ANALYSIS: Oil embargo: why the Baltics are pressing a too-slow EU

The border as a revealer of truth

Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania share direct or very close borders with Russia and its militarized extension, Belarus. These three EU and NATO member nations do not enjoy the luxury of geographic distance that capitals such as Paris, Rome, or Vienna allow themselves. Their position on a total oil embargo against Russia is therefore not ideology: it is survival.

On June 27, 2026, the Kyiv Post confirms that the Baltics are intensifying their pressure on Brussels to accelerate the Russian oil embargo. The EU had only just extended its existing sanctions by one year, until 2027, in its decision of June 19, 2026. But for the Baltic states, a one-year extension with no substantial strengthening is not a victory. It is a status quo that leaves exploitable gaps for Moscow.

The 21st package as a revealer of internal fracture

The proposal for the 21st sanctions package, announced on June 27, 2026 according to Daily Finland, once again illustrates the internal tensions within the European Union. On one side, the states most exposed to the Russian threat — the Baltics, Poland, Finland, Sweden — push for strong, immediate measures without derogations. On the other, a series of member states less directly threatened but more economically dependent on various commercial relationships try to limit the scope of the measures.

This internal European rift is not new. But it is growing increasingly worrying as the war drags on and Russian war budgets increase. Russia, according to Bloomberg of June 23, 2026, will increase military spending by an additional four to five trillion rubles in 2026. If Europe does not accelerate its economic offensive, it is watching an adversary rearm in real time.

There is something profoundly paradoxical in seeing the three European nations most directly threatened by Russia having to convince their better-sheltered allies to act faster. It is as though firefighters had to plead with distant neighbors to turn on the hoses. European sanctions policy sometimes resembles a tragedy of procedure.

Where does Russian oil still enter Europe?

Direct imports of Russian crude oil by EU member states have dropped considerably since 2022. The embargo on seaborne Russian crude oil has been in place since December 2022. But exemptions for certain pipelines — notably the Druzhba pipeline, which still supplies Hungary, Slovakia, and Czechia — constitute significant gaps that Moscow exploits to maintain oil revenues.

Furthermore, the Russian shadow fleet — hundreds of aging tankers operating under flags of convenience — circumvents the restrictions by shipping oil to Asian refineries in China, India, and Turkey. Those refineries then transform the crude into refined products that enter European and Western markets, bypassing the spirit if not the letter of the sanctions. The EU has clearly identified this problem, but the measures to address it remain insufficient.

The price cap: a real tool with limited effects

The mechanism of the Russian oil price cap at 60 dollars per barrel, put in place by the G7 and the EU in late 2022, aimed to reduce Russian revenues without triggering a global oil shock. In its initial logic, the tool is elegant: allow third countries to buy Russian oil, but only below a certain price, thus depriving Russia of its maximum margins.

The reality is that this mechanism has shown its limits. Brokers circumvent the restrictions on insurance and transport services that enable enforcement of the cap. Urals oil sometimes trades above the cap. OFAC and the EU have multiplied coercive actions, but the circumvention network is agile, decentralized, and difficult to dismantle entirely. That is why a total embargo would be structurally more effective.

The price cap was a brilliant idea on paper. In practice, it underestimated Russia's capacity to adapt, along with that of its circumvention partners. That is the same problem with all graduated sanctions: the adversary adapts while you congratulate yourself on the ingenuity of the mechanism. A total embargo leaves no room for adaptation.

History as the foundation of the Baltic position

To understand the intransigence of the Baltic states on sanctions, you must understand their history. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were occupied by the USSR from 1940 to 1991, with a brief interruption during the Nazi occupation. Hundreds of thousands of their citizens were deported to Siberia. Their culture, language, and national identity were systematically attacked for fifty years. When they say that Putin's Russia is an existential threat, that is not rhetorical hyperbole.

This historical memory translates directly into political position. The Baltic governments have never harbored illusions about the nature of the Russian regime. They were among the first to call for stronger sanctions after 2014, and even more firmly after 2022. Their credibility on this subject is total — not because they are particularly virtuous, but because they are right, and history has taught them to distinguish diplomacy from capitulation.

Their economic argument against European hesitation

The standard argument from European hesitants is the economic cost of a total oil embargo. The Baltic states reply with clear figures: the cost of inaction — in terms of military security, rearmament, and support for Ukraine — is structurally higher than the short-term cost of an embargo. Moreover, Europe since 2022 has demonstrated its capacity to diversify energy sources faster than anyone believed possible.

Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania also make the case that maintaining gaps in the sanctions sends a signal of weakness to Putin. A regime that sees that even under the pressure of a war it launched, its adversaries cannot unite on basic economic measures, will logically conclude that this coalition lacks cohesion. And it would not be entirely wrong.

The economic argument against the total embargo exhausts me. Europe proved it could wean itself off Russian gas — nobody believed that was possible before 2022. Why would that same capacity for transformation be impossible with oil? The real reason for the resistance, I believe, is not economic. It is political — rooted in particular interests and a certain institutional cowardice.

