NARRATIVE: Russia Listed Alongside ISIS and Al-Qaeda for Crimes Against Ukrainian Children

For the fourth consecutive year, the same UN verdict

There are words that, repeated long enough, eventually lose their weight. We must not let that happen to this one: for the fourth consecutive year, Russia has been placed on the United Nations' list of shame — the roster of states and groups responsible for grave violations of children's rights in armed conflicts. It appears there alongside ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and other actors that the world unhesitatingly labels criminal or terrorist organizations.

This list is not produced by an advocacy NGO. It is published by the UN Secretary-General, based on data verified by his children-in-conflict monitoring teams (MRM). The figures for 2025 alone are damning: 1,899 confirmed violations of children's rights committed by Russian armed forces in Ukraine, and a 78% increase in the number of children killed and wounded. This is not Ukrainian propaganda — it is the report of the international organization whose Security Council includes Russia as a permanent member.

Sitting on the UN Security Council while appearing on the United Nations' list of shame for crimes against children — that is the most glaring contradiction in the current international architecture. And no one can claim not to see it.

The UN's counting methodology

The 1,899 confirmed violations documented by the UN for 2025 in Ukraine represent a rigorous and deliberately conservative accounting. The United Nations monitoring mechanism counts only violations for which sufficient evidence could be gathered and verified against demanding standards. That means the real number of violations is almost certainly higher — undocumented cases, areas inaccessible to observers, families unable to testify safely.

The category of violations encompasses the six types recognized by Security Council Resolution 1612: killing and maiming of children, recruitment and use of child soldiers, attacks on schools and hospitals, denial of humanitarian access, abduction of children, and sexual violence against children. In Russia's case in Ukraine, the most extensively documented categories are killing and maiming (resulting from strikes on civilian infrastructure), attacks on schools and hospitals, and forced transfers of children.

The 78% increase: what worsened in 2025

The 78% increase in children killed and wounded in 2025 compared to the previous year reflects the intensification of Russian bombardments on Ukrainian urban areas throughout the year. The cities of Kharkiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and communities across the Donetsk region were struck with increased intensity, deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure — water networks, electricity, heating — in a strategy designed to make life impossible for the remaining population.

Children are particularly vulnerable to these strikes for several reasons: they spend more time in sheltered but unprotected spaces (schools, playgrounds, markets), their smaller bodies are more susceptible to blast effects and shrapnel, and they have less capacity to protect themselves or evacuate independently. The 78% rise is therefore not a statistical artifact — it is the reflection of a real, documented escalation in harm to Ukrainian children's lives.

78% more children killed and wounded. That number deserves a pause. A refusal to let it slide into the flood of war statistics. These are real children, with names, with families. 78% more.

An ambassador's words in the face of the list

Ukraine's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Andrii Melnyk, took the floor during the presentation of the report to underline the scale of documented violations. His statement cited the 1,899 confirmed violations and the 78% increase, while calling on Security Council members to act consistently with the conclusions of their own Secretary-General.

Melnyk also highlighted the institutional irony: Russia, which sits on the Security Council with veto power, is simultaneously placed on the list of shame established under that same Security Council's authority. That position allows it to block any resolution that would seek to give the report practical follow-up — including targeted sanctions, humanitarian access mandates, or strengthened investigative mechanisms. This is the core of the institutional dysfunction that Ukraine and its allies seek to circumvent through other forums.

The Russian response: systematic denial

The Russian delegation at the UN responded to the report's findings with systematic denial — dismissing the data as "Ukrainian fabrications" and asserting that Russian armed forces comply with international humanitarian law. This position is contradicted not only by UN data, but by reports from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, monitoring organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and the case files opened by the ICC Prosecutor's Office.

Russian denial is not intended to persuade informed observers — it is intended to sustain the plausibility of an alternative narrative for domestic audiences and diplomatic allies seeking an excuse to avoid taking a position. In that context, the UN report's repetition for the fourth consecutive year — and its coverage across international media — is itself a counter-narrative tool.

Russia's denial at the UN is not a defence — it is a posture. A posture for domestic audiences and timid allies. Against the UN's verified data, it does not hold. But it does not need to hold — it just needs to exist.

1,899 violations — and the ICC arrest warrants

Among the documented violations, forced transfers of Ukrainian children to Russia occupy a specific place in emerging international jurisprudence. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against Vladimir Putin and Russian Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova for the illegal transfer of children — a historic first directly implicating the head of state of a permanent Security Council member.

