TESTIMONY: The Pyongyang-Moscow Alliance — How Kim Jong Un Is Reshaping Northeast Asian Security

Introduction: The Partnership Redrawing a Region

A revealing week for Northeast Asia

The week of June 19 to 26, 2026 concentrated a series of alarming signals about the state of the military partnership between North Korea and Russia. On June 25, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un personally supervised tests of an improved multiple-launch rocket system and a ballistic missile warhead — weapons equipped with automated precision guidance systems and extended ranges designed to strike key infrastructure in South Korea. On June 24, the standing commission of the Workers' Party agreed on an "exponential" expansion of the nuclear arsenal, with Kim declaring that the "most correct and only path" for Pyongyang was to continually increase its nuclear capabilities.

In parallel, a ceremony was held in Moscow to mark the second anniversary of the Russo-North Korean Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, signed on June 19, 2024 during the Pyongyang summit between Putin and Kim. The North Korean ambassador present declared that solidarity and cooperation between the two countries had "expanded and strengthened" since the signing, and that Pyongyang's strategic choice "has proven correct." On the Russian side, a representative declared that fraternal ties are "consolidated in blood." This martial rhetoric is not merely symbolic: since October 2024, North Korea has deployed more than 20,000 soldiers in Russia, including fighters directly engaged in battle zones such as Kursk.

The context: a partnership that goes beyond rhetoric

I must be honest with you: what I know about this partnership comes from open sources — South Korean intelligence, American assessments, analysis from institutes such as the ISW, CSIS, and FDD. The precise details of technology transfers between Moscow and Pyongyang are classified. I work with what is documented and cross-referenced, acknowledging that the reality is likely denser than what open sources reveal. What those sources confirm is already troubling enough to warrant our full attention.

Military Transfers: What Is Documented

From Pyongyang to Moscow: weapons, ammunition, soldiers

The North Korean contribution to the Russian war effort is now well documented. Pyongyang has supplied Moscow with artillery guns and rocket systems, millions of artillery and rocket launcher munitions, short-range ballistic missiles, and — starting in October 2024 — combat soldiers. According to South Korean intelligence, more than 20,000 North Korean soldiers have been deployed in Russia, with total cumulative casualties estimated at approximately 7,000 killed and wounded. These soldiers represent a blood investment by Pyongyang that Kim has consented to in exchange for very concrete Russian counterparts.

The FDD (Foundation for Defense of Democracies) published an analysis on June 25 detailing the scale of Russian reciprocity. Moscow is supplying North Korea with advanced technologies that risk eroding the military advantages of the United States, South Korea, and Japan in the region. Reports cite presumed transfers of submarine propulsion and stealth technology, air defense equipment (a system resembling the Pantsir-M was observed on a North Korean destroyer), and electronic warfare systems.

Improved North Korean missiles: troubling data

The most tangible result of this cooperation is the improved precision of North Korean short-range ballistic missiles. According to information cited by the Japanese Kyodo agency referencing Ukrainian defense sources, the accuracy of KN-23 and KN-24 missiles sent to Ukraine has improved considerably. In 2024, the hit rate was only 20% with a margin of error of 1 to 3 kilometers. By April 2026, the margin of error had narrowed to 1 to 5 meters, and the missiles had acquired an irregular trajectory capability that is difficult to intercept. More than 100 KN-23/KN-24 missiles have been used in Ukraine, causing at least 170 casualties. These missiles can reach all of South Korea and parts of Japan — a strategic data point heavy with consequences.

Kim Jong Un and the Nuclear Program: A Race Toward Global Domination

The "exponential" arsenal: ambition and reality

During the enlarged Central Committee meeting of the Korean Workers' Party that concluded this week, Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his will to expand "the nuclear arsenal with the goal of dominating the world." He committed Pyongyang to arming its warships with nuclear missiles, increasing the production of weapons-grade fissile material, and growing the nuclear stockpile at an "exponential" pace. A constitutional provision adopted earlier this year gives him constitutional authority over nuclear forces and the ability to delegate the launch decision — a safeguard against a potential decapitation strike.

On June 24, at an official ceremony in the port of Nampo, Kim presided over the commissioning of North Korea's first destroyer — the vessel Choe Hyon — a 5,000-tonne ship intended to carry nuclear-capable missiles. He announced the construction of two additional ships of this class each year for five years. South Korean analysts note that weapons tested from the vessel, including a supersonic cruise missile, appear to incorporate Russian technology transferred through the 2024 strategic partnership.

Why does Kim need so many nuclear weapons?

