ANALYSIS: Europe Rearms — $139B More in 2025, an Unprecedented Strategic Awakening

Introduction: The Thunder of Billions — The West Finally Emerges from its Slumber

A figure that changes everything

On June 18, 2026, before the world's cameras gathered in Brussels, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte delivered a sentence that few would have dared imagine five years ago: "Europe and Canada spent over 90 billion dollars more in 2025 compared to 2024, representing a nearly 20% increase in defense spending." Then, speaking again with calculated insistence, he added the figure in nominal terms: 139 billion dollars extra. "I repeat: 139 billion dollars extra." This wasn't rhetoric. It was the birth certificate of a new Europe.

For the first time since the creation of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949, all 32 NATO members have reached or exceeded the 2% of GDP threshold for defense — a target set at the 2014 Wales Summit that had remained a dead letter for an entire decade. This isn't just another statistic: it is the sign of a civilizational break. The West, after decades of strategic naivety, has finally decided to look at the world as it is, not as it would like it to be.

The long road to awakening

We must understand where we are coming from. In 2014, when Vladimir Putin's Russia annexed Crimea with the arrogance of a gangster who knows he won't be hit, only three nations in the Alliance met the 2% of GDP commitment. Three out of thirty. The rest lived under the protection of the American umbrella, lulled by the illusion that peace was a natural, permanent, guaranteed state. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, woke some consciences. But it was the arrival of Donald Trump at the White House, with his brutal demand for equitable burden sharing, that did the rest. Sometimes it takes a shock to trigger transformation.

U.S. Senators Jeanne Shaheen and Thom Tillis, meeting at the Atlantic Council on June 18, 2026, summarized the evolution with precision. "When Thom and I started with the Senate NATO Observer Group, about five countries were at 2% of GDP," Shaheen recalled. "Today, all thirty-two NATO countries are at that threshold. And we now have about seven countries at 3, 3.5%." A transformation in less than ten years that no one thought possible.

The 139 Billion Figure: Real or Smoke and Mirrors?

The nominal/real distinction, an essential reading key

Rutte himself took care to distinguish the two measures during the June 18, 2026 press conference, and this distinction is worth noting. 90 billion dollars in real terms — that is, adjusted for inflation — represents the actual increase in the military purchasing power of European allies and Canada. This is already a colossal figure, "the maximum that can be done in a single year, given the absorption capacities," according to Rutte himself. But in nominal terms, meaning at current 2025 prices, the increase reaches 139 billion dollars. This nominal figure reflects the amount actually coming out of national budgets. Rutte repeated it twice to ensure no one downplays the political and financial significance of the gesture.

This distinction between real and nominal value is not an accounting trick. It reflects a concrete reality: Europe is effectively paying much more, and doing so in an inflationary context. Defense industries, equipment orders, personnel recruitment — all of this is done at 2025 market prices. The NATO Secretary General’s Annual Report published in March 2026 confirms that European allies and Canada together reached a total defense expenditure of 574 billion dollars in 2025, compared to 485 billion in 2024. That is 89 billion more in constant 2021 dollars, and significantly more at current prices.

What this represents concretely

To provide a scale: 139 billion additional nominal dollars in a single year is more than the total GDP of Hungary or Slovakia. It is twice the annual budget of the European Space Agency. It is enough to fully fund, several times over, the arms deliveries to Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict. This is not a marginal adjustment — it is a structural rearmament of a magnitude unseen in peacetime since the Cold War. The NATO 2025 annual report qualifies this increase as 19.6% in real terms, the second consecutive year with such a rate — meaning the momentum is not only powerful, but sustainable.

Senator Shaheen recognized this publicly during the Atlantic Council event: "In terms of progress made, it’s a 20% increase in defense spending among NATO countries over the past year." For her part, Torrey Taussig, moderator of the same event, confirmed the figures: "90 billion in new defense spending" by European and Canadian allies. These amounts are now etched into the Alliance's official accounts.

