INVESTIGATION: Shenzhen Minghuaxin and Xinxiang Richful, Putin’s Chinese Arms

Introduction: Two Chinese Names at the Heart of the Russian War Machine

On June 15, 2026, Brussels Names the Accomplices

On June 15, 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted a new package of restrictive measures targeting Russia. Among the 34 individuals and 47 entities added to the blacklist were two names that, for many Europeans, still meant nothing: Shenzhen Minghuaxin and Xinxiang Richful Lubricant Additive Company. Two Chinese companies. Two essential cogs in Vladimir Putin’s war machine. Two more pieces of evidence that China is the number one enabler of the invasion of Ukraine, and that Beijing has never stopped arming Russia, even while claiming the opposite at every international podium.

This investigation is specifically devoted to these two firms: who they are, what they supplied, how they operated, and why their sanctioning — although late — marks a milestone in Western understanding of the Sino-Russian support architecture. This is not a story of ordinary companies caught by unexpected sanctions. It is a story of deliberate, documented, and quantified complicity.

A "Mini-Package" with Major Consequences

What Brussels called a "mini-package" of sanctions — adopted in a "rolling" manner between the large numbered packages — was mini in name only. It targeted the heart of the Russian military-industrial complex and, for the first time with such clarity, its Chinese suppliers in the drone and military lubricant sectors. High Representative Kaja Kallas did not mince words: "Brick by brick, we are collapsing the foundations of the Russian war economy." The cumulative total of losses inflicted on Russia by Western sanctions is estimated at between 1,000 and 1,300 billion euros.

But while Brussels counts the bricks being removed, Beijing is laying others. It is precisely this paradox that this investigation intends to expose. The United Kingdom separately sanctioned Chinese and Hong Kong entities for similar reasons in February 2026, and again in June 2026, highlighting the transatlantic convergence on this issue. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) confirms that more than 90% of Russian imports of sanctioned technologies that could be used to produce weapons now transit through China, compared to about 80% in 2025.

Shenzhen Minghuaxin: The Drone Empire at the Kremlin's Service

An Electronics Company Turned Pillar of the Russian FPV Industry

Shenzhen Minghuaxin is an electronics manufacturer based in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, in the heart of China's Silicon Valley. Specialized in drone components — batteries, motors, flight controllers — the company found itself at the center of a Financial Times investigation that upended the balance of the Sino-Russian file. Its owner, Wang Dinghua, acquired a 5% stake in Rustakt, Russia's leading manufacturer of FPV drones and producer of the VT-40 model used massively against Ukrainian positions. This was, according to the Financial Times, the first known case of direct Chinese investment in a sanctioned Russian defense company.

Moscow's reaction was immediate and revealing: Russia attempted to erase traces of this shareholding by deleting ownership registries. You don't make public data disappear when you have nothing to hide. Monitoring platforms like Leave Russia have documented that Minghuaxin and its affiliated companies had already shipped hundreds of millions of dollars in components — batteries, motors, controllers — to Rustakt and its partners in the Russian drone industry. This relationship was therefore not an isolated investment: it was the logical culmination of a military commercial relationship that was already deep and lucrative.

Rustakt, the VT-40, and the Supply Chain of Death

Rustakt LLC assembles the VT-40 drone, an FPV (First Person View) craft used for direct attacks against Ukrainian armor, positions, and soldiers. The drone is, in current trench warfare, one of the most fearsome and least expensive weapons on the battlefield. Every VT-40 is a synthesis of components — and a significant portion of those components comes from the supply chain that Shenzhen Minghuaxin has fed without interruption since the beginning of the invasion in February 2022.

The European Union formulated it unambiguously in its designation notice: Shenzhen Minghuaxin is sanctioned for having supplied drone components to the Russian military force. The designation, adopted under the Article 269/2014 regime regarding restrictive measures against Russia, entails an asset freeze and a ban on making resources available to the company throughout the European Union. It is a concrete measure — but it arrives after years during which the company delivered with near-total impunity.

