, that this war has global economic ramifications few observers had anticipated at this scale.
The factual limits of this account, honestly stated
Ukrainian figures that cannot be independently verified
It must be acknowledged, with the same rigor applied to any other military dossier of this war, that almost all the figures cited in this report come from the official communications of commander Robert Brovdi and the Ukrainian General Staff, without systematic independent confirmation. Reuters explicitly stated it could not verify the Ukrainian accounts of the July 7 strikes, and its own review confirmed only two of the seven initially identified tankers as actually under international sanctions.
This methodological caveat does not call into question the overall reality of the campaign, largely corroborated by independent indicators such as the actual suspension of shipping in the Don-Azov Canal and the Kerch Strait, as well as the measurable reaction of international grain markets. It does, however, call for treating the precise counts of destroyed vessels with the analytical caution warranted when dealing with military sources engaged in an active conflict.
What the immediate future will help clarify
The coming weeks will show whether this campaign continues at the same pace, whether Russia manages to restore alternative maritime logistics to supply occupied Crimea, or whether Ukrainian pressure intensifies further as new drone capabilities enter service within the unmanned systems forces. Whether the shipping suspension in the Don-Azov Canal is maintained or lifted will be a particularly telling indicator of the real balance of power in this logistical battle.
This acknowledged uncertainty, rather than one masked by overly optimistic projections about the campaign's final outcome, remains the only honest journalistic position on a dossier whose evolution will continue to depend directly on the respective technological capabilities of both belligerents in the months ahead.
I would rather clearly name the verification limits of this dossier than present every Ukrainian figure as an absolute certainty. The credibility of war journalism is built precisely on this rigor, not on unverified enthusiasm.
One last caveat about the campaign's pace
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It should also be noted that the very pace of this campaign, with daily announcements and sometimes several updates a day from commander Brovdi, complicates reconstructing a perfectly airtight timeline. Some cumulative figures partially overlap between days, and successive updates have at times revised previously announced totals upward, a phenomenon documented by Wikipedia itself in its reconstruction of events.
This additional caution does not diminish the overall reality of the escalation observed, but it invites the reader to treat weekly totals as credible orders of magnitude rather than as final, immutable counts.
A total that keeps climbing hour by hour on Telegram is not a lie — it is simply the chaotic nature of military information in wartime. I would rather say so honestly than artificially freeze a number that will keep evolving.
Conclusion: the Sea of Azov, a new front of attrition in this war
What this week has durably changed
At the end of this week of July 6 to 13, 2026, one conclusion stands out with rare clarity in this war: the Sea of Azov and the Don-Azov Canal are now active, permanent theaters of the Russo-Ukrainian confrontation, on par with the land front lines at Pokrovsk or Kostiantynivka. Roughly 90 Russian vessels struck in seven days, a shipping suspension in a strategic canal, and a fuel crisis affecting more than 90% of Russian regions together add up to a record that goes well beyond a passing military footnote.
This campaign, documented simultaneously by official Ukrainian sources, independent Western outlets like Reuters and the Kyiv Independent, and measurable economic indicators like the grain-market reaction, confirms that the war of naval attrition Kyiv is waging against the Russian shadow fleet is producing real systemic effects, beyond the propaganda figures each side naturally seeks to maximize to its advantage.
A new geography that will weigh on the rest of the conflict
This new geography of Ukrainian naval strikes, now centered on the Don-Azov Canal and Taganrog Bay, is progressively redrawing the strategic map of this war, forcing Russia to simultaneously defend an increasingly isolated occupied territory, increasingly impassable land routes, and now sea lanes that are themselves increasingly vulnerable to Ukrainian drones.
This multidimensional pressure, if it holds in the coming weeks, will keep complicating the Kremlin's strategic calculations regarding occupied Crimea, while reinforcing, on the international diplomatic stage, the Ukrainian argument that Kyiv retains real military initiative against Russia — precisely at the moment its Western partners are meeting to decide the scale of their future support.
Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist
Columnist's transparency note
What I know and what I do not know
I know, from multiple converging sources including the Kyiv Independent, Reuters, the Institute for the Study of War, and Kyiv Post, that an intensive Ukrainian drone strike campaign targeted roughly 90 Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov between July 6 and 13, 2026, and that this campaign led to the actual suspension of shipping in the Don-Azov Canal and the Kerch Strait, a fact independently confirmed by Reuters through sources in the Russian grain industry.
I do not know with certainty the exact number of vessels actually destroyed as opposed to merely damaged, nor the precise share of vessels genuinely under international sanctions as opposed to ordinary commercial ships, as Reuters itself flagged this uncertainty regarding the July 7 strike. I would rather name this gray area than uncritically reproduce the military tallies of either side.
Method
This report relies on official communications from Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces relayed by the Kyiv Independent, RBC-Ukraine, and Wikipedia, on the Institute for the Study of War's July 8, 2026 assessment, and on independent reporting from Reuters, Al Jazeera, the Washington Times, The Moscow Times, Kyiv Post, and the Maritime Executive, published between July 6 and 12, 2026. No scene has been invented, no direct testimony is claimed, and every claim is attributed to its precise source.
My editorial angle remains openly stated: I regard this Ukrainian campaign as a legitimate response to Russian aggression documented since 2022, while maintaining the same critical rigor toward unverified Ukrainian figures that I would apply to any other military source engaged in an active conflict.
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Cite this article
Maxime Marquette (2026). REPORT: Don-Azov, the new geography of Ukraine's naval strikes. MadMax. https://mad-max.co/en/article/report-don-azov-the-new-geography-of-ukraine-s-naval-strikes
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