Everyone at 2%: The Historic Feat No One Believed Possible

From Three to Thirty-Two: The Ten-Year Metamorphosis

In 2014, following the annexation of Crimea, NATO allies committed in Wales to reaching the 2% of GDP threshold within ten years. Most did not do so on time. In 2022, still only seven countries met the target. In 2024, there were 18. And in 2025, for the first time in the Alliance's 77-year history: the 32 members reached or exceeded the target. Not 30. Not 31. Thirty-two, simultaneously, in the same fiscal year. This is what the NATO Secretary General's Annual Report officially confirmed in March 2026.

Among the newcomers to this threshold are countries that were still far from the mark only a few years ago: Albania, Slovenia, Belgium, Spain, Canada, Portugal. All reached exactly 2%. Granted, questions emerged after a NATO financial audit on the accounting method used by some of them — Czechia, Slovenia, and Albania allegedly included budget items ineligible under Alliance rules. But even in that case, the political dynamic is irreversible: these countries now know they must reach and maintain this threshold, and they are committing to it publicly.

American Pressure: A Discreet but Decisive Engine

It would be dishonest not to mention the role of Donald Trump in this acceleration. Since his first term, he has hammered home that European allies were "freeloaders" letting the United States pay for their security. It was brutal, sometimes cartoonish, but factually grounded. And it worked. Secretary General Rutte acknowledged this at the Hague Summit in June 2025, declaring before the cameras: "President Trump, dear Donald, you made this change possible." It is a political fact that must be looked in the face: the Trumpian "necessary evil" produced, at least on this issue, a real good for Western security.

Republican Senator Thom Tillis was more nuanced in his analysis: he pointed out that decades of absent budget discipline created "a $2 trillion deficit in our military-industrial base" — a gap that current increases are only beginning to fill. The road is still long. But for the first time, all allies are walking in the same direction. At the same time. And at the same pace.

The Champions: Poland, the Baltics, Norway — Eastern Europe Leads the Dance

Poland in the Lead, the Baltics as the Model

While some countries have barely crossed the 2% threshold, others have chosen to blaze a trail far beyond it. Leading the pack: Poland, with 4.3% of GDP dedicated to defense in 2025 — the absolute record within the Alliance among European members. Warsaw understood, better than any other capital, what it means to have Vladimir Putin as a neighbor. The invasion of Ukraine didn't surprise the Poles: it confirmed what they had known for generations. The Russian threat is not rhetorical; it is geographical, historical, existential.

Behind Poland, the Baltic countries maintain levels of military commitment that put many Western European countries to shame: Lithuania at 4%, Latvia at 3.7%, Estonia at 3.4%. These three nations, which lived under Soviet occupation and know the nature of the Moscow regime, are investing in their own survival. Not to please Washington. Not to respect a bureaucratic target. But because they know the alternative to strength is capitulation or disappearance.

Norway Surpasses the U.S. Per Capita — A Powerful Symbol

A figure little commented upon but of considerable symbolic weight: according to the Atlantic Council, for the first time in recorded NATO history, a European ally — Norway — has surpassed the United States in terms of per capita defense spending. This is not a statistical curiosity. It is the sign that Western Europe is capable, when it decides, of carrying its share of the burden. Oslo spends 3.2% of its GDP on defense, the same percentage as Washington. But with a smaller economy and an infinitely smaller population, the amount per head exceeds that of the American taxpayer.

More broadly, the list of seven countries already positioned between 3 and 3.5% of GDP — mentioned by Senator Shaheen during the Atlantic Council event — illustrates a profound geopolitical rebalancing. The countries most exposed to the Russian threat are also those investing the most. This is no accident. It is elementary geopolitics: we defend what we know to be precious because we almost lost it.

