INVESTIGATION: Russian oil, the last lock — why the Baltics demand the embargo Brussels keeps deferring

INVESTIGATION: Russian oil, the last lock — why the Baltics demand the embargo Brussels keeps deferring

Introduction: the pipeline feeding the war

An open vein running through Europe's body

Somewhere beneath the plains of Central Europe, millions of barrels of Russian crude oil continue to flow every month toward Hungarian, Slovak, and German refineries. The Druzhba pipeline — «Friendship» in the language of its Soviet builders — remains open. Its flows, reduced but persistent, constitute the last major channel through which European currency directly feeds the Kremlin's war budget. This is not a historical anomaly no one has noticed: it is a conscious political choice, regularly renewed under pressure from certain European Union member states.

In June 2026, that choice is being contested with growing intensity by the three Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania — which have been demanding for months the imposition of a total embargo on Russian oil. Their argument is disarmingly clear: every euro Europe sends to Moscow in exchange for oil is a euro that funds the missiles striking Ukrainian hospitals. The counter-arguments from Berlin, Budapest, and Rome are suspiciously complex: logistical dependencies, transition costs, economic risks. This investigation sets out to separate fact from fiction in those arguments.

The context of June 27, 2026: pressure building

According to the Kyiv Post of June 27, 2026, the Baltic states once again intensified their pressure on Brussels to accelerate the Russian oil embargo, in the context of the 21st sanctions package then under negotiation. The European Union has indeed extended its sanctions regime by one year — through 2027 — and has banned certain flows of Russian maritime oil. But the overland Druzhba pipeline, which carries oil to Central and Eastern Europe, still benefits from exemptions that have been systematically renewed under pressure from the affected countries. The result is a Europe that sanctions Russia while maintaining a major hole in its framework.

This investigation traces the mechanisms behind that blockage, identifies the actors who benefit from it, and examines what a total embargo would actually cost — not according to oil-industry lobbyists' figures, but according to available independent data.

The Druzhba pipeline: anatomy of a dependence that refuses to die

History and geography of a Soviet instrument

The Druzhba pipeline was built in the 1960s to bind the economies of Soviet satellite states to the Russian oil industry. More than 5,000 kilometers long, it crosses Russia, Belarus, Ukraine (via a northern branch), then branches out to supply Poland, eastern Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. A southern branch runs through Ukraine toward Slovakia and Hungary. At its peak, Druzhba carried up to 1.2 million barrels per day into Europe.

Since the 2022 sanctions, volumes through the northern branch have fallen considerably. But the southern branch, feeding mainly Hungary and Slovakia, has benefited from specific exemptions that Budapest and Bratislava negotiated doggedly. These countries argued that no immediate alternative existed and that transition periods were necessary. Four years on, those «transition periods» persist, alternatives have not been developed with the urgency the situation warranted, and Russian oil continues to flow to MOL (Hungary's refinery) and Slovnaft (Slovakia's).

Current volumes: what exemptions mean in numbers

How much Russian oil does Europe still import via Druzhba? Exact figures vary by source and reference period, but available estimates indicate that Hungary, Slovakia, and part of the Czech Republic collectively receive several hundred thousand barrels per day via this overland route. At the current price of crude — around 70–80 dollars per barrel — that represents annual revenues for Russia in the range of several billion dollars, directly attributable to European exemptions.

To put that in perspective: according to United24 Media, Russia's budget deficit exceeds 80 billion dollars. Every billion Russia receives via Druzhba oil is one billion less in that deficit, one billion more available to fund the military. The direct link between European oil purchases and war financing is not rhetorical metaphor: it is an accounting reality.

The Baltic argument: a voice that deserves to be heard

Why Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius speak with authority

The Baltic states have no lessons to take from larger European countries on dependence on Russian oil: they eliminated it themselves, well before the war forced their hand. Estonia had developed its own oil shale industry and reduced its Russian energy imports since the late 2000s. Lithuania finished cutting its electricity imports from the Russian-Belarusian grid and planned to join the European ENTSO-E electricity network by 2025. Latvia actively diversified its supplies. These countries proved that the cutoff was possible, that costs were manageable, and that energy independence from Russia was achievable with political will.

