EDITORIAL: Is Lukashenko preparing war against Ukraine? The 30-page report that must serve as a warning

EDITORIAL: Is Lukashenko preparing war against Ukraine? The 30-page report that must serve as a warning

Introduction: A dossier handed to Kyiv that changes the reading of the Belarusian threat

June 22, 2026: Latushka delivers the report to Sybiha

On June 22, 2026, Pavel Latushka, deputy head of the United Transitional Cabinet of the Belarusian resistance, traveled to meet Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha and handed him a 30-page document. This was no ordinary diplomatic note. It was an intelligence dossier compiled by the Belarusian opposition in exile, identifying eight key indicators suggesting that Lukashenko's regime is actively preparing to join Russia's war against Ukraine.

This report deserves serious attention. Not because the Belarusian opposition in exile is a necessarily impartial source — it has obvious political interests. But because the indicators it cites are verifiable, documented, and consistent with what Western intelligence services have been observing in the field for several months. When the facts converge, even a partisan source deserves to be taken seriously.

What this report contains — and why it should be alarming

The document describes a military transformation of Belarus unprecedented since the end of the Cold War. A 1.5-fold increase in the number of contract soldiers since 2022. A newly established Southern Operational Command at the Ukrainian border, with a potential of 80,000 men. Defense spending multiplied five times over in four years. Russia's Oreshnik missile deployed on Belarusian soil. And a people's militia capable of reaching 150,000 members. This is not a defensive posture — it is a war posture.

The eight indicators: the anatomy of a war preparation

Structural military indicators: an army in transformation

The Belarusian opposition's report first identifies structural changes in the Belarusian armed forces. The 1.5-fold increase in the number of professional contract soldiers since 2022 indicates a deliberate expansion of the professional force — the most immediately deployable for an external operation. The mobilization reserve is estimated at 289,000 people, a considerable figure for a country of 9 million inhabitants.

More significant still: the creation of a Southern Operational Command, oriented precisely toward the Ukrainian border. This type of command does not happen overnight — it requires months of planning, personnel assignments, communications setup and protocols. Its creation means that someone, in the Belarusian military hierarchy, has planned the use of forces toward the south.

Legal and doctrinal indicators: the texts that permit everything

The report cites constitutional and legal changes that have formally stripped Belarus of its status as a neutral and non-nuclear country. The 2024 military doctrine now permits "preemptive strikes" in the case of an "imminent threat" and the deployment of Belarusian forces abroad. This legal framework is essential: it removes the formal legal obstacles to entering the war.

A government decree of May 15, 2026 provides that civilian transport owned by companies can be requisitioned for military convoys. This civilian mobilization measure is exactly the kind of logistical preparation conducted before a major military operation. It is not explained by pure territorial defense — it is explained by the need to mass logistical resources for an advance.

The Russian arsenal on Belarusian soil: Oreshnik, troops, Wagner

The Oreshnik deployment: a threshold crossed

Among the most serious indicators is the permanent deployment of Russian troops on Belarusian territory and, more recently, the deployment of the Oreshnik ballistic missile. The Oreshnik is a hypersonic intermediate-range missile, used by Russia to strike Ukraine in November 2024. Its presence on Belarusian soil brings Russian strike power closer to European capitals — Warsaw is less than 600 kilometers away, Vilnius less than 200.

This deployment constitutes a strategic escalation that NATO cannot ignore. It transforms Belarus from a buffer zone into an advanced strike platform for Russia, threatening not only Ukraine but EU and NATO member states on the eastern flank.

Wagner instructors and the training of Belarusian forces

The report also cites the training of Belarusian forces by Wagner group instructors. Since Prigozhin's mutiny in June 2023 and his death in August, Wagner elements have been partially absorbed into Russian military structures. Their presence as instructors in Belarus indicates deep integration between Belarusian military structures and the Russian war apparatus.

The Belarusian defense industry is, according to the report, "fully integrated with Russia's and placed under strict secrecy." In practical terms, this means Belarus no longer has an autonomous army — it has a segment of the Russian army operating on its territory. The border between Lukashenko's Belarus and Putin's Russia is no longer militarily significant.

The militarization of the borders: five potential attack directions

Infrastructure built along the Ukrainian, Polish and Lithuanian borders

On June 25, 2026, Zelensky publicly declared from Kyiv that Belarus was "completing the construction of military infrastructure along the Ukrainian border." He enumerated five specific directions: Kobrin-Kovel, Ivanove-Manevychi, Luninets-Sarny, Rechitsa-Korosten, and Gomel-Chernihiv. These five axes cover the entire Belarusian border with Ukraine, from northwest to east.