Hungary: the textbook case of resistance

Hungary under Viktor Orbán is the most blatant case of internal resistance to the harshest sanctions. Budapest still benefits from the Druzhba pipeline exemption and has repeatedly opposed or delayed the adoption of new packages. The reasons are multiple: genuine economic dependence on Russian oil, political and ideological ties between Orbán and Putin, and the use of this position as a negotiating lever to extract financial concessions from Brussels.

The problem of the unanimity rule for EU sanctions is structural. A single state can block or dilute a decision. This mechanism, designed to protect member state sovereignty, has become a strategic vulnerability that Moscow has learned to exploit — notably by cultivating allies such as Hungary. Reforming this mechanism is a crucial parallel debate, but one that faces deep resistance.

The quiet resisters: who are the two countries opposing the entry ban?

Pravda Ukraine of June 25, 2026 reveals that two EU member states oppose the entry ban for Russian nationals, without naming them. This opacity is itself revealing: these countries do not wish to own their position publicly. This kind of quiet resistance insidiously undermines European unity. You display solidarity in official statements, then brake behind the scenes during technical negotiations.

This behavior is not exceptional in multilateral diplomacy. But in the context of an active war of aggression, it takes on particular significance. The Baltics and their most resolute allies must constantly negotiate against this internal resistance, expending considerable diplomatic energy convincing their own allies rather than facing the common adversary.

Two EU countries resisting the entry ban for Russians while not even willing to own their position publicly — that is the height of political cowardice. I understand diplomatic constraints, I understand economic interests. What I cannot understand is the shame of one's own position. If you genuinely believe this ban is a bad idea, own it. Otherwise, change your mind.

What the sanctions have accomplished

It would be intellectually dishonest to deny the effects of the twenty sanctions packages already in place. Russia's budget deficit has exceeded 80 billion dollars, according to United24 Media. Russian inflation remains high. Government bonds are collapsing with yields approaching 15%. The Russian tech sector is suffering from the absence of imported components. Russian civil aviation is deteriorating for lack of Western spare parts.

The IMF has revised Russian growth to just 0.8% in 2026, and the Kiel Institute speaks of "structural exhaustion." These signals are real. The Russian economy is being battered. But "battered" is not "on its knees." And that is precisely where the problem lies. To transform this structural exhaustion into a genuine crisis capable of changing the Kremlin's behavior, the pressure needs to be pushed harder.

What the sanctions have not yet accomplished

The sanctions have not prevented Putin from massively increasing military spending. They have not triggered a significant domestic political crisis in Russia — at least not yet a visible one. They have not dissuaded China, India, and Turkey from buying Russian oil. They have not stopped the bombardment of Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.

The primary reason for these limits is well known: the sanctions are too permissive, too full of holes, enforced too unevenly. Zelensky's sanctions adviser declared on June 26 that the Russian economy has reached a "dead end" — but he implicitly acknowledges that this dead end is insufficient to stop the war. To move from a dead end to a strategic collapse, Europe must close the gaps. The 21st package is the next opportunity to do so.

The sanctions balance sheet is that of a job half done. We have wounded the Russian economy without felling it. That is sometimes worse than doing nothing, because it gives the impression we are acting while we have not yet reached the necessary threshold. The Baltics are right: you have to go all the way, not stop halfway and congratulate yourself.

Strengthening secondary sanctions against circumventors

An alternative to the total embargo — or a complement to it — consists of striking harder at entities enabling Russia to circumvent existing sanctions. Companies in China, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and India play a facilitation role that secondary sanctions can target. The United States government has more experience with this tool than the EU, but Brussels is beginning to adopt a similar approach.

The obstacle is diplomatic: hitting Chinese or Turkish companies creates tensions with partners on whom the EU depends for other matters. China is a major trading partner of Europe. Turkey is a NATO member. These real complications must not, however, serve as a permanent excuse for inaction. The point is to set priorities and accept the diplomatic costs of a coherent policy.

Maritime transparency: tracking the shadow fleet

Another line of action concerns the Russian shadow fleet. Initiatives exist to improve vessel movement traceability, identify tankers that switch off their AIS transponders to carry Russian oil, and penalize the insurers and shipowners that allow these operations to function. Several EU member states, notably the Nordic countries and the Baltics, are pushing for more vigorous measures in this domain.

The stakes are significant: if the shadow fleet is genuinely hampered, Russian oil revenues would fall considerably. Studies have shown that the oil transported by this fleet represents a substantial portion of total Russian exports. Dismantling this network is technically feasible given sufficient political will. This, again, is a question of priority, not capacity.

The Russian shadow fleet is a collective shame for the West. We know the vessels, we know the routes, we know the complicit insurers. And we continue to let them operate with symbolic measures. The analogy comes to me naturally: it is like watching someone fill a bathtub with a garden hose while only half-turning off the main tap. Logic demands turning off the hose too.

