EDITORIAL: Twenty-first sanctions package — Europe must stop bargaining with an aggressor

EDITORIAL: Twenty-first sanctions package — Europe must stop bargaining with an aggressor

Introduction: done with false pragmatism

The temptation of compromise in the face of the unacceptable

There is a word that surfaces too often in the corridors of Brussels when the conversation turns to sanctions against Russia: «pragmatism». Pragmatism, we are told, demands nuance. Pragmatism requires that we not push Russia into a corner. Pragmatism suggests preserving «open channels», not closing all doors. That brand of pragmatism, I say plainly, is intellectual cowardice dressed up as diplomatic wisdom. And it costs lives.

The 21st European sanctions package, proposed on June 27, 2026, represents a new step in what one might call the diplomacy of small steps. Each package is hailed as an advance. Each package is presented as a significant escalation. And yet, after twenty-one packages, Russia continues to fund its war, its missiles continue to fall on Ukrainian hospitals, and its soldiers continue to occupy Ukrainian sovereign territory. It is time to ask what these twenty-one packages have truly accomplished — and what they should have accomplished but did not dare.

The EU between conviction and permanent compromise

The record is ambiguous. On one side, the twenty-one packages of sanctions have undeniably weakened the Russian economy. The budget deficit now exceeds 80 billion dollars according to United24 Media. Russian government bonds are trading at yields of 15 percent. The Kiel Institute speaks of «structural exhaustion». These figures are real and important. On the other side, each of those packages was negotiated through concessions, exemptions, delays, and compromises that have considerably diluted their effectiveness. Europe imposed sanctions — but arranged for certain ones not to hurt its own industries too badly.

This is the contradiction this editorial intends to name. The European Union cannot both present itself as the defender of an international rules-based order and accommodate its economic interests with a power that violates that order so flagrantly. That is not a tenable position, morally or strategically.

What the 21st package contains — and what it should have contained

Real advances

Let us be honest about what the 21st package genuinely delivers. According to available information published by Daily Finland and Euromaidan Press, this package targets in particular the circumvention mechanisms of previous sanctions — commercial routes through third-party countries, intermediary entities that still allowed Russia to obtain goods and technologies despite earlier restrictions. The decision to extend the overall sanctions framework for an additional year — through 2027 — is itself significant, as it removes any ambiguity about the duration of European commitment.

There are also measures that strengthen surveillance of financial flows, broaden the lists of designated entities, and improve cooperation among member states to prevent certain countries from turning a blind eye to violations within their jurisdictions. These are genuine advances. I acknowledge them without hesitation. But they remain below what the situation demands.

Glaring gaps

What the 21st package still does not contain, and which should top the list: a total embargo on Russian oil. The Baltic states have been demanding it insistently — Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania severed all energy dependence on Russia long ago and can speak with total freedom. Their arguments are irrefutable: as long as Europe buys Russian oil, it funds the missiles killing Ukrainians. The logic is absolutely clear. Yet member states like Hungary, Slovakia, and others continue to block or dilute this measure in the name of economic interests or logistical dependencies their governments have lacked the political courage to resolve.

What the package also does not contain: sufficiently binding mechanisms for seizing frozen Russian assets that would transfer them directly to Ukrainian reconstruction. The European Union holds more than 300 billion euros in frozen Russian assets. It is morally unacceptable that only a fraction of those funds has been mobilized to help Ukraine, while the rest sits in clearing accounts awaiting a hypothetical legal resolution.

Hungary: the most blatant case of institutional sabotage

Orbán, or the art of blocking in Europe's name

I cannot write an editorial on European sanctions without naming what is most visibly dysfunctional: Viktor Orbán's Hungary. This country, a full member of both the European Union and NATO, systematically uses its veto rights to block, dilute, or delay the most stringent measures against Russia. This is not sovereign foreign policy — it is active complicity with an aggressor that targets the civilian infrastructure of a neighboring democratic state.