What is being built along these axes is not presented as defensive by Zelensky: infrastructure roads and ammunition and fuel storage bases. These elements have a clear logistical use — they allow rapid resupply of an advancing force. They are not defensive fortifications; they are supply corridors.

Russian documents describe Belarus as an OMS zone

Zelensky added a detail of particular gravity: in Russian documents, these constructions are described in the context of the tasks of the so-called "OMS" — the special military operation. In other words, infrastructure being built on Belarusian soil is documented in Russian military planning as part of the war against Ukraine. The façade of Belarusian "sovereignty" in this domain is explicitly contradicted by Moscow's own documents.

Belarusian society mobilized: 150,000 militia members and militarized children

The people's militia and mobilization exercises

The Belarusian opposition's report describes the creation of a people's militia that could reach 150,000 members. Combined with the 289,000 reservists and professional soldiers, this brings the potential Belarusian mobilization capacity to levels that cannot be explained by territorial defense against an external threat. Belarus is not militarily threatened by anyone — it is a member of the CSTO under the Russian military umbrella.

Major military exercises in 2026 are being used, according to the report, to "test mobilization systems and maintain pressure on society." Military summons by SMS have been sent. Thousands of air-raid shelters in Minsk have been inspected. Regular tests of alarm systems are being conducted. This overall picture describes a society put on a war footing — not a society at peace.

The military indoctrination of children

Among the most troubling indicators is the expansion of military training programs in Belarusian schools and the development of military-patriotic programs for children. This militarization of youth is a historically consistent marker of regimes preparing for large-scale mobilization — future generations must be prepared to accept and participate in war.

This phenomenon is not unique to Belarus — Russia has done the same at scale since 2022, with "Yunarmia" programs and basic military preparation courses in schools. Belarus adopting the same model confirms the growing integration of the two societies into a shared war culture.

Defense spending multiplied fivefold: the Belarusian economy in war mode

A fivefold increase in four years

Belarus's defense spending has been multiplied fivefold since 2022 — in four years. For an economy the size of Belarus's, subject to international sanctions since the electoral fraud of 2020 and the subsequent crackdown, this multiplication of military spending represents a considerable economic sacrifice. It is only possible in a context of Russian subsidization and deliberate reorientation of the economy toward the military sector.

More than 4,000 pieces of military equipment were commissioned in 2024 alone. This figure is considerable for a country of 9 million inhabitants. It indicates that Belarus is not gradually modernizing its army — it is rearming at full speed.

The integration of Belarusian defense industry into the Russian chain

The full integration of the Belarusian defense industry into the Russian military industrial chain, carried out under "strict secrecy" according to the report, has important strategic implications. Belarus produces components used in Russian weapons systems. In sanctioning Russia, the West should simultaneously have locked down Belarus as a bypass point — which was only partially done. This industrial integration makes the two military economies nearly indistinguishable.

Ukraine's response and the signals sent to Minsk

Kyiv's diplomatic signals

Zelensky indicated that Ukraine had "already sent to Minsk the relevant signals about the inadmissibility of these actions." This diplomatic formulation likely covers direct warnings transmitted through discreet channels — bilateral, UN-based, or via third parties such as Turkey or China. Zelensky did not specify the nature of the signals, but their existence confirms that Kyiv takes the Belarusian threat seriously and is attempting to act before the situation tips.

The Ukrainian statement calls on Belarus to take "measures aimed at de-escalation and peace." This language is more demanding than conciliatory — it signals that Ukraine is not prepared to indefinitely tolerate the construction of a potential launch base on its northern border, regardless of Minsk's official presentation.

500 targets identified in Belarus

According to available sources, Robert Brovdy, head of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, indicated that 500 targets have been identified on Belarusian territory — notably Russian drone relay stations used to guide drones toward Ukraine. This statement, if confirmed, indicates that Ukraine has precise knowledge of the location of Russian installations in Belarus and holds the theoretical capacity to strike them if the situation requires it.

The international reaction: between growing concern and diplomatic caution

NATO and the threat on the eastern flank

The Belarusian opposition's report arrives in a context where NATO is redoubling its vigilance on its eastern flank. The Ankara summit of July 7–8, 2026 is expected to address the threat of Russian "provocations" against the Baltic states and Poland, identified by Western intelligence. The presence of the Oreshnik in Belarus — which can reach Warsaw in minutes — gives an additional dimension to this threat.

Eastern flank countries — Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia — are following the Belarusian situation with particular attention. For them, a Belarus that enters the war against Ukraine would not only be a threat to Kyiv — it would be a direct threat to their own borders.

