ANALYSIS: China, Putin’s Lifeline — How Moscow Sold Its Soul to Beijing to Survive Sanctions

Introduction: The Dollar Empire Collapses in the East — and Beijing is Picking Up the Pieces

A Number That Changes Everything

In 2024, bilateral trade between Russia and China reached an absolute record of roughly $250 billion. In 2025, this volume slipped to roughly $234 billion — a slight contraction of 6.5% in yuan terms, 6.9% in dollars — but this dip shouldn't distract us. What really matters is the monetary revolution being silently finalized in the shadows of this commercial relationship: according to the latest data from European Relations in June 2025, roughly 92% of this trade is now settled in rubles and yuan, compared to only about 25% before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia's forced dedollarization is a fait accompli, and its architect isn't Moscow — it's Beijing.

This currency shift isn't just a technical anecdote for economists. It tells a political story of raw brutality: Vladimir Putin, by deciding to invade Ukraine, has hurled his country into the arms of a partner that isn't seeking its welfare, but its systematic exploitation. Xi Jinping’s China is Putin’s lifeline — but it’s a lifeline that tightens its grip in sync with Russian struggles, setting prices for energy bought at a discount, selling machinery on credit, and, above all, accumulating unprecedented geopolitical leverage over Moscow.

Why This Analysis is Urgent

The West is still debating the exact nature of the Sino-Russian partnership, trying to figure out if Beijing truly supports Moscow or if it’s playing a double game. This question, legitimate as it may be, masks a more disturbing reality: regardless of China’s stated intentions, the facts of economics are building an irreversible structural dependency. Russia now needs China to sell its oil, import its machinery, finance its budget deficit, bypass sanctions, and even keep its war economy running. It’s a gilded serfdom — and Putin is its primary architect.

In this analysis, I will dissect the mechanisms of this dependency, measure the dizzying asymmetry of this relationship, and ask the question that no one really wants to face: is China the greatest threat the West has ever faced, not despite its apparent caution regarding the war in Ukraine, but precisely because of it?

The Shock of 2022: When Putin Signed Russia’s Economic Surrender

The Sanction That Changed Everything

Before February 24, 2022, Russia maintained a balanced economic relationship with the West. Europe bought its gas, its hydrocarbons provided a windfall in hard currencies — the dollar and euro — and Moscow had a foreign exchange reserve of over $640 billion, most of which was denominated in those same Western currencies. Overnight, sanctions froze more than $340 billion of reserves. Access to the dollar and euro evaporated. The SWIFT system shut its doors to almost the entire Russian banking system. Moscow found itself with a currency no one wanted and natural resources everyone wanted, but no one could buy normally.

Into this vacuum stepped China. Not as an altruistic savior, but as a calculating opportunist. Beijing offered Moscow the only viable exit: the yuan. China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System — CIPS — became the substitute for SWIFT for Russia. Ruble-yuan trade exploded: according to data from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), ruble-yuan volume increased eighty-fold between February and October 2022. The monetary revolution was underway, not out of carefully considered political will, but out of absolute necessity.

The Forced Conversion of an Entire Economy

The shift toward the yuan wasn't limited to bilateral trade. It restructured the entire Russian economy. The share of so-called "unfriendly" currencies — dollar, euro, yen, pound sterling — in Russian exports fell from 86.9% in January 2022 to only 18.4% in December 2024. Simultaneously, the yuan's share in trading on the Moscow Exchange (MOEX) jumped from 0.4% to 57.3% over the same period. Following U.S. sanctions against the MOEX in June 2024, the yuan neared 99% of transactions on that exchange. These numbers are staggering — and they tell a truth that Moscow prefers to dress up as a triumphant narrative of "sovereign dedollarization."

The reality, documented notably by economist Elina Ribakova's testimony before the USCC in February 2025, is more prosaic: Russia didn't choose the yuan because it was better. It chose it because it was the only one available. The ruble and other "friendly" country currencies remain poorly liquid and barely convertible. The yuan, issued by a non-sanctioning country, relatively stable and seeking internationalization, was the only option on the scale of Russo-Chinese trade.

