EDITORIAL: The Lebanon-Israel Deal — A "Beginning of the Beginning" or Peace Without Hezbollah

EDITORIAL: The Lebanon-Israel Deal — A "Beginning of the Beginning" or Peace Without Hezbollah

Introduction: Rubio Announces a Framework Agreement, Hezbollah Says No, and the Bombs Kept Falling

June 26, 2026: An Announcement in Washington, Bodies in Lebanon

On June 26, 2026, surrounded by Lebanese and Israeli representatives in the hushed corridors of the State Department, Marco Rubio announced what he called the "first step" of a framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel. Five days of intensive talks — the fifth round of negotiations since the process began in the spring — produced a text that remains, in his own words, "the beginning of the beginning." That is not false modesty: it is an acknowledgment that the road ahead remains immense.

While Rubio spoke in Washington, strikes continued in Lebanon. The day before, three people had been killed in a strike in the south of the country. Israel still occupied "nearly one-fifth of Lebanon," according to Al Jazeera. And Hezbollah had immediately rejected the deal, calling the process "gratuitous unilateral concessions that serve only the interests of the Israeli enemy." That is the real context in which this framework agreement has just been signed.

The Architecture of the Agreement: Pilot Zones and Partial Withdrawal

According to the New York Times, the framework agreement calls for an Israeli withdrawal from small segments of occupied Lebanese territory in the south, to be replaced by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), which would be tasked with preventing Hezbollah's return to those areas. The idea is to create "pilot zones" — a test of the Lebanese army's capacity to assume its sovereign responsibilities. These pilot zones are the concrete realization of a fundamental Israeli requirement: that any IDF withdrawal be conditioned on Hezbollah's demilitarization and the deployment of regular Lebanese forces.

In parallel, the agreement provides for the creation of a "trilateral military coordination group" between Lebanon, Israel, and the United States to oversee implementation. This is an institutional architecture that implicitly acknowledges the centrality of American mediation — without which no conversation between Beirut and Tel Aviv is possible.

The Absent Party: Hezbollah, the Armed Actor That Decides Without Negotiating

The Paradox of an Agreement Without the Primary Armed Actor

Hezbollah is not at the negotiating table. This is not an oversight — it is an Israeli and American condition. Washington and Tel Aviv categorically refuse any direct negotiation with an organization they designate as terrorist. This position is politically coherent. It is strategically problematic. Because any agreement between the Lebanese state and Israel that does not account for the reality of Hezbollah — the country's best-armed organization, with its own command lines, its own finances, its own regional agenda dictated by Tehran — is an agreement built on sand.

The analysis of Rami Khouri, researcher at the American University of Beirut, captures the problem with surgical precision: "The Lebanese army alone cannot disarm Hezbollah." This is not defeatism — it is a factual assessment. The Lebanese Armed Forces are respectable and professional, but they are structurally incapable of militarily confronting an organization that possesses more arms than some regular armies, with missile launchers pointed at Israel and decades of combat experience in Syria and Lebanon.

Hezbollah Rejects the Agreement: The Message Is Clear

Naim Qassem, Hezbollah's leader, stated his condition in one sentence: "Israel must leave unconditionally." Hassan Fadlallah, a parliamentary leader of the movement, called the process "gratuitous unilateral concessions" that "only weaken Lebanon." This is not rhetorical posturing — it is a structural position. Hezbollah sees this framework agreement as an attempt to normalize Israel's partial occupation of Lebanon, to defuse armed resistance through institutional mechanisms, and to marginalize the organization in favor of the Lebanese state, which is partially hostile to it.

The question is: can we ignore Hezbollah and still build peace? The short answer is no. The long answer is: perhaps, over a very long time, if conditions change — if Iran's influence wanes, if the Lebanese army gradually tightens its grip, if the population of southern Lebanon progressively turns away from the organization. But that scenario requires years, possibly decades, of patient institutional work — and it is fragile with every escalation.

The Context of the US-Iran Memorandum of June 17: The Deal Within the Deal

The Key Date: June 17, 2026, and Its Lebanese Implications

To understand the Lebanon-Israel agreement of June 26, 2026, we must return to June 17, 2026, when the United States and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding designed to end their direct military confrontation. This memorandum required "the immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon." It is precisely this document that made the Lebanon-Israel negotiation urgent — and it is also precisely this document that Israel partly ignored.

