PROFILE: The SABER Act, the law that forces Putin to fund his own defeat

PROFILE: The SABER Act, the law that forces Putin to fund his own defeat

Introduction: When Washington turns the financial weapon against Moscow

A bipartisan initiative that changes the rules of the game

On June 23, 2026, six American senators — three Democrats and three Republicans — introduced a bill that could fundamentally transform the nature of American support for Ukraine. The SABER Act, an acronym for Seized Assets for Battlefield Equipment and Readiness, proposes to amend the REPO Act of 2024 to allow Kyiv to use confiscated Russian assets to purchase military equipment directly. This is no longer humanitarian aid. It is no longer reconstruction. It is pure armament — funded by the reserves of the Russian Central Bank itself.

The six sponsors are: Democratic senators Sheldon Whitehouse (Rhode Island), Chris Coons (Delaware), and Tim Kaine (Virginia), along with Republicans John Cornyn (Texas), Roger Wicker (Mississippi), and Chuck Grassley (Iowa). Representative Joe Wilson of South Carolina simultaneously leads the House of Representatives version. The bipartisan breadth of this support is no small thing in the fractured Washington of 2026.

The context of an intensifying financial war

Since February 2022, the G7 countries and their allies have frozen approximately $300 billion in Russian sovereign assets held in Western financial institutions. Of that total, roughly $4 to $5 billion falls directly under American jurisdiction. The REPO Act (Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity for Ukrainians Act), passed in 2024, had already authorized their confiscation and transfer to Kyiv for civilian purposes. The SABER Act takes the next step: these funds could finance defense purchases — military articles, equipment, services.

John Cornyn stated it plainly: the goal is to "force Putin to foot the bill for arming Ukraine." Behind the rhetoric lies a relentless logic. If Moscow ever wants its assets back, it must first stop its war. In the meantime, its own financial reserves fund the shells that kill its soldiers.

Anatomy of the SABER Act: what the law actually changes

The key amendment to the REPO Act

The REPO Act of 2024, co-sponsored at the time by Whitehouse himself, had established the principle of confiscation. Funds could be transferred to Kyiv but only for reconstruction, economic assistance, humanitarian aid, and contributions to international organizations. The word "armament" was absent. That gap was deliberate: in 2024, the political consensus to go that far did not yet exist. In 2026, after more than four years of war and thousands of dead Ukrainian soldiers, that consensus has formed.

The SABER Act proposes to add to the list of authorized uses the purchase of "defense articles and services" — the precise terminology of American arms export law. This opens the door to direct purchases through the FMS system (Foreign Military Sales), Pentagon contracts, and acquisitions from the American defense industry. In practical terms: Patriot PAC-3 missiles, artillery munitions, air defense systems, and much more.

The targeted assets: a frozen war chest

Russian Central Bank reserves frozen under American jurisdiction are estimated between $4 and $5 billion. That is modest compared to the €210 billion blocked in Europe — principally at Euroclear in Brussels. But symbolically, the American gesture would carry considerable political impact, definitively legitimizing the use of these funds for defensive purposes and paving the way for G7 coordination on the military use of the entire frozen stock.

The Russian Central Bank — governed by Elvira Nabiullina, who is herself the subject of proceedings before the ICC for her role in the financial occupation of Ukraine — has already attempted to recover its funds through legal challenges. In May 2026, it filed a complaint before the EU General Court in Luxembourg to contest the indefinite freeze of its European assets. These efforts have, so far, not succeeded.

The architects: who are these six senators?

Sheldon Whitehouse: the father of the REPO Act

Sheldon Whitehouse, Democratic senator from Rhode Island, is one of the institutional architects of the American legal framework for mobilizing frozen Russian assets. He had already co-sponsored the REPO Act in 2024 and sees the SABER Act as a logical extension of that work. His statement upon introducing the bill is unambiguous: allowing Ukraine to use seized assets to defend itself is the fairest solution — Moscow pays the bill for its own aggression.

Whitehouse is a senator known for his firm positions on international accountability. His engagement on this file fits within a long-term vision: forcing a legal normalization of the confiscation of sovereign assets of aggressor states, creating a precedent that reaches far beyond the Russian case alone.

