DECODING: Five percent of GDP — the figure redefining Western defense

From 2% to 5%: the history of a threshold that changes everything

Ten years ago, discussions about defense spending within NATO revolved around a target that the majority of members were not meeting: 2% of GDP. That target, considered reasonable and modest, was systematically circumvented, minimized, pushed back to "a few years from now." Donald Trump, during his first term, had berated allies who failed to reach it. He was right on substance, even if his methods left something to be desired.

By June 2026, the discussion has radically changed register. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte is pushing for a target of 5% of GDP. This is no longer a suggestion — it is the response to the threat calculations that the most exposed alliance members are making every day. To understand what this figure means, one must decode both its strategic justification and its enormous economic implications.

What Rutte said at the Atlantic Council

During a conversation at the Atlantic Council on June 25, 2026, Mark Rutte laid out the argument: European and Canadian allies' defense spending had increased by 20% in 2025. A total of $1.2 trillion in additional spending had been made by those allies between 2016 and 2026. "Tens of billions" in new contracts would be announced at the Ankara summit on July 7 and 8, 2026. These figures show the scale of the rearmament already under way — and the gaps that remain to be filled.

5% of GDP on defense: this figure represents what the United States already spends — having grown accustomed to it since the Cold War. For Europe, it is a cultural rupture as much as a budgetary one. And perhaps that is exactly what it needs — a rupture with decades of strategic naivety.

Country by country: the scale of the effort demanded

To understand what 5% of GDP implies, here are a few benchmarks. In 2025, France was spending approximately 2.1% of GDP on defense — reaching 5% would require more than doubling its military budget, from roughly €50 billion to over €120 billion. Germany, which has significantly increased spending since Russia's 2022 invasion, sits at around 2.2% and would need to almost quintuple its pre-2022 budget to reach 5%.

By comparison, Poland was spending approximately 4% of GDP on defense in 2025 — a considerable effort, fueled by geographic and historical proximity to the Russian threat. Estonia stood at 3.4%. These eastern flank countries are the only ones approaching the targeted level — and that is no coincidence.

The strategic argument behind the figure

Why 5% specifically? The logic rests on several calculations. First, replenishing ammunition and equipment stocks depleted since 2022 by deliveries to Ukraine and eastern flank redeployments. Second, financing the industrial scale-up needed to produce weapons at the pace of a high-intensity war. Third, funding the personnel, training, and operational readiness of an army that can actually fight — not just parade.

General Stringer, NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, mentioned on June 26, 2026 the objective of a quadrupling of 155mm shell production. This is a concrete example: artillery consumption in the war in Ukraine has depleted stocks that NATO countries thought would last for years. Rebuilding them and reaching a production capacity suited to modern warfare is very expensive — and those costs feed into the 5% calculation.

The quadrupling of 155mm shell production: there is the detail that says everything. We have disarmed so much since 1991 that we are incapable of producing enough ammunition for a war we have been watching unfold in real time since 2022. The awakening is brutal. It was long overdue.

What Nordic and Baltic leaders signed

On June 25, 2026, a Gdansk Declaration was adopted by European leaders meeting on the margins of the Ankara summit preparations. This text reaffirms the collective commitment to 5% of GDP and the reinforcement of NATO's eastern flank. It marks an alignment among the countries most directly exposed to the Russian threat around a shared budgetary ambition.

The Gdansk Declaration is political as much as technical: it creates peer pressure among allies on the question of spending. Countries that sign commit publicly to moving toward 5%. Those that do not sign, or that fail to honor their commitments, will be exposed to comparison. It is a governance tool based on collective pressure — with its limits, but also its effectiveness.

The Nordic and Baltic dynamic: the vanguard of rearmament

Nordic and Baltic countries form the vanguard of Western rearmament. Finland, which joined NATO in 2023, immediately increased its defense spending. Sweden, a new member, is following the same path. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are already spending well above 3% of GDP and regard 5% as both achievable and necessary.