After the signing of the US-Iran memorandum, Israel continued to bomb Lebanon. The strikes "diminished but did not stop." This created growing tension between Netanyahu and Donald Trump. The latter publicly confirmed he had called Netanyahu "crazy" — then walked it back by describing him as "a very good man" with whom he has "an extraordinary partnership," while acknowledging "a small disagreement over Lebanon." The formulation is diplomatic. The reality is that Washington wants its Israeli ally to accept the rules of a larger deal with Tehran.

Is Iran Really Leaving Lebanon?

Israeli representative Yechiel Leiter declared with satisfaction: "In this performance-based framework agreement, Iran is out, Hezbollah is out, and the road to peace between Israel and Lebanon is laid out." This statement is an ambition, not a finding. Iran has been financing and arming Hezbollah since the 1980s. Dismantling this axis does not happen through the signing of a framework agreement in Washington.

Admittedly, the American and Israeli strikes against Iran in 2025 degraded Iranian capabilities and weakened its ability to resupply Hezbollah with weapons. But an organization that has survived decades of counter-terrorism, wars, Lebanon's economic crisis, and international pressure will not simply be "taken out" of the equation by a diplomatic text. It will adapt, restructure, and wait.

The Lebanese Perspective: A Sovereignty Conditioned by Tel Aviv

Nada Hamadeh and the Formulation of Sovereignty

Lebanese representative Nada Hamadeh described the meeting as "long and difficult" and called the agreement "a first step toward restoring Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity." This formulation is revealing. Lebanon seeks to reclaim control of its southern territory — occupied by Israel — and to fully restore its sovereignty. This is a perfectly legitimate objective.

But Rami Khouri points to a fundamental asymmetry in the structure of the negotiations: "This entire process — and the symbolism of it happening at the State Department confirms this — is predicated on the fact that Israel's security must be guaranteed before the Lebanese get their rights." This is a serious critique. The negotiating framework reflects a power dynamic in which it is Israel, with American backing, that sets the conditions of withdrawal — not Lebanon, as a sovereign party that has undergone an occupation.

Israel's Occupation of "Nearly One-Fifth" of the Territory

This reality deserves to be named clearly: as of June 26, 2026, Israel militarily occupies "nearly one-fifth of Lebanon." Netanyahu has conditioned continued presence in this "security zone in southern Lebanon" on Hezbollah's disarmament. It is a circular logic: Israel does not withdraw its troops until Hezbollah is disarmed; Hezbollah cannot be disarmed by an army too weak to do so; the Lebanese army will remain too weak as long as Israel occupies the south and Lebanon's economic crisis persists.

The vicious cycle is real. The framework agreement attempts to break it through pilot zone experimentation — a practical test of Lebanese forces' capacity to ensure security in a defined sector. It is a pragmatic and patient approach. It is also an approach that leaves the Israeli occupation in place for potentially several additional years.

Trump and Netanyahu: A Relationship Complicated by Lebanon

The American President and His "Small Disagreement"

Donald Trump summarized his relationship with Netanyahu on the Lebanese file with unusual candor at the G7: "You don't need to demolish a building every time someone from Hezbollah enters it." He encouraged his ally to adopt "a softer touch." These phrases, behind their apparent lightness, reveal a genuine strategic divergence: Trump wants to close the Lebanese file to deliver the larger deal with Iran; Netanyahu wants to maintain military pressure to obtain maximum security guarantees.

This tension between allies is longstanding, but it took on a new dimension after the US-Iran memorandum of June 17, 2026. Washington clearly has a comprehensive regional vision — closing the Lebanon and Iran files, stabilizing maritime routes through the Strait of Hormuz, normalization with Saudi Arabia — that Israeli tactical ambitions risk undermining. Trump's "small disagreement" with Netanyahu is in reality a strategic disagreement about the sequence and conditions of regional de-escalation.

The Trumpian Logic: "Peace Through Strength" or Deal at Any Cost?

Trump's official doctrine on the Middle East is "peace through strength." In practice, what is taking shape looks more like "the deal at any cost." The successive agreements of recent weeks — the US-Iran memorandum, the Lebanon-Israel framework agreement — are less victories of "strength" than pragmatic arrangements allowing each party to save face. Israel keeps its "security zone." Iran gets sanctions relief. Lebanon gets the promise of a future withdrawal. Hezbollah stays armed and waits.

