FACT CHECK: Beijing Claims Its Trade With Moscow Is "Legitimate" — The Evidence Says Otherwise

Introduction: Beijing’s Comfortable Lie

A phrase, a world of denial

On June 17, 2026, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission — the USCC — updated its tracker of Beijing's position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Within its lines, one finds a statement that has become a mantra for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: spokesperson Guo Jiakun asserts that all of China's trade with Russia is "legitimate and legal". This was in response to threats of secondary tariffs from U.S. President Donald Trump against Beijing, accused of buying sanctioned Russian oil.

This formula — "legitimate and legal" — is now set in stone in Chinese diplomacy. It resurfaces with every new round of Western sanctions, every investigative report, and every formal warning. It is delivered with the same quiet confidence, whether the subject is barrels of oil, drone components, military lubricants, or the training of Russian soldiers. China, in its own terms, is merely defending its legitimate national interests. This fact-check intends to confront this rhetoric with documented facts.

The method: distinguishing the proven from the probable

This is no simple exercise. Between Western propaganda, Chinese propaganda, and the fog of war, the truth exists — but it is fragmented. My job here is to distinguish three levels: what is established by official data (Chinese customs, EU documents, USCC reports), what is corroborated by multiple independent sources (Reuters, Bloomberg, Carnegie, RSIS), and what falls under allegations not yet irrefutably proven, even if they are credible. Beijing's systematic denial will be faithfully reported at each step — this is a journalistic requirement, not an act of complacency.

The baseline figures are clear and indisputable: according to Chinese customs data compiled by EuropeanRelations.com (June 20, 2026), China-Russia bilateral trade reached $234 billion in 2025, following a peak of nearly $250 billion in 2024. Before the February 2022 invasion, this figure hovered around $190 billion. In three years of total war, trade has exploded. This is not a coincidence. It is a strategy.

The $234 Billion Figure: What Chinese Customs Confirm

A war record, not a market fluke

The $234 billion in bilateral trade between China and Russia in 2025 comes directly from General Administration of Customs of China data, as reported by EuropeanRelations.com and confirmed by multiple independent analyses, including The Moscow Times (May 2026). This figure represents an increase of more than 23% compared to 2022 levels, the first year of the full-scale war. In absolute terms, China has nearly doubled its trade with a Russia blacklisted by the West since 2022.

It is useful to put this figure into historical context. In 2021, the pre-war reference year, bilateral trade stood at $146.9 billion. After February 24, 2022, the date of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, trade skyrocketed: $190 billion in 2022, then a peak at approximately $245-254 billion depending on the source in 2024, before a slight dip in 2025 (-6.5%) that the USCC attributes primarily to payment frictions caused by Chinese banks' fear of American secondary sanctions — rather than any strategic disengagement by Beijing.

The 2025 decline: Repentance or tactical caution?

The slight decrease in 2025 is often cited by Beijing's apologists as proof that China is "moderating" its trade with Russia. An analysis by The Next Web (May 2026) refutes this reading: the decline in general trade did not extend to the most sensitive goods. In 2025, Chinese exports of "high priority" dual-use goods reached $1.9 billion for the first half of the year alone, exceeding on an annualized basis the $4 billion for the full year 2024. In other words, civilian goods are slightly down, but strategic components for the Russian war machine are on the rise.

Chinese customs themselves — a rare occurrence — continue to publish this data with no apparent embarrassment. As noted by an analysis from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (May 2024), the fact that Beijing openly publishes its export figures for dual-use goods to Russia demonstrates a deliberate disregard for the Western export control regime, which Chinese officials label as "extraterritorial jurisdiction." This isn't negligence. It's a political signal.

92% of Trade in Rubles and Yuan: The Geography of Evasion

The systemic bypassing of Western sanctions

According to EuropeanRelations.com (June 20, 2026), about 92% of China-Russia bilateral trade is now settled in rubles and yuan — up from only 25% before the February 2022 invasion. This figure was mentioned by Vladimir Putin himself during the Russo-Chinese Expo in Harbin in May 2024: "Today, 90% of all payments are already made in rubles and yuan." This massive monetary pivot has a very specific function: to remove transactions from sanction mechanisms denominated in dollars and euros.