Investment in Rustakt: The First Direct Stake in Sanctioned Russian Defense

A Line-Crossing That Changes Everything

Before the Financial Times revelation, the Chinese defense of its companies' role rested on one argument: components are for civilian use, exports are legal, and if intermediaries transit them to military applications, it is beyond Beijing’s control. The acquisition of a 5% stake in Rustakt by Wang Dinghua dynamites this argument. You don't become a shareholder in Russia's leading FPV drone manufacturer by accident. You don't do it without knowing what that company produces. You don't do it without directly benefiting from the commercial success of that military production.

Rustakt is designated as a sanctioned entity by Western authorities. Its raison d'être is the manufacture of war drones. Wang Dinghua’s investment therefore constitutes, according to the Leave Russia platform, a demonstration of "conscious support for the military manufacture of Russian drones" — and no longer a simple involuntary link in an opaque supply chain. It is the difference between a parts supplier and a strategic partner of the war industry.

Moscow’s Attempt at Concealment

The deletion of shareholding registries by Russian authorities, documented by the Financial Times, is in itself a piece of evidence. Moscow would not have erased this data if it were not compromising. This reaction reveals the awareness both parties had of the problematic nature of the transaction. It also confirms that the Russian government closely monitors, and actively protects, its supply circuits from China — including by manipulating its own official registries.

For sanctions investigators, compliance officers, and financial flow trackers, this deletion constitutes an additional red flag. It suggests that other investments and partnerships between Chinese industrialists and the Russian defense apparatus exist, but that similar concealment mechanisms have been put in place. What we see is only the tip of the iceberg. The 5% in Rustakt is perhaps the documented exception to a much more widespread rule.

Xinxiang Richful: The Lubricant Keeping the Russian Military Machine Running

From Industrial Chemistry to Additives for Tanks and Warplanes

Xinxiang Richful Lubricant Additive Company, based in the city of Xinxiang in Henan Province, is one of the largest manufacturers and distributors of lubricant additives in China. Its product range covers automotive engine oils, aircraft engine oils, railway locomotive oils, marine engine oils, and industrial lubricants. It is a company listed on Chinese financial markets. And that is precisely why the EU sanction hit like a bombshell in financial circles: the stock fell by 6% as early as June 17, then by nearly 10% over the week.

The European Commission did not use ambiguous phrasing in its designation notice: "Xinxiang Richful Lubricant Additive Company is one of the largest manufacturers and distributors of lubricant additives in China. It provides chemical additives for mechanical lubricants used by the Russian military. Consequently, Xinxiang Richful Lubricant Additive Company is an entity supporting the Russian military-industrial complex." It is a direct accusation, formulated with the precision of a legal act. There is no diplomatic language to soften it.

47,000 Tons in 2022: The Accusing Figure

The Center for Intelligence and Research Analysis (CIRA) conducted the most precise numerical investigation into Richful's deliveries to Russia. Its results are edifying: in 2022 alone, the year of the invasion, Richful shipped approximately 47,000 metric tons of additives to Russia — a volume that exceeded pre-war Russian domestic production capacity. The company literally filled a void left by the forced withdrawal of Western suppliers. Between April 2023 and April 2024, shipments still amounted to some 36,000 metric tons. These figures leave no room for ambiguity.

CIRA specifies that Richful gained considerable market share after Western sanctions in 2022 forced European and American suppliers to cease their deliveries of chemical additives to Russia. Russian lubricant blenders, faced with a critical shortage of raw materials, found in Richful an ideal substitute supplier. The company expanded its operations, including offices or points of presence in Moscow, Dubai, Singapore, and Virginia — a network that reflects a deliberately international commercial ambition and a capacity to bypass restrictions.

