EDITORIAL: Xi, Taiwan and the PLA in 2027 — the countdown to the greatest threat of our era

Introduction: The July 1 speech that should make the West shudder

105 years of the Chinese Communist Party — and a military promise reaffirmed

On July 1, 2026, Xi Jinping delivered a speech in Beijing marking the 105th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For anyone who can decode the careful language of Chinese politics, this speech was not an ordinary celebration. It was a program, a roadmap, a declaration of intent dressed in the ritual garments of party ideology. And its central message, reaffirmed once again with the solemnity that great occasions demand, was unequivocal: the reunification of Taiwan is an "unshakeable historic mission," and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) must achieve "world-class" standards before its centenary in 2027.

Those two sentences, spoken by the man who simultaneously holds the presidency, the leadership of the CCP, and supreme command of the military, are not empty rhetoric. They are orders. Institutional priorities. Directives that orient hundreds of billions of dollars in military spending, millions of soldiers, and strategic decisions whose consequences will be felt across the entire Indo-Pacific region — and far beyond.

A leader for eternity: the context of Xi's third term

Xi Jinping is in his third term — a constitutional anomaly he created himself by erasing the two-term limit. He is the only CCP leader after Mao Zedong to remain in power this long. And as he prepares for a likely fourth term at the next party congress in 2027, this 105th anniversary speech is also an operation of internal political consolidation.

The year 2027 is not incidental. It is both the year of the PLA's centenary — which Xi wants to mark with a demonstration of first-rank military power — and the year of the next National Congress of the CCP, which must renew his leadership. Taiwan, military modernization, party discipline — everything converges on 2027 as the focal point of Xi Jinping's agenda.

"Reunification with Taiwan: an unshakeable historic mission"

Xi's exact language and its strategic implications

The exact phrasing Xi Jinping used in this speech deserves word-by-word analysis: "Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing the complete reunification of China is a historic mission and an unwavering commitment of the CCP." He added that China would "take decisive measures against those who seek Taiwan independence" and "oppose foreign interference."

The phrase "foreign interference" targets the United States directly, as Taiwan's primary military supporter. American arms sales to Taipei, the American naval presence in the Taiwan Strait, Washington's statements of support for the island — all of this is in Beijing's crosshairs. Xi is serving notice: China will no longer tolerate what it considers a violation of its sovereignty.

The "One China" policy and the reality of 23 million Taiwanese

Taiwan is an island democracy of 23 million people, with a developed economy, stable institutions, and a distinct cultural identity that has evolved over decades of separation from the mainland. The vast majority of Taiwanese — according to every available poll — want to maintain the status quo: neither formal independence that would provoke Beijing, nor reunification with an authoritarian regime that destroyed democracy in Hong Kong.

Xi's aspiration for reunification takes no account of the will of those 23 million people. That is precisely the problem. The One China policy treats Taiwan as a renegade province to be brought back into the fold, not as a distinct society with its own democratic rights. The West must have the moral clarity to name that reality.

The PLA in 2027: a "world-class" army, meaning rival to the United States

What "world-class standards" actually means

When Xi Jinping orders the PLA to achieve "world-class" standards before its centenary in 2027, this formulation is widely interpreted by military analysts as meaning "at the level of the United States" in terms of equipment, training, and doctrine. This is not a modest ambition.

In 2026, the PLA is already the world's largest military force in personnel. Its navy has become the largest in number of vessels. Its capabilities in ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, drones, and electronic warfare are at the global leading edge. Beijing is investing massively in military artificial intelligence, space capabilities, and anti-satellite weapons.

The accelerated modernization and the dismissal of two Defense Ministers

The credibility of this modernization program must be read in light of a troubling reality: in less than three years, China dismissed two successive Defense Ministers for corruption. This is a sign that the Chinese military-industrial complex is riddled with practices of diversion that potentially compromise the actual quality of equipment produced. Xi himself acknowledged the need to "fight hard, long, and fully against corruption."

This systemic corruption within the PLA is both a structural weakness and a warning for the West: do not overestimate the PLA's actual capabilities based on its official figures, but do not underestimate them either. Russia showed that military corruption can coexist with considerable destructive capacity.