Russia bets on internal divisions to weaken sanctions

Russia's strategy against European sanctions is not exclusively about circumventing them through alternative circuits. It is also about weakening them from within by cultivating dissension between member states. Privileged diplomatic relations with Budapest, economic links with certain capitals, influence channels in European political parties — Russia invests heavily in dividing the Union. And with some success, if one observes the repeated blockages during negotiations for previous packages.

Against this strategy, the European response must be unity — not forced unanimity that produces watered-down compromises, but cohesion on fundamental principles that allows progress even when one or two members drag their feet. The qualified majority mechanism for certain decisions, a revision of the unanimity rules for sanctions, tools to pressure recalcitrant member states — these institutional reforms are urgent.

The Baltic states as catalysts of European cohesion

Paradoxically, the Baltic states — through their insistence, their determination, their refusal to accept easy compromises — play a role as catalysts of cohesion. Their pressure keeps the sanctions debate at a higher level of ambition than it would be without them. They constantly remind their partners of what is at stake. And they provide a moral and strategic anchor that prevents silent capitulations.

This role of collective conscience within the EU is precious and underestimated. Baltic leaders are sometimes perceived as "too tough" or "too inflexible." But in the context of a war where every compromise on sanctions is a concession to the aggressor, their intransigence is a strategic asset for all of Europe. The 21st package should prove them right.

The Baltic states as Europe's moral conscience vis-à-vis Russia — it is a thankless and necessary role. They know they will be accused of being "warmongers" or "inflexible." They press on anyway. Because they have understood something others still refuse to see: in this conflict, unprincipled moderation is not a virtue. It is complicity.

Europe's credibility as a geopolitical actor

Every time the European Union announces sanctions with fanfare and then dilutes them in negotiations, it chips away at its geopolitical credibility. Chancelleries around the world — in Moscow, in Beijing, in Tehran — observe the gap between declarations and actions. This gap, if it widens package after package, progressively turns the EU into an actor whose sanctions threats are anticipated as less than the sum of its announcements.

Conversely, an ambitious 21st package that is effectively enforced would significantly strengthen European credibility. It would send the message that Europe has learned from its own shortcomings and can rise to the level of its stated ambitions. This credibility is a precious strategic asset that would benefit Europe in all its future negotiations — with China, with other authoritarian powers, and in its own internal relations.

The signal sent to Russia's allies

A strengthened oil embargo and robust secondary sanctions send a crucial signal to Russia's allies and partners — China, India, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates. These countries have until now been able to calculate that the cost of their complicity with Russia was acceptable. Secondary sanctions change that calculation by directly placing on them the risk of being cut off from European markets.

This logic is all the more important in the context of Sino-American rivalry. China supports Russia partly because it calculates that Europe will never sanction Chinese companies for their complicity in the Ukrainian war. Proving that calculation wrong — by adopting serious secondary sanctions even against Chinese entities — would be a demonstration of diplomatic strength whose resonance would extend well beyond the Ukrainian conflict.

The signal sent to Russia's allies by a muscular 21st package — that may be its most important and least discussed dimension. Not just what it does to the Russian economy. But what it tells China, India, and Turkey about the cost of their complicity. That is where secondary sanctions can genuinely shift strategic calculations on a global scale.

Pressure that must translate into results

The pressure from the Baltic states on the EU for a more comprehensive oil embargo is not only legitimate — it is strategically sound. These nations have demonstrated, through their consistent positioning since 2022, that they analyze the situation with more clarity than many other Union members. Their historical experience, geographic exposure, and political analysis converge on the same conclusion: only maximum economic pressure can change Putin's calculus.

The 21st package represents an opportunity. An opportunity to prove that the EU is capable of learning from its own past shortcomings. An opportunity to close the gaps that Russia has exploited for years. An opportunity to show the Baltics — and Ukraine — that their pressure has borne fruit.

The future of sanctions policy: act faster, hit harder

Speed is as important an issue as scale. Every multi-month negotiation cycle to adopt a new package is an adaptation window gifted to Moscow. The EU must find mechanisms enabling it to act faster without compromising the necessary consensus. Emergency procedures, a list of measures "ready to deploy" in the event of Russian escalation, a reform of the unanimity rule for sanctions — these options exist and deserve serious exploration.

The Baltics are pressing Europe not out of irrational impatience, but because they see what others refuse to see: that Russia is spending and arming while Europe deliberates. Every delay in the oil embargo is an additional check written for Putin's war machine. Europe can choose to stop signing those checks. It just needs to truly decide to.

A Europe capable of weaning itself off Russian gas in two years can wean itself off Russian oil in less time. The Baltics know it. The skeptics also said weaning off Russian gas was impossible. They were wrong. They are wrong again about oil. Political will is the only real obstacle — and that is precisely what the 21st package must embody.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

Secondary source families: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.