INVESTIGATION : The License That Arms Ukraine — Why the G7 Is Letting Kyiv Build Its Own Missiles

Introduction: The G7 Decision That Changes Everything

Évian-les-Bains, June 16–18, 2026: a quiet revolution

In the corridors of the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains in June 2026, a decision was made that could shift the balance of the war in Ukraine more profoundly than any tank or fighter jet delivered over the past two years. The G7 nations — the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Canada — agreed to authorize Ukrainian and European companies to manufacture under license missiles and air defense systems currently produced exclusively in allied countries. Recorded in a late-night communiqué, this decision represents a paradigm shift: Kyiv will no longer be only a recipient of weapons. It will become a licensed producer of Western arms.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who had attended the summit as a guest, described U.S. President Donald Trump's reaction to Ukraine's production license request: "For now, he was positive. And when President Trump is positive, I hope that means yes." That careful formulation — "I hope" — reveals the uncertainty still surrounding the concrete translation of this agreement in principle. But the direction is unambiguous: for the first time since the war began, the G7 has collectively signaled that Ukraine has the right to build its own Western weapons.

Why this decision now?

The G7 licensing decision did not come from nowhere. It is the fruit of months of intense lobbying by Zelensky and his teams, a growing awareness among allied capitals of the unsustainability of the current model, and a documented operational urgency: Ukraine faces critical shortages of interceptor missiles — primarily PAC-3s for Patriot systems — while demand has never been higher. The ongoing U.S.-Iran war, now fifteen weeks old, is drawing on the same American production lines, aggravating supply tensions. Without local or European production licenses, Ukraine would progressively run out of irreplaceable air defense munitions.

Zelensky put it with characteristic clarity at a Reuters press conference on the sidelines of the G7: "American production is not as large as our needs. We need licenses." Then, anticipating the follow-up question: "On the European side, we very much need the world to try to produce European anti-ballistic systems, robust and, between us, cheaper. Otherwise we, Europe, the Middle East, will not have sufficient quantities."

The Crisis Context: Why Stocks Are Running Out

The triple pressure on interceptor missiles

To understand why production licenses have become an existential necessity for Ukraine, one must understand the triple pressure on allied interceptor missile stocks in June 2026. First factor: Ukrainian consumption. Ukraine uses approximately 60 Patriot PAC-3 missiles per month to defend its cities against Russian ballistic attacks. Over four years, that represents some 2,880 missiles. Global allied stocks, already stretched before the war, have been massively drawn upon.

Second factor: the Iran war. Since the United States entered into direct war against Iran fifteen weeks ago, American production lines for air defense missiles — Patriot PAC-3 MSE, SM-3, THAAD — are running in priority for American forces and their regional allies. Allocations toward Europe and Ukraine are mechanically reduced. Third factor: Europe's own demand. Since 2022, NATO's European members have massively ordered Patriot systems for their own defenses — Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden. These orders mobilize the same already-overtaxed Raytheon factories.

Withdrawn promises and Ukrainian wariness

The history of Ukrainian license requests is marked by a foundational disappointment. Before 2024, American officials had privately broached the possibility of granting European partners licenses to produce Patriot missiles. Those discussions were ultimately buried under pressure from Raytheon and other American industrial interests that did not want to see licensed competitors emerge. Zelensky recalled this at Évian: "The United States once promised Europe the right to manufacture Patriot missiles, then withdrew that offer." This institutional memory explains his cautious formulation — "I hope positive means yes" — rather than certainty.

That is also why Zelensky is not betting solely on American licenses. Alongside the Patriot license request, Ukraine is developing with European partners its own systems — the Freyja project with Germany, SAMP/T improvements with France and Italy — that do not depend on Washington's goodwill. This diversification is the central strategic lesson drawn from four years of excessive dependence.

The G7 Communiqué: What the Text Actually Says

Diplomatic language and its implications

The G7 communiqué published at the summit does not take the form of a detailed licensing treaty — it is a diplomatic text, and diplomatic texts are written with intentionally elastic precision. It commits to "improving the supply of air defense resources, with additional systems, interceptors and long-range capabilities" for Kyiv, and to "considering licenses to strengthen Ukraine's domestic military production." The word "considering" is deliberately open: it creates no immediate legal obligation, but signals a collective political intent that each member can translate according to its national procedures.