Germany: The Most Symbolic Turnaround in the Alliance

The Zeitenwende, Finally Measurable in Euros

No transformation within the Alliance is more significant — historically, politically, symbolically — than that of Germany. Chancellor Olaf Scholz had proclaimed the Zeitenwende — the "turning point" — the day after the Russian invasion of February 24, 2022. But actions long lagged behind words. With Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his government, the break has become budgetary, measurable, and irreversible. In 2025, Germany is dedicating 2.4% of its GDP to defense — roughly 86 billion euros, or 101 billion dollars. This is the first time since the early 1990s that Berlin has crossed the 2% mark in a convincing manner.

But this is only the beginning. Rutte explicitly stated during his preliminary speech on June 18, 2026, in Brussels: "Germany will double its defense spending by 2029 compared to 2021." The figures confirm the ambition: Berlin plans to exceed 162 billion euros in its defense budget by 2029, aiming to reach 3.5% of GDP — the new NATO core defense spending target — even before the 2035 deadline. In five years, Germany will have implemented a global military program of 649 billion euros, the largest rearmament since the 1990 reunification.

What This Means for the European Security Architecture

A Germany that spends 162 billion euros a year on defense is a Germany that becomes the military backbone of continental Europe. The Merz plan aims to transform the Bundeswehr into the strongest army in Europe, with massive investments in armored forces, artillery, command capabilities, and munitions — exactly the deficiencies revealed by the war in Ukraine in all Western arsenals. This is no longer chancery rhetoric. It is public procurement, budget lines, and factories opening — like the new Rheinmetall shell factory in Unterlüss, visited by Rutte himself in August 2025.

However, Rutte forcefully reminded everyone that money alone is not enough. "Cash alone doesn't provide security", he said during the inauguration of the Rheinmetall plant. "Deterrence doesn't come from the 5%; it comes from the ability to fight potential enemies." Converting billions into real operational capabilities — training, doctrine, interoperability, stockpiles — remains the challenge of the coming years. Germany has answered the budget question. The military question remains open.

The 5% Mark: The Target That Redefines the Alliance

The Hague 2025 — A Summit That Changed the Rules of the Game

The 2% of GDP target is now a given. But NATO has already set its sights much further. At the Hague Summit in June 2025, allies made a historic decision: to increase defense and security spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. This target is split into two parts: 3.5% for core defense spending — armed forces, equipment, ammunition — and 1.5% for defense and security spending in the broad sense, including protection of critical infrastructure, cyber defense, civil resilience, and the industrial base. It is the most ambitious target ever adopted by the Alliance in peacetime.

This decision didn't come out of nowhere. It is a direct response to the demands of Donald Trump, who had for years been demanding financial commitments commensurate with real risks. And the Alliance accepted. Rutte said it unambiguously at the Hague Summit: "Every ally must carry their fair share of the burden. NATO has no opt-outs, and NATO doesn't do side deals." This is a break from the culture of soft targets, pushed-back deadlines, and convenient exceptions that had characterized the Alliance for three decades.

Seven Countries Already Above 3%, Some Will Reach 5% Before 2035

Senator Shaheen was explicit on June 18, 2026: about seven NATO countries are already positioned between 3% and 3.5% of GDP. Among them are Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Denmark, Norway, and the United States. During the June 18 press conference, Rutte even specified that "some allies will reach 5% this very year, well ahead of the 2035 deadline". Poland is leading this pack, with a budget trajectory that could take it to 4.5 or even 5% of GDP in the coming years.

The stakes are not only financial. They are industrial. NATO needs this money to quickly transform into stockpiles of ammunition, air defense systems, armored platforms, and drones. The war in Ukraine has shown at what a frightening pace stocks are consumed in high-intensity combat. According to Rutte, we need to "scale up our defense industries on both sides of the Atlantic" — and cooperation between allies on the industrial supply chain has become as important as the budget targets themselves.

