ANALYSIS: Gaza, 64% Under Occupation — Morocco and the Arab Security Architecture Taking Shape

ANALYSIS: Gaza, 64% Under Occupation — Morocco and the Arab Security Architecture Taking Shape

Introduction: The Map That Changes Everything

A map shared with humanitarian organizations

In April 2026, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) shared with humanitarian aid groups a map that sent shockwaves through the international diplomatic community. That map showed a new "orange line", extending beyond the initial "yellow line" defined by the October 10, 2025 ceasefire, now placing approximately 64% of Gaza's territory under direct Israeli military control. Expert Jad Isaac, director of the Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, was unambiguous: "Approximately 65 to 64 percent of Gaza is today excluded and entirely under direct Israeli military occupation."

That figure of 64% is all the more striking given how sharply it contrasts with the terms of the initial ceasefire. In October 2025, the Israeli military had pulled back behind the yellow line, retaining control over roughly 53% of the territory — the sparsely populated eastern zone. The westward shift of that line, which Gaza residents described as a continuous movement "from one day to the next," had added more than 10 percentage points in a matter of months.

The UN raises the alarm, Netanyahu stakes his claim

The UN responded swiftly. Deputy Secretary-General Stefan Dujarric stated: "100% of Gaza should belong to the Palestinian people. That is our position, and we call on Israel to withdraw behind the yellow line." At the same time, Prime Minister Netanyahu, at a public event in May 2026, acknowledged having ordered the army to advance from 50% to 60%, then toward 70% control — on a deliberately vague timeline. International law, according to French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot, was being plainly violated: "It is contrary to international law to declare that 70% of the Gaza Strip will be retaken."

In this context of ongoing Israeli territorial expansion inside Gaza — which the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights describes as "progressive and silent" annexation — a new security architecture is beginning to take shape. And at its center stands an unusual actor: Morocco.

The October 2025 Ceasefire: Peace on Paper

The terms of the "comprehensive plan to end the Gaza conflict"

To understand the current situation, one must briefly return to the framework that produced it. The ceasefire of October 10, 2025, negotiated under American, Israeli, Egyptian, and Qatari mediation, and endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803 on November 17, 2025, had several phases. The first phase involved an Israeli withdrawal to the "yellow line," leaving 53 to 58% of the territory under IDF control. The second phase called for Hamas disarmament, full Israeli military withdrawal, and the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF).

That second phase was never implemented. Hamas refused to disarm — a precondition imposed by Israel before any further withdrawal. Israel continued pushing its control line westward. The UN Security Council recorded more than 3,000 ceasefire violations by Israel between October 10, 2025 and May 31, 2026. According to Gaza's Ministry of Health, by June 22, 2026, the death toll since the ceasefire began had surpassed 1,024 Palestinians killed.

The humanitarian situation: a documented catastrophe

The humanitarian situation in the remaining areas under Palestinian control — less than 40% of the territory, where the vast majority of Gaza's 2.2 million residents are packed — is catastrophic by every available measure. UNRWA reported severe shortages of fuel, spare parts, and engine oil that are compromising vital humanitarian operations. More than 520 endoscopic surgical procedures were at risk due to lack of disinfectant. UN relief chief Fletcher declared that no hospital in Gaza was fully operational. Humanitarian aid was funded at only 24% of needs.

These realities led Al Jazeera to describe a "silent annexation" unfolding in parallel with diplomatic processes. While diplomats negotiated in Doha, Cairo, and Washington, the orange line kept advancing westward on the ground, compressing hundreds of thousands of people into an ever-shrinking space.

The Board of Peace and the International Stabilization Force

The institutional architecture of the Trump administration

One of the most unexpected initiatives of the Trump administration on this file was the creation of the Board of Peace — a transitional governance body for Gaza, established by Security Council Resolution 2803 in November 2025, with abstentions from Russia and China. The Board of Peace, whose director-general is Nickolay Mladenov, is meant to oversee the post-Hamas governance transition in Gaza, with a mandate running through 2027.