The Carnegie Endowment clarifies the mechanism: yuan payments allow Russia to access markets and currencies outside the Western-controlled SWIFT system. Economist Kimberly Donovan, director of the Atlantic Council's GeoEconomics Center, explains that "the two countries are transacting in Chinese yuan and Russian rubles, which allows them to bypass Western sanctions because the transactions take place outside the U.S. dollar, the euro, and other currencies of the G7 sanctions coalition." The result is a Russia that maintains a trade surplus of over $100 billion with China despite Western ostracism.

The limits of the Yuan: Real friction, fictional break

The Chinese argument insists on payment frictions as evidence of a certain alignment with Western norms. It is true that since August 2024, major Chinese banks have temporarily suspended some transactions with Russia, fearing American secondary sanctions. The South China Morning Post (June 5, 2026) analyzes this tension: Chinese banks are trying to preserve their access to the global dollar-based financial system while maintaining their business flow with Moscow. This is not virtue. It is risk management.

The Moscow Times notes (November 2025) that while overall trade volume declined slightly in 2025, a significant portion of the historic rise since 2021 reflects price hikes rather than increasing volumes, particularly for dual-use goods. Prices for export-controlled goods shipped from China to Russia increased by an average of 87% between 2021 and 2024, compared to only 9% for the same goods exported to other countries. The war's margin is, quite literally, profitable for Chinese exporters.

Dual-Use Goods: The Category That Bothers Beijing

$300 million a month, every month since 2024

The USCC report on China's facilitation of sanctions evasion (November 2025) establishes a documented and quantified fact: in 2024, the General Administration of Customs of China itself reported more than $300 million in monthly exports to Russia of "high priority" dual-use goods — goods identified by the U.S., EU, Japan, and the UK as necessary for the production of Russian weapons. These 50 categories of high-priority goods include microelectronics, telecommunications equipment, machine tools, radar, optical devices, sensors — exactly what a war economy in desperate need of technology like Russia's must import to continue producing missiles, drones, and armored vehicles.

The Carnegie Endowment (May 2024) documents that China was responsible for approximately 90% of Russian imports of goods covered by the G7 high-priority list in 2023. This figure is confirmed by the RSIS (August 2025). The Next Web specifies that Chinese exports of dual-use goods to Russia exceeded $4 billion in annual value in both 2024 and 2025, and that Chinese turbojet exports to Russia in the first half of 2025 exceeded the combined total for 2023 and 2024 by 37%. These data do not come from Western intelligence services. They come from the Chinese customs themselves.

Beijing’s official response: Strict control and trade sovereignty

Faced with this data, China's position is unchanging. Guo Jiakun, questioned on the European sanctions of July 2025: "China has never provided lethal weapons to any party to the conflict, and strictly controls exports of dual-use goods." His colleague Lin Jian, in response to British sanctions (May 2026): "China opposes any unilateral sanctions not authorized by the UN Security Council and maintains that trade between Chinese and Russian companies complies with WTO rules." This position is consistent, prepared, and repeated identically for years.

The problem is that the distinction between "lethal weapons" and "dual-use goods used in the manufacture of lethal weapons" is precisely at the heart of the debate. Beijing does not officially provide missiles to Russia. But the microelectronics, machine tools, and drone engines it exports by the hundreds of millions of dollars every month are the components without which these missiles cannot be built. The line between direct weaponry and indirect support has rarely been so thin — and so exploited.

Shenzhen Minghuaxin: Drone Components for the Russian Army

The European sanction of June 15, 2026

On June 15, 2026, the European Union officially sanctioned Shenzhen Minghuaxin, a technology company based in the world's electronics capital. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1361, published that day and analyzed by denuo.legal (June 19, 2026), designates this company for having supplied drone components to the Russian military-industrial complex, notably via the company Rustakt LLC, which was also sanctioned in the same package. According to an analysis by EU Perspectives (June 16, 2026), Shenzhen Minghuaxin supplied Rustakt with essential components for the production of drones used for strikes on Ukraine.