Facing Russia: The Adversary Setting the Pace of Western Rearmament

Moscow: 40% of the State Budget Devoted to War

To understand why the West is rearming at this pace, one must look at the other side. Secretary General Rutte put it into perspective during the June 18, 2026 press conference: "Russia devotes 40% of the state budget to defense — meaning approximately 75% of Moscow’s tax revenues are now spent on defense." This is a total war economy. Putin's Russia isn't pretending: it is preparing for a prolonged confrontation with the West, and it is mobilizing massive resources there despite sanctions, despite partial isolation, and despite economic pressure.

This reality fundamentally changes the strategic calculus. For years, voices in Europe argued that Russian military spending was not a Western problem — that the war in Ukraine was "Ukraine's problem." Volodymyr Zelensky, who has fought this logic since the first day of the full-scale invasion, has repeated it tirelessly: what is happening in Ukraine is the defense of the values and territory of the entire West. NATO has finally internalized this message. Rutte confirmed it on June 18: "Ukraine's security is important for our own security."

China, Iran, North Korea: The Axis of Dictatorships on the Alliance’s Radar

Rutte did not limit his analysis to Russia. In his addresses to the Defense Ministers gathered in Brussels, he pointed to the support of China, Iran, and North Korea for the Russian war effort. Beijing in particular — which provides dual-use technology and turns a blind eye to sanctions evasion — is identified as the greatest long-term strategic threat to the West. China is the one that is "ramp up" its own military industrial production, as Rutte specified, and which is closely watching how the West responds to the Ukrainian test.

This multi-threat context justifies the new 5% of GDP ambition. It is not a hysterical reaction to an isolated incident. It is a structural adaptation to a world in which liberal democracies face, simultaneously, a Russia at war, an expansionist China, a destabilizing Iran, and an increasingly aggressive North Korea. Senator Tillis summarized it bluntly: clearly recognizing who the Alliance's adversaries are is "a priority" for any NATO summit worthy of the name.

Ukraine's Role: The Bloody Laboratory Teaching the West

A War Rewriting Military Manuals

Ukraine is at the heart of this transformation. Not only as a beneficiary of Western support — over 50 billion euros of military assistance was provided by allies to Kyiv in 2024 alone, exceeding the 40 billion target set at the Washington Summit — but as a brutal teacher of a form of warfare that Western armies had forgotten. The consumption of shells, drone warfare, electronic warfare, high-intensity combat logistics — all of this has turned out to be on a scale that Western experts had underestimated.

Senator Shaheen admitted with commendable frankness during the Atlantic Council event: the war in Ukraine showed that the Western defense industrial base and stockpiles "are not as prolific as we thought". This is an euphemism. Production lines for 155mm shells that were turning out 10,000 units a month had to be put under pressure to produce 100,000. Delivery times were measured in years where wars are won in weeks. The lesson was painful, costly, and salutary.

Zelensky, the Contact Group, and Continued Engagement

On June 18, 2026, on the sidelines of the Defense Ministers' meetings in Brussels, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group met with the participation of Volodymyr Zelensky. Rutte announced it publicly: "We will soon begin a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, in which President Zelensky will participate." This is the signal that support for Ukraine remains central to the Alliance’s agenda, even as parallel diplomatic discussions are held on the conditions of a possible ceasefire.

Senator Tillis was as direct as could be: "We cannot be silent on support for Ukraine". He anticipated "positive progress" in U.S. support for Kyiv before the end of the current term. Zelensky is a leader who transformed Ukraine into a symbol of resistance — not only for his people, but for all the world's democracies. His struggle is not just national. It is universal. And the 32 NATO allies who reached 2% know it.

