OPEN LETTER: Thomas Nilsson Is Right — the Russian Threat Will Outlast Putin, and Europe Must Hear It

A statement that should echo in every European capital

On June 30, 2026, Thomas Nilsson, head of the Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST), gave an interview to Bloomberg in which he said something many Europeans still refuse to hear: Russia will likely remain a security threat long after Vladimir Putin has left power. He described Moscow's confrontation with the West as "deep, structural, and enduring." Not circumstantial. Not personal. Not tied to one man and his obsessions. Structural.

These words deserve to be read slowly. Not as one more news bulletin in the uninterrupted stream of Ukraine dispatches. But as a warning that commits the future of Europe for a generation. Thomas Nilsson is not talking about the next Russian election. He is talking about a system — a political culture, a military doctrine, a worldview — that will survive Putin regardless of who succeeds him. This open letter is addressed to him, and through him, to all of Europe that prefers to go back to sleep the moment the cannon falls silent.

Sweden in NATO: a country that understood before the others

Sweden joined NATO in March 2024 after decades of jealously preserved neutrality. That is not a biographical footnote in a nation's curriculum vitae — it is a strategic revolution. Sweden, like Finland, decided that neutrality was no longer sufficient protection in a world where Moscow had positioned itself as a structural adversary of liberal democracy. The MUST produced analyses that contributed to that decision. Thomas Nilsson is the heir to that analytical tradition.

And June 30, 2026 is also the day Ukraine signed a deal with Sweden to acquire 16 Gripen E fighter jets — in addition to 16 Gripen C/D jets expected in early 2027. Sweden does not merely analyze the threat: it actively helps Ukraine resist it. Nilsson's words are inseparable from his government's actions. I write to him not to tell him he is right — he is right — but to carry his words to those who have not yet chosen to hear them.

Mr. Nilsson, you said: "We do not see this crisis as temporary; Russia has chosen its path, and there is no turning back." I would paste that sentence on the door of every European ministerial cabinet still contemplating a "normalization" of relations with Moscow. There is no normalization possible. There is resistance or capitulation. Nothing else.

The threat comes from a system, not from a man

Many Europeans console themselves by saying that the problem is Putin. That when he leaves — through natural death, palace coup, or exhaustion — Russia will become respectable again. That illusion is comfortable. It allows the deferral of difficult decisions: increasing defense spending, severing the last economic dependencies on Moscow, supporting Ukraine unconditionally until victory. Nilsson demolishes that illusion with clinical precision: the problem is not one man. It is a system.

Putin's Russia is a militarist autocracy whose legitimacy rests on confrontation with the West. That confrontation is functional for the regime — it justifies domestic repression, national mobilization, and control of resources and media. Any successor to Putin, whoever he may be, will inherit that system and be subject to the same institutional, ideological, and security logics. He might choose a different tactic — quieter, colder. But the structural confrontation with liberal democracy will not disappear with the man who personifies it today.

Russia's political opposition: eliminated, exiled, assassinated

Nilsson also noted that the Russian political opposition had been "effectively eliminated — through exile, imprisonment, or in the worst cases, assassination." That statement corresponds exactly to the documented facts: Alexei Navalny died in an Arctic prison in February 2024. Hundreds of opponents are in exile, in prison, or silenced. No political force capable of channeling popular discontent toward an alternative to the current regime exists in Russia.

That means even if Putin disappeared tomorrow, there would be no "Russian spring" scenario. No Gorbachev waiting in the wings. The system has locked down all mechanisms of peaceful change. The next power transition, whatever form it takes, will produce another apparatchik of the same system. The West must integrate this reality into its strategic planning — not with despair, but with clarity.

The Russian opposition is eliminated. The West must stop waiting for a "Gorbachev 2.0" who will not come. Russia's transformation, if it is possible, will come from a military and economic defeat severe enough to call the regime's foundations into question — not from a personality change in the Kremlin. That is why supporting Ukraine to victory is not only a moral question. It is a question of long-term European security.