Richful’s Denial in the Face of Documented Evidence

"For Civilian Use Only": An Indefensible Defense

Faced with the EU designation and CIRA data, Xinxiang Richful adopted the classic posture of rhetorical evasion: "firm denial," products "for civilian use only," and never having obtained "military production qualifications." The company claims to have ended its activities in Russia and launched a compliance control system. These statements are difficult to reconcile with the volumes documented by CIRA, whose data extends until April 2024 — two years after the start of the war, and two years after the entire world knew exactly what was happening.

The notion of "military production qualification" is particularly revealing. In China, obtaining such a qualification is an official administrative process. Its absence does not mean that the products are not used for military purposes — it only means the company can pretend to be unaware of the end use. It is an architecture of institutionalized plausible deniability that Beijing has perfected to allow its companies to support the Russian war effort while maintaining a facade of neutrality. The EU has chosen to look beyond this facade and judge based on volumes and destinations.

Market Reaction: The Sentence Pronounced by the Market

The fall of 6% on June 17, followed by a total decline of nearly 10% in one week after the EU designation, illustrates that markets took the sanction seriously. Investors immediately understood that the ban on doing business with European entities — an asset freeze and a ban on financial transactions, joint ventures, and commercial partnerships in the EU — represented a real commercial risk. Since the beginning of the year, the stock had already lost more than 33% of its value, a sign that pressure on the firm was building long before the official designation.

On the Shanghai and Shenzhen financial markets, the case created a precedent: for the first time, a listed and supposedly "civilian" chemical company found itself directly on the EU blacklist for its support of the Russian military machine. The signal sent to other Chinese companies in similar sectors was clear: sanctions no longer just hit weapons manufacturers or entities directly linked to defense. They now reach the industrial supply chain at large, as soon as the link to the war effort is documented.

China as a "Decisive Enabler": Kaja Kallas Puts Reality into Words

The Formula that Changes the Diplomatic Framing

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas did not hesitate to use a strong formula during the adoption of the mini-package of sanctions: Beijing is a "decisive enabler" of Russia's war in Ukraine. These are not the words of a Brussels bureaucrat seeking to spare feelings. It is a political diagnosis of surgical precision. "Enabler" — a facilitator, an active accomplice — is a designation that implies responsibility. It says: you are not neutral. You are participating.

This formulation was adopted in the joint statement of G7 foreign ministers in November 2025, which denounced "China’s provision of weapons and dual-use components" to Russia. It has become the pivot of Western discourse on Beijing's role in this war. And it creates an obligation: if China is a "decisive enabler," then sanctions against Chinese companies are not secondary measures — they are front-line measures, as important as direct sanctions against Russia itself.

90% of Russian Imports of Sanctioned Technology via China

The figure is staggering and it comes from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC): in 2026, more than 90% of Russian imports of sanctioned technology likely to be used for armaments production transit through China. It was 80% in 2025 and 32% in 2021, before the invasion. The trajectory is undeniable: while the West was building its sanctions regime, China was building its replacement network. And each time a new restriction was adopted, a new Sino-Russian trade route opened to bypass it.

Sino-Russian bilateral trade confirms this: from 190 billion dollars in 2022, it rose to nearly 250 billion dollars in 2024, before tapering slightly to 234 billion in 2025. Even more revealing: the share of this trade denominated in rubles and yuan has risen from 25% before the invasion to 92% today. This is not innocent monetary diversification — it is a deliberate architecture for bypassing the Western financial system, methodically built since 2022.

The Supply Network: Routes, Intermediaries, and Concealment

Circuits of Opacity in the Sino-Russian Chain

One of the most troubling aspects of Sino-Russian cooperation in the field of military equipment is the sophistication of its concealment mechanisms. According to consolidated data from the USCC and the 2024 U.S. Congress annual report, sensitive components — integrated circuits, ball bearings, electronic parts for missile guidance — transit through third countries: Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong. These intermediaries allow for the obscuring of both the origin of the goods and their final destination, offering Beijing its cover of "plausible deniability."