John Cornyn and Roger Wicker: the crucial Republican flank

John Cornyn of Texas and Roger Wicker of Mississippi are two significant figures in the Republican Party in the Senate. Their presence on this bill is strategically decisive. At a time when Trump's position on Ukraine remains ambiguous and a fraction of the GOP leans toward isolationism, the commitment of these two senators sends a strong signal: support for Kyiv remains a bipartisan cause, rooted in geopolitical realism rather than ideology.

Cornyn emphasized that the SABER Act does not cost American taxpayers one additional cent. That is the most powerful political argument in the American budgetary context of 2026. "Putin pays for Ukraine's weapons" — the formula is simple, effective, and politically unassailable.

The REPO Act revisited: history of an evolving legal framework

From confiscation to armament: a deliberate legal evolution

The REPO Act, signed in 2024, had itself been a legal revolution. For the first time, the United States legislated explicitly on the confiscation of a foreign state's sovereign assets — not as an economic sanction, but as a mechanism for reparation and support for an invaded nation. That precedent was enormous. The question of international law — does confiscating sovereign assets constitute a violation of sovereign immunity principles? — was handled voluntaristically: yes, but in circumstances of illegal armed aggression, the right of countermeasure prevails.

The SABER Act continues in that vein. It does not reinvent the legal framework; it extends it. By authorizing military equipment purchases, it fills the most obvious gap between the REPO Act and Ukraine's real needs on the battlefield. Reconstruction can wait for peace. Missiles and munitions cannot.

Constitutional and diplomatic obstacles

Several American legal scholars have raised questions about the SABER Act's compatibility with American sovereign immunity rules. The FSIA (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act) normally protects foreign sovereign assets from seizure. However, supporters of the bill argue that the procedure established by the REPO Act — involving a formal confiscation decreed by the executive and validated by Congress — has already navigated around this obstacle. The SABER Act would merely expand the use of funds already legally seized.

On the diplomatic front, Russia has called these attempts "organized theft." Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared in June 2026 that funds sent to Kyiv were stolen money. The Russian position carries no binding legal force — Moscow has abandoned its recourse before the international bodies it helped paralyze.

Ukraine and the financing of its own defense

A vital need in a context of uncertain American aid

The potential adoption of the SABER Act comes in a context where Ukraine faces persistent uncertainty about the continuity of American support. The Trump administration, since its return to the White House, has maintained an ambivalent posture — neither a clean break with Kyiv nor an unlimited commitment. In that political vacuum, the mechanism of frozen Russian assets offers an elegant solution: support continues, but without weighing on the American federal budget.

For Ukraine, which spends hundreds of millions of dollars each month on munitions, air defense systems, and heavy equipment, access to additional funds — even partial — can make a real operational difference. The $4 to $5 billion under American jurisdiction is not an inexhaustible windfall, but it could fund several additional deliveries of Patriot PAC-3 missiles, a critical need identified by Ukrainian command.

The question of G7 coordination and European leverage

The American move fits within a broader dynamic. The European Union voted in late 2025 to indefinitely freeze €210 billion in Russian assets at Euroclear and uses the profits generated by those funds (roughly €3 billion per year) to finance the €90 billion support loan to Ukraine. If the United States crosses into direct military use, the pressure on Europeans to do the same with the entire stock of frozen assets will become considerable.

The G7 reaffirmed after its 2023 summit that Russian assets would remain frozen "until Russia pays for the damage caused to Ukraine." The SABER Act is the first Western legislative text to move from passive retention to active military use. It is a doctrine shift.

The SAVE Act in decline: the political context in Congress

The SAVE Act's failure as backdrop

The SABER Act emerges in a Congress where the SAVE Act (Support and Accountability for a Victorious Europe Act), another pro-Ukraine initiative, was struggling to find the necessary majority. According to analyses published on June 24, 2026, the SAVE Act ran out of steam under pressure from isolationist Republicans, leaving a gap in the legislative calendar for Ukraine support. The SABER Act attempts to fill that space with a more targeted, less costly approach for taxpayers.

The key argument that distinguishes the SABER Act is precisely its funding model: it adds not one dollar to the federal budget. For Republicans concerned about the American deficit — currently above $35 trillion — that is a defensible position. We are not asking American taxpayers to fund this war. We are asking Russia to do it.

Trump's involvement: calculated silence or tacit approval?

The Trump administration has not officially responded to the introduction of the SABER Act. According to an analysis published on June 28, 2026 by Issue Insight, Trump mentioned frozen Russian assets in a fifty-six-word speech, without specifying the direction of their use. That silence is itself a signal. Trump has understood that the formula "Putin pays" is politically profitable with his base. If the SABER Act advances, he can indirectly claim credit for it.

American envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are expected to travel to Moscow for negotiations. In that context, the SABER Act can also serve as an additional pressure lever: either Putin negotiates seriously, or his assets finance Ukrainian armament. It is economic-threat pressure.

The international reaction: between support and caution

Ukraine welcomes it, Kyiv waits

Volodymyr Zelensky welcomed the SABER Act, presenting it as a logical step in American solidarity with Ukraine. For Kyiv, the ability to use frozen Russian funds to purchase 155mm munitions, Patriot interceptors, or anti-drone defense systems would represent an immediate operational gain. Ukrainian forces face continuous Russian pressure in June 2026 on multiple axes — Kherson, the Donbas, Zaporizhzhia — and any additional equipment is welcome.

The Ukrainian government also underscored the measure's symbolic dimension. If the United States allows the military use of Russian assets, it creates a precedent for the €210 billion blocked in Europe. The progression toward total and definitive confiscation — not merely the use of profits — would become politically more feasible.

European allies: watching Washington

European capitals are watching the American file closely. Berlin, Paris, and Brussels have been more conservative than Washington on the use of frozen Russian assets — the EU uses only the profits, not the principal. If the SABER Act is passed and successfully applied, it will become difficult for Europeans to justify their own caution. Political pressure to go further in Europe will intensify.

Several EU member states — notably the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland — have long supported total confiscation of Russian assets. They will be the first to use the American example as an argument in internal EU debates.

The economic stakes for Russia

A limited but symbolically devastating impact

The $4 to $5 billion in Russian assets under American jurisdiction represent only a fraction of the total Russian reserves frozen in the West. The Russian Central Bank held roughly $640 billion in reserves before 2022. The war and sanctions have reduced its room to maneuver, but the direct impact of the SABER Act on Russian finances would be measured. What is devastating, however, is the signal: international law is evolving to allow an aggressor state's assets to fund the resistance of its target. That is a revolution in the doctrine of sanctions.

The Russian economy, despite four years of sanctions, continues to function — largely thanks to oil revenues and trade with China and Iran. But Russia faces growing fuel shortages in June 2026, a direct consequence of Ukrainian strikes on its refineries. Putin himself publicly admitted "a certain fuel deficit." Economic pressure is mounting.

Nabiullina in the crosshairs: the banker and the war

Elvira Nabiullina, governor of the Russian Central Bank, has become a central figure in war-related legal proceedings. LexCollective, a Ukrainian legal group, filed a formal communication before the ICC Prosecutor's Office naming her and Finance Minister Anton Siluanov as accomplices in crimes against humanity for their role in the financial occupation of Ukraine — forced ruble imposition, looting of banks, access to medical care conditioned on a Russian passport.

Nabiullina also filed a complaint in May 2026 before the EU General Court to recover the frozen assets. This legal move is both a delay tactic and an attempt at legitimization — claiming that European procedure violates property rights and sovereign immunity. European legal experts are skeptical about its chances of success.

The international legal precedent: a silent revolution

Sovereign immunity tested by the right of countermeasure

The SABER Act rests on a developing legal theory: the right of countermeasure codified in the Articles on State Responsibility (ARSIWA) of the UN International Law Commission. Under this doctrine, a state victim of a serious violation of international law may take measures that would normally be unlawful — such as confiscating sovereign assets — if they are designed to induce the violating state to comply with its obligations.

The Renew Democracy Initiative, in a 2023 report co-signed by constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe, concluded that the Russian arguments against confiscation "have no validity, practical or legal." The SABER Act fits squarely within that interpretive current. The measure may face legal challenges in American courts, but the precedents established by the REPO Act give defenders of the bill a solid foundation.

A precedent for future wars of aggression

Beyond the Ukrainian conflict, the SABER Act creates a historic precedent. If an aggressor state knows that its financial reserves frozen abroad can fund the resistance of its victim, the cost-benefit calculation of a war of aggression changes radically. The deterrent effect could prove considerable for decades to come. China, which watches the Taiwan situation closely, will have drawn its own lessons — notably about the vulnerability of its own dollar-denominated reserves.

That is why the SABER Act is far more than a budgetary bill or another military aid package. It is the formalization of a new paradigm in international law, one in which the sovereign assets of an aggressor state no longer enjoy total immunity from the consequences of the aggression.