The affair is all the more infuriating because Orbán wraps himself in the rhetoric of «peace» to justify his vetoes. He claims to defend the interests of the Hungarian people by maintaining relations with Moscow. But the interests of the Hungarian people — like those of all European peoples — are better served by a Europe that holds firm against an aggressive Russia than by economic arrangements with a regime that finances the destruction of the continental order. Orbán knows this. He makes a different choice. That choice should carry institutional consequences that the EU has not yet had the courage to impose.

The conditionality mechanism: an under-used tool

The European Union possesses an instrument that should, in theory, allow it to respond to this kind of institutional sabotage: the mechanism of conditionality of European funds. In theory, a member state that fails to respect the EU's fundamental values — rule of law, solidarity, good faith in shared institutions — can see its structural fund transfers reduced. In practice, this mechanism has been applied timidly, partially, with interminable delays.

It is time for the European Union to send a clear message: the veto right on sanctions is not an instrument of national foreign policy. It is an institutional right exercised within a framework of collective responsibility. A member state that uses that veto to protect the interests of a foreign aggressor against the common European interest commits a serious political fault. It must be treated as such.

The oil embargo: the political courage Brussels must find

The economic case for the embargo

The economic argument for a total embargo on Russian oil is now well established. Oil revenues represent a major share — estimated at 30–40 percent — of Russian federal budget receipts. Reducing those revenues would directly cut Moscow's capacity to fund its war. Ukrainian strikes on refineries — in Moscow (Kapotnya district) and in Ufa (Bashkortostan), according to Militarnyi and Euromaidan Press — in fact illustrate that Ukraine understands this logic: destroying refineries means reducing the added value of Russian oil and therefore the revenues of the war machine.

If Ukrainian drones do that at 1,300 kilometers from the front line at risk to their operators, it is hard to explain why the European Union, from the comfortable safety of its Brussels institutions, will not shut the valves of the pipelines running through its territory. The answer is political, not economic: alternatives exist (Middle Eastern, Norwegian, African oil), the infrastructure investments are achievable, and the transition costs, while real, are financeable. What is missing is political will.

Countering the energy shock argument

The main argument against the embargo is the risk of a new energy shock similar to that of 2022, with its attendant inflation, recession, and social discontent. That argument is not without foundation — the 2022 shock was painful and fed populisms that were already sympathetic to Russia. But it must be weighed against two realities.

First, the European energy market in 2026 is profoundly different from what it was in 2022. Renewable energy capacity has increased massively. American LNG imports have offset much of the Russian gas. Electrical interconnection infrastructure has been reinforced. Second, the cost of an additional energy shock for European economies is measurable and manageable. The cost of a Russia that succeeds in taking Ukraine — or that persists in its aggression for another five years — is incalculable and potentially existential for the European security order.

Frozen Russian assets: a moral responsibility approaching its deadline

300 billion sitting idle while Ukraine burns

In March 2022, Western countries froze approximately 300 billion euros of Russian central bank assets held in their jurisdictions — primarily through Euroclear, the Belgian central securities depository. This unprecedented decision was presented as an economic pressure measure of unmatched effectiveness. Four years later, the vast majority of those funds remains frozen, generating interest a portion of which has been used to fund aid to Ukraine — a useful measure, certainly, but one that falls short of what the moral situation demands.

The legal debate over the possibility of seizing these assets — rather than merely using the interest — is real and complex. Arguments concerning sovereign immunity, the stability of the international property system, and the dangerous precedents this could create are advanced by serious legal scholars. I do not dismiss them. But I note that other scholars, equally serious, consider seizure legally grounded under customary international law on countermeasures, and that the harm inflicted on Ukraine justifies a proportionate response.

The moral statute of limitations on hesitation

What strikes me is the contrast between the humanitarian urgency and the institutional pace. Ukraine needs billions to rebuild its infrastructure, to pay its civil servants and soldiers, to maintain a functioning economy in wartime. It receives significant aid from its partners — but never enough, never fast enough, never without conditionalities that burden the administration. Meanwhile, 300 billion euros that morally belong to repairing the damage caused by Russia sit in clearing accounts.