In the case of drone motors, Reuters revealed in July 2025 that Chinese companies were shipping motors to the Russian weapons manufacturer IEMZ Kupol by falsely labeling them as "industrial refrigeration units." These motors allowed IEMZ Kupol to increase its production of the Garpiya-A1 attack drone, used against military and civilian targets in Ukraine. This is documented, deliberate fraud that bypassed export controls. And it is only one example among a multitude.

The Thai Channel: A Diversion Route Documented by Bloomberg

The USCC analysis platform also referenced a crucial piece of information from Bloomberg: Chinese drones are being shipped to Russia via intermediaries in Thailand. An increase in Thai imports of Chinese-origin drones since 2022 coincides precisely with a rise in Thai drone exports to Russia since the start of the war. This is a clear statistical signal of an active diversion route. Thailand becomes, in this scheme, a transit node that allows China to maintain formal distance from final deliveries.

These triangulation mechanisms are not improvised. The Wall Street Journal revealed in December 2024 that Beijing had established an inter-agency group at the start of the invasion to study the impact of Western sanctions on Russia and analyze how to mitigate their effects — with a view toward a possible application of similar measures to China in a future conflict over Taiwan. This group reported directly to He Lifeng, Chinese Vice Premier, who is himself in direct contact with Xi Jinping. Complicity is therefore not just economic, but strategic and steered at the highest level of the State.

Beijing’s Responses: Denial, Indignation, and Counter-Threats

The Diplomatic Manual of Refusal

With each new designation of Chinese companies on Western sanctions lists, Beijing's response follows an immutable protocol. The Foreign Ministry spokesperson asserts that China "has never provided lethal weapons" to anyone in this conflict, that it "strictly controls" exports of dual-use goods, that it "opposes all unilateral sanctions not approved by the UN Security Council," and that it "will take all necessary measures to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese companies." This script was rolled out word for word during the 20th and 21st sanctions packages, as it had been during the 15th, the 13th, and all those that preceded them.

The Chinese mission to the EU issued a similar statement in April 2026, during the 20th package, warning that "the EU will bear the consequences" of its decisions and demanding the immediate removal of Chinese companies and individuals from the list. It is a posture of wounded sovereignty — but it never addresses the core accusations. It does not explain Richful's 47,000 tons. It does not deny Wang Dinghua’s investment in Rustakt. It contests Brussels' right to sanction, not the facts that justify those sanctions.

Economic Threats that Have Not Deterred Sanctions

Beijing's implicit threat — commercial retaliation, difficulties for European companies accessing the Chinese market — has not prevented the adoption of successive packages. And for good reason: EU Sanctions Envoy David O'Sullivan told Euronews in early June 2026 that China remained a "very big problem" for the effectiveness of restrictive measures, and that Brussels continued to act unilaterally precisely because Beijing refused to hear the concerns expressed "at the highest level." China does not cooperate. It does not yield. The EU therefore sanctions specific entities, company by company, to reduce the impact of this global refusal.

This diplomatic tug-of-war has also taken on a financial dimension: Bloomberg in June 2025 revealed that the EU was considering sanctioning two Chinese banks for helping Russia bypass trade restrictions. The logic of escalation is at work — and it shows that the EU, contrary to what Beijing perhaps hoped, is ready to go much further in its confrontation with the Kremlin's Chinese financial and industrial relays.

Zelenskyy, the USCC, and the Data Confounding Beijing

Kyiv Accumulates Evidence of Direct Chinese Involvement

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was one of the first Western leaders to name China no longer as an ambiguous actor, but as an active and documented supporter of the Russian war machine. In April 2025, he accused Beijing of providing the Russian army with gunpowder, artillery, and components, announcing Ukrainian sanctions against three Chinese companies. These were not vague allegations: Zelenskyy cited "confirmed data" from the Ukrainian intelligence agency on the delivery of special chemicals, gunpowder, and components specifically designed for military use to 20 Russian military factories.