The Brussels Conference of June 18: The Final Summit Before Ankara

The Last-Chance Meeting Before the Big Event

The meeting of NATO Defense Ministers in Brussels on June 17 and 18, 2026 had a particular significance: it was, in Rutte's own words, "the last major meeting we will have before the Ankara Summit" scheduled for July 2026. A summit which, according to the Secretary General, will be "entirely devoted to implementation" — meaning the concrete translation of the Hague commitments into real military capabilities, booming defense industries, and maintained support for Ukraine. "NATO 3.0 is truly happening", Rutte declared, in a phrase that sums up the ambition of an Alliance in the midst of refoundation.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth came to Brussels with a deliberately balanced message: he hailed the progress made by allies on spending commitments — "what we are seeing in terms of spending is staggering" — while signaling that some members still need to "do more". Hegseth's conciliatory tone, far from the usual Trumpian outbursts, indicates that Washington recognizes European efforts while maintaining pressure for full implementation of commitments. This is the productive dynamic the Alliance must maintain.

The Architecture of NATO 3.0 — Forces, Production, Interoperability

The notion of "NATO 3.0" — a term used by Rutte in Brussels — refers to an Alliance that no longer settles for setting budget targets but ensures that the money spent translates into forces actually operational, interoperable, and rapidly deployable. The NATO Force Model was explicitly mentioned by Rutte: it is the plan that allows the Alliance to know exactly what capabilities it can count on in the event of a simultaneous multi-theater conflict. American adjustments to their contributions to this model provoked an immediate reaction: several European allies offered to fill the gaps left by the partial American withdrawal from certain arrangements.

Senator Tillis summarized the industrial stakes with acuity: he calls for "integrated supply chains of the Western alliance", with healthy competition between allies to become essential links in this chain. This is not an abstract vision. It is Plan B in the face of the possibility of a more pronounced American disengagement. Europe must be able to defend itself, produce its own weapons, and do so autonomously if necessary — while remaining in solidarity with Washington.

The Alliance's New Standard: 5% of GDP and the Roadmap to Ankara

The Implementation Agenda — Credible Plans and the 2029 Review

At the Hague Summit in June 2025, allies did not settle for setting a new target. They also created an accountability mechanism: each country must submit credible and progressive plans to reach 5% by 2035. A mid-term review is scheduled for 2029, coinciding with the American elections scheduled for that year — which guarantees maintained political pressure regardless of the tenant of the White House. Rutte was clear: "We will see. And in any case, there will be a review in 2029."

The July 2026 Ankara Summit will be the opportunity to present the first progress reports. The NATO page on defense spending, updated in April 2026, confirms that the Alliance "strongly encourages allies to devote at least 5% of GDP to defense by 2035" and to submit annual plans. The 2026 data — not yet published at the date of writing this article — promises to be even more favorable, as Rutte specified that further increases are already planned for the current fiscal year.

Regained Legitimacy — and the Challenge of Real Transformation

What is striking about the current dynamic is the change in political legitimacy of rearmament in Europe. For decades, increasing defense budgets was electorally risky, perceived as warmongering or reactionary. Today, in the majority of European democracies, not investing sufficiently in defense has become the politically costly act. Public opinion has shifted. The war in Ukraine, Moscow's threatening rhetoric, Chinese provocations in the South China Sea, and Iranian nuclear ambitions have transformed the European collective consciousness.

But Rutte rightly reminded us that the true transformation is not budgetary — it is capacitary. "Money alone doesn't stop a missile or a tank", he said in Brussels. The German Bundeswehr must recruit, train, and equip tens of thousands of additional soldiers. European air and naval fleets must be upgraded. Ammunition stockpiles must be replenished. Defense industries must transition from "peacetime" production to production supporting a potential war effort. This is a multi-year, perhaps decade-long project.

The Laggards: Canada, Spain — and Questions on Methodology

Those Who Waited Until the Last Moment

Not all progress deserves the same applause. Some countries waited for a political ultimatum to act. Canada, in particular, illustrates this paradox: after years of chronic under-investment — with only 1.37% of GDP in 2023, well below the target, despite the 2006 and 2014 agreements — Ottawa reached 2% only in 2025, under the combined pressure of Trump and Rutte. Senators Shaheen and Tillis had co-signed an open letter pressing the Canadian government to respect its commitments. The situation has finally unblocked. But the path remains long.

