OPINION: Is Trump abandoning us? The fear haunting NATO's eastern flank

OPINION: Is Trump abandoning us? The fear haunting NATO's eastern flank

Introduction: The question nobody wants to ask out loud

The fear lurking beneath official communiqués

In the diplomatic corridors of Tallinn, Riga, Warsaw, and Vilnius, there is a question everyone asks in private and no one wants to put officially on the record: is Donald Trump going to actually defend the Baltic states if Russia attacks? The Guardian lifted the veil on June 27, 2026: several NATO leaders fear they can "no longer count on American help if Russia attacks." That sentence, published in a major reference publication, says it all.

The fear is not irrational. Pete Hegseth, the American Secretary of Defense, announced a 6-month review of United States presence and contributions in Europe. Trump has repeatedly stated he would not defend allies who were not paying their "fair share." And even if the American administration officially maintains its commitment to Article 5, the deliberately cultivated ambiguity creates genuine uncertainty on the alliance's eastern flank.

What Hegseth's review really means

A "6-month review" of American presence in Europe is not a withdrawal decision — it is a pressure tool. By announcing this review, Hegseth sends a message to the allies: if you do not spend more, we will reduce our presence. This is the same logic as Trump's first term, but applied with greater institutional precision.

The eastern flank: where the fear is most visceral

The Baltics: a few hundred kilometers from disaster

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania share land borders with Russia or its exclave of Kaliningrad. Their combined area is smaller than Poland. Their combined population barely exceeds 6 million. And they carry collective memories of Soviet occupation that make any naivety about the Russian threat impossible.

For these countries, NATO — and Article 5 in particular — is not a foreign policy abstraction. It is the existential guarantee of their independence. Latvia warned on June 22, 2026 that Russia is preparing hybrid attacks on the eastern flank. Russia has been conducting strike exercises from Kaliningrad with Su-24M bombers and Su-30SM2 fighters since June 21, 2026. These are not routine exercises — they are messages.

Poland: the shield that is reinforcing itself

Poland has chosen a different response to the fear of American disengagement: it spends. With a defense budget approaching 4% of GDP, an army undergoing massive rearmament, and an American military presence on its soil it actively cultivates, Poland is betting on deterrence through demonstration of force. It is a costly bet — but a coherent one.

Polish reasoning is straightforward: if the United States is willing to defend allies who invest seriously in their own defense, Poland must be unquestionably in that category. This is buying credibility with Washington through budgetary effort — a strategy never guaranteed under the Trump administration, but more convincing than doing nothing.

The Russian hybrid threat on the eastern flank

Beyond conventional war: the specter of provocation

The Guardian of June 26, 2026 and Fox News of June 22 reported warnings that Russia is preparing "provocations" in the Baltic states or Poland. These provocations are not necessarily direct military attacks — Russia knows that striking a NATO member directly would trigger Article 5. They take subtler forms: border incidents, destabilization operations, cyberattacks, information manipulation, tensions around Russian-speaking minorities.

This is what is known as hybrid warfare — a combination of military and non-military instruments designed to create pressure, instability, and uncertainty without crossing the thresholds that would trigger a collective military response. Russia practiced this in Ukraine as early as 2014. It is practicing it now on NATO's eastern border.

Kaliningrad: the exclave as a permanent threat

Russia's Kaliningrad exclave, wedged between Lithuania and Poland, has long been a splinter in NATO's flank. It houses Russian troops, Iskander missile systems capable of striking anywhere in Central Europe, and now low-altitude bombing exercises with Su-24M aircraft. These exercises, documented on June 21, 2026, are not routine training — they are rehearsals of attack scenarios.

The Suwalki Gap — the land corridor between Poland and Lithuania separating Belarus from Kaliningrad — remains the most-cited geographic vulnerability by NATO military planners. Severing that corridor would be a surgical strike against the territorial coherence of the alliance in Eastern Europe. And every exercise from Kaliningrad is a rehearsal of that possibility.