$234 Billion in 2025: The Trade of Dependency

Impressive Numbers Hiding an Asymmetric Reality

Data published in January 2026 by China's General Administration of Customs, cited by Reuters and the Moscow Times, is unambiguous: Sino-Russian bilateral trade reached 1.63 trillion yuan, or roughly $234 billion in 2025. This is the third consecutive year above the 200 billion threshold that Putin and Xi Jinping set as a symbolic goal in 2019. Despite the 6.9% contraction in dollars, the volume remains colossal — and every dollar of this trade further cements Russian dependency.

But let’s look behind this impressive figure. Russia represents 34% of China's total trade for itself — no, sorry, it’s the reverse: China represents 34% of Russia's total trade, while Russia represents only 4% of China's total trade. In 2025, Russia fell back to 7th place among China's trading partners, behind Vietnam, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. This asymmetry is the central element of any honest analysis of this relationship: Moscow needs Beijing to survive economically; Beijing needs Moscow to get a good deal.

What Russia Sells, What China Buys — and the Equation of Subordination

The structure of bilateral trade speaks for itself with disconcerting clarity. According to the Atlantic Council report on the Russian economy in 2025, more than 85% of Russian exports to China consist of natural resources: crude oil, natural gas, coal, metals, minerals. Russia exports what it pulls from the ground. In return, it imports from China machinery, vehicles, electronic equipment — everything it no longer knows how to manufacture since the dismantling of its post-Soviet industrial fabric and the flight of Western multinationals since 2022.

The Atlantic Council notes with biting irony that this is "a complete and embarrassing reversal" compared to the 2000s, when Russia was still exporting higher value-added goods to China. Today, 70 to 90% of machines and equipment imported by Russia come from China. Chinese cars have flooded the Russian market following the withdrawal of Western brands — Chinese automotive exports to Russia surged 495% between 2021 and 2024, before beginning to recede in 2025 following Russian tax hikes on imported vehicles. This sectoral dependency creates strategic vulnerabilities that Beijing can activate at any moment.

92% Dedollarization: A Rhetorical Victory, a Structural Trap

Minister Siluanov’s Figures and Their Real Meaning

In November 2025, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov announced during the 11th Russian-Chinese Financial Dialogue in Beijing that 99.1% of bilateral payments are now conducted in rubles and yuan. This figure, confirmed by Deputy Prime Minister Alexandre Novak who mentioned "90 to 95%" for all trade with China and India, is presented as a triumph of Russian "financial sovereignty." Pro-Kremlin media celebrated the death of the dollar in Sino-Russian trade. It is a real victory — but a poisoned one.

Because behind that 99.1% hides a new dependency, perhaps more dangerous than the old one. Before 2022, Russia was dependent on the dollar, but the dollar is a liquid international currency not controlled by a single rival state. Today, Russia is dependent on the yuan — a currency whose exchange rate is controlled by the People’s Bank of China, whose liquidity outside China remains limited, and whose access can be cut off if Beijing ever decides to change its calculations. As the Atlantic Council points out, China can "at any time — for political or other reasons — make Chinese imports extremely expensive and Russian exports to China much less profitable."

The Yuan Shortage: Moscow’s Achilles’ Heel

Dependency on the yuan is already creating shortage episodes that weaken the Russian economy. BOFIT (Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies) documents "payment transmission problems" in bilateral trade linked to secondary sanctions. Chinese banks, fearing U.S. sanctions, have reduced or even suspended transactions with Russian counterparts — the Heihe Rural Commercial Bank thus halted its Russian operations in September 2025 after being targeted by European sanctions. These incidents create supply disruptions and force Russian players to take increasingly tortuous payment routes: barter, third-country intermediaries, cryptocurrencies.

The yuan shortage in Russia also translates into high borrowing costs and increasing risk premiums on Russian-Chinese transactions. In December 2024, Moscow had to issue sovereign bonds denominated in yuan — "panda bonds" — to finance part of its budget deficit, a move that marks further financial dependency on Beijing. The West now has a tool: by threatening Chinese banks with secondary sanctions, it can tighten the financial vice on Russia even further.