The legislative calendar: obstacles and chances of passage

The packed agenda of the American Senate

The American Senate's legislative calendar in 2026 is loaded. The House of Representatives passed the Ukraine Support Act on June 4, 2026, providing for additional military assistance. The SABER Act is expected to follow a parallel track. The question is whether the bill can be voted on before the midterm elections or whether it will be absorbed into broader budget negotiations.

The fact that senators as influential as Grassley — one of the longest-serving and most respected in the GOP — support the bill is a good sign for its progress. Grassley brings institutional credibility that can convince hesitant Republican colleagues. His support is not rhetorical: it is a procedural guarantee.

Realistic chances of passage

Several analysts believe the SABER Act has a serious chance of passing, particularly if the Trump administration sees political value in it — which the "Putin pays" argument offers. The formula is electorally profitable for Republicans in defense-industry states like Texas (Cornyn) and Mississippi (Wicker), where military contracts carry significant weight in the local economy. If Russian assets fund Ukrainian armament, the American defense industry is the direct beneficiary.

The convergence of geopolitical interest, the fiscal argument, and the economic benefits for the American defense industry creates a rare coalition. It is hard to imagine frontline opposition to the bill in the context of June 2026.

Zelensky's position: Ukraine as actor, not victim

An aggressive financial diplomacy since 2022

Volodymyr Zelensky has transformed Kyiv into the diplomatic center of a new doctrine: Ukraine will not beg for aid, it will build the institutional mechanisms to sustain it. Since 2022, successive Ukrainian governments have worked with their American and European partners to develop the legal framework that now makes the SABER Act possible. It is no accident that Russian assets are now within reach of military conversion — it is the result of years of legal and diplomatic lobbying.

Zelensky's strategy is that of a sovereign actor, not a passive recipient. He understood before many others that sustaining Western support requires institutionalizing it — engraving it into law rather than leaving it dependent on the mood of elections or budget negotiations.

Ukraine as testing ground for a new doctrine of war

Ukraine is becoming the laboratory for a new form of total war in the 21st century — not only militarily, with its FPV drones and deep strikes, but also financially and legally. The SABER Act is the legislative translation of that reality: modern war is also won in Senate committee rooms and in the halls of international courts.

For Kyiv, each billion dollars of Russian assets converted into armament is a double victory: logistical, because it means more materiel on the battlefield; and symbolic, because Moscow is the one paying for its own defeat.

The Russian reaction: between verbal fury and practical impotence

Lavrov and the accusations of "organized theft"

Russia reacted to the SABER Act with the predictable machinery of its propaganda apparatus. Minister Lavrov in June 2026 called the funds sent to Kyiv from frozen assets "stolen" money. That terminology is calculated to resonate with public opinion in Global South countries, where Moscow tries to cultivate an anticolonial narrative in which the West is the real looter.

Practically, Russia has few options. It no longer participates actively in WTO bodies; the International Court of Justice rejected its main arguments in the Ukrainian case; and the Russian Central Bank cannot seize equivalent Western assets in retaliation — it no longer has the capacity or access to do so.

The legal delay strategy

Moscow is betting on time. The Russian Central Bank's complaint before the EU General Court, filed in February 2026, aims to block the European procedure for years. Similarly, if the SABER Act is adopted, legal challenges before American courts are foreseeable. The goal is not to win, but to buy time. By delaying the use of the assets, Moscow hopes to shift the balance of power on the ground or wait for a political change in the West to reopen the debate.

This legal delay strategy is consistent with Russian military doctrine: attrition. But on the other side, American legislators have also learned to accelerate. The REPO Act took less than two years to pass; the SABER Act could follow the same pace.

The stakes for the American defense industry

A multi-billion-dollar market for American contractors

If the SABER Act is adopted and Ukraine can use Russian assets to buy American military equipment through the FMS system, the direct beneficiaries include major American defense contractors: Lockheed Martin (Patriot PAC-3 missiles, F-16 support), Raytheon Technologies (interceptors), General Dynamics (artillery munitions), and many others. The multiplier effect on the American defense industry could be considerable.

This economic reality partly explains the enthusiasm of senators like Cornyn from Texas, a state that hosts several major military production facilities. Support for Ukraine thus becomes disguised industrial policy — one more argument for lawmakers with a defense-industry base.