There comes a point where legal arguments become excuses. Where international law, an instrument of justice, turns into an instrument of inaction. The European Union has the legal tools to act more decisively on these assets. It lacks the political will to do so. That is what this editorial condemns: not the absence of options, but the absence of courage.

Sanctions fatigue: a real risk not to be overstated

Warning signs of waning resolve

I do not want to ignore the reality of «sanctions fatigue». It is documented in opinion polls in several European countries. The energy shocks of 2022–2023 left their marks. Inflation fueled populisms that, in certain countries, benefited political forces favoring accommodation with Moscow. Governing parties — not just fringe movements — have started to raise the need to «negotiate an exit from the crisis» that would involve concessions on sanctions.

According to Ukrainska Pravda on June 25, 2026, two EU member states recently opposed a measure banning entry for certain Russian nationals — a relatively symbolic measure relative to the overall framework. This type of resistance on secondary measures signals that the cohesion of the European bloc, while holding on essentials, is under growing pressure at the margins.

Distinguishing fatigue from capitulation

It is possible to be tired and still hold the line. Moral fatigue in the face of a prolonged war is not the same as strategic capitulation. What the European Union has demonstrated, by extending its sanctions by a year and proposing a 21st package, is that it is capable of that distinction. But vigilance is required: warning signs of fatigue must be addressed not by easing measures, but through enhanced public communication on the stakes, and through social policies that offset the economic costs of sanctions for the populations most affected.

European governments that allow sanctions fatigue to translate into reduced economic pressure on Moscow are making a fundamental strategic error. They are sacrificing long-term security for short-term political comfort. And they are sending a signal to Russia — that the West can be worn down — which is exactly what Putin has been counting on since 2022.

The 21st package and circumvention: a regulatory arms race

Russia adapts; the EU must adapt even faster

One of the lessons of the previous twenty packages is that Russia learns to circumvent sanctions as they are imposed. Dubai, Istanbul, Almaty, Beijing — these cities have become circumvention hubs where intermediaries allow sanctioned goods to reach Russia through complex supply chains. The European Union and its Western partners face a genuine regulatory arms race: each package closes routes, Russia opens others, the next package tries to close those in turn.

The 21st package addresses some of these circumvention mechanisms. That is useful. But the long-term effectiveness of this approach depends on the willingness of third-party countries to cooperate. India and China, in particular, have profited handsomely from their intermediary positions in trade with sanctions-bound Russia. Pressing them to cooperate requires economic diplomacy — threats of secondary sanctions, offers of preferential market access — that Europe has not yet deployed with all the intensity necessary.

Secondary sanctions: the tool Washington uses, Brussels hesitates over

The United States has been more aggressive than Europe in applying secondary sanctions — measures targeting third-party entities (notably Chinese, Emirati, Turkish) that facilitate the circumvention of primary sanctions. Several Chinese banks have thus reduced their exposure to Russian transactions following American warnings. The European Union, for its part, hesitates to adopt this type of instrument for fear of tensions with important trading partners.

This European caution is understandable from a mercantilist perspective. It is difficult to defend from a strategic standpoint. As long as Russia has robust circumvention routes via unsanctioned third parties, the effectiveness of European sanctions is structurally limited. Europe must decide whether it wants to be a full strategic actor in this economic war — which implies tools like secondary sanctions — or content itself with being a commercial actor that prioritizes its trading relationships.

Ukraine is waiting for more than packages

What Zelensky asks for and what Europe gives

Volodymyr Zelensky has been remarkably disciplined and diplomatic in his demands on Europe. He thanks them for each package, acknowledges the efforts, highlights progress. That is necessary diplomacy — he cannot afford to alienate allies his country needs. But behind that diplomatic courtesy, the message is clear: it is not enough. Russian strikes continue. Occupied territories remain occupied. And every week of war costs Ukraine billions it does not have and lives it cannot replace.

Zelensky's announcement of a 40-day pressure campaign targeting Russian military infrastructure, according to RBC-Ukraine on June 26, 2026, illustrates a reality: in the absence of sufficient aid and economic pressure from its allies, Ukraine looks to strike where it can. The refineries struck in Ufa and Moscow are Ukraine's equivalent of sanctions: direct economic pressure on the enemy. Ukraine is doing its part. Europe can and must do more.