Russian Energy Sold Off to Beijing: The Discount of Shame

China Buys Russian Oil with a Permanent Discount

One of the pillars of the Sino-Russian relationship is energy. China has become the primary buyer of Russian crude oil, accounting for roughly 18% of Chinese oil imports in the first half of 2025, according to BOFIT. Meanwhile, energy exports to China represent 35% of Russian hydrocarbon revenues, or about $83 billion in 2024, according to Ribakova’s testimony before the USCC. These figures demonstrate the extent to which China has become the financial lung of the Russian war machine: according to USCC calculations, the Chinese contribution to Russian hydrocarbon budget revenues could reach roughly $43 billion per year — equivalent to one-third of the Russian military budget estimated at $130 billion in 2024.

But China isn't buying this energy at a premium. It takes advantage of the G7 price cap on Russian oil at $60 per barrel and Russian dependency on this captive customer to negotiate permanent discounts. For natural gas, the calculations from Ribakova’s testimony are striking: Russia sells its gas to China at $261 per thousand cubic meters in 2025, a 23% discount compared to other international buyers — while the European price exceeds $500 per thousand cubic meters. Gazprom, Russia's main gas company, recorded a $7.3 billion loss in 2023. Russia is indirectly financing Chinese industry with its discounted energy.

Power of Siberia 2: The Pipeline Beijing Refuses to Finance

The centerpiece of Russia's strategy to reduce its dependency on a single Chinese buyer would be to develop new gas transport infrastructure — notably the Power of Siberia 2 project, a 50-billion-cubic-meter-per-year pipeline passing through Mongolia. But this project, according to the USCC and the Atlantic Council, "exists only on paper." China systematically refuses to invest in expanding transport capacities, despite repeated requests from Moscow and the steep discounts offered. Beijing’s calculation is simple: why pay for infrastructure that would give Russia more leverage, when the current situation of a lack of Russian options guarantees low prices indefinitely?

This strategic block perfectly illustrates the logic of asymmetric dependency: China only helps Russia to the extent that this help consolidates its own dominant position. It doesn't seek to rebalance the relationship — it seeks to perpetuate it. Moscow has lost its European gas market (European imports of Russian gas plummeted 73% between 2021 and 2023) and cannot compensate for these volumes with China: gas exports to China have more than doubled, but the difference in volume is only 17 billion cubic meters — far below the 122 billion cubic meters lost in Europe.

Military Technology: China, Supplier of the Russian War Effort

90% of Critical Components Pass Through Beijing

Russia's dependency on China isn't limited to energy and consumer goods. It extends to the very heart of the Russian war machine. According to Ribakova’s testimony before the USCC, 90% of Russian imports of common high-priority items (CHPL) in 2023 were facilitated one way or another by China: 49% manufactured in China, 18% transiting through China, 16% produced in Chinese factories owned by Western companies. These components — integrated circuits, radio and communication equipment, optics, CNC machine tools — are indispensable to the production of armaments used against Ukraine.

BOFIT also notes that Chinese exports to Russia of industrial machinery — industrial robots, industrial furnaces, rolling machines, conveyor belts, distillation equipment — saw explosive growth in 2025, partially offsetting the decline in car sales. This equipment directly feeds the Russian military-industrial complex, which the Atlantic Council describes as "critically dependent on China for its advanced component needs." Without Chinese supply of dual-use technology, Russian weapons production would slow significantly.

Secondary Sanctions: The Western Tool That Is Starting to Bite

Faced with this implicit technological support, the West has begun to deploy the weapon of secondary sanctions. The December 2023 U.S. executive order threatening sanctions on third-party financial institutions that facilitate trade with Russia has had a measurable effect: major Chinese banks have drastically reduced their exposure to Russian counterparts, and several mid-sized banks followed after being directly targeted. According to the Carnegie Endowment, up to 80% of Russian sanctions circumvention now involves Chinese entities, but that same Carnegie article points out that targeted sanctions against these entities can be effective. The closure of the Heihe bank in September 2025 proved it.

The question is whether the West will go far enough in this direction. The economic interests of many European Union member states with China are considerable — and Berlin, Paris, or Rome hesitate to push too hard against Beijing. This is precisely what China is counting on: the West will remain divided, secondary sanctions will be applied at the margins, and the technological flow to Russia will continue, perhaps slowed, but never stopped.