More concretely, a diplomatic source cited by The Guardian was more direct: "We will produce under license not only air defense systems, but also deep-strike capabilities." If confirmed, this statement goes beyond mere air defense. Deep-strike capabilities under Ukrainian license would mean Ukraine could locally produce long-range missiles capable of hitting targets deep in Russian territory — without depending on physical delivery that can be delayed, conditioned, or halted.

Merz's contribution: Germany as pivot

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz played a central role in negotiating the G7's final communiqué on Ukraine. His public statement is equally revealing of the internal mechanics: "Stocks are declining, and can be compensated by granting licenses to companies that have these production capabilities, including those in Europe and Ukraine." He also described consensus on the final declaration as a "success" and thanked Trump "for this significant willingness to collaborate."

The fact that Merz publicly thanks Trump for his "willingness to collaborate" confirms that American resistance to licenses was real and that overcoming it required substantial diplomatic work. Merz is well positioned to do this: Germany is both one of Ukraine's largest military contributors and one of the United States' historic defense industry partners. His capacity to convince Trump that licenses serve American interests too — by offloading demand from factories that cannot meet it alone — is at the heart of the successful negotiation.

The Investigation: Which Weapons, By Whom, By When?

The systems covered by the licenses

Investigating this licensing decision raises a central practical question: which systems are actually involved? Available sources mention several categories. First, air defense systems and their interceptors — primarily missiles for Patriot systems, IRIS-T SLM and SLX missiles, and potentially SAMP/T munitions. These systems are currently manufactured exclusively in the producing countries, with exports subject to strict arms control rules.

Second, long-range and deep-strike missiles, as the diplomatic source cited by The Guardian indicates. This could include variants of the Franco-British SCALP/Storm Shadow cruise missile, clarifications around American ATACMS munitions (which Ukraine already possesses but in limited quantities), and perhaps — the most ambitious hypothesis — elements of the HIMARS program. On this last point, no official confirmation is available and analytical caution is warranted.

The potential producers: Europe and Ukraine

Who would produce these missiles under license? Several categories of actors emerge from the investigation. First, existing Ukrainian companies — Fire Point, which already produces the Flamingo and FP-7, and which is in active discussions with Diehl Defence to produce its cruise missile in Germany. Second, European joint ventures that could form around American licenses — Diehl-Fire Point for a Ukrainian IRIS-T, Rheinmetall for munitions, MBDA for air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles.

The concrete mechanics of defense industrial licenses are complex. A license is not a simple form. It involves a carefully controlled partial technology transfer, industrial audits, security guarantees, and often co-investments by the licensor. The White House will have to negotiate details with Raytheon for the Patriot, with Lockheed Martin for certain HIMARS components, with others for other systems. This will not be concluded in a few weeks. But the G7's agreement in principle gives the political authorization to begin those industrial negotiations.

Trump and Ukraine: A Relationship of Pragmatic Necessity

Trump's "positive": what does it really mean?

Donald Trump's reaction to the licenses deserves nuanced analysis, free from reflexive enthusiasm or skepticism. When Zelensky says Trump was "positive," he is describing a one-on-one conversation at the G7 — their first in-person meeting in four months. What Trump said exactly is not public — Ukraine declined to reveal the content of that confidential conversation. What is known is that Zelensky interpreted it as openness, not a firm commitment.

At the G7's closing press conference, Trump described his discussions with Zelensky at Évian and his recent phone call with Putin: "They both want to act, they just don't know how to go about it." He described Russia as the "offensive" party in the conflict — a significant formulation implicitly acknowledging Russian responsibility for the war. French President Emmanuel Macron acknowledged a "very profound change in the American approach" and stated that "President Trump, like all of us, has simply recognized that there is a real willingness from Russia today to engage in peace discussions."