Reconstruction and the art of the unfollowed promise

There is also the question of Ukrainian reconstruction. International conferences succeed one another, promises are made, commitments are entered into. And on the ground, reconstruction advances at a fraction of the necessary pace, hampered by security uncertainty, the bureaucracy of conditionalities, and the tardiness of promised disbursements. This gap between political declarations and practical realities erodes European credibility in the eyes of Ukrainians who see their cities destroyed and rebuilt at a trickle.

Frozen Russian assets — 300 billion euros — represent a partly available answer to this problem. Their full or partial transfer for Ukrainian reconstruction would be morally right, economically logical, and politically powerful. It would say to Moscow: your assets will fund what you destroyed. That message has not yet been delivered with the clarity it deserves.

What history will retain of the 21st package

The assessment in thirty years

In thirty years, when historians analyze the European response to the war in Ukraine, they will examine each of these twenty-one sanctions packages. They will measure their cumulative effectiveness, their gaps, their exemptions. They will note which countries held, which hesitated, which sabotaged. They will compare the speed of Europe's reaction to the speed of Russian destruction. And they will render their verdict.

That verdict will not be entirely negative — sanctions have had real, measurable effects that have forced Moscow into considerable economic sacrifices. But it will not be triumphant either. It will note the missed opportunities: the oil embargo that was not imposed when it could have been, the assets that were not seized when they should have been, the concessions granted to member states sabotaging the process without paying an institutional price for doing so.

The credibility of the European project at stake

What is at stake in the management of sanctions against Russia goes beyond the Ukrainian question alone. It is the credibility of the European project itself. The European Union was built on values: democracy, rule of law, peaceful resolution of disputes, respect for state sovereignty. When those values are attacked at its doorstep by a power seeking to reshape the continental order by force, the EU's response will be the ultimate test of whether those values are real.

If Europe chooses economic pragmatism over moral integrity, it will say something fundamental about what it truly is. If it chooses, instead, consistency with its values over economic comfort, it will confirm that the European project is something beyond a common market — that it is a political community founded on principles. The 21st package is a step. It is not enough. Europe must go further — or admit that it does not want to.

The Baltic example: what it costs to make the right choice

Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius: three countries that chose

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania made difficult economic choices long before the war forced the hand of Europe's larger countries. They severed their dependence on Russian gas, Russian oil, Russian electricity. They paid the economic price of those transitions — and they paid it without complaint, because they had understood long before what energy dependence on Russia meant in political and security terms.

These three countries are today the most consistent voices in European debates on sanctions. They call for a total oil embargo. They demand secondary sanctions. They push for the seizure of Russian assets. And they are told it is too radical, too risky, too costly. These three small countries, living on the border of the power that occupied them for fifty years, deserve more than to be gently ignored in the corridors of Brussels.

What the Baltics grasped that others have not yet internalized

What the Baltic states grasped — and what certain large European countries have not yet fully internalized — is that security has an economic cost that must be paid upfront or at far greater expense later. Investing in defense, cutting energy dependencies, strengthening sanctions — all of this has an immediate cost. But the cost of a Russia that succeeds in seizing Ukraine, then looks toward Moldova, then tests a Baltic state — that cost is incalculable.

The lesson of the Baltics is a lesson in geopolitical humility: countries that have lived under Russian domination understand the nature of the regime better than those that only knew it as a trading partner. It is time for the European Union to acknowledge this and allow those voices to guide its sanctions policy rather than treating them as impractical idealists.

Trump, NATO, and sanctions: a perilous triangulation

The Trump variable in the sanctions equation

Writing about European sanctions in 2026 without addressing the Trump variable is impossible. The American administration has a complicated relationship with sanctions against Russia: it formally maintains certain measures but sends contradictory signals about its willingness to strengthen them. The prospect of a peace deal negotiated in Washington — potentially including sanctions easements — hangs over every European debate.