Even more troubling: in April 2025, Ukrainian soldiers captured the first Chinese national prisoners of war fighting alongside Russian forces — Zhang Renbo and Wang Guangjun. Zelenskyy stated that some 155 Chinese nationals were fighting for Russia. The head of Ukrainian intelligence, Oleh Ivashchenko, claimed to have "confirmed data" on these presences. Beijing refuted this, invoking "lost nationals" who "should have avoided conflict zones." The argument holds little weight against material evidence.

The USCC Annual Report: The Map of Complicity

The 2024 annual report of the USCC to the U.S. Congress calls China a "decisive enabler" of Russia's war against Ukraine — precisely the same term Kaja Kallas would use in June 2026. It documents that China has supported Russia by buying sanctioned oil, maintaining trade and investment links, providing critical minerals and chemical precursors for explosives and gunpowder, machine tools and drone components for defense industries, and tolerating the presence of more than 150 Chinese nationals fighting alongside Russian forces.

The USCC specifies in its report on the "Axis of Autocracy chapter" that Russian dependence on Common High Priority List (CHPL) goods from China rose from 32% in 2021 to 89% in 2023. This list — maintained jointly by the U.S., EU, Japan, and the UK — covers items like integrated circuits for precision-guided weapons systems, for which Russia has no domestic production capacity. China has therefore, for these critical components, become the only real supplier for Russia.

The UK’s Role: A Convergence with Brussels on the Chinese Question

London Strikes in Parallel, with Similar Logic

The United Kingdom, which since Brexit has led its own sanctions policy independent of the EU, adopted a package in February 2026 including Chinese and Hong Kong entities "for their alleged involvement in supporting Russian energy exchanges, defense procurement, and dual-use goods." This is a formulation that perfectly converges with European discourse — and confirms that the nature of the Chinese role is now recognized by the entire Western sanctions architecture, including the United States.

The Chinese reaction to the British package was identical to its reaction to European packages: spokesperson Mao Ning asserted that China "strictly controls" dual-use exports and "opposes any interference" in "normal trade and cooperation between China and Russia." This formulation — "normal trade and cooperation" — says a lot. It does not dispute the existence of these exchanges. It only claims they are normal. Delivering 47,000 tons of lubricant additives to an economy at war, normal? Investing in the leading manufacturer of military FPV drones for an invading power, normal? That word "normal" is a confession.

Transatlantic Synchronization of Designations

What is remarkable in the recent period — 2024 to 2026 — is the increasing synchronization between American (Treasury, Commerce, State), European (EU Council), and British (OFSI) designations. The targeted companies overlap, the reasoning corroborates, and the lists mutually enrich each other. Shenzhen Minghuaxin and Xinxiang Richful did not appear by chance on the EU list in June 2026: they were identified, documented, and designated as part of a collective intelligence that Western allies have spent years building on the issue of Sino-Russian supply chains.

This convergence is crucial. It means that the designation of these companies is not an isolated political gesture — it is the result of an accumulation of evidence collected by several allied intelligence services, cross-referenced with trade data, journalistic investigations, and independent analyses. The case against Minghuaxin and Richful is robust. It will not collapse under Beijing's diplomatic pressure.

The Broader Architecture of Chinese Complicity

Beyond Two Firms: A Support Ecosystem

Shenzhen Minghuaxin and Xinxiang Richful are only two names in a much broader landscape. Since the start of the war, the EU has taken measures against more than 100 Chinese companies and individuals for their support of the Russian war effort. The European Parliament has documented this in its own written questions. The progression is methodical: first the most obvious electronic component suppliers, then the Hong Kong bypass networks, then the banks, then the drone manufacturers, and now industrial lubricants. The EU is moving up the chain — piece by piece, sector by sector.

The Robert Lansing Institute published a mapping in January 2026 of Chinese companies providing electronic components — microchips, connectors, printed circuit elements — to the Russian missile industry. Four identified Chinese companies were directly supplying missile manufacturers. These companies join drone manufacturers, lubricant suppliers, dual-use goods traders, and banks that have facilitated transactions. The architecture of complicity is massive, systemic, and likely still underestimated despite investigative efforts.