IISANS and the credibility of the opposition's report

The Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (IISANS), an independent organization in exile, published an analysis in its Belarus Review of June 2026 that corroborates several of the indicators cited in the report delivered to Sybiha. This convergence between different sources — the political opposition on one side, an analytical think tank on the other — strengthens the credibility of the warnings.

What this means for the future: three scenarios

Scenario 1 — Deterrence works

In the best-case scenario, Ukrainian signals, combined with Western pressure and the credible threat of retaliation, deter Lukashenko from ordering an entry into the war. Minsk continues to support Russia logistically — storage, transit, drone relays — without directly engaging its own troops. This scenario is possible if Lukashenko assesses that the risks to his regime are higher than the benefits of direct participation.

This calculus can change. Putin has shown he is capable of exerting direct pressure on his allies to compel greater commitment. If Lukashenko needs Russian support for his own political survival — and he does — his margin for refusal is limited.

Scenario 2 — Limited engagement under the Russian flag

The second scenario, more probable in the short term, sees Belarus becoming more involved without officially declaring war. Missile strikes from Belarusian soil against Ukraine (already practiced with Russian missiles), drone operations, active logistical support for a Russian offensive from the north, or even the dispatch of Belarusian "volunteers" alongside Russian forces. These forms of engagement allow official denial of participation while intensifying it in practice.

Scenario 3 — Open entry into the war

The third scenario — an open entry into the war by Belarus, with its own forces, its own identified units, on Lukashenko's order — seems less probable at this stage. It would immediately expose Belarus to Ukrainian strikes on its territory, something the Belarusian population, whose documented opposition to the war is real, does not appear willing to accept.

What the West must do: six concrete measures

Sanction, monitor, deter

This report from the Belarusian opposition should trigger several concrete responses from the West. First, strengthened sanctions specifically targeting Belarusian companies that serve as intermediaries for import-controlled goods. Second, more active intelligence sharing with Kyiv on troop movements and infrastructure construction in Belarus. Third, direct diplomatic messages to Minsk — not only through Moscow — on the consequences of entering the war.

Lithuania, which shares a border with Belarus, has already reinforced its defenses. Poland has massed forces near the Belarusian border since 2023. These preparations are justified. They must be supported and reinforced by the decisions of the NATO Ankara summit.

Support the Belarusian opposition

The delivery of this report by Latushka to Sybiha serves as a reminder that the Belarusian opposition in exile represents an intelligence and legitimacy resource that the West underexploits. Tens of thousands of Belarusians in exile — in Warsaw, Vilnius, Kyiv, Berlin — maintain information networks about what is happening in their country. These networks deserve to be supported financially, institutionally and diplomatically.

The editorial: refusing the ostrich strategy on Belarus

Europe's convenient denial

There is a temptation, in European capitals, to minimize the Belarusian threat in favor of focusing on Russia. This temptation is understandable — managing one crisis at a time is cognitively simpler than managing two simultaneous threats. But it is strategically blind. Belarus and Russia are no longer two separate crises — they form a single threat system, with Putin as the architect and Lukashenko as the executor.

Refusing to see the Belarusian militarization for what it is — out of fear of escalation, diplomatic fatigue, or simple denial — does not make the threat disappear. It allows the threat to grow in the shadow of inattention.

Time for preventive action, not belated reaction

The history of the past thirty years teaches that large-scale military transitions do not stop by themselves. Russia spent years preparing the invasion of Ukraine in plain sight of the West, which refused to see or act preventively. This 30-page report is an alarm. The choice is simple: hear it now, or regret later not having heard it in time.

What this report changes in the perception of the war

From bilateral war to regional war

Since the 2022 invasion, the conflict in Ukraine has been largely treated as a bilateral war between Kyiv and Moscow, with peripheral actors (Iran, North Korea, China) in logistical support. The Belarusian report complicates this reading. If Belarus enters the war — even in a limited and unofficial way — the conflict becomes multilateral with a northern front reopened against Ukraine, which would require Kyiv to defend on several axes simultaneously.

This eventuality is not abstract. The Gomel-Chernihiv axis is the one by which Russian forces tried to reach Kyiv in March 2022 before being repelled. Reconstituting a base of attack on this axis is not a theoretical scenario — it is precisely what the infrastructure being built there makes possible.

Ukraine faces multiple enemies simultaneously

Ukraine is facing Russia, supported by Iran (Shahed drones) and North Korea (munitions and soldiers). It is monitoring Belarus. It is maintaining a permanent anti-drone defense. It is conducting a deep industrial strike campaign. It is managing a diplomatic crisis with Poland. And it is doing all this with a war economy dependent on international financial transfers. The burden is colossal. This report on Belarus is a reminder that this burden could grow heavier still.