This model of peace — built on compromises, gray zones, and deferred conditions — is characteristic of Trumpian diplomacy. It favors quick agreements, even imperfect ones, over slow and rigorous processes. Sometimes this works — the Abraham Accords of 2020 outlasted their critics. Sometimes it fails — and unresolved crises return with even greater violence.

Lebanese Resistance to the Agreement: Beyond Hezbollah

Lebanese Voices Questioning the Agreement

Criticism of the agreement does not come only from Hezbollah. Diverse voices in Lebanon — not necessarily pro-Hezbollah — are questioning the conditions under which this deal was negotiated. Researcher Rami Khouri notes that "this entire process is predicated on the fact that Israel's security must be guaranteed before the Lebanese get their rights." This asymmetry creates unease that extends beyond supporters of armed resistance.

Independent Lebanese parliamentarians have also expressed reservations about the Lebanese Armed Forces' capacity to assume the responsibilities flowing from the agreement without sufficient resources. The Lebanese army suffers from chronic underfunding, equipment shortfalls, and a recruitment crisis linked to the country's economic collapse. Entrusting it with the security of a zone vacated by the IDF is ambitious — perhaps too ambitious within the envisaged timeframe.

The Population of Southern Lebanon: Caught in the Crossfire for Decades

The population of South Lebanon is the great absentee from all these diplomatic discussions. These are families that have lived under repeated bombardments since 1978 — at least five major wars between Israel and various Lebanese or Palestinian factions. They fled en masse during the offensives of 2006 and 2024-2025. Their homes, villages, and olive trees have been destroyed time and again.

These people want peace. They want to return home — many are still displaced in the north of the country. They want to be protected by a credible Lebanese army, not occupied by Israel and not armed by Iran through Hezbollah. But their aspirations are represented in none of the delegations present in Washington. That may be the fundamental problem with this agreement: it is made by states for states, while populations wait for someone to think of them.

The Performance-Based Architecture: What It Really Means

The "Performance-Based" Agreement: A Key and a Trap

The framework agreement is described by the Israeli representative as a "performance-based trilateral framework agreement." This formulation deserves a moment's attention. It means concretely that the stages of Israeli withdrawal are conditioned on practical demonstrations of the Lebanese Armed Forces' capacity to ensure security in the pilot zones. No withdrawal before proof of performance.

This approach may seem pragmatic. It is also a door left open to permanent deadlock. Because what constitutes "satisfactory performance" by the Lebanese army? Israel defines its own criteria. If the Lebanese army does not meet those criteria — because Hezbollah maintains a presence in the zone, because an incident occurs, because Israeli standards evolve — the withdrawal is deferred indefinitely. This is an architecture that grants Israel a permanent veto over the timeline of its own occupation.

What Would Be Required for the Agreement to Succeed

For this framework agreement to lead to real and lasting peace, several difficult conditions would need to be met. First, the Lebanese Armed Forces must receive massive and sustained funding — billions of dollars over several years — to be able to assume their responsibilities in the south. Second, Iranian influence over Hezbollah must continue to diminish under the combined effect of sanctions, strikes, and the evolution of the regional equation. Third, an inclusive political solution in Lebanon — one that involves all communities, including Hezbollah's supporters — must be built in parallel with the security negotiations.

These conditions are not impossible to meet. They are simply very difficult and very slow to achieve. And they require sustained, patient American engagement across multiple administrations — which is not Trump's style.

Historical Precedents: What History Tells Us About Lebanon-Israel Agreements

1949, 1983, 2006: A Long History of Fragile Agreements

Lebanon and Israel have never signed a peace treaty since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. The armistice of 1949 created a border, not a peace. The agreement of May 1983, negotiated after Israel's invasion of Lebanon and under American pressure, had seemed to open the path to normalization — before being annulled less than a year later under combined Syrian and nascent Hezbollah pressure. UN Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted after the 2006 war, was supposed to guarantee a lasting ceasefire and the deployment of Lebanese forces in the south — but it was never fully implemented.