The Kyiv Post and Ukra0020101nska Pravda (June 15, 2026) confirm this information in their reports on the 21st package of European sanctions. The Straits Times (June 16, 2026) specifies that Shenzhen Minghuaxin was "accused of providing drone components to the Russian military". The company itself has not published a documented public denial to date. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded generically by rejecting the sanctions as "illegal" and asking the EU to stop "harming the legitimate interests of Chinese companies without a factual basis."

The structural pattern: From China to Russia via opaque networks

The USCC (November 2025) documents a systemic pattern: Chinese companies ship components to Russia using intermediaries, false labeling, and shell companies in Hong Kong. Reuters (cited by the USCC, July 2025) reports that Chinese companies were secretly shipping engines to the Russian weapons manufacturer IEMZ Kupol by falsely labeling them as "industrial refrigeration units." These shipments allegedly allowed IEMZ Kupol to increase production of its Garpiya-A1 attack drone, used against military and civilian targets in Ukraine. A Financial Times report (January 2026) documents the use of a Central Asian country as a fake end-user to bypass Chinese export controls on drone components for a Russian defense industrialist.

Ukra0020101nska Pravda (May 2026) adds that Chinese companies were openly exporting, without even bothering to conceal, hundreds of containers of engines and other dual-use goods to Russia and Iran. The same source notes that since April 2025, China has begun providing Russia with significantly larger volumes of fiber optic cables after Ukraine neutralized Russia's main producer of this component in Saransk. This is not the behavior of a neutral actor. It is active war logistics.

Xinxiang Richful: Lubricants for the War Machines

The additive giant that replaced the West

Xinxiang Richful Lubricant Additive Company is one of the largest manufacturers and distributors of lubricant additives in China. It was also sanctioned on June 15, 2026, by the European Union in the same package as Shenzhen Minghuaxin. The specialized source Lubes'N'Greases (June 16, 2026) provides the most precise detail publicly available: according to a study by the Center for Intelligence and Research Analysis (CIRA), Richful shipped approximately 36,000 metric tons of additives to Russia between April 2023 and April 2024, gaining market share directly following the withdrawal of Western suppliers after the 2022 sanctions.

Lubricants and their additives are militarily critical goods: they allow for the operation of armored vehicles, military aircraft, and missiles. Babel.ua (June 15, 2026) and Ukra0020101nska Pravda confirm that Xinxiang Richful provided chemical additives for mechanical lubricants destined for the Russian army. The company, for its part, has "firmly denied" the allegations according to Lubes'N'Greases. It should be noted that neither Richful nor Shenzhen Minghuaxin has provided documented public evidence refuting the cargo tracking data upon which the European sanctions are based.

The replacement mechanic: Beijing as a substitute supplier

The Richful case illustrates a broader phenomenon documented by the USCC: China has systematically filled the gaps left by Western sanctions in the Russian economy. Whether it is lubricants (Richful), electronic components, machine tools, or even barrels of refined oil, Chinese suppliers have occupied the niches abandoned by Western companies forced to leave within months. The Moscow Times (May 2026) notes that China now provides 90% of Russia's sanctioned technology imports, up from about 80% in 2025.

Bloomberg (cited by the USCC, November 2025) reports that the EU had proposed as early as June 2025 to sanction two Chinese banks for helping Russia bypass trade restrictions. Beijing responded through Lin Jian that "trade between Chinese and Russian companies complies with WTO rules." But as the USCC notes, the WTO is based on the reciprocity of trade agreements and not on the moral legitimacy of partners. Being WTO-compliant does not exclude being complicit in a war crime.

Military Training: The Red Line Beijing Denies Crossing

Kaja Kallas: "We have now verified the reports"

On June 15, 2026, in Luxembourg, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, told foreign ministers: "We have now verified the reports that the Chinese military has trained Russian military personnel to fight in Ukraine." She added: "We are carefully evaluating the implications." These statements were reported by The Straits Times (June 16, 2026), which specified that Kallas did not name specific sources or provide further details during the press conference.