Russia plans expanded military presence on the north-eastern flank

Thomas Nilsson stated that Russia was planning to extend its military presence along NATO's north-eastern flank, "from northern Finland downward." These plans remain largely on paper while Moscow prioritizes its war against Ukraine — but the MUST expects Russia to pursue them once it has recovered sufficient military capabilities. Satellites have photographed the expansion of Russian military infrastructure near the Finnish border, confirming that these plans are not rhetoric.

Sweden and Finland have considerably strengthened the alliance's presence in the Baltic region since joining NATO. The strategic depth gained by the alliance with these two accessions is significant — the Baltic Sea is no longer the "Russian lake" that Moscow called it before 2022. But Nilsson warns that this deterrence is not permanent — it must be maintained, reinforced, and adequately resourced for the long term.

The hybrid threat: relay drones, signal balloons, and SIM cards

On June 30, 2026, Zelensky had given the Belarusian dictator Aliaksandr Lukashenko an ultimatum a week earlier to remove signal repeaters helping Russian Shahed drones penetrate Ukrainian territory from Belarus. The repeaters stopped transmitting on June 22. But Russia has other methods: signal-relay balloons and Shahed drones equipped with SIM cards that latch onto neighboring countries' mobile networks to maintain navigation. The hybrid threat does not end with a switched-off repeater.

This type of hybrid threat — difficult to formally attribute, difficult to counter without courageous political decisions — illustrates exactly what Nilsson means by "deep, structural, and enduring." Russia has been waging a hybrid war against all of Europe for years: disinformation, cyberattacks, electoral manipulation, recruitment of extremists. The war in Ukraine is the most visible and violent form of this confrontation. But it is not the only one.

Russian drones using the SIM cards of telecom operators in neighboring countries to navigate toward their targets. If this does not shock you, you have not fully understood what "hybrid war" means. Russia uses the civilian infrastructure of democracies to kill Ukrainians. And some of those telecom operators may be yours. Think about that.

Five percent of GDP for defense: a target that is not an exaggeration

The target adopted at the The Hague summit — dedicating 5% of GDP to defense by 2035 — has been widely discussed as an excessive demand. Reasonable diplomats cite the economy, budget constraints, social priorities. Nilsson and his colleagues in the Nordic military intelligence services have a simple answer: look at the map. Look at history. Look at what Russia has done in Ukraine since 2022. 5% is the price of freedom calculated with a calculator, not with emotions.

The E5 meeting in Berlin on June 24, 2026 confirmed that Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Poland accepted this target. That is a step in the right direction. But Spain, excluded from that meeting notably due to its reluctance on defense spending, illustrates that the European consensus remains fragile. Sweden, a small power paying the price of its foresight through a late but fully assumed NATO membership, sets the example. Larger countries should be embarrassed by their hesitation.

Supporting Ukraine until victory — not until a convenient deal

Nilsson's analysis has a direct implication for Ukraine aid policy: no peace agreement with Russia structurally resolves the European security problem. A ceasefire that allowed Moscow to retain occupied Ukrainian territory, rebuild its military, and resume confrontation in five years with better resources would not be peace — it would be a dangerous interlude. Ukraine knows this. The Baltic and Nordic countries know this. All of Europe must admit it.

On June 30, 2026 — the same day as Nilsson's interview — Zelensky and Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson met to discuss the Gripen E deal and broader bilateral defense cooperation. Sweden translates its analyses into action. Stockholm also announced $108 million in additional military aid on June 18, 2026 under the PURL initiative. That is what a coherent security policy looks like: analyze the threat, name it, and act accordingly.

A peace deal that gives Putin what he could not conquer militarily would be a strategic catastrophe for Europe. Not for abstract moral reasons — though those reasons exist and matter. But because Nilsson is right: Russia will come back. And it will come back stronger, more determined, emboldened by the conviction that force always pays. I refuse that future for my children.

A military deal signed the day of Nilsson's interview

There is something deeply coherent in the fact that Ukraine signed, on that same June 30, 2026, an agreement with Sweden to acquire 16 Gripen E fighter jets. While Thomas Nilsson told Bloomberg that the Russian threat was structural and enduring, the Swedish government was translating its analysis into tangible military action. This is not editorial coincidence — it is the signature of a coherent policy that aligns words and deeds.