Chemical Precursors for Explosives: The Gravest Ukrainian Accusation

Among the gravest accusations formulated by Kyiv is the delivery by Chinese companies of chemical precursors for explosives and gunpowder to Russian military factories — documented by Ukrainian intelligence according to Zelenskyy, and corroborated by the USCC in its "Axis of Autocracy" report. If this allegation is accurate — and concordant sources suggest it is — it places China in a very different category than a simple supplier of electronic components. It makes it a direct supporter of munitions production, at the heart of Russian destructive capacity on the battlefield.

Beijing's response has been to categorically deny any supply of "lethal weapons" — a carefully chosen formulation that excludes chemical precursors, lubricants, circuit components, and drone motors, all of which are "non-lethal" equipment in themselves but all essential to the production or operation of lethal armaments. This language game is a legal strategy as much as a diplomatic posture. China does not supply bullets — it supplies the powder that allows them to be fired. The distinction is becoming less and less tenable.

Sanctions: Real Effectiveness and Structural Limits

What Sanctions Do — and What They Don't Do

We must look at the effectiveness of sanctions with uncomfortable intellectual honesty. On one hand, the record is impressive: 1,000 to 1,300 billion euros in losses inflicted on Russia, a decline in its manufacturing industry that in 2025 reached its fastest pace of contraction since March 2022, ten consecutive months of production decline, seven consecutive months of falling new orders. Sanctions hurt Russia. On the other hand, they have not stopped the war. They have not prevented the bombings of Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa. They have not made Putin fold. And they have not deterred China from filling the gaps created by Western embargos.

The designation of Minghuaxin and Richful is symbolically powerful, but its immediate practical effects remain limited. These companies operate essentially outside the European perimeter. Their assets in the EU are likely minimal. The ban on transactions with them primarily affects European companies that might have continued to trade with them — and in this sense, it closes a potential door for bypassing sanctions. But it does not physically cut the flows to Russia, which can transit through other circuits.

Increasing Pressure on Third Countries

This is why the June 2026 package also introduces new end-use controls (SEUCs), which came into force in May 2026. These controls require an export license for sales to non-sanctioned third countries identified as presenting a "high risk of diversion" to a sanctioned destination. Once an exporter is notified of this risk, they cannot proceed without prior authorization. It is a regulatory architecture that specifically targets transit routes — Thailand, the UAE, Kyrgyzstan — used to bypass sanctions by passing components through non-sanctioned countries.

These mechanisms are promising, but their effectiveness depends on enforcement capacity — and that is where the problem lies. The EU and the UK do not have the means to physically control the Kazakhstani or Thai borders. They can share intelligence, exert diplomatic pressure, and post-sanction identified transit entities — but they cannot stop in real-time containers labeled "refrigerator parts" that contain drone motors. The race between sanctions architects and sanctions bypassers remains open.

Perspectives: Toward an Escalation of Sanctions against China?

The 21st Package and Future Chinese Designations

At the time of writing this article, the 21st EU sanctions package is under negotiation among Member States. It was presented by the European Commission on June 9, 2026, and is described as a larger and more comprehensive package than the June 15 mini-package. Diplomats in Brussels indicate that it will very likely contain new designations of Chinese entities — the question is not "if," but "how many" and "in which sectors."

The logic of escalation is inevitable. EU Sanctions Envoy O'Sullivan said it clearly: as long as China does not cooperate, the EU will continue to act unilaterally against the most problematic Chinese companies. The sectors in the sights are now well documented: electronic components, drones, lubricants, chemical precursors, but also semiconductors (the Yangzhou Yangjie case is an illustration), machine tools, and potentially civilian vehicles repurposed for military uses. Every new revelation — every "industrial refrigerator" that turns out to be a drone motor — feeds the case.