Dizzying Asymmetry: Moscow Needs Beijing, Beijing Doesn’t Care About Moscow

Four Percent Versus Thirty-Four Percent

Two figures sum it all up: Russia accounts for 34% of China's total trade — no: it’s China that accounts for 34% of Russian trade, while Russia accounts for only 4% of Chinese trade. This 1-to-8.5 ratio says everything about the power balance in this relationship. In 2025, Russia fell to 7th place among China's trading partners, behind economies like Vietnam or Taiwan. As the Ribakova report to the USCC brutally concludes: "China is an indispensable partner for Russia. Russia is merely a 'nice to have' for China."

This asymmetry translates concretely into every negotiation. China sets energy prices with substantial discounts. It refuses to invest in the infrastructure Moscow demands. It lets its state banks reduce their exposure to Russia without compensation. It imposes delays and conditions on technological component deliveries. It even dared, according to the Atlantic Council, to manipulate the yuan-ruble exchange rate to its advantage shortly after the invasion — "to avoid subsidizing Chinese goods bought by Russians by devaluing the ruble too quickly." China is playing its own tune, and it’s playing it well.

Russia: 57% of Its Imports Come from China

The figure published by Euromaidan Press is final: in 2025, 57% of Russian imports come from China, compared to only 23% in 2021. In certain strategic categories, dependency is total or near-total: CNC machine tools, communication equipment, certain types of semiconductors. Russia buys Chinese cars, Chinese phones, Chinese industrial equipment, Chinese military components. Its economy is Sino-fied to a degree unprecedented in the modern history of a major power.

And this dependency deepens every quarter. The first quarter of 2026 saw bilateral trade rebound by 14.7% year-on-year according to Chinese customs data — after the 2025 contraction. China is again becoming the engine of Russian trade. Moscow lacks the means to diversify its supplies: Western markets are closed to it, Indian and Turkish markets can only partially absorb Russian needs, and local producers have been deindustrialized by decades of oil rents. The path to total dependency is set.

The CIPS Card Against SWIFT: Beijing Builds Its Financial Empire on Russian Ruins

CIPS: The Rising Alternative Payment System

The Chinese Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) is one of the major structural beneficiaries of the war in Ukraine. Its indirect members grew from 1,288 in February 2022 to 1,413 in December 2024 according to USCC data, a modest increase in numbers but significant in terms of volume. With the near-disappearance of the dollar in Sino-Russian trade, CIPS has become the de facto infrastructure for transactions between the two countries. The People's Bank of China has activated currency swap lines with Russia of up to 150 billion yuan, or about $20.86 billion, to facilitate this trade.

This development has strategic implications far beyond Russia. China is testing the robustness of its alternative to SWIFT on the Russo-Chinese battlefield, refining its protocols, identifying bottlenecks, and accumulating operational experience it can one day deploy on a large scale with other partners — BRICS countries, emerging markets, states tempted by monetary diversification. The Russia is the laboratory for the yuan internationalization strategy.

The Internationalization of the Yuan: Beijing’s Real Ambition

Behind the solidarity displayed with Moscow, China is pursuing an agenda strictly in its own interest: the internationalization of the renminbi. In December 2023, the yuan became the most used currency in Chinese cross-border transactions, surpassing the dollar for the first time. BOFIT notes that the share of Chinese trade settled in yuan was 31% in the first quarter of 2025, a significant progression driven in part by trade with Russia. The Atlantic Council summarizes the stakes: "Cela pourrait théoriquement ouvrir la voie à un système financier mondial dirigé par la Chine et anti-occidental." But it cautiously adds that Beijing is not yet ready to pay the cost — notably the easing of capital controls necessary for true internationalization.

Beijing’s calculation is more subtle. Xi Jinping is not looking to destroy the dollar tomorrow. He is looking to create grey zones where the yuan can gradually establish itself, reducing the reach of U.S. sanctions, building captive clienteles among sanctioned or developing states, and accumulating the financial and technological know-how that will eventually allow for true monetary competition with Washington. Russia is the first domino. Iran, North Korea, and certain African states could follow the same path.

