Why Spain Remains the Only NATO Member Exempt From the 5% Goal Before Ankara

Introduction: a number that isolates Madrid within NATO

What the Anadolu factbox reveals ahead of the summit

On the eve of the NATO summit in Ankara, set for July 7 and 8, 2026, a detailed factbox from the Anadolu agency confirms a remarkable fact: Spain remains the only country in the Alliance formally exempted from the ambitious target of 5% of GDP in defense spending set at the The Hague summit in June 2025. Madrid negotiated a separate cap of just 2.1% of GDP, a figure that stands in stark contrast with the rest of the Alliance's collective push.

This special status hasn't gone unnoticed among NATO's 32 members, all of whom already met, in 2025, the old 2% of GDP threshold set at the 2014 Wales summit. The gap between unanimity on the old target and the Spanish exception on the new one speaks volumes about the internal tensions Madrid will have to manage in Ankara, and it raises an uncomfortable question that few diplomats want to answer publicly: what happens when a single ally sets its own ceiling while everyone else marches toward a common floor.

Why this budget file is a credibility test for the Alliance

Amid a prolonged war in Ukraine and constant pressure from Donald Trump on his allies, every budgetary gap becomes a political symbol that goes far beyond its accounting value. The Spanish exception tests NATO's ability to maintain real cohesion when faced with members negotiating carve-outs rather than following the collective rearmament push, and it hands skeptics on both sides of the Atlantic a convenient argument against the entire spending framework.

I'll say it plainly: in an Alliance facing the greatest European military threat in decades, an exception at 2.1% while Poland exceeds 4.4% amounts to a lack of strategic solidarity that's hard to justify, whatever Spain's internal budgetary constraints.

The champions of Western rearmament

Poland and the Baltic states lead the pack

Poland leads the Alliance with 4.48% of GDP devoted to defense, driven by a national law imposing a minimum floor of 4% since the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022. Lithuania follows at 4%, its defense budget having more than quintupled since 2014, while Latvia reaches 3.73%, already surpassing the new interim target of 3.5% set for 2035, a full decade ahead of schedule.

Estonia, Norway, and the United States round out the podium

Estonia posts 3.38%, one of the highest per capita rates in the Alliance, while Norway crossed a symbolic threshold in 2025 by becoming the first European ally to surpass the United States in per capita defense spending, at 3.35%. Washington follows closely at 3.22%, roughly $838 billion in total spending in 2025.

Watching Norway surpass the United States in per capita defense spending strikes me as a genuinely historic moment, almost unprecedented in NATO's annals, one that deserves to be praised as a strong signal of European awakening in the face of the Russian threat.

The Spanish case explained in detail

A negotiated cap of 2.1%, ten times below the target

The government of Pedro Sanchez secured a formal cap of 2.1% of GDP, a mere fraction of the 5% target set collectively at The Hague. This negotiation, secured even before the Ankara summit, places Spain in a category of its own, neither sanctioned nor fully aligned with the common Western rearmament effort, and it will inevitably be cited by other reluctant capitals looking for their own way out.

Sanchez's words that irritated Washington

Spain's prime minister called the 5% target "not only unreasonable but also counterproductive," a statement that immediately drew criticism from the American administration, already impatient with allies deemed insufficiently committed to collective rearmament.

I understand Spain's internal budgetary constraints, but calling "counterproductive" a target that 31 other allies accepted, several with far more fragile economies, strikes me as a risky political choice that isolates Madrid at the worst possible moment.

The American pressure looming over Ankara

The harsh words from Hegseth and Trump

American defense secretary Pete Hegseth warned his NATO counterparts in Brussels that while many allies are meeting their Hague commitments, others "still need to do more," a barely veiled remark aimed at countries like Spain. In March, Donald Trump went further, calling certain NATO allies "cowards" for refusing to support the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz during the Israeli-American war against Iran.

The "paper tiger" label that left a mark

Trump had also called the Alliance a "paper tiger," ineffective without American involvement, harsh rhetoric that continues to weigh on the diplomatic mood ahead of the Ankara summit. These statements, though provocative, achieved their intended effect of keeping budgetary pressure on the most reluctant allies.

I don't share Trump's provocative style, but I recognize that his blunt pressure on defense spending has produced concrete results that years of quiet diplomacy never achieved. It's a necessary evil for an Alliance that underinvested in its own security for far too long.

Countries that just crossed the 2% threshold

Italy, Belgium, and Croatia finally aligned

Italy crossed the 2% threshold for the first time since the 2014 Wales summit, while Belgium pushed through a dramatic 59% increase in a single year to reach that exact threshold, despite hosting NATO headquarters in Brussels. Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia all reached this same threshold after years of chronic delay.