Alongside the Board of Peace, the International Stabilization Force (ISF) was supposed to handle security functions: border security, humanitarian assistance, and training of a new Palestinian police force. ISF commander Jasper Jeffers was designated, and troop contributions from five founding nations were announced at the inaugural summit in February 2026: Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Morocco.

The ISF between theory and operational reality

The reality of the ISF in June 2026 is more complex than its launch announcement suggested. According to multiple diplomatic sources and media reports, the force faces considerable challenges: vague rules of engagement, contributing countries reluctant to expose their soldiers to ill-defined risks, and above all, the unresolved fundamental question — Hamas disarmament. Hamas continued to dodge disarmament demands while insisting that Israel implement its military withdrawals. Without resolving this Gordian knot, the ISF cannot deploy its forces under the anticipated conditions.

The ultimate goal of 20,000 soldiers and 12,000 police officers was still far from being reached in June 2026. Indonesia, which was expected to contribute the largest contingent — up to 8,000 soldiers by some estimates — had seen its deployments delayed due to uncertainty about conditions on the ground. According to Arab News from June 24, 2026, Moroccan planning officers had arrived in Israel to join the nascent ISF.

Morocco: The Arab Actor at the Center of the Equation

The Moroccan decision: between pragmatism and symbolism

Morocco's decision to engage in the ISF for Gaza is one of the most diplomatically remarkable of the first half of 2026. Morocco became the first Arab country to publicly announce its troop contribution to the stabilization force, at the inaugural Board of Peace summit in Washington in February 2026. Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita stated that Rabat was among the first five nations to formally commit.

To understand this decision, one must recall Morocco's geopolitical context. Morocco normalized its relations with Israel under the 2020 Abraham Accords, in exchange for American recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. This normalization created a particular relationship with Tel Aviv — Morocco is one of the few Arab countries to maintain open diplomatic ties with Israel while retaining a position as defender of the Palestinian cause in international forums. Joining the ISF fits this difficult but coherent dual posture.

Israeli trust in Morocco

A Ynetnews article from June 24, 2026 carried a revealing headline: "The only army in Gaza Israel actually trusts isn't Egypt's. It's Morocco's." That formulation — whatever its simplifications — captures something important. Israel trusts Morocco in a way it does not trust other potentially contributing Arab countries, owing to the ties established through the Abraham Accords, bilateral security cooperation, and the reputation of Moroccan military forces for reliability.

The Moroccan planning officers who had begun arriving in Israel in late June 2026 marked "an early operational step" toward the multinational force, according to the Board of Peace. Rabat appeared positioned to be the first Arab country to actually deploy operational personnel — even if the final modalities remained to be defined.

The Arab Security Architecture: A New Regional Reality

Arab countries facing a historic dilemma

Arab participation in the Gaza Stabilization Force represents a historic moment for the Arab world. For the first time in decades, Arab countries are engaging in an international security management mechanism for Gaza — not in opposition to Israel, but within a framework that coexists with Israeli military presence and aims ultimately to prepare for its succession. This is a considerable paradigm shift.

The contributing countries — Morocco, Indonesia, Albania, Kazakhstan, Kosovo — were carefully selected. None of them share a border with Gaza. None are engaged in direct regional rivalries that would create immediate conflicts of interest. These are countries that can claim international credibility and that, for various reasons, have an interest in maintaining good relations with both the United States and the regional parties involved.

The post-Hamas governance model: what Arabs want

The Arab countries involved in the process — notably the Gulf monarchies — have clear preferences regarding the future governance of Gaza. They want a reformed Palestinian Authority or a similar structure to manage Gaza stably, without Hamas returning to power. They want to avoid a model that creates a security vacuum filled by radical groups or increased Iranian dominance. And they want to demonstrate to their own populations that they have not abandoned the Palestinian cause while maintaining their strategic interests in regional stability.