The American interest in licenses

To understand why Trump might be "positive" about production licenses, one must understand American interests in the decision. First, American factories are saturated: Raytheon cannot meet global Patriot demand regardless of export policy. European licenses would reduce pressure on American industrial capacity without reducing ally dependence on American technology. Second, the commercial dynamic: a license generates royalties for the American holder, even when production happens elsewhere. That is a business model the American industry knows well.

Third, the strategic argument: more autonomous European and Ukrainian allies in arms production means more resilient allies in the face of Russian pressure or American political uncertainty. Paradoxically, Trump's America, which wants Europe to take care of itself, should look favorably on a Europe developing its own defense industry — even under American license. That is an argument Merz managed to present convincingly at Évian.

Macron, the G7, and "Deep Remobilization"

France and the consensus on Ukraine

Zelensky's presence at the Évian G7 was not guaranteed in advance. France, as host and holder of the presidency, played a key role in ensuring Ukraine had access to discussions and that the final communiqué included substantive commitments. President Emmanuel Macron described the result as a "profound remobilization of the G7" and a "common commitment to move this issue forward."

Macron's willingness to put Ukraine at the center of the G7 is all the more remarkable given his criticism in 2022–2023 for attempts to dialogue with Putin. His line has evolved — or rather clarified — toward more determined support as Russian duplicity became undeniable. The fact that he physically seated Zelensky and Trump side by side at the G7's final roundtable, "on either side of Macron" according to participants' descriptions, is a strong symbolic gesture: he put the two men in the same room and facilitated a direct conversation whose result — Trump "positive" on licenses — is one of the summit's most concrete fruits.

The difference from last year's G7

Comparison with the previous G7 is illuminating. In 2025, Trump left the summit prematurely, leaving a final declaration devoid of any substantive reference to Ukraine. This time, he stayed. He met Zelensky. He participated in a roundtable with all G7 leaders and sat next to the Ukrainian president. The communiqué includes explicit commitments on production licenses, air defense, and deep strikes. This shift in posture is not incidental — it reflects a real, if fragile, American political evolution.

Macron acknowledged this explicitly: "Like all of us, he has simply recognized that there is a real willingness from Russia today to engage in peace discussions." That formulation is interesting: it attributes to Trump an analysis that Europeans were already making, thereby legitimizing his behavior while highlighting convergence. That is classic diplomacy — valorizing the difficult ally to anchor him in the coalition rather than stigmatizing him.

Industrial Implications: A Supply Chain Revolution

From dependency to co-production

If the licenses materialize — and the G7 commitments give reason for hope — they would trigger a structural transformation of the Western military supply chain. Today, Ukraine receives weapons. Tomorrow, with licenses, it co-produces them. That distinction is essential. A weapon received can be stopped by a political decision, delayed by a logistical shortage, conditioned by restrictive rules of engagement. A weapon produced locally under license is permanent, scalable, and independent of export flows.

In practice, the first licenses will probably focus on the most urgent munitions: Patriot PAC-3 interceptors, additional IRIS-T missiles, and perhaps munitions for HAWK and NASAMS systems. These components are standardized, their technology is partly already known to European industrialists, and their production can be launched relatively quickly in existing retooled factories. Complete systems (radar platforms, launch vehicles) would follow in a second phase.

The Flamingo under license: the feasibility test

The case of Fire Point's Flamingo cruise missile constitutes an excellent feasibility test for the entire license mechanism. This missile — range exceeding 3,000 kilometers, produced at approximately 200 units per month by Fire Point at roughly €600,000 apiece — is currently manufactured in Ukraine. Negotiations are underway with Diehl Defence in Germany to produce the Flamingo on German soil. If successful, it would demonstrate that producing a Ukrainian missile in Europe is technically and politically feasible.

The inverse model — Ukrainian companies producing Western missiles under license on Ukrainian soil — is more complex from a security standpoint (Ukrainian factories are military targets) and a technology confidentiality standpoint (American allies do not want the secrets of their missiles to reach Russian intelligence). The hybrid solution — licensed production in Europe with Ukrainian companies as co-beneficiaries — is probably the most realistic short-term model. This is, in fact, what the Build with Ukraine program already practices with drones in the Netherlands.