The long-term implications for the European security architecture

A structural turning point in continental security relations

The developments described in this article are part of a broader transformation of the European security architecture. The European Union, long perceived as an essentially normative and economic power, is acquiring a real and substantial military dimension. The instruments created since 2022 — SAFE, APF, enhanced PESCO, bilateral industrial cooperation — together constitute an institutional foundation for a European defense that did not exist five years ago.

This structural change is irreversible insofar as it responds to real, documented and growing security needs. As long as Putin's Russia maintains an aggressive posture and the democracies on Europe's eastern periphery are threatened, the movement toward a more robust European defense will continue. Debates about national sovereignty, burden-sharing and national priorities will remain — but they will not reverse the underlying trend. Collective security requires collective structures. And Europe is building them.

What this evolution means for Ukraine

For Ukraine, these developments are directly linked to its immediate security and its long-term future. In the immediate term, every billion invested in European defense, every military capability developed, every contract signed with Ukrainian producers strengthens its capacity to resist. In the longer term, a solid European defense is the best guarantee that Western support for Ukraine will not evaporate with the next change of government in the United States or elsewhere.

Ukraine is not only a beneficiary of these developments — it is also an essential driver of them. Its combat experience, its growing industries, its technological innovations in drones and electronic warfare systems directly feed the investment choices and operational doctrines of the allies. Europe learns from Ukraine as much as it brings to Ukraine. And this mutual learning partnership is one of the most enduring legacies this war will leave to the continent's collective security.

The Latushka report and the collective response the West owes it

What the international community must retain

The report delivered by Pavel Latushka to Andrii Sybiha on June 22, 2026 is a serious alert document, supported by verifiable facts and corroborated by independent sources. It describes a military transformation of Belarus — in manpower, doctrine, budget, equipment and integration with Russia — that cannot be explained by legitimate defense. It describes a country preparing to strike southward, toward Ukraine.

The response to this report cannot be diplomatic silence or calculated caution. It must be clear messages to Minsk, reinforcements on NATO's eastern flank, increased support for the Belarusian opposition, and active monitoring of military developments on the ground. The history of this war has already shown that ignored warnings become crises managed in emergency. The moment to choose is now.

Belarus's future belongs to its people, not to Lukashenko

We must end with an essential reminder: Lukashenko does not represent the Belarusian people. Hundreds of thousands of Belarusians took to the streets against him in 2020. Tens of thousands are in exile. The Belarus that Latushka represents — democratic, free, at peace with its neighbors — is possible. It begins with Ukraine surviving this war and the West maintaining its commitments. A defeated Ukraine would be the definitive death of Belarusian hope. That is why this report is not only strategic — it is fundamentally moral.

Conclusion: An editorial in the form of a collective ultimatum

The cost of preventive inaction

What Latushka placed on Sybiha's desk on June 22, 2026, is an ultimatum addressed to the West as much as to Kyiv. The indicators documented in these 30 pages do not call for sophisticated interpretation — they call for a political and military response. The alternative to that response is discovering in a few months that Belarus was indeed preparing itself, and that we chose not to believe it.

The cost of preventive inaction in this war has already been paid once — in February 2022, when Russian tanks crossed the Ukrainian border. Paying this cost a second time, this time from the north, would be an unforgivable mistake.

The hope that justifies vigilance

We must end on a note of hope — not naive, but clear-eyed. Ukraine has survived everything Putin has thrown at it since 2022. It is still surviving. It is now conducting a 40-day campaign to force Russia to the peace table. It is monitoring Belarus with precise intelligence tools. This vigilance is not paranoia — it is the condition of survival. And if the West adopts it in turn, the Belarusian threat can be contained before it becomes a catastrophe.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Editorial positioning

This editorial is based on verifiable sources cited in the Sources section. The author supports Ukraine in its resistance against Russian aggression and considers the militarization of Belarus a real and documented threat. The three prospective scenarios presented are the author's analyses based on available facts — not certainties. Facts attributed to the Latushka report are drawn from verifiable journalistic sources, not the original document, to which the author did not have direct access.

Limits and sources

The Belarusian opposition in exile is a partisan source with real political interests. The facts it cites have been evaluated based on their corroboration by independent sources. The author does not assert that Belarus's entry into the war is inevitable — only that the available indicators require urgent attention.

Sources

Primary sources

United24 Media — Belarus opposition claims Lukashenko preparing for war — June 22, 2026

UNN — Zelensky: Belarus completes military infrastructure at Ukraine border — June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

IISANS — Belarus Review June 22, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Coverage of the Belarusian threat and the war in Ukraine — June 2026

Euromaidan Press — Belarus-Russia context — June 2026

The Guardian — Russia preparing provocations against Baltic states and Poland — June 26, 2026