These statements rely on a Reuters report from May 2026 (cited by the USCC) stating that the Chinese military allegedly secretly organized training sessions focused primarily on the use of drones for approximately 200 Russian military personnel in China in late 2025, some of whom have since returned to fight in Ukraine. This report allegedly relies on three European intelligence agencies and a Sino-Russian agreement signed by senior officers in Beijing in July 2025. The USCC had also noted (November 2025) that since August 2025, a shadow fleet tanker carrying Russian LNG from a sanctioned facility had docked for the first time at a Chinese terminal — a clear signal of defiance.

Beijing’s denial: Slander, slander, slander

The response from the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson on June 16, 2026, to Kallas's statements was immediate and blunt: "The relevant claims have no factual basis. It is pure slander and an attempt to smear [China]." (Straits Times, June 16, 2026.) Beijing had already denied the Reuters report from May, calling it an attempt to "shift responsibility for the war." This posture of total denial is consistent with the diplomatic line defended since 2022: China is neutral, promotes peace, and Western accusations are merely political.

It should be noted, for the sake of journalistic rigor, that the publicly available evidence on military training remains at this stage derived from intelligence sources whose methods cannot be fully verified publicly. The USCC calls them credible, and Kallas's verification adds European institutional weight. However, it would be inaccurate to claim that this allegation is as firmly documented as the customs data on dual-use goods exports. The distinction between what is proven and what is alleged is a journalistic line I maintain.

The 125 Chinese Entities Sanctioned by Washington

A list that grows as the war lasts

Between February 2022 and August 2025, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 125 Chinese or Hong Kong entities to the list of entities providing support to Russia's military and defense industrial base. It is a figure that speaks for itself — except for Beijing, which comments on it extensively as a matter of "abusive extraterritorial jurisdiction" and "malicious suppression." The Next Web (May 2026) adds that more than 20 additional Chinese and Hong Kong companies were sanctioned in 2025 alone for providing critical inputs to the Russian defense industry.

Among recent examples documented by the USCC: Xiamen Limbach Aircraft Engine and Redlepus Vector Industry Shenzhen, sanctioned by Washington for allegedly supporting the Russian war machine via aircraft engines. Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics appears on the Commerce blacklist for technology transfers. The USCC (November 2025) also notes that the New York Times reported in July 2025 that at least 130 Chinese and Hong Kong companies were advertising export-controlled chips destined for Russia, including critical components integrated into Russian cruise missiles used against Ukraine.

Beijing’s response to U.S. sanctions: Symmetrical escalation

Beijing does not remain passive in the face of sanctions. In April 2026, after the EU included 28 Chinese and Hong Kong companies in its 20th anti-Russian sanctions package, China placed seven European defense and aerospace companies on its own export control list, banning them from importing Chinese dual-use goods. Among the targeted companies: the Belgian arms manufacturer FN Herstal. (RFE/RL, April 24, 2026.) This counter-move illustrates Chinese geopolitical logic: trade sovereignty as a weapon, reciprocity as a deterrent signal.

The South China Morning Post (April 26, 2026) reports that Beijing's Ministry of Commerce had then demanded that the EU immediately remove Chinese companies and nationals from the sanctions list, threatening to take "all necessary measures to protect the rights and interests" of its citizens and businesses. The rhetoric is firm, but it fails to address any underlying facts: it does not refute customs data, does not comment on the volumes of dual-use goods, and does not contest the cargo tracking documents presented by the European Commission.

Wang Yi: "China Does Not Want a Russian Defeat"

A statement that contradicts the displayed neutrality

One of the most disturbing revelations compiled in the USCC tracker dates back to July 2, 2025: according to a USCC memo based on reports from government sources, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi allegedly told European Union officials that Beijing did not want a Russian defeat in Ukraine because the United States would then focus entirely on China. This statement — if accurate, and the USCC presents it as substantiated — is disarmingly frank about the geopolitical logic underpinning Beijing's economic support for Moscow.