Russia as China’s 7th Partner: Moscow’s Downgrade in the Global Hierarchy

A Symbolic Retreat with Profound Implications

In 2025, according to data from Euromaidan Press, Russia fell to 7th place among China's trading partners, behind Vietnam, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. This symbolic retreat illustrates a reality often hidden by the rhetoric of a "strategic partnership without limits": for China, Russia is one energy supplier among others, and a medium-sized export market. Dynamic Asian economies — Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea — count more for Chinese value chains than Russia, which is now deindustrialized and captive.

The 6.9% contraction in bilateral trade in 2025 is partly explained by the collapse of Chinese car sales in Russia (-46% in volume in January-November) following Russian customs tax hikes on imported vehicles — a Moscow attempt to protect its own nascent auto industry. But even this protectionist measure reveals dependency: by imposing barriers on Chinese cars, Russia finds itself without Western cars (gone in 2022) and with a domestic industry incapable of filling the void. Elle taxe son sauveur parce qu'elle en a peur — mais elle ne peut pas s'en passer.

The 87% Surcharge on Components: Paying for Servility

Another revealing aspect of this relationship: according to data published by Euromaidan Press, la Russie paie des surcoûts de 87 % sur certains composants that it can only obtain from China, and which China delivers knowing it is the only viable supplier. These monopoly premiums are layered on top of the discounts imposed on energy sold to Beijing, creating a pincer effect that systematically erodes Russian margins. China buys at a discount and sells at a markup — the définition parfaite d'une relation commerciale déséquilibrée.

This dynamic is documented by BOFIT, which notes that bilateral trade growth largely reflected hausses de prix plutôt que des augmentations de volumes between 2022 and 2024 — in other words, Russia was paying more and more for the same quantities of Chinese goods, while China was paying less and less for the same quantities of Russian resources. The inflationary rent went in only one direction.

Putin in Beijing, Xi in Moscow: The Diplomacy of Assumed Dependency

High-Level Visits as a Ritual of Subordination

The diplomatic calendar between Moscow and Beijing in 2025 is telling. Xi Jinping traveled to Moscow in May for four days — a visit that included his participation in the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazism, a highly symbolic gesture. Vladimir Putin made a four-day visit to Beijing at the end of August, signing more than 20 accords de coopération in the fields of energy, space, artificial intelligence, and agriculture. These visits are invariably accompanied by triumphant announcements on the "unparalleled depth" of the bilateral partnership — and common anti-Western rhetoric.

But let’s look at what these summits actually produce. The 20 agreements signed? They mostly consist of intentions de coopération, most of which go nowhere. Chinese investments announced in Russia total 200 milliards de dollars de projets on paper, but Chinese foreign direct investment in Russia only amounted to $10.7 billion in 2023. Power of Siberia 2 remains a project. The joint settlement bank remains an aspiration. Beijing announces a lot and invests little — because it doesn't need to invest more to keep Moscow under its thumb.

China’s Visa Policy for Russians: A Soft Power Tool

A revealing example of the asymmetry: in September 2025, China announced a politique de visa facilitée pour les citoyens russes, valid until September 2026. At the same time, Chinese citizens enjoy a visa exemption in Russia. This is not a gesture of selfless friendship — it is a puissance douce policy aimed at strengthening China's cultural and economic attraction for the Russian population, normalizing the idea that China is Russia's great natural partner, and creating flux humains qui renforcent l'influence économique chinoise on Russian soil. In 2025, 2 million Russian tourists visited China, and more than a million Chinese tourists visited Russia.

This cultural and tourist penetration is accompanied by Chinese commercial expansion on Russian territory: plus de 9 000 entreprises chinoises are registered in Russia, with over 2,400 created between 2022 and mid-2024. More than 90% of these new companies operate in wholesale or retail trade, consumer goods, vehicles, machinery. China isn't investing in Russia to help it develop — it is establishing têtes de pont commerciales to capture the market abandoned by Western companies.

The War in Ukraine Funded by Beijing: China’s Silent Involvement

Without China, the Russian War Stops

The most disturbing conclusion from Ribakova’s testimony before the USCC — and undoubtedly the most important for understanding the strategic stakes — is this: "La capacité de la Russie à poursuivre sa guerre d'agression serait sérieusement compromise sans la Chine." This isn't rhetorical hyperbole. It’s a conclusion supported by data. Oil revenues sold to China represent environ 43 milliards de dollars par an of the Russian military budget, or about one-third of Moscow's war budget. Without these revenues, Russia could not finance its military spending at current levels.