These precedents do not invite uncritical optimism. Each agreement, each resolution, was eroded by ground realities — the persistence of Hezbollah, conflicting regional interests, the weakness of the Lebanese state. The framework agreement of June 26, 2026 is presented as "different" from its predecessors, notably because it fits within a regional context transformed by the US-Iran confrontation of 2025. That may be. History, however, counsels caution.

The Difference That 2026's Context Makes

What is different in 2026 is the scale of the shock sustained by Iran and by Hezbollah. The American and Israeli strikes of 2025 significantly degraded Iranian military capabilities. Hezbollah's budget has been affected by sanctions and the loss of some financial networks. The organization is weaker than it was in 2006 or 2023. The diplomatic window may be more open today than it has ever been.

But the window is not unlimited. Hezbollah is rebuilding. Iran is negotiating a deal with Washington that will provide additional resources. If the implementation of the framework agreement takes too long, if the pilot zones stall, if Israel maintains its demands at unattainable levels, the window will close. And the next war will be even more destructive.

Analysis of Structural Limits: What the Agreement Cannot Do

Lebanon's Economic Crisis: The Root of the Problem

Peace in Lebanon cannot be built solely on military and security agreements. One of the deep roots of Lebanese fragility — and of Hezbollah's recruiting power — is the catastrophic economic crisis the country has been experiencing since 2019. The collapse of the Lebanese pound, the destruction of the middle class's savings, mass unemployment, brain drain — all of this has left a country profoundly weakened in its institutional capacity.

A serious Lebanese economic reconstruction plan — similar in conception, if not in scale, to the Marshall Plan for postwar Europe — is the sine qua non of any lasting peace. Without it, the Lebanese army cannot fund its operations in the south. Without it, communities in South Lebanon will have no economic prospects making them less receptive to Hezbollah's offers. Without it, the Lebanese state will remain too weak to exercise its sovereignty.

Lebanese Governance: The Confessional System That Blocks Everything

Lebanon's political system — based on confessionalism, with positions of power distributed among Christian, Sunni, and Shia communities — is structurally unfavorable to the emergence of a strong, centralized state. Hezbollah is the armed wing of the Shia community within this system — it can only be disarmed if this community perceives that its interests will be protected by other means. This is not a military operation: it is a complete overhaul of Lebanon's entire political system, requiring years of difficult internal negotiations.

The framework agreement does not address this fundamental political dimension. It treats the symptoms — Hezbollah's presence in the south, Israeli occupation — without tackling the structural causes — the weakness of the Lebanese state, confessionalism, Iranian guardianship. That is its primary limitation.

What the Agreement Reveals About American Policy in the Middle East in 2026

A Washington in "File-Closing" Mode

American policy in the Middle East in 2026 is that of an administration seeking to close files that have been open for decades. The memorandum with Iran, the Lebanon-Israel framework agreement, the continuation of Saudi-Israeli normalization discussions — all fit within a coherent regional strategy whose objective is to create spaces of stability that will allow the United States to focus on strategic competition with China.

This is an understandable logic. It is also a logic that treats Middle Eastern files as boxes to check rather than complex problems to resolve in depth. The risk is that agreements signed too quickly, in conditions not yet ripe, will flip into more severe crises in a few years.

Rubio the Architect: Capable, But Under Deadline Pressure

Marco Rubio has demonstrated in this process impressive working capacity. Five rounds of negotiations in a few months, a persistent mediation effort despite ongoing bombardments, an honest public statement that this is "the beginning of the beginning" and not a final solution. That is no small thing. But Rubio is also under the pressure of an administration that wants quick, visible, announceable results. This pressure can lead to announcing as an "agreement" what is only a "negotiating framework" — and to creating false hopes that feed disappointment when reality reasserts itself.

The agreement of June 26, 2026 may be both simultaneously: a genuine diplomatic advance AND an agreement announced too early, in a context still too fragile to guarantee its implementation. The coming months will determine which of these two readings is correct.

The Regional Perspective: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey in the Equation

The Regional Actors That Can Make or Break the Agreement

The Lebanon-Israel agreement cannot be seen in isolation from the wider regional system. Saudi Arabia is a crucial actor: a Saudi-Israeli normalization, if it materializes, would profoundly change the regional context and weaken the Iranian axis that supports Hezbollah. Turkey, which has ambivalent relations with both Hezbollah and Israel, can facilitate or complicate de-escalation efforts. Egypt, historically a regional mediator, has been less active in recent years but could resume a role.