The parallel with Russia-Ukraine: lessons Xi has drawn

What the Russian invasion taught Beijing

Russia's invasion of Ukraine was an extraordinary laboratory for Beijing's military planners. They watched carefully: Russia's logistical difficulties, the effectiveness of Ukrainian resistance backed by Western weapons, the role of drones and electronic warfare, the power of information warfare, and above all the economic consequences of sanctions.

Beijing drew several lessons. First lesson: an invasion of Taiwan must be decisive and rapid — a prolonged war would give the West time to respond with weapons and sanctions as it did for Ukraine. Second lesson: logistical preparation is crucial — never repeat the Russian mistakes of the convoy stalled north of Kyiv. Third lesson: economic resilience against sanctions must be built in advance, which Beijing is doing by reducing its dependence on the dollar and developing alternative trade circuits.

The "limitless cooperation" with Moscow: an alliance of last resort

The relationship between China and Russia is not an alliance of love — it is a relationship of convenience between two revisionist powers seeking to weaken the West-led liberal international order. Xi Jinping supports Vladimir Putin diplomatically, supplies him with dual-use equipment, and buys his oil at a discount, while carefully avoiding formally violating Western sanctions so as not to jeopardize his economic relations with Europe.

This strategy of oblique support allows Beijing to keep Ukraine and its allies under pressure without paying the full price of a direct confrontation with the West. Rutte himself cited "Russia and its ongoing cooperation with China, Iran and North Korea" as fundamental elements of the threat. This authoritarian quadrilateral is the primary source of global instability in 2026.

Taiwan in global geopolitics: this is not just an island

Semiconductors, the strait, and global power balances

Taiwan produces more than 90% of the world's most advanced computer chips through TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company). These chips are at the heart of everything: artificial intelligence, guided weapons systems, smartphones, autonomous vehicles, medical equipment. A Chinese takeover of Taiwan would not only be a geopolitical catastrophe — it would be an economic lever of mass destruction for global technology.

The West is fully aware of this. The United States has invested tens of billions of dollars to repatriate semiconductor production to its own soil through the CHIPS Act. But that diversification takes years. Until then, Taiwan remains the single most irreplaceable piece of the global technology economy. That is why its protection is not only a matter of democratic principle — it is a matter of vital economic interest for every nation that depends on advanced technology.

The Taiwan Strait: the 180 most-watched kilometers in the world

The Taiwan Strait, roughly 180 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, is one of the most surveilled and most heavily trafficked maritime spaces in the world. Dozens of commercial vessels cross it every day. American and allied submarines patrol it discreetly. PLA aircraft regularly violate the median line that constitutes the informal boundary between the two sides.

Every time the PLA conducts large-scale exercises around Taiwan — as it has done several times in recent years — the global economy trembles. Maritime insurance markets spike. Shipping routes are rerouted. The mere threat of a conflict around Taiwan has immediate global economic consequences. Imagine an actual conflict.

The American response: between strategic ambiguity and signals of resolve

The doctrine of ambiguity and its limits under pressure

American policy toward Taiwan has rested for decades on the principle of "strategic ambiguity": not explicitly promising to defend Taiwan militarily, but not excluding that possibility either. This ambiguity is meant to deter both a Chinese attack and a Taiwanese declaration of independence that would trigger a crisis.

But under pressure from Chinese military advances, several American officials — including President Biden before him, and to some extent Trump — have slipped toward more direct statements of support for Taiwan. Trump, whose relations with Xi Jinping have oscillated between trade rivalry and tactical pragmatism, maintains an unpredictable position that generates both hope and anxiety in Taipei.

Arms sales to Taiwan and Beijing's response

The United States has continued under the Trump administration to sell arms to Taiwan — anti-aircraft missile systems, drones, anti-ship missile systems, surveillance equipment — despite Beijing's protests. These sales are both a political signal and a strategic necessity: they allow Taiwan to develop an asymmetric defense that could make an invasion sufficiently costly to deter a hostile decision by Xi.

Beijing's response is systematically to threaten "resolute countermeasures" and denounce "American interference in China's internal affairs." This response is predictable but does not change American conduct. The calculation is: the costs of arms deliveries to Taiwan (diplomatic tensions with China) are lower than the costs of an undefended Taiwan (existential risk for regional stability and semiconductor access).

The role of North Korea and Iran in the revisionist axis

Military technologies moving between authoritarian allies

Xi's speech on PLA military modernization cannot be read without accounting for the flows of technology and military cooperation circulating between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Iranian Shahed drones used by Russia against Kyiv contain components of Chinese origin. North Korean missiles supplied to Russia benefit from technology transfers that improve their range and accuracy.