This is not neutrality. It is a geopolitical pressure management strategy: keep Russia strong enough to occupy the United States and Europe, thereby freeing up strategic bandwidth for Beijing in the Sino-American competition. Russia, in this vision, is a useful strategic asset — even weakened, even bleeding — as long as it does not collapse completely. China's economic support for Russia is therefore not merely commercial: it is functionally strategic.

The "no limits" partnership: The starting contract

On February 4, 2022, exactly twenty days before the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin established a "no limits" trade partnership during their meeting at the Beijing Olympics. The USCC (November 2025) emphasizes that this partnership served as the framework for the explosion of trade that followed. This timing is not insignificant: it suggests coordination, or at least anticipation, of what was going to happen. Beijing has denied any prior knowledge of the invasion — and this specific denial remains difficult to prove or refute publicly.

What is documented, however, is that in the months following the invasion, China became the world's leading buyer of Russian fossil fuels, importing approximately 2.2 million barrels per day of crude oil in 2024 — directly undermining the effectiveness of the G7 price cap on Russian oil, designed to choke off war funding. The USCC labels China as the "world's leading supplier of dual-use military supplies to Russia and leading buyer of its energy exports". Both pillars of Russian war funding rely on Beijing.

The June 17 USCC Report: What the Document Actually Says

A monitoring tool, not a formal accusation

The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) maintains a chronological database of Beijing's position on the invasion of Ukraine, updated regularly. The June 17, 2026 update — the date indicated in the angle of this article — is the most recent version available of this public tracker, accessible to all on uscc.gov. It compiles official statements, documented actions, and press information, classified by date and category (statements, sanctions, actions). It is a reference tool, not a judicial indictment report.

Regarding the specific statement by Guo Jiakun asserting that "all of China's trade with Russia is legitimate and legal", the USCC tracker dates it to August 8, 2025 — in response to Donald Trump's threats of secondary tariffs against Beijing for its purchases of sanctioned Russian oil. The same wording has been used multiple times since then, notably by other Chinese MFA spokespeople in similar contexts. The most recent entry in the tracker again quotes Lin Jian using an almost identical formulation in response to the British sanctions of May 2026. The consistency of the message is itself a documented fact.

What the tracker reveals about Beijing’s trajectory

A chronological reading of the USCC tracker since 2022 reveals a trajectory of progressive escalation: initial statements of "neutrality," an increasing defense of the legitimacy of trade, increasingly aggressive protests against Western sanctions, and increasingly documented actions by Chinese entities providing militarily sensitive goods. Simultaneously, official denials become more mechanical — less nuance, more canned formulas. Guo Jiakun's "legitimate and legal" is repeated with the precision of an algorithm, not the spontaneity of conviction.

The USCC also points out (November 2025) that China fundamentally refuses to adopt export controls aligned with those of the U.S., EU, Japan, and the UK, and continues to allow the direct sale of dual-use technologies as well as transshipment via its territory. This position is not a bureaucratic oversight. It is a deliberate political choice. Guo Jiakun's "legitimate and legal," in this context, simply means: "legal according to our own laws, which we have chosen so as not to constrain our relationship with Moscow."

Beijing’s Rhetoric: Anatomy of a Five-Point Argument

The five pillars of Chinese diplomatic discourse

Beijing's rhetoric on the subject is structured around five recurring arguments, identifiable in all statements since 2022: (1) China opposes "unilateral sanctions with no basis in international law and without UN Security Council authorization." (2) China "strictly controls its exports of dual-use goods in accordance with its laws and regulations." (3) Normal trade between Chinese and Russian companies "must not be disrupted." (4) China "has never provided lethal weapons to any party to the conflict." (5) Western allegations are "politicization," "abusive extraterritorial jurisdiction," or "slander."