The SAMP/T Option: The Franco-Italian Path

A parallel route to anti-ballistic autonomy

G7 licenses are not the only route to Ukrainian missile autonomy. France and Italy, which jointly produce the SAMP/T air defense system (via MBDA), have already delivered several units to Ukraine. In March 2026, Zelensky announced France would deliver a new SAMP/T that would be tested against ballistic missiles during 2026.

If those tests succeed, the SAMP/T would become the second Western system operationally deployed in Ukraine capable of intercepting ballistic missiles — alongside the Patriot. Its production is entirely European — no American dependency, no uncertainty tied to Washington. And its technology, developed by MBDA, is in principle accessible for licensing to European partners, including Ukraine. France-Ukraine discussions on a licensed production of the SAMP/T or its munitions would be a complementary and less politically complex path than Patriot licenses with the United States.

The complementarity of approaches

The intelligence of Ukraine's strategy lies precisely in this multiplication of parallel approaches. Patriot licenses through the G7 and the United States. The Freyja project with Germany and Hensoldt. SAMP/T with France and Italy. The Flamingo under license in Germany with Diehl. Drones produced in the Netherlands through Build with Ukraine. None of these paths is guaranteed on its own. Together, they form a net so dense that at least several threads will hold. That is the diversification doctrine that Zelensky has imposed on his team since the first disappointments over conditioned American deliveries.

This diversification has a cost: it requires extraordinarily active diplomacy, teams capable of simultaneously managing negotiations with a dozen partners, and consistency of vision despite the multiplicity of interlocutors. But in a war where every delivery delay can cost lives, having multiple backup threads is elementary strategic necessity. Zelensky and Fedorov understood this. And the Évian G7 is one of the most recent proofs that this diversification strategy is bearing fruit.

Canada and the United Kingdom: The Intermediate Allies

Canada's role in the interceptor shortage

A revealing detail of the interceptor missile crisis: two days before the June 18 Ramstein, Canadian Defense Minister Bill Blair McGuinty had a phone call with Fedorov specifically about the missiles needed to intercept Russian ballistics. According to Euromaidan Press, this call focused on ways to fill the missile shortage that Canada itself acknowledged. Canada then traveled to Brussels for Ramstein, where it participated in discussions on PURL contributions.

This sequence — Canada-Ukraine call on missiles, then Ramstein with PURL commitments — perfectly illustrates the Ukrainian coalition's mechanics. Contributing countries learn the concrete needs at the technical level, then translate those needs into financial commitments at political meetings. This is not a slow bureaucracy. It is an agile coalition that has adapted to the speed of war.

The United Kingdom and frozen Russian assets as a funding source

Among the concrete advances of the Évian G7 during the week of June 16–18, the United Kingdom made a distinct but complementary announcement: a package of £752 million including 150,000 drones and more than 350 air defense missiles and radars, funded by revenues from frozen sovereign Russian assets. This mechanism — transforming confiscated Russian assets into weapons for Ukraine — is legally innovative and politically powerful: it tells Putin that his own wealth is funding the defense of the country he is attacking.

This financing model — ERA (Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration) loan in British terminology — could extend to other countries and other types of purchases, including production licenses. If G7 nations collectively decided that revenues from the $300 billion in frozen Russian assets held in Western central banks would be used to fund Ukrainian production licenses, it would create a sustainable funding source, economically neutral for taxpayers, and symbolically perfect. The idea is on the table. It has not yet been formally adopted.

The Opponents: Interests Pushing Back

The American defense industry versus licenses

Any licensing decision is not implemented without resistance. The American defense industry — Raytheon for the Patriot, Lockheed Martin for certain systems, others for munitions — has historic reluctance to any intellectual property transfer, even partial. These companies have invested billions in developing these technologies. A license, even accompanied by royalties, creates potentially costly precedents for their technological monopoly.

The counter-arguments these industries presented to the Pentagon and White House to block licenses include: the risk of technology leakage to adversaries (Russia, China) through Ukrainian operational theaters; the difficulty of guaranteeing security of licensed production processes in Ukraine itself; and the impact on their future revenues if licensed competitors emerge. These arguments are taken seriously by negotiators — and they explain why licenses granted will probably initially be limited to munitions rather than complete systems.