This cross-cutting circulation of military technologies is one reason why the West cannot treat these conflicts as separate problems. The war in Ukraine, the Taiwan crisis, the Iranian nuclear program, Pyongyang's ambitions — these are different manifestations of the same structural challenge: the coordinated assault by authoritarian regimes against the liberal international order.

North Korea as a substitute armed arm

Kim Jong-un's North Korea is supplying artillery ammunition to Russia in industrial quantities, allowing Moscow to sustain its offensive in Ukraine despite its own production difficulties. In exchange, Pyongyang receives technology transfers in missiles and potentially nuclear technology — reinforcing the threat it poses to South Korea, Japan, and American allies in the Pacific.

This interdependence between members of the revisionist axis is deliberately designed to create strategic dilemmas for the West: every resource devoted to supporting Ukraine is a resource not going to the Pacific. Every weapons system delivered to Taiwan is a system not in European arsenals. This is the challenge of strategic dispersion that democracies must overcome.

Europe facing the Chinese threat: between economic interests and security realism

A trading partner and a security threat: the European contradiction

The European Union faces a fundamental contradiction vis-à-vis China. On one hand, China is one of Europe's primary trading partners — hundreds of billions of euros in annual trade flows. On the other, European intelligence services increasingly identify China as the primary threat in industrial and technological espionage, and strategic analyses recognize that access to Taiwanese semiconductors is vital for European economies.

This contradiction produces a European policy toward China that attempts to combine economic competition, diplomatic engagement, and maintenance of principles on human rights and Taiwan — an approach the Chinese call hypocritical and that American hawks consider insufficient. Navigating between those two criticisms is one of the most delicate tasks in European diplomacy.

Defense investment as a structural response

Facing the combined threats — Russian to the east and Chinese to the west in terms of influence — Europe is investing massively in its defense for the first time since the Cold War. European defense spending has increased significantly since 2022. France, Germany, Poland, and other NATO members have revised upward their military budgets and reoriented their arsenals toward high-intensity scenarios.

This increase in European military spending — which Trump sometimes presents as a response to his pressure, which is partially true — is in reality a response to a realistic assessment of the threats posed by Putin and Xi. Xi's July 1, 2026 speech on PLA modernization and Taiwan is one more argument for accelerating this trend.

The CCP anniversary as domestic political operation

Xi consolidates his power ahead of the 2027 Congress

The July 1, 2026 speech is not addressed only to the world. It is also addressed to the 98 million CCP members in China and to the elites who will determine Xi's political future at the 2027 National Congress. By reaffirming the major themes — Taiwan, military modernization, the anti-corruption drive — Xi consolidates his position as the indispensable leader of modern China.

Anti-corruption, in particular, is presented as a "difficult, long, and total battle." Since coming to power in 2012, Xi has used these campaigns to eliminate political rivals as much as to genuinely clean up party ranks. More than one million officials have been subject to disciplinary sanctions. This dual function — moral and political — is characteristic of Xi's governing style.

Internal destabilization as a counter-power on Xi

Despite Xi Jinping's apparent omnipotence, China faces considerable internal pressures. Economic growth is structurally slowing — the post-Evergrande property bubble continues to weigh on the economy, domestic consumption stagnates, and youth unemployment among college graduates remains high. These economic pressures create a space of latent discontent that nationalism around Taiwan serves to channel.

This political instrumentalization of nationalism is a double-edged risk. It can push Xi into military adventures he cannot fully control once started — the logic of internal escalation can override strategic rationality. This is one of the scenarios Western analysts fear most: not a deliberate, calculated decision to invade Taiwan, but an unplanned escalation fed by Chinese domestic political dynamics.

What the West must do now

Arm Taiwan, support South Korea and Japan, diversify semiconductors

Faced with Xi's July 1, 2026 speech, the Western response must be multidimensional. Militarily: accelerate defensive arms sales to Taiwan, strengthen alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia within the AUKUS partnership and the Quad, maintain a regular naval presence in the Taiwan Strait to signal clearly that the West considers this waterway international.

Economically: accelerate the diversification of semiconductor supply chains, reduce dependence on Chinese imports in strategic sectors, support TSMC investments in Arizona, the Netherlands, and Japan. Diplomatically: maintain a consistent line of support for Taiwan without triggering unnecessary escalation — the delicate balance that American and European diplomats have been practicing for decades.