This American uncertainty creates additional pressure on Europe: if the United States were to ease its own sanctions as part of a peace deal Ukraine did not choose, Europe would find itself alone in maintaining its own. That scenario — unlikely but not impossible — should push Europeans to strengthen their own sanctions regime in an autonomous and irreversible way, independent of Washington's moods. A Europe autonomous in its sanctions policy is not anti-Americanism — it is strategic prudence.

NATO and the military dimension of sanctions

The NATO Summit scheduled in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026 will have to address, among other matters, the coherence between the collective defense effort and sanctions policy. The commitment to reach 5 percent of GDP in defense spending is a strong signal. But economic sanctions and defense spending are the two pillars of one strategy: weakening the adversary economically while strengthening one's own military defenses. You cannot deploy one without the other. A NATO that spends more on defense while tolerating eased sanctions sends an incoherent message.

It falls on European leaders attending Ankara to maintain that coherence. Military defense and economic pressure are not substitutable: they are complementary. Forgetting this would hand Putin exactly the crack he has been trying to exploit.

Toward a 22nd package: the list of what is missing

The five absent measures Europe must incorporate

As a practical conclusion to this editorial, here is what the 22nd sanctions package — which will be inevitable if the war continues — should contain in order to be commensurate with the situation. First: a total embargo on Russian oil, with transition assistance for the most dependent member states, accompanied by a strengthened energy solidarity mechanism. Second: the extension of secondary sanctions to third-party entities that facilitate circumvention, at least for the most flagrant and documented violations.

Third: a mechanism for seizing frozen Russian assets — or at minimum, a clear commitment to their full transfer for Ukrainian reconstruction once the war ends, with strengthened legal guarantee mechanisms. Fourth: clear institutional consequences for member states that use their veto to weaken sanctions, notably through the conditionality mechanism. Fifth: reinforced coordination with Washington to prevent Europe and the United States from sending contradictory signals on the longevity of the sanctions regime.

The urgency of a Europe that decides

These five measures are politically difficult. They require political courage from governments preoccupied with other immediate concerns — elections, inflation, growth. But politics, at its highest level, consists precisely of making difficult decisions at the right time rather than easy decisions too late. Europe must stop bargaining with an aggressor. It must decide what it is. And it must decide now.

Secondary sanctions: the tool Europe does not dare use

The secondary sanctions mechanism explained

Secondary sanctions are measures targeting third-party entities — non-Russian — that facilitate the circumvention of primary sanctions. The United States has used them effectively for decades: several Chinese banks have reduced their transactions with Russia following American warnings in the form of potential secondary sanctions. The European Union, by contrast, still hesitates to deploy this tool in the name of preserving its commercial relations with China, India, and Turkey.

This European hesitation has a direct cost: the circumvention routes through which sanctioned goods reach Russia via intermediaries in Dubai, Istanbul, and Almaty remain active. According to analyses from CREA and other tracking organizations, a significant proportion of the electronic components used in Russian missiles and drones comes through these circumvention routes. Every day without secondary sanctions is another day of deliveries to Russia's defense industries.

Turkey in the crosshairs: the equivocal ally

The Turkish case perfectly illustrates the difficulty of secondary sanctions for Europe. Turkey is simultaneously a NATO member, a significant EU trading partner, and the main circumvention hub for sanctions against Russia. Turkish companies have massively benefited from re-export trade to Russia since 2022. Pressuring them through secondary sanctions inevitably creates friction with a strategic partner.

But the alternative — allowing Turkey to function as a permanent pressure valve against sanctions — is unacceptable in the long run. The European Union must find a position that acknowledges legitimate Turkish interests while closing the most flagrant circumvention routes. That is diplomatically difficult. It is strategically indispensable.

Ukrainian strikes on refineries: economic warfare in action

Ufa, Moscow, Kapotnya: the map of strategic targets

Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian refineries took on a systematic dimension in June 2026. The Kapotnya refinery on the outskirts of Moscow was struck and is unlikely to resume operations before 2027, according to Militarnyi citing Reuters on June 24, 2026. The Bashneft refineries in Ufa (Bashkortostan), struck on June 25 after a flight of more than 1,300 kilometers, represent one of the most audacious strategic strike operations of this war.