The question posed by Guardian analysts on June 24 is fundamental: why is North Korea developing such a vast arsenal? According to researchers cited, the lesson drawn from Iran is explicit: nations that do not have a fully functional nuclear capability risk being targeted rather than deterred. The North Korean arsenal is designed to survive an initial strike — with mobile launchers on railways and roads, fortified underground facilities, and an increasingly advanced submarine fleet. The goal is to make locating all these weapons impossible, making any disarmament strike a gamble.

The Impact on the Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia

Regional balances overturned

The Russo-North Korean partnership seriously complicates strategic management of the Korean Peninsula for the United States, South Korea, and Japan. First, the diplomatic isolation of Pyongyang — once the primary pressure strategy — is now considerably reduced. With Russia as an economic, diplomatic, and technological partner, and China dominating trade at 98% of foreign commerce, North Korea has less incentive than ever to engage in denuclearization negotiations.

Second, technology transfers from Moscow to Pyongyang diversify and improve North Korean military capabilities in ways that sanctions cannot counter. According to an American assessment report cited in analysts' work, Russia is supplying North Korea with technologies applicable to space, nuclear, and missile programs — transfers that "will enable advances in Pyongyang's weapons of mass destruction programs" over the "next three to five years."

Seoul's response: a drone army

South Korea's reaction to these developments is telling. On June 26, South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back announced ambitious plans to strengthen the country's drone forces, in direct response to the growing threats from North Korea and its presumed technology transfers from Russia. The plan includes developing long-range explosive drones, acquiring more than 20,000 low-cost reconnaissance and attack drones, and training all 500,000 active-duty soldiers as "drone warriors." Ahn explicitly stated: "North Korea is currently receiving technology transfers from Russia — there is therefore an urgent need to respond proactively to the evolution of warfare."

Denuclearization: An Objective Becoming Theoretical

When official policy diverges from reality

The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remains the official policy of South Korea, the United States, Japan — and even nominally China. At the G7 summit in May 2026, Trump and Xi Jinping reiterated a "shared goal" of denuclearizing North Korea, according to the White House. But according to independent reports on Xi's visit to Pyongyang, denuclearization was not mentioned during the meetings. This divergence reveals the rhetorical character of the objective.

Specialized researchers estimate that Washington and Seoul will continue to promote denuclearization as a formal objective, but that the practical focus will likely shift toward arms control — limiting and progressively reducing the arsenal rather than eliminating it entirely. This shift may be realistic, but it represents a major strategic retreat from the ambitions publicly displayed for thirty years.

The risk of secondary proliferation

Beyond the Korean Peninsula itself, the Russo-North Korean partnership raises the risk of secondary proliferation — that Pyongyang will begin marketing its improved missile technologies to third parties. North Korea has already supplied missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine. Reports from the Sasakawa Peace Foundation note that serious concerns exist about possible transfers of North Korean missile technologies, military expertise, and nuclear knowledge to third-party countries — developments that could affect the security of nations far beyond Northeast Asia.

Kim Jong Un and the Nuclear Program: A Race Toward Global Domination

The "exponential" arsenal: ambition and reality

During the enlarged Central Committee meeting of the Korean Workers' Party that concluded this week, Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his will to expand "the nuclear arsenal with the goal of dominating the world." He committed Pyongyang to arming its warships with nuclear missiles, increasing the production of weapons-grade fissile material, and growing the nuclear stockpile at an "exponential" pace. A constitutional provision adopted this year gives him constitutional authority over nuclear forces and the ability to delegate the launch decision.

On June 24, at an official ceremony in the port of Nampo, Kim presided over the commissioning of North Korea's first destroyer — the Choe Hyon — a 5,000-tonne vessel intended to carry nuclear-capable missiles. He announced the construction of two additional ships of this class each year for five years. Analysts note that weapons tested from the vessel, including a supersonic cruise missile, appear to incorporate Russian technology transferred through the strategic partnership of 2024. The logic is terrible in its coherence: Saddam Hussein had no bomb and was hanged. Gaddafi abandoned his nuclear program and was lynched. Kim drew a simple and implacable conclusion — and that is why no economic pressure has, to date, altered his nuclear trajectory.

The Impact on the Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia

Regional balances overturned

The Russo-North Korean partnership seriously complicates strategic management of the Korean Peninsula for the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The diplomatic isolation of Pyongyang — once the primary pressure strategy — is now considerably reduced. With Russia as a partner and China dominating trade, North Korea has less incentive than ever to engage in denuclearization negotiations.

Technology transfers from Moscow to Pyongyang diversify and improve North Korean military capabilities in ways that sanctions cannot counter. According to an American assessment report, Russia is supplying North Korea with technologies applicable to space, nuclear, and missile programs — transfers that "will enable advances in Pyongyang's weapons of mass destruction programs" over the "next three to five years."