The Taiwan Question in the Background

It is impossible to conclude this analysis without mentioning the strategic background that the Wall Street Journal highlighted: China observes the Western sanctions system against Russia as a preparation laboratory for a possible conflict over Taiwan. The inter-agency group created in 2022 to study the impact of sanctions on Russia is working to design the firewalls that Beijing would need to activate if the West decided to sanction China tomorrow. This is information of primary importance. It means Beijing is planning its economic resilience in the face of future sanctions — which implies it does not rule out a future conflict that would trigger them.

In this context, support for Russia is not just a short-term policy of autocratic solidarity. It is also a dress rehearsal. China is testing its bypass networks, refining its transit routes, developing its payment infrastructures in yuan and rubles outside the dollar, and consolidating its raw material reserves — all while using Russia as a guinea pig and as a simultaneous beneficiary. It is two-level geopolitics of disturbing sophistication. And Minghuaxin and Richful are two pawns among hundreds of others.

Conclusion: Name, Sanction, Persevere — and Never Naively Believe the Denial

What History Will Remember of Minghuaxin and Richful

In the history of the war in Ukraine and the Western response, the names of Shenzhen Minghuaxin and Xinxiang Richful Lubricant Additive Company will hold a specific place: they are the first Chinese companies jointly sanctioned by the EU and the UK in the drone and industrial military lubricant sectors. They embody the intellectual and political transition the West had to make — from a vision of a "neutral but interested" China to the recognition of an active accomplice to Russian aggression. This transition was necessary. It was overdue. And it is not finished.

Richful's denial — "civilian-only" products, never any "military qualifications" — and Beijing's institutional silence on Wang Dinghua's investment in Rustakt would not hold up in a court with all the evidence. 47,000 tons in 2022. Hundreds of millions of dollars in drone components. A direct stake in the manufacturer of the VT-40. These facts are documented, sourced, and quantified. Denial is not a defense — it is an insult to the intelligence of the investigators who built the case and the victims who paid the price for these deliveries on the battlefield.

The West's Obligation: Go Further, Faster

The June 2026 sanctions against these two companies are a milestone. They are not a conclusion. The 21st package, currently in preparation, must go further — by designating more Chinese entities, targeting more of the financial nodes that facilitate Sino-Russian payments outside the Western system, and strengthening control mechanisms for third transit countries. Since 2022, the EU has adopted restrictions on 54% of its exports to Russia and 58% of its imports from Russia. This is a considerable effort. But as long as the Sino-Russian door remains open to 90% of critical technologies, this effort is partially neutralized.

Zelenskyy is the hero of this story — not because he alone discovered Chinese complicity, but because he had the courage to name it publicly, despite diplomatic pressures, and at the risk of complicating relations with a country some still hoped to pull toward neutrality. He was right. The West must have the same frankness, the same determination, and the same refusal of complacency. Brick by brick, as Kaja Kallas says. Firm by firm, as the treatment of Minghuaxin and Richful shows. Never naively. Never too late.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary Sources

European Relations — “The EU's Latest Russia Sanctions: Targeting the Networks Behind the War” — June 20, 2026

Lubes'N'Greases — “EU Bans Richful for Aiding Russian Military” (CIRA data, EU designation notice) — June 16, 2026

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) — “China's Position on Russia's Invasion of Ukraine” (updated timeline) — June 17, 2026

Secondary Sources

EU Perspectives — “Drones, oil tankers, and a death in custody: EU widens Russia sanctions” — June 15, 2026

Mayer Brown — “EU Adopts "Mini" Sanctions Package Against Russia” (legal analysis of the package, Yangjie exemption) — June 19, 2026

Leave Russia — “Shenzhen Minghuaxin is Doing Business in Russia as Usual” (Wang Dinghua investment in Rustakt, FT) — December 1, 2025

Euronews — “China a "very big problem" for EU sanctions against Russia: O'Sullivan” — June 3, 2026

USCC — “Axis of Autocracy: China's Revisionist Ambitions with Russia” (report to Congress 2025, CHPL 89% data) — November 2025