Their call for a total oil embargo therefore comes from countries that have done their homework and are asking their European partners to do theirs. This is not idealism — it is lived experience. And their voice carries all the more authority because they are most geographically exposed to the Russian threat. As The Guardian noted on June 27, 2026, NATO officials fear Russia is preparing «provocations» in the Baltic states. The countries facing that threat directly also understand most clearly the link between Russian oil revenues and Russian military capability.

Their four-step plan

The Baltic plan for the oil embargo is not an emotional improvisation. It has concrete elements: a clearly defined, non-indefinitely-extendable transition period; a European solidarity mechanism to help the most dependent countries finance their alternatives; infrastructure investments to allow Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary to connect their refineries to alternative supply routes (Baltic Sea, Adriatic via the TAL pipeline); and economic compensation for industries facing significant transition costs.

This plan is realistic. It has been presented to European institutions on multiple occasions. It has been studied, annotated, commented upon — and ultimately shelved in favor of yet another extension of exemptions. The reason is not technical: the solutions exist. The reason is political: certain governments prefer the ease of the status quo to the political effort of the transition.

Hungary: the Viktor Orbán case explained without softening

Budapest between Moscow and Brussels: a deliberate balance

To understand why the total oil embargo remains blocked, one must understand Viktor Orbán's Hungary. This country occupies a unique position within the EU: it is a member state that deliberately maintains economic and political relations with Moscow that other members deem incompatible with European solidarity. MOL, Hungary's national oil company, depends heavily on Russian oil for its main refinery. The Hungarian government has negotiated long-term supply agreements with Rosneft and other sanctioned Russian entities. These agreements are presented as an economic necessity.

But behind the economic necessity lies a political choice. Orbán maintained close ties with Putin well after the war began. He traveled to Moscow. He blocked sanctions packages. He argued for negotiations with Russia on terms unacceptable to Ukraine. This positioning is not a consequence of Hungarian energy dependencies — it is their cause. Orbán chose Moscow as a strategic partner, and he uses economic dependencies as a defensive argument to justify that choice.

Slovakia: a quieter but equally problematic follower

If Orbán's Hungary is the most widely covered case, Slovakia plays a similar role, more quietly but just as problematically. The Slovnaft refinery, which supplies much of the Slovak economy, is a MOL subsidiary and depends on the same Druzhba flows. The Slovak government has followed Budapest in its requests for exemptions and aligned with its positions on several sanctions packages.

The Slovak case illustrates a troubling European dynamic: governments that could act independently choose to shelter behind louder allies to avoid diplomatic pressure. Bratislava benefits from the protections extracted by Budapest without bearing the political cost. It is a version of the tragedy of the commons applied to sanctions: everyone tries to minimize their individual effort, hoping others will carry the burden. The collective result is insufficiency.

Technical alternatives: myth or reality?

Alternative routes exist and are underused

The central argument of those opposing the oil embargo is that no immediate alternative exists to Druzhba oil for Central European refineries. This argument deserves serious examination — and it does not survive serious examination. Several alternative routes exist and have underused capacity.

The TAL pipeline (Trans Alpine Pipeline), connecting the port of Trieste in Italy to Bavaria, could potentially carry oil to Central and Eastern Europe via extensions or additional transport agreements. The port of Gdańsk in Poland, on the Baltic, has a tanker reception infrastructure that would allow substitution oil to be routed to Polish refineries and, with pipeline investment, further south. The JANAF pipeline in Croatia, linking the Adriatic port of Omišalj to Hungary, has a theoretical capacity sufficient to partially offset Druzhba flows if expansion investment were undertaken.

The missing investments: a political choice, not a destiny

What is missing to make these alternatives fully operational is not unavailable technology or nonexistent resources. It is targeted investment — in unloading terminals, pipeline extensions, storage capacity — that could have been planned and funded since 2022 had the political will been there. These investments have a real cost, on the order of several billion euros, which is perfectly manageable for economies the size of Germany, Austria, or even Hungary with adequate European support.