Each of these points deserves to be tested against the facts. Point (1) is a defensible legal position — but it is used to block any coordinated pressure. Point (2) is contradicted by Chinese customs data itself on volumes of dual-use goods. Point (3) ignores the distinction between ordinary trade and trade in support of a war of aggression. Point (4) is technically true regarding direct lethal weapons — but dodges the question of components. Point (5) is a rhetorical technique, not a factual refutation.

The strength of Chinese discourse: Its international consistency

It would be intellectually dishonest not to acknowledge the partial effectiveness of this rhetoric. A large part of the Global South shares Beijing's skepticism toward unilateral American and European sanctions. Countries like India, Turkey, Brazil, or the UAE also maintain trade links with Russia. In this context, the Chinese discourse finds real resonance. The argument of "legitimacy" relies on a sincere — if often hypocritical — critique of Western double standards regarding international law.

But this partial resonance does not change the central fact: the documented evidence shows that Chinese entities are supplying militarily critical goods to Russia on an unprecedented scale, in the context of a war of aggression that the vast majority of the international community has condemned at the UN. The popularity of an argument in certain capitals does not make it factual. And fact-checking — which is precisely the purpose of this article — has no concern for popularity.

What China Is Not Doing (Yet): The Documented Limits

No direct lethal weapons: A line maintained

It would be inaccurate — and contrary to the requirement of journalistic honesty — to claim that China is doing "everything" to support Russia. There is a line that Beijing has not, to date, publicly crossed: the direct supply of lethal weapons to the Russian army — missiles, tanks, artillery systems. The USCC, in its updated tracker, does not document public proof of direct lethal weapon transfers from the Chinese state to the Russian army. The Ukrainian foreign policy chief, as well as Western intelligence sources, systematically distinguish this line from support in dual-use goods.

It should also be noted that China, according to cybersecurity reports cited by the USCC (June 2025), also spies on Russian government agencies and defense corporations to obtain information on the weapons and tactics deployed in Ukraine. This is behavior that runs counter to total solidarity with Moscow. The Sino-Russian relationship is an alliance of convenience and interest, not an unconditional ideological alliance. Beijing monitors Russia as much as it supports it.

Chinese intelligence on Ukraine: A documented double game

The New York Times (cited by the USCC, June 2025) reports that an internal Russian intelligence document written in late 2023 or early 2024 claimed that China was spying on Russian military operations in Ukraine to learn more about Western weapons and tactics. This document suggests that Beijing views the war in Ukraine as an observation room for NATO's military capabilities — a perspective that explains its interest in the conflict prolonging without a decisive winner. The USCC also notes that Beijing-linked hacker groups have "repeatedly targeted Russian government agencies and defense corporations".

These elements complicate the simple narrative of China as an unconditional "enabler" of Russia — while not fundamentally contradicting it. Beijing supports the Russian war economy because it serves its strategic interests. It simultaneously monitors the Russians because it serves other strategic interests. It’s not schizophrenia: it’s large-scale realpolitik. And in this realpolitik, the Ukrainians dying under drones equipped with Chinese components are merely a variable in Xi Jinping's geopolitical equation.

The Fact-Check Verdict: What is Established, What is Alleged, What is Invented

Summary table of verified facts

ESTABLISHED BY OFFICIAL DATA: China-Russia bilateral trade reached $234 billion in 2025 (Chinese customs, confirmed by EuropeanRelations.com and Moscow Times). 92% of trade is settled in rubles and yuan (EuropeanRelations.com, June 20, 2026). China exported over $4 billion of high-priority dual-use goods to Russia in 2024 and 2025 (Chinese customs data, USCC, Carnegie). Shenzhen Minghuaxin and Xinxiang Richful were sanctioned by the EU on June 15, 2026, for providing military components to Russia (EU Official Journal, Straits Times, Denuo Legal, EuropeanRelations.com). 125 Chinese and Hong Kong entities have been added to the U.S. BIS list for supporting the Russian military base (USCC, November 2025). Guo Jiakun stated that Sino-Russian trade is "legitimate and legal" (statement of August 8, 2025, USCC).

