Germany wants to build Tomahawks, and that's excellent news

Introduction: Berlin no longer asks for permission, it builds

A negotiation that changes the strategic equation

There are pieces of news that pass almost unnoticed in the whirlwind of the daily cycle, yet still mark a turning point. On July 1, 2026, the Financial Times revealed that Germany is actively negotiating with Washington to obtain authorization to produce, on its own soil, Tomahawk cruise missiles and Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors. If this deal materializes, Berlin would become the first continental European nation to manufacture these two of the most technically sensitive American weapons systems (Army Recognition, July 1, 2026, see Sources).

This move fits a precise context: German officials are pressing their American counterparts to conclude a co-production agreement before the NATO summit in Ankara, scheduled for the following week. A source close to the matter indicated that the American response, both governmental and industrial, has proven "more positive than expected" (United24 Media, July 1, 2026, see Sources).

Why this file deserves your attention

One might think this is just another technical file, one more arms negotiation in a world that already has plenty. But that would misjudge the scale of the change. Moving from a simple financial burden-sharing arrangement — Europe paying, America producing — to genuine transatlantic industrial integration represents a change in kind, not merely in degree.

This is exactly the kind of decision that, ten years from now, will be identified as the moment Europe stopped being a mere customer of American defense and became a full industrial partner. I'll say it bluntly: watching Germany demand the right to build Tomahawks at home is watching the West finally act like a coherent bloc rather than a collection of dependent customers. It's exactly the strategic maturity Europe should have reached long ago.

The context: a year of twists on the Tomahawk file

From Biden's promise to Trump's cancellation

To understand the significance of this moment, we need to go back. In July 2024, the Biden administration and Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced the temporary deployment, starting in 2026, of a multi-domain American force equipped with Typhon launchers capable of firing Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles on German soil — a measure presented as a temporary bridge while Europe developed its own long-range strike capabilities.

Yet in early May 2026, the Trump administration suspended this deployment, citing a broader review of American military commitments in Europe. Chancellor Friedrich Merz confirmed this pullback, leaving Berlin facing a brutal capability gap it had not anticipated (Defense News, May 5, 2026, see Sources).

A reversal that forced Berlin to rethink its strategy

This American retreat sent shockwaves through Berlin. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius had to publicly admit that "this temporary agreement" reached with Biden might not hold, leaving Germany without an immediate solution to fill its long-range strike capability gap. Rather than simply absorbing the blow, Berlin chose to come back with a more ambitious proposal: no longer just buy, but manufacture.

This strategic pivot illustrates a hard but necessary lesson: depending entirely on a partner, even the closest ally, carries political risks that only partial industrial autonomy can mitigate. An uncomfortable truth must be acknowledged: American reversals on this file have hurt European trust. But instead of giving in to resentment, Germany turned that disappointment into a concrete industrial project. That's a mature response, not an emotional reaction.

What Berlin is concretely asking Washington for

Ground-launched Tomahawks and PAC-3 interceptors

The German proposal covers two specific systems. First, a ground-launched version of the Tomahawk cruise missile, with a range exceeding 1,600 kilometers, would require transferring sensitive proprietary software and guidance algorithms to German companies. Second, the Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptor, a cutting-edge hit-to-kill missile-defense technology, would help densify European air-defense coverage against tactical ballistic missiles.

According to Germany's defense ministry, an "intensive and well-established" cooperation already exists between American and German manufacturers, citing Rheinmetall's production of fuselage sections for F-35 fighter jets and a new joint MBDA-Raytheon facility manufacturing GEM-T missiles for Patriot systems (Chosun Biz, July 3, 2026, see Sources).

A realistic industrial timeline, not a miracle one

It would be naive to believe that this co-production, even if approved quickly, would produce immediate effects. Analysts stress that a gradual, incremental approach — starting with the manufacture of structural components or propulsion modules before reaching full final assembly — represents the most realistic regulatory path, given American export controls and ITAR licensing requirements.

Even with swift political and regulatory approval from Washington, establishing operational production lines will take several years before having a measurable impact on NATO inventories. This is a decade-long project, not a short-term fix. I prefer a patient Germany building real industrial capacity over a Germany buying quick, fragile fixes. Slowness here isn't a flaw, it's the mark of a serious project.

The Rheinmetall-Lockheed Martin example, a precedent that inspires

A European center of excellence already under construction

This German-American project doesn't start from zero. In May 2025, Rheinmetall and Lockheed Martin announced the creation of a joint venture in Europe to produce ATACMS missiles and Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors, with Rheinmetall holding up to 60% of the shares. The stated goal: produce up to 10,000 missiles and as many rocket motors annually once full capacity is reached.