For comparison: Germany invested tens of billions in developing LNG terminals after Russian gas was cut off. It demonstrated that rapid energy transitions were possible when political will existed. There is no structural reason why a similar transition could not be made for Druzhba oil. There are political reasons. And those reasons deserve to be named for what they are.

What oil revenues fund exactly

From oil pump to ballistic missile: the funding chain

To understand why the oil embargo is so crucial, one must trace the chain between oil revenues and Russian military spending. The Russian federal budget draws an essential share of its receipts from taxes and royalties on hydrocarbon production and export. Those receipts are directly fed into a budget whose absolute priority has become, since 2022, war financing. The Russian government announced plans to increase military spending by 4 to 5 additional trillion rubles in 2026, according to Bloomberg. Those funds must be financed — and oil revenues contribute directly.

The chain is therefore direct: oil purchased by Hungarian refineries → foreign-currency revenues for Rosneft → taxes and royalties paid to the Russian state → military budget → purchase of missiles, drones, ammunition. This chain is not a theoretical construction. It is the normal functioning of a state-integrated oil economy. When Europe buys Russian oil, it funds this chain. That is a fact.

Destroyed Ukrainian refineries and a terrible irony

There is a cruel irony in the current situation: while some EU member states buy Russian oil via Druzhba, Russian forces bomb Ukrainian refineries. Ukraine has lost a large portion of its refining capacity to Russian strikes. It now imports a portion of its petroleum products. Those imports carry a considerable economic cost for a country already exhausted by the war. This is not only a shocking asymmetry — it is a strategic absurdity that the member states persisting in buying Russian oil should be ashamed to perpetuate.

In other words: Europe buys the Russian oil that Russia uses to produce the weapons that destroy Ukrainian refineries. The circularity of this situation should be unbearable for anyone who claims to support Ukraine. It is, for the Baltic states. It should be for everyone.

Investigation into circumvention: who still buys and how

The circumvention routes of oil sanctions

Beyond the Druzhba pipeline — whose exemptions are official and documented — less visible circumvention routes exist through which Russian oil reaches European markets despite maritime oil sanctions. The best-documented mechanism is ship-to-ship transfer: Russian oil is loaded in Russia onto tankers, transferred in the ports of third-party countries (Turkey, United Arab Emirates, India), sometimes blended with other origins, then re-exported to buyers who can no longer or prefer not to purchase directly from Russia.

This mechanism is known, documented, and partially targeted by successive sanctions packages. But it remains active. Investigative journalists and organizations like CREA (Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air) have documented several of these routes. The 21st sanctions package attempts to improve tracking and strengthen restrictions, but without effective secondary sanctions against the third-party countries most actively facilitating transfers, results remain limited.

The «shadow fleet»: ships without traceability

A particularly troubling phenomenon documented since 2022 is the development of a Russian «shadow fleet» of tankers: vessels flying flags of convenience, operating without standard insurance, outside standard AIS tracking systems, and with actual ownership obscured behind opaque corporate structures. These ships carry Russian oil to buyers who do not want or can no longer purchase directly from Russia, allowing them to circumvent the G7 oil price cap.

The European Union, in successive sanctions packages, has attempted to target this fleet by designating specific ships and prohibiting its nationals from insuring them or providing them services. But the list of designated ships is always behind reality — new vessels are added to the shadow fleet faster than they can be identified and sanctioned. It is once again a regulatory arms race where Russia has the advantage of rapid adaptation and where Europe struggles to keep up.

The real costs of a total embargo: dismantling a myth

An honest assessment of economic costs

A total embargo on Russian oil would carry real economic costs. It would be dishonest to deny them. For the directly concerned countries — Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic — the transition involves infrastructure investment, costs of adapting refineries to other crude grades, and possibly temporary price increases at the pump. These costs are estimated, by various analyses, at several billion euros spread over two to three years of transition.

