COMMENTARY: USA-Iran Deal and 440 kg of 60%-Enriched Uranium — The IAEA Demands Bulletproof Verification

Introduction: The last-chance deal and its gaping holes

A memorandum signed, a fragile peace, and bombs still awaiting an accounting

In mid-June 2026, following American-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear sites during a 12-day war, the United States and Iran signed a 14-point memorandum of understanding (MOU). IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed on June 26, 2026 in Tokyo that the agreement grants UN inspectors access to Iranian nuclear sites. But he immediately stated the fundamental condition: a "very robust" verification system is indispensable, and Iran's stated intentions are entirely insufficient on their own.

Behind these diplomatic formulas lies a blunt reality: before the bombings, Iran held 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60% — enough, by the IAEA's own standards, to produce up to 10 nuclear weapons if that material were enriched above 90%. Those stockpiles are today "unaccounted for" according to the IAEA itself. That is where the real problem lies. That is where my political anxiety finds its precise address.

Grossi in Tokyo: "Intentions are not enough"

Grossi was remarkably clear at his Tokyo conference. "The Iranian government has stated quite clearly that developing nuclear weapons is not its intention, but of course, intentions are not enough." He added: "In order to have certainty, we need a very robust verification system as soon as possible." And more bluntly still: "We need to verify everywhere." These three statements form the core of the most complex diplomatic problem in the world right now.

The IAEA finds itself in the uncomfortable position of being the arbiter of an agreement whose two parties — Washington and Tehran — read in contradictory ways. The United States claims that inspections were fully agreed upon in the MOU. Iran says that discussions on inspections remain "limited for now." This contradiction at the very heart of the deal points toward weeks of difficult technical negotiations in Switzerland.

The 440 kg of 60%-enriched uranium: the number that will not sleep

What 440 kg of 60%-enriched uranium actually represents

The figure of 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60% that Iran held before the strikes is critically important for evaluating the real scope of this deal. To put that number in context: the IAEA's threshold of concern for nuclear bomb production — a "significant quantity" — is 25 kg of uranium enriched to 90%, meaning weapons-grade material.

To go from 60% enrichment to 90%, additional centrifuges, time, and facilities are required. That is not an insurmountable technological leap for a nation that has already mastered 60% enrichment. With 440 kg at 60% as a starting point, Iran would have had the raw material — if enriched to 90% — for several dozen kilograms of weapons-grade fissile material. That is the calculation that justifies the urgency.

Where are those stockpiles now? The IAEA does not know

The central problem revealed by Grossi's statement is this: Iran's enriched uranium stockpiles remain "unaccounted for." Iran maintains that the bombed sites are off-limits until a final agreement is signed. Technical negotiations are resuming in Switzerland. But between now and a final agreement on inspections, there is a window of uncertainty in which potentially dangerous nuclear materials exist in a state of insufficient traceability.

It is precisely this void that explains Grossi's firm stance: as long as the IAEA does not have complete, verifiable access to all sites — including the bombed sites — it cannot guarantee that Iran's nuclear program is purely civilian. And in this domain, uncertainty is not an acceptable option. The consequences of an error are too irreversible.

Washington and Tehran: two readings of the same agreement

Trump promises "the highest levels of inspection" — Iran says otherwise

President Donald Trump publicly stated that Iran had agreed to "the highest levels of nuclear inspections." Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, said that access to the bombed sites and the materials within them would be examined "within the framework of a final agreement" with the United States — and tied to concrete sanctions-relief measures. These two statements are incompatible. Someone is lying, or at minimum heavily slanting the truth.

This contradiction is the hallmark of a deal built on deliberate ambiguity — each side reads into it what it wants to tell its domestic audience. Trump needs an "extraordinary deal" for his image as a negotiator. Tehran needs sanctions lifted to save its shattered economy. Neither necessarily has an interest in resolving the ambiguity at the risk of collapsing the deal.

The IAEA as impossible arbiter of an ambiguous agreement

Grossi is in a delicate position: he must simultaneously encourage the deal — because any access is better than no access — while clearly signaling its limits so as not to lend his legitimacy to an insufficient arrangement. His Tokyo statement strikes this careful balance: he acknowledges that the deal "grants access to nuclear sites," but immediately insists on the necessity of a "very robust" verification system.

The IAEA operates under the Inspection and Safeguards Agreement (ISA) referenced in the MOU. That legal framework is potentially robust — but only if applied in full. The Iranian clause by which the bombed sites remain off-limits until a final agreement is precisely the flaw that threatens the integrity of the entire system.