Estimates of the number of Ukrainian children transferred to Russia since 2022 vary by source: the Ukrainian government cites more than 20,000 children whose locations are known, and estimates the real number could be several times higher. Children have been placed with Russian foster families, in Russian orphanages, or in "re-education" programs across different regions of Russia. Some have been found and repatriated through intensive diplomatic and humanitarian efforts — but the vast majority remain unaccounted for.

Ukraine's repatriation program and its limits

Ukraine established the Bring Kids Back UA program to identify and repatriate deported children. The program, led by First Lady Olena Zelenska and supported by international organizations, has secured the return of several hundred children since 2022. But the process is extraordinarily complex: it requires identifying each child individually, locating their foster family or institution in Russia, obtaining cooperation from Russian authorities (which is rarely granted), and physically executing the transfer.

The rare successful repatriation cases typically involve mediation through third-party countries — notably Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which maintain relations with both sides. But for every repatriated child, hundreds remain in Russia, subject to active Russification: schooling in Russian, acquisition of Russian citizenship, erasure of Ukrainian identity. The UN report categorizes this policy as a grave violation of children's rights and a war crime under the Geneva Conventions.

Erasing a child's identity, giving them a new name, a new language, a new nationality — that is a form of cultural erasure that international law recognizes as a crime. These children exist. Their Ukrainian identity exists. It deserves to be defended.

Children's infrastructure under bombardment

The UN report documents a significant number of attacks on schools, kindergartens, and pediatric facilities in Ukraine in 2025. These attacks, conducted primarily through cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and Shahed drones, destroyed or damaged hundreds of school buildings, forcing millions of Ukrainian children to attend class online or in underground shelters.

UNICEF and other humanitarian organizations have documented the long-term psychological impact of these attacks on Ukrainian children: chronic anxiety, sleep disorders, learning difficulties, trauma from repeated exposure to air-raid sirens and strikes. These psychological effects are not counted in the UN's statistics on violations — but they represent a form of long-term harm that Ukrainian children will continue to carry long after the conflict ends.

The Okhmatdyt strike and attacks on pediatric facilities

Among the most extensively documented incidents are strikes on pediatric medical facilities, including the attack on the Okhmatdyt children's hospital in Kyiv in July 2024 — one of Europe's largest children's hospitals, struck during a Russian missile attack that also hit several other civilian sites in the capital. That strike prompted unanimous international condemnation — with no practical effect on Russian military behavior.

The recurrence of this type of attack — against hospitals whose medical use is clear and protected under international conventions — constitutes, according to international law specialists, intentional war crimes rather than accidents of war. The fact that these attacks continue despite international condemnation indicates that Russia has no incentive to stop them as long as the costs remain primarily symbolic.

Striking a pediatric hospital identified by name, whose coordinates are known to every military navigation service — that is not an error. It is a decision. And a decision of that kind has a name in international law.

Western declarations and their practical limits

The United Kingdom presented a statement before the OSCE on June 24, 2026, describing Russian violations of international humanitarian law in Ukraine as "extensive and well-documented." This position reflects the consistent policy of Western governments — acknowledging violations, documenting them, condemning them publicly. But it runs into the same structural limit: without an enforcement mechanism, condemnations remain symbolic costs that Russia absorbs without modifying its behavior.

The real question is no longer whether violations are documented — they are, abundantly, rigorously, and by multiple independent sources. The real question is: what additional costs is the international community prepared to impose on Russia specifically for these violations? The answer to that question will determine whether future UN reports continue to accumulate without consequences, or whether a fourth consecutive year finally produces a response proportionate to the facts.

Judicial proceedings as a long-term response

The international judicial response is advancing — slowly, but genuinely. The ICC arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova remain active. Case files in the ICC Prosecutor's Office on crimes committed in Ukraine continue to grow. The Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression is in its constitutive phase. And the UN report data on violations against children feeds these files, providing prosecutors with official, multilaterally verified documentation.

This judicial response does not protect Ukrainian children today. It is a post-war tool — for the trials that will come, for the accountability of decision-makers who ordered or permitted these violations, for establishing a precedent that will deter future aggressors from treating civilian children as acceptable targets. It is slow justice. But in the long arc of history, it is the only justice that endures.

The ICC arrest warrants against Putin for deported children — that is a first act. The trial may not happen tomorrow. But the warrant exists. It follows. And leaders who know a warrant awaits them change their behavior — or at least their travel plans.