Zelensky met Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson to discuss the deal's implementation, broader bilateral defense cooperation, preparations for a drone initiative, and work on anti-ballistic capabilities. The deal also includes associated equipment, technical assistance, and support. In addition to the 16 Gripen E jets, Ukraine is expected to receive its first 16 Gripen C/D aircraft as early as 2027. These are modern combat aircraft — not promises.

$108 million and a Nordic solidarity logic

Sweden had already announced on June 18, 2026 an additional $108 million in military support under the PURL (Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List) initiative, alongside Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands. This is not an isolated decision — it is a concerted strategy aligning the most resolute allies behind a common approach. The Nordic logic of supporting Ukraine — grounded in honest threat assessment, not calculation of the minimum acceptable — is a model for the rest of Europe.

Comparing the Swedish approach to that of other European countries still hesitating to deliver certain weapons, still delaying decisions under the pretext of avoiding "escalation," reveals a gap in political courage that the coming years will make increasingly apparent. Stockholm has chosen clarity. Europe must do the same before time runs out.

Sweden was neutral since 1814. It renounced that neutrality in 2024 because its military intelligence experts told it the truth about Russia. That is what real political courage looks like: listening to your experts when what they say is uncomfortable. All of Europe should do the same. Nilsson's analyses are not political opinions — they are professional assessments from people whose job is to survive errors of evaluation.

What the 32 nations must confirm on July 7

The NATO summit in Ankara on July 7 and 8, 2026 will be a test of everything Thomas Nilsson and his Nordic counterparts have insisted upon for years. The 32 allied nations will collectively decide on the level of support for Ukraine, defense commitments for the north-eastern flank, and the response to Russia's planned military expansionism. This is not a routine meeting. It is a meeting that will shape the European security architecture for the decade ahead.

Allies are prepared to provide $70 billion to Ukraine over two years, according to information cited by Ukrainian media outlets. Donald Trump — the necessary evil, unpredictable but still present — will be in Ankara. Russia will scrutinize every word, every disagreement, every compromise. What allies say in Ankara will be heard in Moscow. And Russia will adjust its strategy accordingly.

Sweden as a model for Europe — strategic courage

Sweden offers Europe an example of what strategic courage means in practice. Joining NATO after two centuries of neutrality was not a popular decision in all layers of Swedish society. Delivering Gripen fighter jets to Ukraine while some countries still hesitate to send tanks requires a political clarity that few governments have found. Supporting Ukraine with honest analyses of the structural nature of the Russian threat, even when allies prefer soothing formulations, demands a rare intellectual rigor.

Europe needs more Sweden in its ranks — countries that look reality in the face, draw logical conclusions, and act before history forces them into painful retrospection. Poland has done it. The Baltic states have done it since 2014. Sweden and Finland have done it. Too many countries still wait for others to make the difficult choices for them.

This open letter I do not write for Thomas Nilsson — he already knows all this. I write it for all those who prefer forgetting to vigilance, comfort to clarity, soothing formulas to uncomfortable truths. The Russian threat is structural. It will survive Putin. And if Europe does not draw the right conclusions now, it will draw them in ten years under far more difficult circumstances.

Moscow is not alone — an anti-West coalition in action

Thomas Nilsson spoke of the Russian threat, but the strategic reality is more complex. Russia does not fight alone in Ukraine: North Korea supplies artillery munitions and soldiers, Iran delivers Shahed drones, and China buys sanctioned Russian oil while supplying electronic components. This coalition of Western adversaries is not a formal alliance — but it is functional and documented. Against it, the West cannot afford fragmentation.

China represents the greatest long-term strategic threat to the West — greater even than Russia, whose economic resources are fundamentally limited. But for now, it is Russia that kills Ukrainians with Iranian drones and North Korean shells. Nilsson's analysis must therefore be read in this broader context: the Western adversary is not only Moscow, but a coalition of actors who share the objective of weakening liberal democracies by every available means.

The European Union's response: €3.9 billion for drones

The EU sent a strong signal on June 30, 2026: €3.9 billion specifically allocated for Ukrainian drone production, as part of a total €90 billion loan approved in April. Two thirds of these funds are dedicated to defense needs: drones, munitions, missiles, air defense systems. Ursula von der Leyen declared that "Ukrainian ingenuity is at the heart of its resistance." This concrete aid directly responds to the structural threat Nilsson described.