Jordan and Egypt have a particular role in this framework — training the Palestinian police officers destined for the new Gaza security force. This is less visible than troop deployment, but potentially more decisive in the long run: the quality of local security forces will largely determine the viability of any political agreement.

The Central Question: Hamas Disarmament

The obstacle blocking everything

The Gordian knot of the entire Gaza stabilization process is Hamas disarmament. Resolution 2803 and the American ceasefire plan both stipulate that the second phase of the process involves disarming Palestinian armed groups — a prerequisite for Israel to carry out any more substantial military withdrawal. Hamas, for its part, has refused any engagement on this question, conditioning it on a prior Israeli withdrawal.

The circularity of this deadlock was illustrated by the negotiations in Cairo in June 2026: Hamas "continued to dodge disarmament demands" while insisting Israel begin its withdrawal. Israel refused to withdraw its troops before disarmament. The ISF could not deploy under satisfactory conditions as long as this question remained unresolved. The Board of Peace could not exercise its governance functions without minimal security. The loop is closed.

Options on the table to break the deadlock

Negotiators have explored several approaches to escape this impasse. One involves allowing the ISF to deploy progressively in stabilized zones under the agreement, independently of a full resolution of the disarmament question — an approach some call realistic, others irresponsible because it would allow Hamas to retain its capabilities in the remaining zones. Another approach involves conditioning ISF deployment on "measurable progress" toward disarmament without requiring its full completion.

The United Arab Emirates distinguished itself by supporting the firmest position: no deployment before full disarmament. Saudi Arabia adopted a more nuanced stance, conditional on progress on both disarmament and the pathway to a Palestinian state. These divergences among Arab countries contribute to the slowness of the process — but they also reflect different readings of what is actually achievable in the current context.

Reconstruction: A $70 Billion Challenge

The scale of the task

Rebuilding Gaza represents one of the most colossal humanitarian and economic challenges of the contemporary era. United Nations development experts estimate that $70 billion is needed to reconstruct what has been destroyed. The financial commitments made at the Board of Peace summit in February 2026 — $7 billion from an Arab-country consortium, $10 billion from the United States, $2 billion from OCHA, and additional contributions — still total a fraction of the identified needs.

On the ground, the reality is even grimmer. According to UNRWA and OCHA, shortages of fuel, medicines, and construction materials are undermining even emergency humanitarian operations. Long-term reconstruction requires a minimum of political and security stability — precisely what is lacking in the current context of partial Israeli military occupation and the deadlock over Hamas disarmament.

The Warsaw reconstruction conference

In late June 2026, a conference on post-conflict reconstruction of Ukraine was being held in Warsaw — but the parallels with Gaza were on everyone's mind. If Ukraine can benefit from a European loan of 90 billion euros and substantial international community commitments, why are the standards of international mobilization so different for Gaza? The question is politically delicate, but it is being posed by many observers in the Arab world and among Global South nations — and the asymmetry in treatment feeds the perception of a two-speed Western foreign policy.

This perception is not politically neutral. It fuels Chinese and Russian influence in international forums, where both countries regularly denounce Western "double standards" to build their own legitimacy among non-aligned nations. The international community's incoherence on Gaza carries a geopolitical cost that too few Western analysts take sufficiently into account.

The Gaza Strip as a Contested Territory: Legal Implications

What international law says about occupation

The Fourth Geneva Convention defines the obligations of an occupying power toward the civilian population under its control. Assuming that Israeli military control of 64% of Gaza constitutes an occupation in the legal sense — which the UN and most international law experts conclude — this implies substantial obligations: ensuring the supply of food and medicines, maintaining public order, and prohibiting the transfer of the occupying power's population into the occupied territory.

The documented violations of these obligations are considerable. Limited access to humanitarian aid, ongoing strikes in areas inhabited by civilians, and — according to UN reports — preparations for the installation of Israeli settlements in parts of Gaza create a situation in which the obligations of international occupation law are manifestly not being upheld. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has already issued provisional measures on Gaza, ordering Israel to prevent acts of destruction and to allow humanitarian access.