Hungary and potential European blockages

Within the European Union, one country has systematically sought to block or dilute decisions supporting Ukraine: Hungary under Viktor Orbán. However, during the G7 and Ramstein week, a new political reality had asserted itself: with Orbán's electoral defeat against pro-European Péter Magyar in Hungary's national elections, Budapest has shifted posture. According to UNITED24 Media, Hungary even returned to Ukraine $82 million in cash and gold that had previously been withheld.

This Hungarian political change — if it consolidates — removes a recurring obstacle to European decisions on Ukraine. The unanimity rule in the European Council had often allowed Budapest to block initiatives that all other member states approved. Magyar's new Hungary, if it shifts toward a standard pro-EU position, will significantly change the European political calculus on Ukraine. That is a development to follow closely in the months ahead.

The G7 as Architect of a Defense Sovereignty Doctrine

Toward a systematic license principle

Beyond the immediate decision on Ukrainian missiles, the Évian G7 laid the groundwork for a broader wartime license doctrine. The emerging principle — that countries at war against aggressions may manufacture under license the weapons necessary for their defense, with the licensor's consent — is potentially revolutionary for international defense law. It creates a precedent that other attacked nations can invoke in the future.

This doctrine is consistent with a broader vision the G7 seems to be progressively adopting: democracies at war deserve growing strategic autonomy, not perpetual dependence on external deliveries subject to political vagaries. Ukraine, by pushing for months for this recognition, has finally obtained that the principle be inscribed in a communiqué of the world's most powerful grouping. It is not yet international law. But it is a milestone toward a norm that could change how democracies defend themselves.

China watches, and worries

This decision does not pass unnoticed in Beijing. China, which diplomatically supports Russia while avoiding the most flagrant sanctions, watches with concern the military industrial strengthening of Ukraine and its allies. If the Ukrainian model — local production under license, source diversification, low-cost innovation — spreads to other potential theaters of operations (Taiwan comes immediately to mind), Beijing's strategic calculations for a potential aggression would be significantly complicated.

Taiwan's capacity to locally produce defense missiles under American license, supported by G7 guarantees similar to those granted to Ukraine, would be a major deterrence factor against a Chinese invasion. China knows this. It is one of the reasons Beijing invariably presents Western support for Ukraine as a "threat to world peace" — in reality, it is a threat to its own doctrine of unimpeded military action. And that is worth stating clearly.

The "Winter Package": Zelensky's Parallel Request

Gas, diesel, and fuel to survive the cold season

On the sidelines of the license discussion, Zelensky submitted to the Évian G7 a distinct and urgent request: a "winter package" to prepare Ukraine for the cold season. This request covers financing for the diesel, gas, and fuel needed to run Ukrainian power plants if the war has not ended as cold months approach. Zelensky indicated that all countries present would support this package.

The necessity of this winter package illustrates an often-overlooked dimension of the Ukrainian war: energy infrastructure. Russia systematically strikes thermal power stations, electrical substations, and energy distribution networks as winter approaches. Without diesel for backup generators, without gas for heating, millions of Ukrainian civilians are exposed to Siberian temperatures that can drop to -20°C in certain regions. Military defense is not enough — civilian energy security is the second front line of every Ukrainian winter.

The interconnection: missiles and energy, the two shields

The simultaneous request for missile licenses and an energy package for winter reveals the complexity of Ukraine's situation. Defending cities against Russian ballistic missiles and maintaining energy systems against infrastructure strikes — these two objectives are inseparable. A Patriot can intercept the Iskander targeting a power plant. But if the plant is offline for lack of backup generator fuel, Patriots are useless for keeping apartments heated.

Zelensky has the integrated vision of this situation. His G7 request covered both dimensions — weapons and energy — because both are necessary for Ukraine to survive another winter of war. And it is this systemic vision, rare in leaders during crises, that partly explains why the coalition holds: its allies know that Ukrainian requests are coherent, quantified, and embedded in a comprehensible overall strategy.