Donald Trump — the necessary evil of the Atlantic alliance — remains unpredictable in his support. But on June 25, 2026, he declared that Zelensky was fighting "pretty well" against Russia. This minimal but real calibration on the American side means that US support, however capricious, has not yet been withdrawn. Europe must use this window to strengthen its own defense pillar, as Nilsson recommends and as the E5 Berlin meeting confirms.

North Korea delivers shells. Iran delivers drones. China buys sanctioned Russian oil. And some Europeans still debate whether delivering tanks to Ukraine is too provocative. This asymmetry of resolve between the West's adversaries and some of its own members is exactly the fragility Nilsson is trying to correct. I hope he will be heard before it is too late.

History as instruction — what happens when democracies appease

The European reflex to seek accommodation with Moscow has a history. Before 2022, Germany built Nord Stream. France sought strategic dialogue. Italy maintained economic ties. These choices were not made from malice — they were made from a belief that economic interdependence would moderate Russian behavior. Nilsson's point is that this belief was structurally wrong, not merely factually wrong. The incentive structure of Putin's regime does not respond to economic integration the way a liberal democracy would. It responds to strategic pressure and credible deterrence.

The Budapest Memorandum of 1994 gave Ukraine security assurances in exchange for surrendering its nuclear weapons. Those assurances were not honored when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. The lesson has been absorbed by Ukraine: the only guarantee of sovereignty is military capacity, backed by credible alliances. Nilsson teaches Europe the same lesson, now, before the next test arrives.

The price of inertia — calculated in advance

If Europe fails to act on Nilsson's warning — if it reverts to the pre-2022 posture of managed dependence and strategic ambiguity toward Moscow — the cost will not be abstract. It will be measured in future Ukrainian lives, in compromised sovereignty for the Baltic states, in accelerated Russian military rebuilding enabled by a peace that rewards aggression. The €70 billion committed at Berlin is insurance against this scenario. The Gripen E deal signed on June 30 is insurance against this scenario. Every decision taken now is a bet on whether Europe has learned from the last decade of its own history.

The war in Ukraine is not a peripheral conflict. It is a test of the central proposition of the post-1945 European order: that borders are inviolable and that aggression has a cost. If Russia escapes that test without a decisive defeat, the test will be administered again — in conditions chosen by Moscow, not by Europe's democracies. Nilsson is not making a prediction. He is reading the structure of the system. That structure has not changed.

"There is no turning back" — and then what?

"Russia has chosen its path, and there is no turning back." This sentence from Thomas Nilsson is simultaneously the most clear-eyed assessment and the most demanding challenge Europe must face. If Russia has no path back, it falls to Europe to chart a future in which liberal democracy resists, strengthens, and wins. Not by hoping for change in Moscow. But by building a resilience that makes Russian aggression inoperable over the long term.

This requires total support for Ukraine until victory. Serious defense budgets. An end to naïve notions about "dialogue bridges" with a regime that uses those dialogues as cover for military preparations. Solidarity with the north-eastern flank countries that see the threat up close. And the political will to name things clearly: Russia is our structural adversary. Not our eternal enemy — but our adversary, as long as it chooses this path.

Thank you, Mr. Nilsson — but the ball is in our court

Thomas Nilsson has done his job: analyze, name, warn with rigor and without demagoguery. He has described a reality that too few European political leaders have had the courage to articulate with this clarity. His statement of June 30, 2026 deserves to be cited in inaugural speeches, security council meetings, and contemporary history courses. Not as an analytical curiosity, but as a strategic orientation for the decisions that lie ahead.

The ball is now in our court. In that of governments that must translate analyses into policies. In that of citizens who must demand from their elected officials the clarity and courage that Nilsson showed in that interview. In that of every person who reads these lines and must decide whether they will stand on the side of vigilance or inertia. History does not record the absent. It records those who chose to see.

Sweden signs Gripen jets the day its military intelligence chief says Russia will be a threat for a generation. These two acts are inseparable. That is what an adult security policy looks like: see reality, name it, and act accordingly without waiting for history to force you to it through violence. All of Europe should take note.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

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