Add to that the dual-use technological components transiting through China — 49 % fabriqués en Chine, according to the USCC — that directly feed the production of drones, missiles, and military communication equipment. The Carnegie Endowment notes that in August 2025 alone, China exported a record 328 000 kilomètres de câble à fibre optique and près de 50 millions de dollars de batteries lithium-ion to Russia — two dual-use materials heavily used in military systems. Pékin sait exactement ce qu'il fait.

Calculated Complicity: What China Gains by Not Stopping the War

China has no interest in the war ending quickly on terms favorable to Ukraine and the West. A Ukrainian victory would free Moscow from its forced dependency on Beijing and eventually allow it to turn back toward the West — which would diminish Chinese influence. Conversely, a prolonged war keeps la Russie dans sa posture de demandeur, exhausted and dependent, unable to resist conditions imposed by Beijing on energy, technology, and payments. For Xi Jinping, the war in Ukraine is a long-term strategic investment — an instrument that consolidates the vassalisation économique de Moscou without China having to fire a single shot.

The West is beginning to understand this dynamic. The Atlantic Council report on dollar strategy (2025) notes the risks of a global financial system fragmenting into competing blocs, with China at the center of an alternative bloc. But the Western response remains insufficient: secondary sanctions are deployed in small doses, dual-use exports are imperfectly controlled, and internal NATO and EU divisions on China policy limit the effectiveness of the collective response.

The Rupture Scenario: What Would Happen if Beijing Turned Off the Tap?

Moscow’s Maximum Vulnerability

To measure the scale of Russian dependency, let's imagine the scenario — theoretical but instructive — of a Sino-Russian commercial rupture. Without Chinese energy purchases, Russia would lose 35 % de ses recettes d'hydrocarbures and about $43 billion in annual budget receipts. Without Chinese imports, which cover 57 % des besoins d'importation russes, the Russian economy would find itself short on industrial machinery, communication equipment, electronic components, and a wide range of consumer goods. The military-industrial complex, 90% dependent on China for its critical components, would see its production slow drastically.

Russian financial markets would collapse instantly: without the yuan to replace the dollar and euro, Russia would no longer have an international currency for its external transactions — the ruble is not freely convertible outside of Sino-Russian markets. Russia's foreign exchange reserves, mostly denominated in yuan and gold, would lose their operational utility. La Russie serait économiquement paralysée en quelques semaines. This is what 92% dependency for trade settlements concretely means.

Why China Won't Turn Off the Tap — and What That Implies

This nightmare scenario won't happen, for a simple reason: it's not in China's interest. Beijing benefits too much from the current situation to end it abruptly. But — and this is crucial — Beijing peut moduler la pression à volonté. It can tighten or loosen access to the yuan according to its diplomatic interests of the moment. It can speed up or delay component deliveries. It can influence the yuan-ruble exchange rate. It can encourage or discourage its state banks from facilitating Russian transactions. Cette capacité de modulation est le levier le plus puissant qu'un État ait jamais détenu sur un rival potentiel.

And that’s precisely what makes China so dangerous to the international order. It doesn’t wave its missiles. It doesn't deploy its troops. It controls the faucets — and Russia knows it. If the West imposed even harsher sanctions on Russia, Beijing could decide within 48 hours to loosen or maintain its grip. La vraie décision sur l'avenir de la guerre en Ukraine passe par Beijing, pas par Moscou.

The Systemic Threat: Dedollarization as a Geopolitical Weapon

Beyond Russia: The Precedent for the Global South

The Russo-Chinese experience with dedollarization is being watched closely by dozens of countries that, for various reasons, seek to reduce their exposure to the Washington-dominated financial system. Iran, which has faced U.S. sanctions for decades, has adopted similar mechanisms with China. Venezuela, Cuba, and some African states look at the Russo-Chinese model as a possible path to indépendance financière partielle vis-à-vis de l'Occident. And if tomorrow a country in the Global South decides, after a crisis with Washington, to shift massively to the yuan for its trade settlements, it won't have to reinvent the system — il l'héritera de la Russie.