The 12-day war and its nuclear consequences

Did the American-Israeli strikes actually destroy Iran's program?

The "12-day war" of summer 2025 between the United States, Israel, and Iran targeted Iran's main nuclear sites. But the assessment of actual damage remains contested. Some analysts claim the strikes set the program back by several years. Others believe the deepest and most hardened installations — notably at Fordow and Natanz — partially survived or can be reconstituted.

Iran knew, before the strikes, that the threat existed. Legitimate questions arise about the possible dispersal of nuclear materials and equipment before the attack. This is precisely the risk that makes full and immediate verification by the IAEA urgent: if materials were dispersed to undeclared sites, inspectors must be able to track them everywhere, without geographic restriction.

The Strait of Hormuz and Iran's leverage in the negotiations

Iran holds considerable leverage in these negotiations: the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's oil flows. Gharibabadi warned that "safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, with ambiguous arrangements or parallel routes taken outside of Iranian considerations, cannot be guaranteed." This veiled threat is a reminder that Tehran holds cards to play, and intends to use them in the final negotiations.

This geopolitical reality partly explains why Washington — and part of the Gulf States — accepts negotiating with Iran rather than demanding total capitulation. A cornered and desperate Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz would cause a global economic crisis far more severe than the political costs of an imperfect deal.

Israel, the Gulf states, and structural mistrust

Israel: vigilant, skeptical, and ready to strike again

Israel regards the existence of an Iranian nuclear program as an existential threat. The summer 2025 strikes were a response to that conviction. Whatever the content of the negotiations between Washington and Tehran, Jerusalem maintains the doctrine that it will act unilaterally to prevent Iran from acquiring the bomb. That position is non-negotiable and does not depend on the goodwill of whatever American administration happens to be in office.

For Israel, the current deal is acceptable only if the verification regime is genuinely robust and if Iran's enriched uranium stockpiles are effectively immobilized under international supervision. Otherwise, Tel Aviv reserves the right — and will exercise it — to resume military operations. This Israeli calculation is itself a lever on Tehran: if Iran does not cooperate with the IAEA, the risk of a new Israeli strike is real.

The Gulf states: between relief and lasting caution

The Gulf monarchies — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain — welcomed the summer 2025 strikes with relief they only partially expressed in public. A nuclear Iran represents a direct existential threat for these countries. They support the current deal insofar as it delays the Iranian program — but they maintain their own readiness for alternative scenarios.

Iran attempted to respond to Gulf State criticism by advocating for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East — a proposal that implicitly includes Israel's undeclared nuclear arsenal. This demand, however rhetorically clever, has no chance of succeeding in the current context. But it illustrates the complexity of the regional dynamics in which this deal is embedded.

Technical negotiations in Switzerland: the devil in the details

Site access, sanctions relief, and the timeline

The technical negotiations resuming in Switzerland must resolve several Gordian knots. First: access to the bombed sites and the materials that were there. Iran conditions that access on "practical sanctions-relief measures" from the United States. Washington says that conditionality is not in the MOU. This disagreement is fundamental.

Second: the timeline. Grossi said "it is not essential to get there in a week or two weeks," but also that technical work has "started and we hope to be there soon." That "soon" is deliberately vague. Every week without full access is a week during which Iranian nuclear materials remain in a state of insufficient traceability.

An imperfect deal is better than no deal — but only if we say so honestly

There is a realist school of thought that holds an imperfect deal with Iran is preferable to no deal. I understand that argument. The summer 2025 strikes had unforeseeable regional consequences, reinforced the Iranian regime's nationalist posture, and complicated discussions about the bombed sites. A deal that gives the IAEA a partial presence is better than no presence.

But that argument cannot serve as an excuse for accepting a deal in which enriched uranium stockpiles remain "unaccounted for." This is not a matter of perfectionism — it is a matter of fundamental security. If the IAEA does not know where the 440 kg of 60% uranium are, the deal has not resolved the central problem it was supposed to solve.

What this deal means for global security

A precedent in non-proliferation or a dangerous one

The 2026 USA-Iran deal will be studied for decades in international law and nuclear non-proliferation courses. If the verification regime is solid and effectively applied, it could establish a precedent for diplomatic resolution of a nuclear crisis following military conflict — a potentially useful model for other situations. If verifications remain incomplete and Iran eventually ends up with a military nuclear capability, this deal will be cited as the example that paved the way for proliferation.

The 440 kg of uranium enriched to 60% will not vaporize by diplomatic magic. Either the IAEA accounts for them fully under international supervision, or they constitute a latent risk to global security for years to come. There is no comfortable third option that diplomacy can invent to spare itself from this reality.