The debate over the applicability of legal qualifications

The debate over the legal characterization of the situation in Gaza is intense and politically charged. Organizations using terms like "annexation" or the most severe qualifications under international law are contested by Israel and its supporters, who argue that the current military situation is an unavoidable consequence of Hamas's refusal to disarm and relinquish control. This article takes no position on these extreme qualifications — that is not its role. It notes that the expansion of Israeli control beyond ceasefire boundaries is documented, that its humanitarian effects are severe, and that the international community is divided on the appropriate responses.

What can be stated with certainty: the current trajectory — 64% in March 2026, a Netanyahu directive to reach 70% in May 2026 — is not compatible with the terms of the ceasefire that was supposed to protect the rights of the civilian population. What the international community can or wishes to do about it remains an open question.

Israel Between Security and International Law

Israel's legitimate security concerns

Israel has legitimate security reasons for maintaining a military presence in Gaza. The October 7, 2023 attack claimed more than 1,200 lives and saw more than 250 hostages taken — a deep national trauma that radically transformed Israeli security policy. The IDF assesses that Hamas retains significant military capabilities in the areas it still controls, and that any premature withdrawal without disarmament risks creating the conditions for a resurgence.

These concerns are real and cannot be dismissed out of hand. But they do not justify, under international law, territorial expansion beyond the lines agreed to in the ceasefire agreement, nor ongoing strikes against civilian areas. Security and respect for international law are not options between which one must choose — they are simultaneous obligations that every democratic state must honor, even under extraordinarily difficult circumstances.

International pressure and its limits

International pressure on Israel to comply with the terms of the ceasefire is real, but limited. Trump's United States — which remains the principal guarantor of Israeli security and the central mediator of the peace process — has adopted a position that de facto accepts the progression of the orange line while verbally maintaining the goal of a "two-state solution." This tension between American statements and realities on the ground is noted by all regional observers.

Europe, the United Nations, and a broad international coalition continue to demand respect for international law. But without active American cooperation in conditioning support for Israel on compliance with its commitments, international pressure remains essentially symbolic.

The Broader Regional Dimension: Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia

Iran: the structurally present great absentee

Despite the American-Iranian ceasefire of June 2026, Iran remains structurally present in the Gaza equation through its ties to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The Hamas disarmament program implies, in the background, the question of whether Tehran would accept cutting its relations with the movement — something it has shown no sign of wanting to do. The Iranian logic is clear: an armed Hamas in Gaza is a strategic lever against Israel, regardless of other diplomatic developments.

The fact that the June 2026 American-Iranian deal does not cover Iranian proxies in the region — including Hamas — is precisely one of the points criticized by Gulf countries and by Israel. As long as this question is not addressed within a broader diplomatic framework, progress on Gaza will remain fragile.

Egypt as an indispensable pivot

Egypt plays a central role in any Gaza equation, for obvious geographical and historical reasons. It shares the Rafah border with Gaza, and it is traditionally through its diplomatic channels that indirect negotiations between Israel and Hamas take place. Within the ISF framework, Egypt is tasked with contributing to the training of Palestinian police forces — a less visible role than troop deployment, but potentially decisive.

Cairo is in a delicate position: it does not want a massive influx of Gazan refugees into the Sinai (an explicit red line of the Egyptian government), nor does it want Iran to strengthen its influence along its eastern border, and it seeks to maintain good relations with the United States, with Israel, and with the Gulf Arab countries that finance its economy. These multiple constraints make Egypt an indispensable but unpredictable partner in this process.

The Human Toll: More Than 73,000 Dead

A conflict that keeps killing

Behind the geopolitical equations and security architectures are human lives. Since the start of the conflict in October 2023, the total documented death toll has exceeded 73,000 people killed, according to Gaza's Ministry of Health — whose figures are considered reliable by the United Nations. More than 1,027 Palestinians have been killed since the start of the October 10, 2025 ceasefire. 270 journalists and media workers, 120 academics, and more than 560 humanitarian workers are among the victims.