Seoul's response: a drone army

South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back announced ambitious plans to strengthen the country's drone forces, in direct response to North Korea's growing threats. The plan includes developing long-range explosive drones, acquiring more than 20,000 low-cost drones, and training all 500,000 active-duty soldiers as "drone warriors."

Ahn stated explicitly: "North Korea is currently receiving technology transfers from Russia — there is therefore an urgent need to respond proactively." This South Korean response illustrates a broader trend: nations facing direct threats do not wait for diplomatic cycles. They act with budgets, acquisition programs, and training. It is the lesson Ukraine learned the hard way — and that Seoul is now integrating into its doctrine.

Denuclearization: An Objective Becoming Theoretical

When official policy diverges from reality

The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remains the official policy of South Korea, the United States, Japan — and nominally China. At the G7 summit in May 2026, Trump and Xi Jinping reiterated a "shared goal" of denuclearization. But according to independent reports on Xi's visit to Pyongyang, denuclearization was not mentioned during the meetings. This divergence reveals the rhetorical character of the objective.

Specialized researchers estimate that Washington and Seoul will continue to promote denuclearization as a formal objective, but that the practical focus will likely shift toward arms control — limiting and progressively reducing the arsenal rather than eliminating it entirely. This shift may be realistic, but it represents a major strategic retreat from thirty years of publicly stated ambitions.

Long-term perspectives

The future of the North Korean nuclear file will be largely determined by the evolution of the war in Ukraine — a variable no one could have anticipated. If Russia emerges weakened from this conflict, Pyongyang's position becomes more fragile. If Russia holds its ground or obtains territorial concessions, the alliance with North Korea will be reinforced for a decade. The war in Ukraine is therefore also, indirectly, the war for the stability of the Korean Peninsula.

The West must integrate this interconnection into its strategy. Supporting Ukraine with sufficient weapons to impose an unbearable cost on Russia is also sending a signal to Pyongyang: that military ambitions backed by revisionist powers have limits. Deterrence in this war is not played only on the Ukrainian battlefield — it is also played in the capitals of Seoul, Tokyo, and Taipei.

Conclusion: An Axis Challenging the Liberal International Order

What this partnership reveals about the world of 2026

The Russo-North Korean partnership is not simply an alliance of opportunity between two sanctioned states — it is the symptom of a profound geopolitical reconfiguration in which authoritarian regimes are learning to protect each other from Western pressure. Pyongyang, Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing share a fundamental common interest: counterbalancing American influence and dismantling the liberal international order built since 1945. Their increasingly operational and less rhetorical cooperation represents a systemic challenge that democracies cannot address with sanctions policies alone.

What democracies must do

The appropriate response to this reality is multidimensional. It requires strengthening existing alliances — South Korea, Japan, Australia — with credible deterrence commitments and technology transfers. It requires closer coordination of intelligence on weapons transfers among members of the axis. And it demands intellectual honesty about the fact that the denuclearization of North Korea, while formally remaining the objective, requires a radically different approach from all those that have failed for thirty years. The world in which Kim Jong Un builds his first destroyer with nuclear missiles and Russian technologies is a more dangerous world — and the West must look this reality in the face.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

My sources, my limits, my biases

I approach this subject with the humility it deserves: North Korea is one of the most opaque regimes in the world. Information on military programs, technology transfers, and Pyongyang's strategic intentions comes primarily from intelligence services (American, South Korean, Japanese), from specialized institute analyses, and from a limited number of open sources. I do not claim access to information that is not publicly available. My bias is clearly pro-Western: I believe North Korea represents a real threat and that the partnership with Russia amplifies it in a concerning way.

The uncertainties I acknowledge

The precise data on Russian technology transfers to Pyongyang are not fully confirmed. The missile precision figures for KN-23/KN-24 (margin of error reduced to 1–5 meters) come from a Ukrainian source cited by Kyodo — not independently corroborated at this date. The actual scale of the North Korean nuclear program remains partly opaque. I work with the best available data while acknowledging these limits.

Sources

Primary sources

The Guardian — North Korea's exponential nuclear program: why Kim Jong-un is racing to expand — June 24, 2026

FDD — Kim Pushes for Faster North Korean Defense Buildup With Russia's Help — June 25, 2026

ISW — Korean Peninsula Update, June 23, 2026 — June 23, 2026

Secondary sources

New York Times — North Korea Deploys Its First Destroyer, Vowing to Project Nuclear Power — June 25, 2026

Sasakawa Peace Foundation — Why North Korea's Involvement in Russo-Ukrainian War Matters for Indo-Pacific — June 2026

New Indian Express — North Korea conducts major weapons tests, Kim calls for stronger offensive posture — June 26, 2026