These regional actors have diverging, sometimes contradictory interests. But they share one thing: concern that instability in Lebanon not become a breeding ground for extremism and refugees that destabilize their own societies. This convergence of interests, imperfect but real, can be the foundation for broader regional support for the agreement's implementation.

UNIFIL and the United Nations: A Presence Seeking a Mandate

UNIFIL — the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon — has been present in southern Lebanon since 1978. Its presence did not prevent the wars of 2006 or subsequent escalations. Its mandate is limited, its rules of engagement restrictive, and its authority regularly questioned by all parties. The agreement of June 26, 2026 does not appear to have modified UNIFIL's role, whose presence continues but whose effectiveness remains contested.

A strengthened mandate for UNIFIL — with real interposition capabilities, clearer rules of engagement, and guaranteed funding — would be an important complement to the bilateral agreement. It would provide a safety net if the pilot zones do not function as planned and if tensions between Lebanese forces and Hezbollah remnants escalate.

What This Agreement Says About the State of International Law

Occupation, UN Resolutions, and Selective Impunity

There is a question I must ask, at the risk of discomfort: why does Israel's military occupation of one-fifth of Lebanon — in violation of Security Council resolutions — not generate the same type of international sanctions as Russia's occupation of Ukrainian territory? I am not asking this question to equate the situations — they are fundamentally different in their causes and contexts. I am asking it because the uneven application of international law norms is one of the most recurring critiques of the liberal order from the non-Western world, and that critique deserves to be heard.

The West loses its moral credibility when it applies different standards depending on who violates international norms. This inconsistency is exploited by China, Russia, and Iran to discredit the entire liberal order. Defending Ukraine with conviction AND demanding that Israel respect its international obligations are not contradictory positions — they are two sides of the same moral coherence.

UN Resolution 1701 and the 2026 Agreement: A Comparison

Resolution 1701 of 2006 demanded Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon and deployment of Lebanese forces. Twenty years later, the framework agreement of June 26, 2026 reprises essentially the same objectives, adding the pilot zone mechanism and American oversight. The progress is real — a gradual, verifiable implementation mechanism is better than non-binding declarations of intent. But the fact that twenty years were needed to move from a resolution to a framework agreement says a great deal about the difficulty of translating international norms into ground realities in the Middle East.

If the agreement of June 26, 2026 succeeds where Resolution 1701 failed, it will be a genuine diplomatic victory. If the same obstacles — an armed Hezbollah, a weak Lebanese state, prolonged occupation — undermine its implementation, we will find ourselves in 2046 negotiating a third framework agreement. That is not a fatality. It is a warning.

The Coming Weeks: What to Watch

The Indicators of Success or Failure

The coming weeks will be decisive in assessing whether the framework agreement of June 26, 2026 is viable. The indicators to monitor: whether Israel is respecting the Lebanon ceasefire — have strikes truly stopped or merely diminished? The effective launch of the "trilateral military coordination group" — has it been constituted and is it meeting? The definition of pilot zones — where, when, with which Lebanese forces deployed? Hezbollah's reaction on the ground — is the organization tacitly respecting the agreement or seeking to sabotage it?

The public declarations of all parties will be less important than these operational indicators. The Lebanon-Israel agreement, like any political agreement, is worth what its signatories do after the signing ceremony — not what they say during it.

What I Hope, What I Fear

I hope this framework agreement will be the genuine first step of a process that will ultimately return to Lebanon its full sovereignty and give its people a life free from the permanent threat of bombs. I hope the Lebanese Armed Forces receive the financial and material support to play their role. I hope that Hezbollah, facing an unfavorable regional context, will progressively choose political integration over armed confrontation.

But I fear that American haste to announce a success is masking this agreement's real fragility. I fear that the Israeli occupation will extend indefinitely in the name of "security through performance." I fear that the next escalation — a border incident, a Hezbollah missile, a miscalibrated Israeli strike — will sweep away the laboriously achieved progress. These fears are not gratuitous pessimism. They are the lesson of Lebanon's history since 1978.