CORROBORATED BY MULTIPLE CREDIBLE INDEPENDENT SOURCES: The use of false labeling and shell companies by Chinese firms to deliver drone components to Russia (Reuters, cited by USCC; Ukra0020101nska Pravda). The training of 200 Russian soldiers by the Chinese military on the use of drones (Reuters, verified according to Kallas/EU). Wang Yi's statement that China did not want a Russian defeat (USCC). SERIOUS ALLEGATIONS BUT NOT FULLY VERIFIABLE PUBLICLY: Beijing's prior knowledge of the 2022 invasion (no documented public proof). Specific support for Russian nuclear or hypersonic weapons programs (allegations by The Telegraph, January 2026, denied by Beijing). NOT ESTABLISHED: Direct delivery of lethal weapons by the Chinese state to the Russian military.

Guo Jiakun’s rhetoric vs. the verdict

Guo Jiakun's statement that "all of China's trade with Russia is legitimate and legal" is, in its letter, partially true: a large portion of Sino-Russian trade does indeed comply with Chinese laws. This is precisely the problem. Chinese export control laws are deliberately constructed so as not to align Beijing with Western sanctions regimes. By not adopting comparable export controls, China has granted itself the "legal right" to do what all industrialized democracies have chosen not to do. Legal according to its own rules does not mean legitimate under international law, let alone morality.

The EU and U.S. sanctions against specific Chinese entities are not based on a violation of Chinese law — Beijing is right on this point. They are based on the violation of the export rules of the sanctioning states, on documented support for a war economy illegal under international law, and on the facilitation of an aggression condemned by the UN General Assembly. Beijing's "legality" is a legality of convenience, built to permit exactly what it is doing. In the fact-check of serious journalism, Guo Jiakun's formula "legitimate and legal" is at best incomplete, at worst misleading.

Conclusion: Fact-Check Delivered — The Rhetoric Does Not Stand Up to the Evidence

What the data establishes unequivocally

At the end of this rigorous fact-check, the balance sheet is clear. Guo Jiakun's statement that "all of China's trade with Russia is legitimate and legal" is a rhetorical formula that does not withstand the scrutiny of documented evidence. $234 billion in trade in 2025, including a growing share of militarily critical dual-use goods. 92% of transactions in rubles and yuan, designed to bypass sanctions. Two Chinese companies — Shenzhen Minghuaxin and Xinxiang Richful — sanctioned by the European Union for the direct supply of components to the Russian military. 125 Chinese entities on the American blacklist. A foreign minister who says he does not want a defeat for Moscow. These facts do not come from a Western disinformation campaign. They come from Chinese customs, the Official Journals of the EU, and data from the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security.

China, active enabler: A factual verdict, not an ideological one

China is not simply a neutral actor maintaining ordinary trade relations with Russia. It is, according to available data, an active enabler of Putin’s war: the leading supplier of dual-use military goods, the leading buyer of sanctioned Russian oil, the architect of a bilateral financial system designed to bypass Western sanctions, and a country whose entities have been documented training Russian soldiers on drone usage. Beijing's systematic denial — always "legitimate," always "legal," never a point-by-point factual refutation — is not a demonstration of innocence. It is a well-oiled communication strategy in the face of a documented reality. The fact-check is delivered.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary Sources

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission — China's Position on Russia's Invasion of Ukraine (tracker updated as of June 17, 2026) — June 17, 2026

EuropeanRelations.com — The EU's Latest Russia Sanctions: Targeting the Networks Behind the War — June 20, 2026

Denuo Legal — New EU and UK Sanctions Against Russia (analysis of the regulations of June 15-16, 2026) — June 19, 2026

Secondary Sources

The Straits Times — EU says China trained Russian troops to fight in Ukraine war — June 16, 2026

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission — China's Facilitation of Sanctions and Export Control Evasion — November 14, 2025

South China Morning Post — China warns EU to remove firms and citizens from Russian sanctions list — April 26, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — EU approves parallel mini-package of anti-Russian sanctions — June 15, 2026

Lubes'N'Greases — EU Bans Richful for Aiding Russian Military — June 16, 2026