Luxembourg, the last historical laggard to fall in line

Luxembourg, long considered one of the Alliance's least budget-committed members, finally reached the 2% floor in 2025, while continuing to host NATO's civil budget administration. This late but genuine compliance illustrates the scale of pressure applied to all allies since the start of the war in Ukraine.

This 59% Belgian increase in a single year strikes me as the clearest proof that collective pressure, American and allied combined, actually works when sustained relentlessly. No country wants to be the visibly weak link in the chain.

France and Germany, heavyweights relatively lagging

Paris and Berlin still far from the new standard

France, NATO's second European nuclear power, posts only 2.05% of GDP, roughly $66.5 billion, a respectable figure in absolute terms but modest as a share against the 5% target. Germany, Europe's second-largest contributor in absolute value at roughly $93.7 billion according to 2024 data, plateaus at just 2%, with its full 2025 figures not yet incorporated into NATO's report.

A gap between economic power and proportional budgetary effort

This gap between the economic size of France and Germany and their proportional budgetary effort remains one of the most debated blind spots of current Western solidarity, a subject sure to animate the hallways of the Ankara summit as much as the Spanish case.

I believe France and Germany, as Europe's economic and political engines, carry a particular responsibility to lead by budgetary example against Russia. Hiding behind modest percentages isn't worthy of their historic role in the Alliance.

What the Spanish exception reveals about NATO's internal fractures

An Alliance moving in scattered order despite a united front

If unanimity on the old 2% threshold in 2025 projected an image of cohesion, the Spanish exception is a reminder that the Alliance remains crossed by deeply divergent national budgetary priorities, between Baltic states rearming massively out of existential necessity and southern European countries who perceive the Russian threat as more distant.

A precedent that could inspire other exemption requests

The precedent set by the Spanish exemption could encourage other allies less geographically exposed to Russia to negotiate similar carve-outs, a risk of budgetary fragmentation the Alliance will need to watch closely during the Ankara discussions.

I sincerely fear the Spanish exception could become a dangerous precedent. If Madrid can negotiate a cap ten times below the collective target without visible consequence, why wouldn't other southern European allies try the same in the months ahead.

The symbolic role of host country Turkey

Ankara at 2.33% of GDP, a host in the middle of the pack

Turkey, which hosts this crucial summit, itself posts a rate of 2.33% of GDP in defense spending, roughly $32.6 billion, an intermediate level that places it neither among the Baltic champions nor among the southern European laggards. This middling position gives Ankara a relatively neutral host role in the upcoming budgetary debates.

A host country that doesn't escape American pressure either

Even Turkey, despite its role as summit host, isn't spared calls from American defense secretary Pete Hegseth to do more, pressure that thus touches every member of the Alliance, regardless of their geographic position relative to Russia. That universality of pressure is itself a message: no seat at the table, however central, buys immunity from the numbers.

I find it telling that even the summit's host country isn't spared calls for additional effort. This confirms that the current budgetary pressure doesn't target only the laggards, but the entire Alliance without exception.

Conclusion: Ankara, a test of budgetary solidarity for the West

A summit that must clarify expectations toward Madrid

The Ankara summit on July 7 and 8, 2026, offers NATO the chance to publicly clarify its expectations toward Spain, without necessarily revoking the already-negotiated exception, but by maintaining constant diplomatic pressure to prevent this isolated case from becoming the norm.

Budgetary solidarity as the foundation of Western deterrence

Beyond the numbers, this file illustrates a simple truth: the West's collective deterrence against Russia, China, and their allies depends directly on the budgetary credibility of every Alliance member, without any lasting exception that would weaken the entire structure.

I close with a simple conviction: the West cannot afford prolonged budgetary exceptions while facing a Russia that shows no sign of easing its war effort. Financial solidarity is the minimum price of our collective security.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my acknowledged biases

I am a columnist and analyst, not a defense economist or a budgetary negotiator within NATO. My analysis rests on public data reported by specialized press agencies, not on direct access to internal negotiations between Madrid and the Alliance.

My acknowledged bias is clear support for Western rearmament in the face of the Russian threat, which leads me to judge the Spanish exception harshly, while acknowledging that I don't know Spain's specific internal budgetary constraints in detail.

My method for this decoding

This piece draws on a detailed factbox published by the Anadolu agency on July 1, 2026, cross-referenced with public NATO data and reported statements from American and Spanish officials. No figure was invented or extrapolated beyond what is explicitly reported in these sources.

Sources

Primary sources

Anadolu Agency — Factbox: NATO defense spending, where allies stand ahead of Ankara summit, July 1, 2026

Global Affairs — Beyond defense spending, what's at stake at NATO Ankara, July 2026

Secondary sources

Newsmax — Whitaker on NATO defense spending, July 1, 2026

Reuters — Aerospace & Defense

Wikipedia — 2026 Ankara NATO summit

Forbes — What defense leaders will discuss at the 2026 NATO summit, July 1, 2026