The Ukrainian lesson applied to Taiwan: prevention rather than reaction

The war in Ukraine taught a painful lesson: it is infinitely more costly to react to a completed aggression than to prevent it. Credible deterrence — visible, robust, clearly communicated — is the best investment in peace. For Taiwan, this means the West must act now, before 2027, to make the cost of an invasion sufficiently high in Xi's mind for him to stand down.

This does not guarantee permanent peace — nothing does. But it is the most reasonable strategy available. And Xi Jinping's July 1, 2026 speech on Taiwan and the PLA is an urgent reminder that the clock is ticking. The window for credible deterrence is closing as the PLA approaches its modernization targets.

The impact of the July 1 speech on markets, allies, and Taipei

Market and regional ally reaction

Xi's July 1 speech did not trigger a spectacular market reaction — the phrasing used was sufficiently similar to previous speeches not to constitute an outright surprise. But maritime insurance markets and semiconductor investors closely monitor every signal from Beijing. The slightest rhetorical escalation immediately translates into a risk premium.

The West's regional allies — Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines — took note. The Japanese government accelerated its rearmament program, approving defense budget increases unprecedented since World War II. The Philippines, under President Marcos, tightened its military ties with Washington in the face of Chinese pressure in the South China Sea.

Taipei: official calm, intense preparation

Taipei responded to Xi's declarations with the habitual restraint of Taiwanese diplomacy: no provocative statement, maintenance of the status quo position, continuity of defense and economic diversification programs. Behind the scenes, however, Taiwanese military planners integrate every Xi speech into their preparation scenarios.

Taiwan is investing massively in asymmetric defense: anti-ship missiles, drones, mobile anti-aircraft systems, naval mines, fuel and ammunition reserves for a prolonged war. The objective is not to win a war against China — that would be militarily illusory. The objective is to make an invasion costly enough that Xi recalculates the cost-benefit ratio before deciding.

Xi Jinping, Putin and Moscow's war: calculations that answer each other

How the war in Ukraine influences Xi's decision on Taiwan

It would be naive to treat Xi Jinping's ambitions over Taiwan and Putin's war in Ukraine as independent phenomena. They directly influence each other. If Putin succeeds in imposing his conditions on Ukraine — even partially — he will send Xi the signal that Western democracies lack coherence and perseverance. If Ukraine holds and the West remains united, the message is the opposite: the costs of a military adventure against a democracy supported by the West are prohibitive.

That is why support for Ukraine is not solely a Ukrainian matter. It is a signal sent to Beijing. Every Patriot missile delivered to Kyiv, every sanction maintained against Moscow, every billion dollars of military aid that keeps Ukraine standing tells Xi: the West does not back down in the face of authoritarian regimes. And that lesson, more than any summit speech, can deter a Chinese military adventure against Taiwan.

Western unity as the best deterrent

The best response to Xi's July 1, 2026 speech is not a thundering military declaration nor a brutal commercial break with China. It is the continued demonstration of robust Western unity — in Ukraine, in the Indo-Pacific, in semiconductor trade policy, in multilateral forums. This unity, when visible and credible, is the most powerful deterrent of all.

The NATO summit in Ankara on July 7 and 8, 2026 is an opportunity to demonstrate this unity. The 70-billion-euro financial commitments to Ukraine, if they materialize, send a message to Beijing as much as to Moscow. This is not diplomatic naivety — it is coherent geopolitics.

Party discipline and anti-corruption: the other face of Xi's speech

Corruption and purges: the internal sword of Damocles

The July 1 speech was not directed solely outward. A significant portion was addressed to CCP members on the need to continue the "strict and total governance of the Party." This phrasing is the standard code for the anti-corruption campaigns Xi has conducted since 2012. More than one million officials have been sanctioned since then.

The two successive Defense Ministers dismissed for corruption — Li Shangfu in 2023 and the investigations that followed into other senior military officials — illustrate the extent of the rot within the PLA. For Xi, these purges are both necessary (cleaning up an army he genuinely wants to modernize) and politically useful (eliminating alternative networks of loyalty within the armed forces).