The Iran-Russia-China-North Korea connection in the global context

Iran's nuclear program cannot be analyzed in isolation. Iran is part of the revisionist axis that includes Russia, China, and North Korea. Iranian Shahed drones are killing Ukrainians in Kyiv. Financial flows between Tehran and Moscow help fund the Russian war machine. A nuclear Iran would be an additional Russia or North Korea in that axis — an actor that can threaten its neighbors and the West from behind the shield of nuclear deterrence.

That is why this deal goes far beyond bilateral US-Iran relations. It is a question of global security. And the international community — beyond Washington and Tehran — has a direct interest in ensuring the verification regime is genuinely robust, and that Grossi obtains the "everywhere" access he is demanding.

Iran's missile program: the other bomb left in the deal's shadow

Ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead

While negotiations focus on enriched uranium, another alarming Iranian program remains in the shadows: its ballistic missile program. Iran possesses one of the largest ballistic missile arsenals in the Middle East, with delivery vehicles capable of reaching Israel, the Gulf states, and parts of Europe. These missiles are not covered by the 14-point MOU signed with Washington.

The combination of unaccounted fissile material and a long-range ballistic delivery vehicle is precisely what defines offensive nuclear capability. The agreement currently under negotiation addresses one of those two problems — the nuclear material — while leaving the other intact. This is a gap that neither Washington nor Grossi has clearly addressed in their public statements, and it deserves scrutiny.

Israel's response: possible preemptive strikes on missiles too

Israeli military doctrine has always treated Iran's missile program as a threat separate from, but linked to, the nuclear program. The summer 2025 strikes varied their targets. If the negotiations in Switzerland do not produce a satisfactory agreement on nuclear materials, the probability of new Israeli strikes increases.

This risk of regional escalation is one of the strongest arguments in favor of a rapid, comprehensive agreement. A region at war around Iran would be catastrophic for energy prices, global market stability, and the security of sea lanes. The West has a direct economic interest in this deal working — but actually working, not working in a hollow, face-saving version.

Conclusion: Grossi is right — "everywhere" or nothing at all

The only acceptable standard: full and unconditional access

The position of Rafael Grossi is the only one that is morally and strategically defensible: a "very robust" verification system, access "everywhere," a full accounting of the 440 kg of uranium. No Iranian conditions on sanctions before access. No open-ended delays. No deliberate ambiguities allowing each party to read into the agreement whatever it wants.

The next round of negotiations in Switzerland is decisive. If Iran accepts full IAEA access to the bombed sites and rigorous accounting of its uranium stockpiles, this deal can become a positive precedent in the history of non-proliferation. If Iran continues to tie access to prior demands for sanctions relief, the deal remains an empty shell whose legitimacy will be exploited by Tehran without real reciprocity.

The West must back the IAEA, not sidestep it

One last thing needs to be said: the solidity of this deal depends on the willingness of Washington and the other permanent members of the Security Council to back the IAEA in its demands for access. If political pressure to announce a "diplomatic success" overrides the rigor of verification, the risks will accumulate in silence. Grossi told the truth in Tokyo. The West must have the courage to back him — even if it complicates the triumphant narrative that some would like to build around this deal.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My position and my sources

I consider a nuclear Iran a serious and unacceptable threat to global stability — and, by extension, to the security of Ukraine, Israel, the Gulf states, and the entire West. That position is stated openly. My information draws primarily from Rafael Grossi's public statements in Tokyo on June 26, 2026, as reported by Al Jazeera, CNBC, and the Straits Times, as well as publicly available official Iranian and American statements.

What I do not know

I do not have access to classified intelligence assessments on Iran's actual uranium stockpiles or on the precise state of the bombed sites. The figures I use (440.9 kg at 60%) are those the IAEA had documented before the strikes — they may have changed in either direction since then. I report the public facts and draw analysis from them, without claiming a certainty that no one possesses on this opaque file.

Sources

Primary sources

Al Jazeera — IAEA demands "strong verification" of Iran's nuclear programme — June 26, 2026

CNBC — US-Iran deal: nuclear access and inspections — June 26, 2026

Straits Times — Iran deal grants access to nuclear inspectors, IAEA chief says — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

Times of Israel — US-Iran deal grants UN inspectors access to nuclear sites, IAEA chief says — June 26, 2026

Anadolu Agency — IAEA chief says US-Iran deal grants agency access to Iranian nuclear sites — June 26, 2026

Foundation for Defense of Democracies — Brief: Iran agreement, site access, negotiations — July 1, 2026