Article 5 under Trump's pressure

What Article 5 actually guarantees

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. But it leaves each member to determine the appropriate response. In theory, an attacked ally might receive only verbal declarations of support. In practice, Article 5 has always been interpreted as a collective military guarantee — but that interpretation depends on the political will of the most powerful members.

Under Trump, that political will is ambiguous. The American president has repeatedly stated he would not protect allies who were not paying their "fair share." This conditionality — unprecedented in alliance history — creates uncertainty about what Article 5 is actually worth for a country like Estonia or Latvia if Trump judges their contribution insufficient.

The European response: building autonomy to avoid dependence

Faced with this uncertainty, the rational response of the eastern flank countries is twofold: pay more to satisfy American demands, and simultaneously build sufficient military capabilities to defend themselves without American help in the short term. This is the logic behind 5% — not only to please Washington, but to build genuine strategic autonomy.

Poland exemplifies this dual logic. It spends heavily, it buys American (which satisfies Trump), and it is building an army capable of credible defense on its own territory. It is costly. It is the only rational response to American ambiguity.

What the Ankara summit can — and cannot — resolve

Possible Ankara commitments on the eastern flank

The Ankara summit can produce concrete decisions to reassure the eastern flank. Announcement of reinforced troop rotations. Deployment of additional air defense systems in the Baltic states. Larger-scale military exercises. And above all, a reaffirmation of Article 5 precise and binding enough to limit the space of ambiguity available to the American administration.

Some allies also hope Ankara will signal a permanent reinforcement — not rotations — of NATO troops on the eastern flank. The distinction is significant: a rotation means troops come and go, creating intermittent presence. A permanent presence means that in the event of a Russian attack, alliance soldiers are immediately on the spot — with all the implications that carries for deterrence.

What Ankara cannot do: restore trust in Trump

The Ankara summit can make military and budgetary decisions. But it cannot change the nature of the Trump administration. Eastern flank allies' distrust of Washington will not be resolved by a communiqué — however well drafted. It will only be resolved by years of reliable, predictable American behavior.

In the meantime, eastern flank countries do what they can: they spend, they train, they build their defenses. And they hope that at the critical moment, the alliance will hold. That is a lot of hope for a region whose history is populated by moments when guarantees were violated.

Alternatives to NATO: do they really exist?

European defense as a complement, not a replacement

The question of "European defense" regularly resurfaces as an alternative or complement to NATO. The idea: European countries building collective defense capability sufficient to protect themselves without the United States. That is a valid objective — but it faces considerable obstacles: national sovereignties difficult to reconcile, capability disparities, differing strategic interests among countries.

What is realistic in the near term is a reinforcement of intra-European bilateral and multilateral cooperation that complements NATO without replacing it. France and Germany, Poland and the Nordic countries, the Baltic states among themselves: partnerships that create additional capabilities without depending entirely on Washington.

France's nuclear response: a taboo becoming less taboo

In European strategic circles, a discussion once reserved for experts has broadened: could French nuclear deterrence play a role in the security of Eastern Europe? France possesses nuclear weapons in the name of its national sovereignty and its own deterrence. Under certain conditions, this capability could constitute a partial substitute European nuclear umbrella to that of the United States.

This discussion is far from being settled politically. But the fact that it is taking place illustrates the scale of the changes under way in European strategic thinking. American uncertainty is forcing Europe to think through alternatives it refused to contemplate just a few years ago.

The structural outlook: what the alliance must build

Beyond Ankara's immediate decisions

The Ankara summit matters. But it is only one step in a deeper transformation of Western defense. The decisions made there — budget commitments, defense contracts, eastern flank reinforcements — must be part of a long-term vision, not crisis management. NATO needs a strategic direction for the next ten years, not just the next ten months.

That strategic direction means answering difficult questions: how to maintain alliance coherence in the face of American unpredictability? How to balance Ukraine's immediate needs and long-term investments in the defense industrial base? How to build credible deterrence against multiple simultaneous threats? These questions will not find definitive answers at Ankara — but the summit can lay the foundations of a process that progressively addresses them.