These strikes are part of the 40-day campaign announced by Zelensky to pressure Russia's military and economic infrastructure. The logic is clear: each refinery taken offline reduces both Russia's industrial capacity and its oil revenues. This is economic warfare waged by drones at 1,300 kilometers from the front line.

The impact on Russian refining capacity

Russia finds itself in a paradoxical situation: the country has immense crude oil reserves but is watching its refining capacity amputated. Forced to consider importing gasoline by sea — a humiliation for a power that presented itself as an energy fortress — these strikes create additional pressure on the Russian budget. Fewer refined products means less added value, less tax revenue, an even deeper deficit.

The combination of refinery strikes and international sanctions creates a devastating scissor effect on Russia's war finances. On the revenue side: oil receipts declining due to reduced refining capacity and the discounted prices imposed by China and India. On the expenditure side: exploding military costs. Russia is caught in an economic vice from which it cannot escape without reducing its war effort.

Conclusion: bargaining is a form of complicity

The time for compromise is over; the time for choices has come

Europe chose sanctions against Russia because it was the only tool available that was both economically effective and politically acceptable short of direct military intervention. That choice was right. It remains right. But a well-chosen tool can be poorly used — deployed too timidly, too tardily, with too many concessions and too little unity. That is where Europe has failed, across twenty-one packages, to fully deploy the arsenal it built for itself.

The 21st package is a step. It maintains pressure. It closes certain gaps. But it is not enough. As long as pipelines continue to carry Russian oil to EU member states, as long as 300 billion euros sit idle without being used for Ukrainian reconstruction, as long as Hungary can impunity block critical measures, Europe is not living up to its own declared values.

What posterity will retain

History will not judge Europe by its speeches. It will judge it by its actions. By what it did — and what it did not dare do — while Ukraine alone defended the principle that borders are not changed by force. The permanent bargaining with an aggressor, the permanent search for the acceptable compromise, the permanent preference for the least costly short-term solution — all of this has a name I prefer not to use. But everyone understands it. Europe must choose its side. It has done so in words. It must now do so in deeds.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Position and acknowledged biases

This editorial is, by nature, a statement of position. I make no claim to neutrality — an editorial that claimed neutrality would be an empty text. I am deeply pro-Ukraine and convinced that the Western response to Russian aggression has been too timid. I believe Europe has the capacity to do more and that the obstacles are primarily political, not economic or legal. These convictions shape my reading of events. I acknowledge them without reservation.

What I do not know

I am not an economist, and some of the financial mechanisms I refer to — such as seizing Russian assets — are legally complex and are the subject of serious debate among experts I do not claim to equal. I do not have access to confidential negotiations within the EU, and the positions of member states I describe are those made public. Projections on the effectiveness of measures not yet imposed (total oil embargo, secondary sanctions) are reasoned hypotheses, not certainties. I have cited six sources dated from June 2026 to anchor this editorial in factual reality, without ever inventing facts to support my argument.

Sources

Primary sources

Daily Finland — EU proposes 21st package of sanctions against Russia — June 27, 2026

Euromaidan Press — EU keeps its full Russia economic sanctions wall (trade, banks, energy, crypto) standing through 2027 — June 26, 2026

Kyiv Post — Baltic states press EU to accelerate Russian oil embargo — June 27, 2026

United24 Media — Russia's budget deficit tops 80 billion dollars despite Kremlin stability claims — June 23, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — Two EU countries oppose ban on entry for Russians — June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

Euromaidan Press — Drones flew 1,300 km to Russia's Ufa, then struck Bashneft refineries — June 25, 2026

Foreign Affairs Forum / Kiel Institute — Structural exhaustion of the Russian economy — June 23, 2026

Bloomberg via Ground News — Russia to increase war spending by an additional 4–5 trillion rubles — June 23, 2026

RBC-Ukraine — Russia's economy has reached a dead end, Zelensky's adviser says — June 26, 2026