Rheinmetall's CEO, Armin Papperger, called this facility a "European center of excellence for rockets." Solid-propellant motor production was to begin in 2026, full missile assembly from 2027, reaching full capacity between 2028 and 2029 (Militarnyi, May 2025, see Sources).

A model that reassures technology-transfer skeptics

This precedent demonstrates that transferring American intellectual property to Europe, though politically sensitive, remains feasible when both parties see a shared strategic interest. The fact that research and development are being carried out jointly with Lockheed Martin means the intellectual property rights will also be based in Europe, a far from trivial detail for the continent's strategic autonomy.

This growing trust between American and European manufacturers is the ground on which today's even more ambitious proposal to build Tomahawks on German soil is now taking root. It's not said enough: this industrial cooperation is weaving a stronger bond between America and Europe than any diplomatic summit. Shared factories create a mutual dependency that actually discourages sudden ruptures.

Why Germany is acting now, without waiting

The Iranian threat has emptied American stockpiles

The timing of this initiative is not incidental. American Tomahawk missile stockpiles have been significantly depleted by the military campaign against Iran, forcing the Pentagon to prioritize replenishing its own forces before considering any additional deployment in Europe. War Secretary Pete Hegseth himself acknowledged before Congress that it would take "months, if not years" to rebuild these inventories (reports picked up by several specialized outlets, May 2026, see Sources).

This American shortage, however frustrating for Berlin in the short term, paradoxically constitutes the strongest argument in favor of co-production: if the United States cannot guarantee reliable supply, then the only durable solution is to manufacture these weapons directly in Europe, with American consent and expertise.

Mounting pressure ahead of the NATO summit in Ankara

The diplomatic calendar adds further urgency. Berlin hopes to reach a framework agreement before the NATO summit in Ankara, seeking to present a concrete example of transatlantic industrial reinforcement at the very moment the alliance is navigating tensions over burden-sharing and the announced withdrawal of thousands of American troops stationed in Germany (Eurasia Review, July 3, 2026, see Sources).

Successfully closing this negotiation before Ankara would send a strong signal to Moscow and Beijing: despite occasional political friction between Washington and its European allies, the architecture of Western deterrence keeps getting stronger and deeper. This is exactly the kind of news that Putin and Xi Jinping dread most: proof that transatlantic tensions, however real, don't fracture deep military cooperation. The West bickers sometimes, but it keeps building together.

The limits and risks we cannot ignore

The weight of American export bureaucracy

It would be dishonest to present this file as a mere administrative formality. American export controls, governed by the ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) regime, impose rigorous vetting on any transfer of sensitive military technology. The American Congress, the domestic defense industry, and intelligence officials must all sign off before a final agreement is signed.

These checks, though sometimes perceived as frustrating obstacles by European partners, exist for good reason: they protect technologies that, if they fell into the wrong hands, could compromise Western collective security itself.

Transatlantic trust remains fragile

The American reversal on the initial Tomahawk deployment in Germany, announced then canceled within two years, has left scars. Chancellor Merz himself publicly admitted he no longer has "much hope" regarding certain earlier American promises. This legitimate caution should push Berlin to diversify its options rather than bet everything on a single co-production deal.

This is, in fact, exactly what Germany is doing in parallel, simultaneously investing in autonomous European projects like the Ruta Block 2 cruise missile, developed with Dutch startup Destinus, as an industrial safety net independent of Washington. I believe this is the right approach: negotiate with the Americans without depending exclusively on them. A Europe that keeps several options open is a Europe negotiating from strength, not weakness.

What this reveals about the balance of power with China and Russia

Beijing is watching this industrial reorganization closely

It would be a mistake to analyze this German-American negotiation in isolation, without placing it within the broader context of the rivalry between the West and the powers seeking to weaken it. China watches with particular attention every sign of cohesion or division within the transatlantic alliance, since its own strategic calculus on Taiwan depends heavily on its perception of Western solidity.

A successful co-production between Germany and the United States would send a clear message to Beijing: trade tensions and occasional disagreements over burden-sharing do not stop the West from strengthening, together, its most critical defense industrial capabilities. That's a deterrent signal that goes far beyond the European framework.

North Korea and Iran, indirect beneficiaries of a divided West

Conversely, any sign of transatlantic fragmentation would directly benefit regimes seeking to exploit Western fault lines. North Korea, which already supplies munitions and soldiers to Russia, and Iran, whose missile stockpiles precisely caused the American shortage behind this file, are both watching whether the West can turn its internal tensions into concrete projects rather than paralysis.