These figures are people with names, families, and life plans. The risk of international politics is to transform them into statistics and adjustment variables in geopolitical equations. This analytical piece must not cause that to be forgotten. Every security architecture, every diplomatic process, every stabilization mechanism finds its ultimate justification in its capacity to end these deaths — and everything that fails at this objective is, whatever its conceptual elegance, a moral failure.

The ongoing humanitarian crisis

According to the British government's security report on Gaza from June 2026, the yellow line continues to shift westward, compressing hundreds of thousands of people into an ever-shrinking space. "The space where people live is continuously narrowing, framed by violence." No hospital in Gaza is fully operational. Humanitarian aid funding stands at 24% of needs. This ground-level reality is the context in which the Arab security architecture is being negotiated — and it imposes a moral urgency that diplomatic delays struggle to justify.

Outlook: What This Architecture Can and Cannot Accomplish

The conditions for success

The emerging Arab security architecture around Gaza can succeed if several conditions are met. First, a political agreement on Hamas disarmament — without which any international force remains without a clear operational mandate. Second, a progressive and verifiable Israeli withdrawal to the initial ceasefire lines, creating the space necessary for ISF deployment. Third, sustained reconstruction funding — not promises, but actual disbursements. Fourth, credible Palestinian governance — reformed, inclusive, and not associated with Hamas — capable of exercising civil authority in stabilized areas.

All of these conditions are necessary and none is guaranteed. Their simultaneous realization within the Board of Peace's mandate through 2027 represents an extraordinary challenge. That is not a reason to abandon the effort — it is a reason to be realistic about the time it will take and the resources it will require.

The risk of the failure scenario

The failure scenario — if the conditions for success are not met — is as important to analyze as the success scenario. If the ISF fails to deploy credibly, if the orange line keeps advancing, if reconstruction never starts, and if Hamas continues governing part of Gaza — the likely outcome is an increasingly unstable status quo, with endemic low-level violence, a persistent humanitarian catastrophe, and growing radicalization among a population that feels abandoned.

This scenario feeds regional instability, strengthens Iranian influence, weakens the moderate Arab regimes that took the risk of engaging in the ISF, and gives anti-Western actors — China, Russia, Iran — a permanent rhetorical platform against American and European foreign policy.

The US Position in This New Architecture: Conditional Support and Silent Pressure

The American administration and the Gaza file: between engagement and reservations

Behind the scenes of this new security architecture in the Middle East, the American position is decisive. Washington officially supports the stabilization process while maintaining its reservations about the modalities of a full Israeli withdrawal. The presence of American officials in the negotiations on the Board of Peace signals that the United States remains a central actor, even in a configuration where Arab countries are playing a new role.

Donald Trump's statements on Gaza have been particularly ambiguous: simultaneously enthusiastic about the idea of a "historic deal" and vague on the details of residual Israeli control. This American ambiguity is not purely tactical: it reflects the internal pressures of an American governing coalition in which unconditional supporters of Israel and advocates of a negotiated settlement are in permanent conflict.

Pressure on Israel: how far will Washington go?

The real question for the future of this architecture is whether Washington will exert sufficient pressure on Israel for the withdrawal from the 64% of territory currently occupied to become a reality rather than an indefinitely deferred promise. Historical examples — from the Oslo Accords to the Camp David negotiations — show that American pressure is the most decisive variable in any peace process involving Israel.

Without a firm commitment from the White House on clear timelines, regional actors — including Morocco — risk finding themselves managing a residual Israeli presence without the means to challenge it. That would be a stabilization architecture built on sand: elegant in theory, fragile in practice.

Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction: A Test of Consistency for the International Community

The $70 billion promised and the reality of disbursements

International financial commitments for the reconstruction of Gaza theoretically total nearly $70 billion. But between the promise and the disbursement, the history of conflicts teaches brutal skepticism: donor conferences are oversubscribed, transfers arrive at a trickle. The reconstruction of Iraq after 2003, of Libya after 2011, or of Mali remain sobering examples of the distance between announced commitments and concrete achievements.

The additional complexity in Gaza is that reconstruction cannot begin in earnest as long as part of the territory remains under military occupation. The infrastructure to be rebuilt can be destroyed again if security conditions are not stabilized. This is the vicious cycle that the Board of Peace must break, but for which it still lacks concrete mechanisms.

Palestinian civil society as a forgotten actor

All these architectures — security, financial, diplomatic — share a common blind spot: Palestinian civil society. Churches, women's organizations, educators' networks, professional associations: these structures that sustain a society from within are rarely invited to the negotiating table. Yet they are the ones who will have to, in practice, rebuild a social fabric torn apart by years of conflict, blockade, and loss.

The successful post-conflict reconstruction experiences — in Bosnia, in Mozambique, in Rwanda — all included a substantial component of support for local civil society. Without that component, peace agreements remain fragile institutional constructions that collapse at the first shock. Gaza will not be an exception to this historical rule.

Conclusion: A New Architecture, Uncertain Foundations

What Morocco in the ISF represents

Morocco's decision to engage in the ISF represents something real and important: an Arab country that accepts responsibility for security in Gaza within a multilateral institutional framework. It is a wager on the possibility of a different future for Palestinians — a future that neither Hamas domination nor prolonged Israeli occupation can offer. This wager deserves to be supported, even if its institutional foundations remain fragile.

But that support must be demanding. The emerging Arab security architecture cannot be a substitute for resolving the fundamental political questions — Hamas disarmament, Israeli withdrawal, and the pathway to a viable Palestinian state. If it becomes a way of indefinitely managing an occupation without addressing its causes, it will serve neither the Palestinians nor regional stability.

What the West must do now

For the West, the lesson of the Gaza analysis is the same as the one we draw from the war in Ukraine: unresolved conflicts become influence terrain for our adversaries. China and Russia are not interested in Gaza's stability — they are interested in the instability that its non-resolution sustains, and the anti-Western rhetoric it fuels. The honest and equitable resolution of the Palestinian question is not only a moral imperative — it is a strategic imperative.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My biases and my method

This analysis addresses a politically highly charged subject. I am pro-Western and I believe in the standards of international law. I am also aware that the Palestinian question generates strong positions and accusations of bias from all sides. I have attempted to present documented facts as they are, without extreme qualification, while maintaining a clear position on international legal obligations.

The figures cited — 64% Israeli control, 73,000 dead, 1,027 dead since the ceasefire — come from recognized sources (Gaza's Ministry of Health, whose figures are validated by the UN; OCHA reports; government sources). I used cross-referenced data to ensure their consistency.

What I don't know

I do not know with certainty exactly what Morocco has agreed to deploy, nor when. I do not know the precise terms of the discussions between ISF contributing countries and Israel. I cannot predict whether the Hamas disarmament process will be able to move forward. These uncertainties are inherent to the analysis of an active conflict.

Sources

Primary sources

UN Security Council briefing on Gaza humanitarian situation — Security Council Report — June 17, 2026

Palestine weekly wrap: Israel's 'quiet annexation' grows louder — Al Jazeera — June 23, 2026

Moroccan contingent arrives in Israel to join international Gaza force — Arab News Japan — June 24, 2026

Morocco, Albania, and Greece join Gaza International Stabilization Force — Jerusalem Post — June 24, 2026

Secondary sources

Morocco is officially among the first five countries to commit troops to Gaza's ISF — Morocco World News — February 19, 2026

Country bulletin: security situation in Gaza, June 2026 — GOV.UK — June 22, 2026

The only army in Gaza Israel actually trusts isn't Egypt's. It's Morocco's — Ynetnews — June 24, 2026