Regional Actors Facing the Agreement: Between Distrust and Opportunism

Iran in the Equation: A Deal That Avoids It But Cannot Ignore It

The Lebanon-Israel framework agreement is being negotiated without Iran, but not without its shadow. Tehran remains Hezbollah's primary funder and arms supplier — any regional equation that ignores this reality is doomed to illusion. The US-Iran memorandum of June 17, 2026 on nuclear matters created a space of partial détente, but Washington and Tehran remain fundamentally in competition for influence in Lebanon. The real question is whether Iran has an interest in letting this agreement succeed or in making it fail.

Some Beirut-based analysts argue that Tehran, weakened by sanctions and occupied with its own nuclear negotiations, would prefer a period of relative calm in Lebanon to consolidate its positions. Others maintain that Iran cannot afford to see Hezbollah neutralized — that would mean losing its primary lever of regional pressure. Both readings coexist, and the reality will likely fall somewhere between the two.

Gulf Powers: Discreet Support or Silent Obstacle?

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates welcomed the Lebanon-Israel agreement with cautious support. For both countries, Lebanon's stability is a priority — if only to end the flow of refugees and protect their investments in the country. They see in this agreement an opportunity to reduce Iranian influence in Lebanon without having to directly deploy their own forces. The financing of Lebanese post-agreement reconstruction will likely be largely assured by Gulf states — giving them considerable leverage over Beirut's political direction.

This dynamic cuts both ways. Gulf money can accelerate reconstruction and strengthen Lebanese institutions. But it can also create new dependencies and a new model of external guardianship that limits Lebanese autonomy. The challenge for Lebanon is to find a balance between the necessary external assistance and the preservation of its capacity to decide its own future.

Conclusion: A Real Agreement in an Still-Unstable Context

The Nuanced Assessment of an Editorialist

The Lebanon-Israel framework agreement of June 26, 2026 is a genuine diplomatic advance — the first concrete step toward Lebanese-Israeli normalization since 1993. It reflects sustained and sincere American effort, a willingness from all official parties to find a negotiated exit, and a regional context transformed by the events of 2025. These are positive points that deserve to be acknowledged.

But this agreement leaves fundamental problems open: the exclusion of Hezbollah from negotiations, the persistence of the Israeli occupation, the weakness of the Lebanese state, the economic roots of instability. Rubio's "beginning of the beginning" is honest — provided that the "beginning of the beginning" transforms into a genuine process and not a definitive press release.

A Call for Vigilance

Lebanon has suffered too much for its people to deserve anything less than total vigilance from those who conclude agreements in their name. The agreement of June 26, 2026 will be judged ten years from now by its results: a reduced or eliminated Hezbollah presence in the south, a credible Lebanese army, a complete Israeli withdrawal, a Lebanese economy rebuilding itself. These are the real indicators. Everything else is facade diplomacy.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's Transparency Note

Acknowledged Biases and Positions

I am Maxime Marquette. I support Israel's right to exist and to defend itself, and Lebanon's right to full sovereignty. I consider Hezbollah an organization that has caused immense suffering to Lebanon and the region, and whose disarmament is a necessary condition for any lasting peace. I consider the prolonged Israeli occupation problematic under international law. These positions may seem contradictory — they are not. Lebanon's complexity requires holding several truths simultaneously.

Limits of My Analysis

I have not had access to the full text of the framework agreement, whose details "remain scarce" according to sources. My analysis is based on the public statements of Rubio, Netanyahu, Hamadeh, Leiter, Qassem, and the analysis of Rami Khouri. The operational military dimensions of the agreement — what the pilot zones concretely entail — remain to be specified.

Sources

Primary sources

Al Jazeera — US announces framework agreement between Israel and Lebanon — June 26, 2026

New York Times — In a Small Step, Israel Agrees to a Withdrawal From Two Areas in Lebanon — June 26, 2026

CNBC — Rubio says Israel and Lebanon have reached a framework deal aimed at "lasting peace and security" — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

Politico — Israel and Lebanon sign framework agreement with US in "a first step toward peace," Rubio says — June 26, 2026

Jerusalem Post — Peace agreement signed between US, Israel and Lebanon — June 26, 2026

US News — Israel-Lebanon framework agreement sets process to disarm Hezbollah, Rubio says — June 26, 2026