Spain, Portugal, Belgium — three Western European countries with strong economies — also barely reached 2%, with figures that do not exceed this threshold. These nations have the financial capacity to go much further. Their hesitation reflects not a problem of resources, but a deficit of strategic culture. The absence of a land border with Russia, the comfort of a favorable geography, decades without a direct threat — all this has produced societies less sensitized to the stakes of collective security. The war in Ukraine is changing this progressively. But not yet fast enough.

Controversy over Albania, Czechia, Slovenia

The question of accounting sincerity surfaced during an internal NATO audit, reported by Dutch media. According to sources within the Alliance, Albania, Slovenia, and Czechia allegedly included budget items ineligible under NATO rules in their defense spending calculations. Albania and Slovenia supposedly have levels about 0.5 percentage points lower than the official target. These revelations created a certain diplomatic embarrassment, as Rutte had already celebrated the fact that "all allies" had reached 2%.

This accounting debate should not overshadow the general trend, which remains massively positive. But it underscores the importance of transparency and methodological rigor in measuring commitments. Tillis has insisted on this: countries that have "fallen short on their commitments need to take note, learn the lessons, and move forward". NATO is not a club where appearances suffice. It is a collective defense alliance where the reliability of every link conditions the security of all others.

The Defense Industry: The Other Front of Western Rearmament

From Money to Production — The Industrial Bottleneck

Increasing defense budgets is one thing. Converting that money into operational military equipment is another, infinitely more complex. The war in Ukraine has brought to light with certain brutality the limits of the Western defense industrial base. Production rates for shells, missiles, drones, armored vehicles — all have been tested and all have shown deficiencies. The Rheinmetall plant inaugurated in Germany in 2025, which Rutte visited, is a concrete response to this challenge: it is a new production line for large-caliber shells, on European soil, intended to reduce dependence on American suppliers for the most-consumed munitions.

Senator Tillis argued for a model of "integrating supply chains at the Alliance scale": each ally brings its specific expertise — nuclear submarines on the American and French sides, drones on the Turkish or Polish sides, precision munitions on the Norwegian or Swedish sides. This division of labor, if well-orchestrated, can produce a more resilient and efficient Western military supply chain than any single power could ever hope to build alone. That is the vision. Execution, as always, will be the decisive test.

Asia in the Equation — South Korea, Japan, Australia

NATO's industrial transformation is not only playing out in Europe and North America. Asian partners — South Korea, Japan, Australia — are contributing more and more to the Western arsenal, notably in artillery shells and electronic components. South Korea, in particular, has emerged as one of the main suppliers of shells to Ukraine and Europe — an evolution that illustrates the globalization of collective security against adversaries who, for their part, cooperate fully: Russia sources North Korean munitions, Chinese technology, and Iranian drones. The West must build an equivalent response in terms of industrial density and diversity.

NATO remains a Euro-Atlantic alliance. But its security logic is now global. Rutte implicitly acknowledged this by mentioning freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz — an issue that goes far beyond the Alliance's geographical borders but directly affects the economic interests of all its members. The Alliance is learning to think and operate on a global scale while maintaining its Euro-Atlantic anchor. This is the definition of NATO 3.0.

The Editorial Posture: Why the West Must Remain the Center of the World

Freedom is Not a Natural State — It Must Be Defended

There is a temptation, in intellectual and pacifist circles, to see in this rearmament a dangerous spiral, an arms race that could lead to an even broader conflict. This analysis starts from a flawed premise: that peace is the natural state to which nations return if left alone. It is not true. Peace, democracy, the rule of law, freedom of the press, the right to political opposition — all this is a fragile achievement, constantly threatened, which exists only because people are ready to defend it, with weapons in hand if necessary. The history of the 20th century demonstrated this at an unimaginable price.