This is precisely why the success or failure of this German-American negotiation goes far beyond the technical question of missiles: it tests the West's ability to stay united against an increasingly coordinated axis of hostile powers. I keep repeating this in my columns: Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang are cooperating more and more closely with each other. It would be suicidal for the West, on its side, to let its own internal tensions stall industrial projects as essential as this one.

What this means for Ukraine and the eastern flank

An industrial capacity that indirectly benefits Kyiv

This German industrial buildup isn't only about defending national territory — it has direct repercussions on Europe's ability to sustain support for Ukraine over the long haul. Every additional production line for PAC-3 interceptors or Patriot missiles means, eventually, more available munitions to equip the Ukrainian air-defense batteries protecting cities against Russian strikes.

Germany has already demonstrated this concrete commitment by financing, through a $3.7 billion contract with Raytheon, the production of Patriot missiles bound for Ukraine, produced partly at the new facility in Schrobenhausen, Bavaria (Euromaidan Press, April 14, 2026, see Sources).

A signal of resolve toward Moscow

For Vladimir Putin, who has long bet on the exhaustion of Western will to support Ukraine, this new transatlantic industrial architecture sends a clear signal: the West isn't retreating, it's reorganizing to endure. The ability to manufacture sophisticated weapons directly on European soil makes this deterrence less vulnerable to the political whims of a single supplier nation.

This may be the most important message to take away from this seemingly dry technical file: the resilience of support for Ukraine will no longer depend solely on Washington's goodwill, but on an increasingly autonomous and robust European industrial base. Zelensky and his government should watch this file closely: every advance in this German-American co-production is one more guarantee that military support for Ukraine will survive changes of government in Washington or Berlin.

Conclusion: a step toward a Europe that finally stands on its own

The deeper meaning of this negotiation

What this German-American negotiation reveals goes far beyond the technical specifications of Tomahawk missiles or PAC-3 interceptors. It marks a step in Europe's strategic maturation, as it gradually stops being a mere passive buyer of American military equipment and becomes an industrial partner capable of producing, innovating, and contributing directly to its own collective security.

This transformation, if it fully materializes in the years ahead, will durably reshape the balance of the transatlantic partnership, making it more resilient to the inevitable political ups and downs on both sides of the Atlantic.

Staying watchful on execution

It now falls to German and American leaders to turn this political intention into concrete industrial reality, a process that will take years rather than months. Western citizens, and particularly the German taxpayers who will fund this buildup, have the right to demand transparency and accountability at every stage of this ambitious project.

But on the principle itself, there should be no ambiguity: a Europe that manufactures its own deterrence weapons, in close partnership with America rather than in total dependence on it, is a stronger, more credible Europe, and ultimately one more useful to the collective security of the entire West. I'll close with a simple conviction: ten years from now, we will look back at July 2026 as the month Germany stopped waiting for Washington's permission to act as a responsible industrial power. That's exactly the kind of wake-up call the entire West should imitate, and fast.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my acknowledged biases

I am a columnist and analyst, not an expert in arms export controls or missile engineering. My view of this file is openly pro-Western and favorable to strengthening European industrial autonomy in partnership with the United States, a conviction that inevitably colors my analysis in this piece.

I firmly believe that Western deterrence against Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea requires a more robust and better geographically distributed transatlantic industrial base, rather than excessive dependence on a single producing country.

What I don't know and my method

I cannot guarantee that this co-production agreement will materialize within the timeframe Berlin hopes for, nor predict how the American Congress and export-control agencies will rule on the transfer of technologies as sensitive as Tomahawk guidance algorithms. These negotiations remain, at the time I am writing this piece, at a preliminary stage.

My method consists of cross-referencing the Financial Times revelations picked up by several specialized outlets, official statements from Germany's defense ministry, and analysis from defense-specialized sources to establish the facts presented in this piece. The opinions expressed in the italicized passages are entirely my own.

Sources

Primary sources

NATO, defence spending commitment at 5% of GDP — 2026

Army Recognition, Germany seeks authorization to produce Tomahawk and PAC-3 — July 1, 2026

United24 Media, Germany pushes the United States to build Tomahawk and Patriot missiles on its soil — July 1, 2026

Secondary sources

Chosun Biz, Germany leads US-Europe arms co-production — July 3, 2026

Eurasia Review, US seeks to ease Europe troop drawdown concerns at NATO summit in Ankara — July 3, 2026

Defense News, German defense minister laments long-range strike gap caused by planned US drawdown — May 5, 2026

Euromaidan Press, Germany will pay for hundreds of Patriot missiles for Ukraine as strategic partnership signed — April 14, 2026