The G7, Zelensky, and Peace: Licenses in a Negotiation Perspective

Negotiate from strength, not from distress

Production licenses fit into a logic that Zelensky has defended since the beginning of the war: Ukraine can only negotiate a lasting peace from a position of strength. A Ukraine that produces its own missiles, protects its own cities, and does not depend entirely on Washington's political moods is a Ukraine whose potential concessions in a peace negotiation will be less dictated by exhaustion and vulnerability. That is the doctrine of peace through strength — the only one that has ever worked in conflicts between democracies and authoritarian regimes.

Trump himself said at Évian that both sides "want to act, they just don't know how to go about it." This formulation — whatever its author's intent — implicitly recognizes that the conflict will end only through negotiation, not through one side's total military victory. In that framework, production licenses are not just tools of war — they are tools of future peace. A better-armed and more autonomous Ukraine will arrive at the negotiating table with real assets, not a knife at its throat.

The G7's diplomatic awareness: a signal to Moscow

The G7's collective message to Moscow is clear and multi-layered. First: the coalition holds. Four years after the invasion, the world's seven largest free-world economies still support Ukraine and are even increasing the quality of that support — moving from deliveries to licenses. Second: Ukraine will be even harder to crush in the years ahead, as it will produce its own weapons. Third: international pressure is intensifying — Macron describes a "profound remobilization" of the G7, and the license communiqué is its concrete demonstration. For Putin, who was banking on Western fatigue as his primary strategy, every G7 meeting that produces new commitments is a strategic defeat.

This demonstration of cohesion also has value for nations still hesitating to join the coalition — notably certain Global South countries that Russia courts actively with its anti-colonialist narrative. Seeing the G7 reinforce its commitment to Ukraine, including through unprecedented production licenses, strengthens the image of a determined and competent coalition — in contrast to a Russia burning its soldiers on a static front and losing its oil markets under Ukrainian drone strikes.

Conclusion: The Licenses, First Building Block of Ukrainian Defense Sovereignty

What changed with the Évian G7

The Évian G7 produced something that previous summits had failed to formalize: a collective commitment by the most powerful grouping of world democracies to give Ukraine the tools of its own industrial defense. Production licenses — even if their implementation will take months and complex negotiations — represent a qualitative shift in the relationship between Ukraine and its allies. It will no longer only be "we deliver you weapons." It will be "we give you the right to make them."

That distinction is fundamental for the sustainability of support for Ukraine. A Ukraine capable of producing its own defensive and offensive missiles is a Ukraine that can resist longer, with less dependence on external political decisions. It is a Ukraine that structurally reinforces European security, not just circumstantially. And it is, ultimately, a Ukraine that gives its allies the best possible answer to war fatigue: if it can defend itself, the political cost of support diminishes for democracies.

What remains to be done

Obstacles remain numerous. Contract negotiations with American industrialists will be difficult. Technological security questions will need to be resolved. Financing will need to be secured — and frozen Russian assets constitute an obvious and morally justified source. But the direction is set. And in a war where every week counts, the fact that the G7 took this step in June 2026 — before summer, before stocks are completely exhausted, before the next winter — is a decision made at the right moment.

Primary Sources

The Guardian — Allies give nod for Kyiv to reproduce their air defense missiles — June 18, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Zelensky at G7: Trump "positive" on missile licenses, but Europe needs a cheaper option — June 16, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Missiles Ukraine uses to shoot down Russia's ballistic missiles are in short supply; Canada and Ukraine talked about fixing that — June 16, 2026

Secondary Sources

Kyiv Independent — Allies pledge $4 billion in military aid for Ukraine following Ramstein summit, Fedorov says — June 19, 2026

UNITED24 Media — Zelensky announces major German-Ukrainian anti-ballistic defense initiative — June 18, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Germany's Diehl in talks to produce Ukraine's Flamingo cruise missile on German soil — June 12, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Ukraine pushing to produce home-grown ballistic defense system within a year, Zelensky says — April 20, 2026

UNITED24 Media — Ukraine secures one of the largest $1 billion territorial defense packages and 700 Dutch missiles — June 18, 2026