The CCP builds "the most magnificent epic" on 105 years of history

Xi described the CCP's 105-year history as "the most magnificent epic" of the Chinese nation. He recalled that the party grew from fifty members to the world-leading power it is today. This narrative of historical grandeur is the emotional foundation on which Xi builds his program: Taiwan as the fulfillment of the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation," military modernization as the guarantor of that rejuvenation.

This fusion of history, nationalism, and military ambition is precisely what makes Xi's threat different from more ordinary threats. It is not merely strategic — it is existential for his political project. And leaders who have existential projects are the ones who take the greatest risks.

Conclusion: The 2027 clock is running — the West must act before it stops

Xi's strategic timetable and the Western window for action

Xi Jinping's July 1, 2026 speech draws a clear line in the sand: 2027 is the horizon for PLA military modernization. It is no coincidence that this is also the year of the next CCP congress, the likely moment for a fourth Xi term. China's political and military timetables converge on a moment of reckoning of which the West must be acutely aware.

Ukraine has shown what happens when an authoritarian regime is allowed to develop its military capability without a credible response. Taiwan must not repeat that experience. The deterrence window — the moment when strengthening Taiwan's defenses, regional alliances, and economic resilience is still possible before a crisis — is narrowing.

The world deserves better than two simultaneous wars against authoritarianism

The West is already deeply engaged in resisting Russian aggression in Ukraine. Opening a second front of major instability in the Pacific would be a strategic and economic catastrophe that no one can afford. The best way to avoid this scenario is deterrence: arming Taiwan, maintaining alliances, keeping a visible naval presence, and — above all — holding Ukraine.

Because if Putin fails in Ukraine, Xi will see that the costs of aggression against a democracy supported by the West are unacceptable. That is the most important strategic link that Western leaders must understand and communicate: the wars over Ukraine and Taiwan are not two separate files. They are two fronts of the same fight for an international order in which democracies can exist in security.

Conclusion: Xi has spoken — now it is the West's turn to act

The words of July 1 as a roadmap for the Western response

The July 1, 2026 speech reaffirmed what every serious observer already knew: Xi Jinping considers the reunification of Taiwan his historic mission, the PLA as the armed instrument of that mission, and 2027 as the horizon for military preparation. These three elements form a coherent, serious, and potentially dangerous program.

The question is not whether Xi is sincere — he manifestly is. The question is whether the West takes that sincerity seriously with enough consistency and foresight to respond before a crisis forces an improvised reaction. The July 1 speech was not a surprise. What would be a surprise — the bad kind — is having failed to act on the basis of what it so clearly announces.

Taiwan, Ukraine, and the defense of democratic values

At its core, the question of Taiwan and the war in Ukraine pose the same fundamental question: are democracies willing to defend the values that define them, even when that costs something? Ukraine answers "yes" with its blood. The West so far answers with arms deliveries and sanctions — insufficient but real. For Taiwan, the Western response must be built now, before the urgency, so that deterrence is credible when it is most needed.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My biases and my position on China

I consider Xi Jinping's China as the primary long-term threat to the liberal international order, just as I consider Putin's Russia as the primary short-term threat. This stated position is openly assumed. I am not a sinologist and I do not claim to master all the nuances of Chinese domestic politics. My analysis rests on verifiable primary sources — public speeches, recognized expert analyses, economic data — and I endeavor to separate facts from my editorial judgments.

What I do not know

I do not know whether Xi Jinping will actually make the decision to invade Taiwan. I do not know when, or under what conditions. I do not know to what extent corruption within the PLA genuinely compromises its combat capabilities. These are fundamental unknowns that the world's best experts debate without certainty. I report the available signals and draw analyses that seem reasonable to me — without claiming a prescience that no one possesses on this subject.

Sources

Primary sources

India Today — Xi Jinping urges PLA modernization, reaffirms Taiwan reunification push — July 1, 2026

Chosun Biz — Xi Jinping speech for the 105th CCP anniversary — July 1, 2026

RBC Ukraine — Xi Jinping signals determination to resolve the Taiwan question — July 1, 2026

Secondary sources

Reuters — China urges US to handle Taiwan issue with utmost caution — July 1, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Rutte to Trump: Russia cooperates with China, Iran and North Korea — July 1, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Context of the Ukrainian conflict and Russia-China cooperation — July 2026

Foreign Policy — Trump, weapons, Iran, Lockheed, Ukraine, NATO, Rutte — June 25, 2026