Ukrainian children between trauma and resilience

Beyond the UN statistics, the war in Ukraine is leaving its mark on an entire generation of children growing up under wartime conditions: daily air-raid sirens, fathers absent or killed at the front, mothers working alone to manage displaced families, disrupted schooling, absence of psychological stability. These effects — difficult to quantify but real — are documented by Ukrainian psychologists and social workers as a developing mental health crisis.

But these same children also display a resilience that commands respect. Testimonies from Ukrainian teachers describe classes continuing in basements, children learning to draw NATO flags and name Ukrainian drone models, teenagers helping fundraise for the military at school. That resilience should not be romanticized — it is the sign of a society coping with the unbearable using whatever resources it has. But it is real, and it says something about Ukraine's future.

Long-term recovery: a generational challenge

The psychological and educational recovery of Ukrainian children after the war will be a generational challenge. Studies on children who have lived through prolonged conflicts show effects on cognitive development, learning capacity, and mental health that can persist for decades after a conflict ends. These effects can be mitigated by psychological support programs, stable environments, and access to quality education — all elements that post-war reconstruction will need to prioritize.

UNICEF, the EU, and several European governments are already planning these long-term support programs. But their effectiveness depends on the bombardments stopping — psychological support programs cannot function if children continue hearing sirens and living under the constant threat of strikes. The end of the war is not only a military and diplomatic priority. It is a prerequisite for the recovery of an entire generation.

Ukraine's children today will build the Ukraine of 2040. What is done to them now — or what we allow to be done to them — will determine what country they build. That may be the strongest reason not to let go.

What being placed on the list actually changes

Russia's inscription on the United Nations' list of shame for violations against children is not merely a symbolic gesture. It triggers concrete mechanisms: enhanced monitoring by the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, regular reporting to the Security Council, and increased pressure on member states to adopt specific protective measures. These mechanisms are not always effective, but they create an institutional paper trail that may prove invaluable in future judicial proceedings.

For Ukrainian families whose children have been deported or separated, Russia's placement on this list is an official acknowledgment of their reality. It does not bring their children back. But it says, through the voice of the most universally recognized international institution, that what happened is documented, named, and unacceptable. In the long battle for justice, that recognition matters.

Precedents and lessons for international policy

Historical precedents allow an assessment of the impact of such listings. Myanmar was placed on similar lists for its treatment of Rohingya children. South Sudan experienced cycles of listing and removal in line with changes in its practices. In cases where governments sought to be removed from the list, they were required to demonstrate concrete commitments on child protection — which sometimes produced real, if modest, behavioral changes.

In Russia's case, the prospect of behavioral change driven by UN pressure is implausible in the short term — the Putin regime has demonstrated its contempt for international human rights mechanisms. But the listing creates a usable record in other contexts: before the International Criminal Court, in sanctions negotiations, and in post-conflict discussions on reparations and accountability.

Russia alongside ISIS and Al-Qaeda on a UN list for crimes against children — that image carries a force beyond words. It says something fundamental about what the Putin regime has become. Not a debatable international actor. An entity designated criminal by the institutions it once sought to be part of.

Four years, four listings — and now what?

Four consecutive listings on the UN list of shame. 1,899 confirmed violations in a single year. 78% more children killed and wounded. These figures lack no precision. What is lacking is the international community's proportional response to their gravity. Documentation has reached a saturation point that makes sincere denial impossible. What remains is the question of political will to act on it.

History will judge this period. It will judge the leaders who read the annual UN reports, heard Melnyk's statements, reviewed the ICC arrest warrants — and chose to calibrate their response according to domestic political constraints rather than the gravity of the facts. That judgment has not yet been rendered. But the evidence in the file accumulates, report after report, with a consistency that neither Russian denial nor Western fatigue can erase.

What each actor can and must do

Faced with this report, three types of actors carry distinct responsibilities. Western governments: maintain and intensify support for Ukraine, strengthen international judicial mechanisms, and stop treating violations against children as a humanitarian question separate from security policy. International organizations: continue documenting with rigor, but develop more effective pressure mechanisms than list inscriptions. And civil societies: refuse normalization — refuse to let the 1,899 violations become an abstract number heard without being felt.

Deported Ukrainian children are not statistics in a report. They are stolen lives, broken families, erased identities. The UN list names them, counts them, makes them visible to the world. It is not enough. But it is a start. And sometimes, in history, a well-documented start precedes justice that arrives late but arrives.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

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Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.