The supply chain question

One of the challenges the SABER Act will need to overcome is the production capacity of the American defense industry. Patriot PAC-3 missile production lines, for example, have been accelerated since 2022, but delivery timelines remain significant — on the order of 12 to 24 months between order and delivery. If additional orders are placed using funds from Russian assets, delivery delays could stretch over several years. The immediate operational effect for Ukraine would therefore be limited, but the medium-term effect on stocks would be real.

Berlin, as illustrated by the announcement on June 28, 2026 by Defense Minister Boris Pistorius of allocating $400 million for PAC-3 missiles via the PURL and JUMPSTART mechanisms, is also working to accelerate deliveries. American-European coordination on the use of frozen assets could allow more efficient bulk purchases.

Analysis: toward a new architecture of financial warfare

The SABER Act in the broader picture

The SABER Act fits within a broader movement to rearrange the rules of international financial warfare. Since 2022, Western democracies have discovered — or rediscovered — the power of financial sanctions and asset-freezing tools. The question now agitating chancelleries is: how far can we go? The freeze is established. The use of profits is underway. Total confiscation for military use is the next threshold.

The SABER Act crosses that threshold, at least for the $4 to $5 billion under American jurisdiction. If the bill succeeds, the argument for crossing the same threshold in Europe on the €210 billion at Euroclear will become politically irresistible. What is today an American legislative bill could tomorrow become the standard of international law in matters of armed aggression.

The long-term legacy

In fifty years, historians may view the SABER Act — if adopted — as one of the founding texts of a new international regime for sovereign assets. It establishes that sovereign immunity has limits; that the reserves of a state that violates international law are not protected indefinitely; and that the international community can and must use available financial tools to support the resistance of aggression victims.

This is not only a law for Ukraine in 2026. It is potentially a rule for the world of tomorrow. Sheldon Whitehouse, Tim Kaine, and their colleagues may be writing a chapter of international law without yet fully grasping its reach.

Conclusion: When the law becomes the most powerful weapon

A legislative act that transcends the Ukrainian war

The SABER Act, if adopted, will be far more than a military financing mechanism. It will be the demonstration that liberal democracies know how to use their most powerful weapons — not just missiles and drones, but laws, legal precedents, and financial institutions — to defend the international order they have built. Putin's Russia bet that this order was fragile, that the West would hesitate, temporize, divide. It is partly right on certain points. But in 2026, the general trend is toward escalating responses, not moderating them.

The SABER Act tells Moscow this: you parked your assets in our banks because you believed in our rules. Those rules are evolving. And now, those assets are working against you. There is no better answer to aggression than turning its own resources against it.

Ukraine deserves this tool

Zelensky and the Ukrainian people have been fighting for more than four years against a nuclear power that invaded their sovereign territory. They deserve every legal, diplomatic, and military tool their allies can place at their disposal. The SABER Act is one of those tools. It is not perfect; it is not sufficient. But it is just. And sometimes, in the conduct of international policy, justice and strategic interest converge in rare ways. This bill is one such example.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my acknowledged biases

I am a columnist-analyst specializing in international affairs, with a particular focus on armed conflicts, international law, and Eurasian geopolitics. My position is pro-Ukrainian and pro-Western — I say so without ambiguity. I believe that defeating Russian aggression is a moral and strategic imperative for the world order. These biases inevitably influence my analytical angle, even as I strive to ground them in verifiable facts.

What I do not know and my method

I am not a lawyer specializing in international sovereign immunity law. My analysis of the SABER Act's legal framework rests on secondary sources and published analyses — notably the Laurence Tribe report and the positions expressed by the bill's sponsors. I am not able to independently assess the chances of success of potential legal challenges. My forecasts on the bill's adoption remain speculative. I used publicly available primary sources and cross-referenced factual information with several independent sources.

Sources

Primary sources

U.S. Senate — Whitehouse and colleagues introduce bipartisan SABER Act — June 23, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — Frozen Russian assets for weapons for Ukraine: New bill introduced — June 19, 2026

TASS — US senators initiate bill on buying weapons for Ukraine from Russian frozen assets — June 19, 2026

Secondary sources

Read Lion — As SAVE Act withers on the vine, Republicans unveil bill to help Ukraine — June 24, 2026

Issue Insight — Fifty-Six Words About Assets From President Trump — June 28, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Inside the war crimes case against Russia's central bank — May 18, 2026

Wikipedia — Confiscation of Russian central bank funds — updated 2026