The role of each ally in the collective transformation

Transforming NATO into a 21st-century alliance is a collective responsibility requiring every member to carry its share. The large countries — France, Germany, United Kingdom — must take budgetary and political leadership. The smaller countries of the eastern flank must keep setting the example of maximum commitment. And the United States must decide whether it wants to be a reliable partner or an unpredictable actor.

These individual choices, multiplied by the 32 members of the alliance, collectively define NATO's trajectory. The Ankara summit is the opportunity to reinforce the coherence of these individual choices around a shared vision — carried by Rutte and backed by the most committed members.

The historical responsibility of leaders gathered in Ankara

What the stakes demand of those who decide

The heads of state and government gathering in Ankara on July 7 and 8, 2026 carry a historical responsibility that no speech drafted by their diplomats can erase. They are meeting at the moment when Europe is more vulnerable than at any point since the end of the Cold War. And their decisions — or absence of decisions — will have lasting consequences.

History judges leaders not on their intentions but on their actions. Churchill is celebrated because he acted when others hesitated. Chamberlain is criticized because he yielded when he should have held firm. The question the Ankara summit poses is simple: which leaders do those gathered want to be in the history books? Those who stood firm against Putin, or those who temporized until it was too late?

Ukraine as the measure of Western credibility

The way NATO treats Ukraine is the most direct measure of its credibility. A country fighting with heroism for more than two years, striking Russian refineries at 1,300 km, liberating its prisoners exchange after exchange: that country deserves the unconditional support of the alliance. Not out of sentiment, but because Ukraine is Europe's first line of defense.

If NATO abandons Ukraine — or if it lets American hesitation erode its support — the message sent to every other actor in the world will be devastating. Conversely, a firm and continuous commitment to Ukraine demonstrates that the alliance is serious, that its guarantees are worth something, and that Putin will not win through attrition.

Conclusion: Fear is a warning, not a fatality

What eastern flank fear says about the state of the alliance

The fear that NATO leaders can "no longer count on the United States" is a serious alarm signal about the state of the alliance. It reveals a trust fracture between Washington and its most exposed allies that summit communiqués struggle to paper over. This fracture is the most precious strategic gift that Trump has given to Putin — perhaps without realizing it.

But fear is also a driver. It pushes eastern flank countries to spend, to arm, to develop stronger regional partnerships. It pushes Europe to think through its strategic autonomy with a seriousness it lacked before 2022. In that sense, fear is a useful warning — provided the right lessons are drawn before it is too late.

What NATO must do at Ankara to address legitimate fears

The Ankara summit cannot resolve the Trump problem. But it can deliver a response to it: concrete commitments to reinforce the eastern flank that make the alliance's defense credible independent of the White House's moods. More troops on the ground. More air defense systems. More exercises. And a reaffirmation of Article 5 that even Trump would struggle to contest publicly.

That is a lot to ask of a summit. But the situation demands it. NATO's eastern flank deserves a response commensurate with the real threat — not with what is politically comfortable.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

What I know and what I assume

Information about NATO leaders' fears comes from The Guardian of June 27, 2026. This source cites "leaders" without naming them — a common journalistic practice for sensitive official sources, but one that introduces a margin of uncertainty. Information about Russian military activities in Kaliningrad comes from Army Recognition and Fox News.

My bias

I support NATO, I support the eastern flank countries, and I am critical of Trump's policy toward the alliance. This opinion piece reflects these positions. I own them by naming them clearly.

Sources

Primary sources

The Guardian — NATO leaders fear they can no longer rely on US — June 27, 2026

The Guardian — Russia prepares provocation in Baltic States or Poland — June 26, 2026

Fox News — Russia preparing hybrid attacks on NATO's eastern flank — June 22, 2026

Army Recognition — Russia rehearses Baltic strike operations from Kaliningrad — June 21, 2026

Secondary sources

NATO/Rutte — Atlantic Council — June 25, 2026

European Parliament — Briefing on the Ankara summit — June 26, 2026

Gdansk Declaration — June 25, 2026