The West — understood as the collection of liberal democracies, from Warsaw to Washington, from Paris to Sydney — is the only political space where these values are systematically defended and practiced. This is not blind Western-centrism: it is the recognition of a reality. None of the proposed alternatives — authoritarian China, imperial Russia, theocratic Iran — promotes individual freedom, human dignity, or popular sovereignty. The West is imperfect, but it is the only institutional and moral framework that allows these values to exist on a large scale. And it must remain so.

The Strategic Awakening of 2025 — A Chance Not to Be Missed

What the 2025 figures say is that the West has chosen to take its defense seriously. After thirty years of the "peace dividend" that left arsenals unbalanced and minds anesthetized by comfort, a collective burst has occurred. 20% increase in a single year. 32 out of 32 countries at 2% of GDP. 7 countries already between 3 and 3.5%. Germany doubling its spending by 2029. This is not a flash in the pan. It is a strategic reconfiguration that is here to stay. But it will only make sense if it translates into real capabilities, maintained support for Ukraine, and preserved transatlantic solidarity.

The threat does not wait. Putin tests the limits of the Western response every day. Xi Jinping observes, calculates, prepares. Iran, even partially weakened by the deal negotiated by Trump, remains a destabilizing power. North Korea has delivered thousands of shells and soldiers to Russia. Facing this axis of dictatorships, the West does not have the luxury of nonchalance. The extra 139 billion dollars in 2025 are not an expense — they are an investment in the survival of freedom.

Conclusion: 139 Billion Reasons to Believe in the West

The Balance Sheet of a Pivotal Year

The year 2025 will go down in NATO annals as a key moment: when the Alliance stopped promising and started paying. $139 billion extra in nominal terms. $90 billion in real terms. All allies at 2% of GDP for the first time in 77 years. Seven countries already above 3%. Germany on track to double its military spending by 2029. Rutte talking about a transformation "probably the greatest in the Alliance's history." This is not institutional propaganda. These are facts, corroborated by national budgets, official NATO reports, and analyses from SIPRI, SIPRI, and the Atlantic Council.

This awakening has a context. It has a price. And it has a meaning. The context is a war in Europe, waged by a revisionist nuclear power dreaming of recomposing the Soviet empire. The price is billions of public funds diverted from other uses — education, health, climate transition — toward collective defense. And the meaning is that the West has chosen to preserve what defines it: freedom, democracy, the sovereignty of nations, and the dignity of individuals.

The Challenge That Remains

But it is not enough to spend. We must spend well. Convert billions into operational forces, ammunition stockpiles, and projection capabilities. We must maintain transatlantic unity, however difficult it may be in the Trump era. We must support Ukraine — not only with words and conferences, but with weapons, ammunition, and a political resolve that does not waver at every poll or every diplomatic pressure from Moscow. The July 2026 Ankara Summit will be the next test of this determination. The road to 5% of GDP in 2035 is long. But for the first time in three decades, the West is walking it. Together. And with feet on the ground.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Sources

Primary sources

Rutte’s press conference following the meeting of NATO Defense Ministers — NATO, June 18, 2026

Rutte’s doorstep statement ahead of the meeting of Defense Ministers — NATO, June 18, 2026

The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2025 — significant increase in defense investment — NATO, March 26, 2026

Secondary sources

Rutte: NATO shifts to implementation phase ahead of Ankara Summit — Yeni Şafak, June 18, 2026

Senators Shaheen and Tillis on the NATO Summit in Ankara — Atlantic Council, June 18, 2026

NATO Defense Ministers meet to discuss spending, Ukraine, and reforms — IRIA News, June 20, 2026

NATO chief says alliance entering implementation phase ahead of Ankara Summit — Anadolu Agency, June 18, 2026

NATO Defense Spending Tracker — Atlantic Council, updated April 9, 2026