But those costs must be weighed against their context. The European Union, through its Cohesion Fund and solidarity mechanisms, has the resources to support this transition. Frozen Russian assets — 300 billion euros — could legitimately be used to fund part of that transition. And above all, the costs of a two-to-three-year oil transition are incomparable to the costs of a continued war that destroys tens of billions of euros of Ukrainian infrastructure every year and maintains strategic insecurity for the entire European continent.

The gas precedent argument: Europe has already done it

The best answer to objections about the costs of an oil embargo is to recall recent history. In 2022, Europe cut, in less than a year, the vast majority of its imports of Russian natural gas — a dependence far deeper and more structural than the current oil dependence. The cost was real: painful energy inflation, businesses under pressure, households that suffered high bills. But Europe survived. It adapted its supplies. And by 2026, its dependence on Russian gas is marginal compared to what it was.

If this is not possible for oil in 2026, it is only because certain governments decided not to apply the same urgency they applied to gas. It is a political choice disguised as a technical constraint. The Baltic states, who did everything themselves without the massive assistance large countries were able to mobilize, are living proof of that.

Russia facing a total embargo: what would the real impact be?

Analysis of the effects on the war budget

A total European oil embargo would not eliminate Russian oil revenues — China and India would continue buying, at discounted prices. But it would significantly reduce the total volume exported at acceptable prices and deepen the discount Moscow already accepts on its Asian sales. According to analyses by CREA and the Kiel Institute, a complete European embargo on Russian oil (maritime and overland) would reduce Russian oil revenues by an additional 15 to 25 percent relative to the current level under partial sanctions.

In the context of a budget deficit already exceeding 80 billion dollars and military spending rising by 4–5 trillion rubles, an additional reduction of 15–25 percent in oil revenues would represent a considerable budgetary pressure on Moscow. It would not trigger an immediate collapse — but it would force even more painful trade-offs between military and social spending. It would accelerate the structural exhaustion the Kiel Institute has already documented.

The effect on the duration of the war

The question too rarely asked directly is that of the embargo's potential impact on the duration of the war. If enhanced economic pressure accelerates the depletion of Russian resources — forcing Putin to choose sooner between the war and domestic economic stability — then every week shaved from the potential length of the conflict translates into saved human lives, preserved Ukrainian infrastructure, and reduced reconstruction costs. The economic calculus of the oil embargo must incorporate this parameter — often neglected in analyses that focus solely on European transition costs.

The Baltic states, who have been making this intuitive calculation since 2022, have drawn a clear conclusion: the cost of the embargo is lower than the cost of continuing the war. This is not idealism. It is a perfectly rational strategic calculation — and that is why they press Brussels with an insistence that will not relent.

Allies of the embargo: beyond the Baltics

Poland and Finland: joining voices

The Baltic states' call for a total oil embargo is not isolated. Poland, neighbor to both Ukraine and Russia, has cut its own Druzhba imports and supports the general embargo call. Finland, after joining NATO in 2023, has adopted an increasingly firm position on sanctions and supports the Baltic approach on oil. These countries form a coherent northeastern bloc within the EU that understands the Russian threat viscerally and acts accordingly.

Added to these voices are, more surprisingly, certain representatives of the European Parliament and human rights NGOs that have publicly supported the total embargo. Parliamentary resolutions have been adopted to that effect. This parliamentary support is not enough to force the decision — sanctions are decided in the EU Council, not Parliament — but it creates growing political pressure on hesitant governments.

The European Commission: between wanting and being able

The European Commission finds itself in an uncomfortable position on the oil embargo question. Its technical services and some of its political officials believe privately that a total embargo would be the most effective measure to accelerate Russia's economic exhaustion. But the Commission cannot impose sanctions without unanimous agreement from member states in the Council. And as long as Hungary and Slovakia block, unanimity is impossible.

This institutional constraint — the unanimity rule for sanctions — is one of the major architectural flaws in the EU's foreign policy. It gives every member state an absolute veto right over decisions crucial to collective security. Reforming this rule — toward qualified majority on sanctions questions — is politically desirable but near-impossible to achieve without the agreement of those who benefit precisely from this veto. This institutional vicious circle is one of the deepest obstacles to a truly effective sanctions policy.