This is the systemic risk that the Atlantic Council identifies in its May 2025 dollar strategy report: a "geoeconomic fragmentation" driven by the U.S. trade war under Trump, Russian sanctions, and tensions with China could "force small countries to choose sides — and those that move closer to China would align their currency usage for international transactions and reserves away from the dollar and the euro." This isn't a conspiracy theory — it's the IMF’s assessment cited by the Atlantic Council: deeper economic fragmentation could cost jusqu'à 7 % du PIB mondial.

The Yuan Doesn’t Replace the Dollar Yet — But It Doesn’t Need to in Order to Be Dangerous

It's important to be precise: the yuan won't become the world's reserve currency overnight. Its share of international payments remains small, its capital controls limit its appeal, and trust in Chinese institutions is far from equal to that in the dollar system. But — as the Carnegie Endowment report points out — it n'a pas besoin de remplacer le dollar pour diminuer le pouvoir de coercition économique occidental. It only needs to create grey zones large enough for sanctions to lose their effectiveness. Russia is proving in real-time that this is possible: despite the harshest sanctions ever imposed on a major power, Moscow continues to fund its war, import technology, and fuel its budget — thanks to the yuan. Russo-Chinese dedollarization is therefore not just a bilateral phenomenon. It is a géopolitique demonstrateur that shows every state that might one day find itself in the crosshairs of Western sanctions that a partial exit from the dollar system is viable. This is perhaps the most lasting — and most dangerous — contribution the Ukraine war will have brought to the world order.

Conclusion: Beijing Wins, Moscow Exhausts Itself, and the West Must Choose a Side

The Audit of Four Years of Forced Dependency

The picture is now complete, and it is anything but flattering for Putin. By deciding to invade Ukraine, the master of the Kremlin hurled his country into a structural economic dependency on China unprecedented in modern history. Bilateral trade, though slightly down to 234 milliards de dollars en 2025, remains the pillar of the Russian war economy. 92 % de ce commerce est réglé en dehors du dollar et de l'euro — a forced monetary revolution that replaced dependency on the Western system with dependency on Beijing’s goodwill. China represents 57% of Russian imports, 34% of its total trade, and indirectly finances about one-third of its military budget. In exchange, Russia represents only 4% of Chinese trade — and has fallen to 7th place among Beijing’s partners. The asymmetry is so blatant that even the most patriotic Russian analysts cannot ignore it: Moscow traded dependency on Western markets, which were open and mutually beneficial, for dependency on a partner whose calculation is cold, strategic, and structurally unfavorable to Russia. Poutine a fait de son pays le fournisseur de matières premières d'une puissance qui le traite en état vassal — while pretending to build a "multipolar world." The irony is biting.

What the West Must Do Now

The West's response to this reality requires clarity and courage. First, we must renforcer et élargir les sanctions secondaires targeting Chinese entities that facilitate the evasion of Russian sanctions — and the proven effectiveness of measures against the Heihe bank shows that this tool works. Next, we must unambiguously support Ukraine militarily, economically, and diplomatically — because every liberated Ukrainian territory is a setback for Putin’s model and for Xi’s strategic calculation. Finally, we must build a credible response to the challenge of yuan internationalization by strengthening the institutions of the dollar system and offering developing countries alternatives to conditional Chinese financing. L'Occident a les moyens de gagner cette partie — à condition de reconnaître qui est son véritable adversaire.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary Sources

Elina Ribakova, testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) — February 2025

BOFIT (Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies) — Chinese car exports to Russia collapse, other exports grow — August 8, 2025

Reuters / The Moscow Times — Sino-Russian trade in 2025 records its first decline in five years — January 14, 2026

Secondary Sources

Atlantic Council — The Russian economy in 2025: between stagnation and militarization — December 12, 2025

Atlantic Council — Russia and China have been teaming up to reduce reliance on the dollar — February 22, 2023

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace — What are the limits of Russia's "yuanization"? — May 2024

Deutsche Welle — How China became Russia’s economic lifeline — May 19, 2026

Carnegie Endowment — China is the weak link in Europe’s Ukraine strategy — November 11, 2025