The 21st package: real progress or missed opportunity?

What this package concretely changes

Placed in this context, what does the 21st sanctions package actually change relative to its predecessors? According to available information, it strengthens restrictions on maritime oil flows, improves tracking of the shadow fleet, and extends the designation lists to new circumvention intermediaries. It maintains and extends the overall sanctions framework through 2027. These measures represent genuine progress — every gap closed in the sanctions regime is useful.

But it does not touch the Druzhba pipeline. The exemptions for Hungary and Slovakia are renewed, once again, without any commitment to a transition timeline. And without secondary sanctions measures targeting the most active third-party intermediaries in circumvention. These are the two most glaring absences, and the Baltic states named them clearly during the negotiations.

The Baltic verdict: insufficient but better than nothing

The Baltic governments will likely welcome the 21st package with a nuanced reaction: acknowledging its advances while making no secret of their frustration at its gaps. This posture — principled support for the EU, precise criticism of its shortcomings — is the one they have adopted since 2022. It is politically wise: nothing is gained by alienating allies who are still making progress, however insufficient. But it cannot mask the reality: as long as Druzhba flows, the embargo is incomplete and Russia's war financing is not cut off.

What a total embargo would change for the Russian economy

The oil chain as a vital artery

A total embargo on Russian oil — including closure of the Druzhba pipeline — would deprive Moscow of a significant share of its foreign-currency revenues. According to analyses by the Kiel Institute and CREA, an additional reduction of 15 to 25 percent in Russian oil revenues would be achievable with a complete European embargo. In the context of a budget deficit already exceeding 80 billion dollars, this would represent considerable economic pressure on Moscow.

Russia was already selling its barrels to China and India at significant discounts — sometimes up to 15 to 20 dollars per barrel below the global price. A European embargo would force the Kremlin to discount its crude even further to those captive buyers, reducing its margins and tax revenues. The arithmetic is unforgiving.

The cost of inaction versus the cost of the embargo

Some economists have attempted to quantify the cost of a total oil embargo for European economies: several billion euros in transition costs, a temporary disruption of energy markets, and a moderate growth impact on the most dependent countries. These figures are real. But they must be placed against the cost of inaction: every additional year of war destroys tens of billions of euros of Ukrainian infrastructure and maintains strategic insecurity for the entire European continent.

The most relevant comparison is with the 2022 gas shock: Europe succeeded in cutting its dependence on Russian gas in less than a year, at the price of painful but absorbed inflation. That transition demonstrated that Europe can show remarkable adaptability when political will is present. For oil via Druzhba, that political will is still absent. It is not impossible to build.

The Russian shadow fleet: an under-reported maritime scandal

Hundreds of tankers off the radar

Since 2022, Russia has assembled a «shadow fleet» of tankers: vessels flying flags of convenience, without recognized insurance, operating outside standard AIS tracking systems, with real ownership obscured behind opaque corporate structures. These ships carry Russian oil to buyers who do not want or can no longer purchase directly from Russia, allowing them to circumvent the G7 price cap.

The European Commission and its partners have attempted, in successive sanctions packages, to target this fleet. But each new designation is followed by reconstitution: new ships are registered under opaque flags faster than they can be identified and sanctioned. It is a regulatory chase that Russia is, for now, winning.

The role of third-party countries in this shadow trade

Countries like the Marshall Islands, Palau, Gabon, and other states with laxer maritime registration systems serve as flags of convenience for the Russian shadow fleet. These states lack the resources — or sometimes the will — to control what ships registered under their flag actually do. International pressure to strengthen these registration systems would be necessary.

Without robust secondary sanctions mechanisms targeting the insurers, ship brokers, and flag states that facilitate this trade, the shadow fleet will continue to thrive. This is one of the most visible flaws in the current sanctions regime. And it is a flaw the 21st package has not yet fully plugged.

The NATO Summit in Ankara: what is being decided for Ukraine

5 percent of GDP: an ambitious and necessary target

The NATO Summit scheduled in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026 should formalize a collective defense spending target of 5 percent of GDP for Alliance members. This is a considerable increase from the previous 2 percent target — itself rarely met by most European members. This ambitious target is a direct response to Russian threats and to American signals about the need for greater burden-sharing in collective defense.

For Ukraine, the Ankara summit is crucial: it should send a clear signal on NATO membership prospects. Kyiv hopes to obtain at minimum a formal invitation or a credible membership timeline. The persistent hesitations of certain members — notably the United States under Trump — on the question of Ukrainian membership are followed with anxiety by Zelensky and his diplomatic team.

Coherence between sanctions and military defense

One of the key stakes at the Ankara summit is maintaining coherence between the collective military defense effort and economic sanctions policy. These two dimensions are complementary and non-substitutable: economically sanctioning Russia without defending militarily leaves an open vulnerability; defending militarily without maintaining economic pressure allows Russia to fund its military through oil revenues.

A NATO committing to 5 percent of GDP in defense spending sends the right signal. But if, in parallel, certain alliance members continue to buy Russian oil through the Druzhba pipeline, the strategic coherence of that signal is compromised. Defense policy and sanctions policy must speak with one voice. Ankara is a test of that.

Conclusion: close the last tap

The urgency that cannot wait

This investigation has sought to answer a simple question: why has Europe still not closed the last major tap feeding Russia's war coffers? The answer is not technical — solutions exist, alternatives are available, costs are financeable. The answer is political: certain governments chose to maintain dependencies they could have eliminated, for short-term economic reasons that do not withstand serious scrutiny against the human cost of the war.

The Baltic states are right. Their demand is not radical — it is the logical consequence of a sanctions policy that claims to deprive Russia of the resources needed for its war. As long as that logic is not fully applied, the sanctions policy will remain what it too often is: a political signal more than genuine economic pressure. The last lock must be closed. The question is no longer why. It is when.

The responsibility of the hesitating capitals

History will record which countries delayed the total embargo and for what reasons. It will also record the human cost of that delay — the additional weeks of war, the Ukrainian cities bombed, the prisoners who do not come home. Budapest, Bratislava, and the capitals covering their hesitations will bear that responsibility. The time for corridor diplomacy and renewed exemptions is over: the time for choice has come. And the choice, morally and strategically, is clear.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Investigation method and limits

This investigation draws on public sources from June 2026, economic data published by independent institutes (Kiel Institute, CREA), specialist media (Kyiv Post, Euromaidan Press, Militarnyi), and government statements. I did not have access to confidential documents from EU Council negotiations on Druzhba exemptions. Exact volumes of oil flowing through the pipeline are estimates based on partial data. Certain assertions about the political intentions of the Hungarian and Slovak governments are inferences based on their documented public behavior, not on direct statements.

Bias and positioning

I am pro-Ukraine and convinced that the total oil embargo is a justified and necessary measure. This conviction influences my treatment of the subject. I have tried to present the counter-arguments — transition costs, logistical constraints, the unanimity rule — honestly, but they do not personally persuade me. Readers are invited to form their own view by consulting the cited sources.

Sources

Primary sources

Kyiv Post — Baltic states press EU to accelerate Russian oil embargo — June 27, 2026

Euromaidan Press — EU keeps its full Russia economic sanctions wall standing through 2027 — June 26, 2026

Daily Finland — EU proposes 21st package of sanctions against Russia — June 27, 2026

United24 Media — Russia's budget deficit tops 80 billion dollars despite Kremlin stability claims — June 23, 2026

Bloomberg via Ground News — Russia to increase war spending by an additional 4–5 trillion rubles — June 23, 2026

Secondary sources

Euromaidan Press — Drones flew 1,300 km to Russia's Ufa, then struck Bashneft refineries — June 25, 2026

Militarnyi/Reuters — Moscow refinery unlikely to resume operations after drone strikes until 2027 — June 24, 2026

Foreign Affairs Forum / Kiel Institute — Structural exhaustion of the Russian economy — June 23, 2026

The Guardian — NATO leaders fear they can no longer rely on US help if Russia attacks — June 27, 2026