This Nordic-Baltic dynamic creates positive pressure on more reluctant Western European countries. "If Estonia can do it, why can't we?" is the implicit question that Rutte poses to the capitals still dragging their feet. And the answer is not always convincing from governments with other budgetary priorities.

Estonia spends 3.4% of GDP on defense with a $30 billion economy. France spends 2.1% with a $3 trillion economy. I am not moralizing — but the proportions say something about who is taking the threat seriously. And it is not flattering for Europe's major powers.

The weight of European public debt

Southern European countries — Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece — carry public debts that often exceed 100% of GDP. In that context, massively increasing defense spending raises questions of fiscal sustainability. European Stability and Growth Pact rules, even relaxed for defense spending, create real constraints.

The discussion about 5% of GDP is therefore inseparable from a discussion about common European financing of defense — shared borrowing, special funds, budgetary exemptions. These instruments exist or are being created, but their deployment takes time. And Putin is not waiting.

Cultural resistance to rearmament

Beyond budgetary constraints, several European countries harbor a cultural resistance to the idea of rearmament. Decades of the post-1991 peace dividend, European integration, and belief in the power of soft power: all of this has created a strategic culture that struggles to think in terms of hard military power.

2022 began to change that culture — the Russian invasion was the necessary electric shock. But deep cultural changes take time. Voting a defense budget at 5% of GDP requires a political consensus that many European democracies have not yet consolidated. That is one of the real challenges the Ankara summit cannot resolve by decree.

European peace culture, built since 1945, is a precious thing. It enabled 75 years of prosperity without a major continental war. But Putin has made that culture dangerous. Clinging to cultural pacifism in the face of armed aggression is offering your throat to whoever wants to cut it. Rearmament is not war — it is war's deterrence.

Trump pushes toward 5% — for good and bad reasons

The Trump administration, through Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and his 6-month review of American contributions in Europe, is pushing allies to spend more. On substance, this objective is correct: Europe must take a larger share of responsibility for its own defense. But the method — disengagement threats, calculated uncertainty, emotional blackmail about American reliability — creates instability that weakens the alliance as much as it strengthens it.

The United States itself spends approximately 3.5% of GDP on defense. Asking Europeans to reach 5% means asking them to spend more, proportionally, than the Americans themselves. That is a defensible position — the US has other global commitments, notably in the Pacific — but it must be presented honestly, not as a simple unilateral demand.

European strategic autonomy: from concept to necessity

The threat of American disengagement, uncomfortable as it is, has had an unintended positive effect: it has brought the question of European strategic autonomy to the forefront of the political agenda. For years, this concept — championed primarily by France — was seen as naive or provocative by Atlanticists. Today, it has become a practical necessity.

If the United States reduces its presence in Europe, Europeans must be capable of defending themselves alone. This implies not only more spending, but a far deeper integration of European military capabilities than currently exists. The Ankara summit could — should — mark a step in that direction.

European strategic autonomy: from an academic concept in 2017, it has become by 2026 a matter of survival. Trump has done more to push Europe to defend itself than twenty years of integration speeches. I don't thank him for his methods — but the result, if it works, is good.

Deterrence as an investment in peace

The fundamental calculation behind 5% of GDP is that of deterrence: spend heavily now to avoid having to fight later. The Cold War demonstrated that deterrence works — the USSR and NATO never directly confronted each other. What changed since 2022 is that deterrence failed in a sector where it was considered established: Europe.

Rebuilding credible deterrence against Russia requires real military capabilities — not declarations. And those capabilities cost money. The 5% of GDP is the price of credibility for rebuilt deterrence. It is expensive — but less expensive than a war on European territory.

Industrial and technological spinoffs

Increased defense spending generates significant industrial and technological spinoffs. Contracts announced for the Ankara summit will fund arms production lines, defense technology, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence applied to warfare. These investments create jobs, stimulate innovation, and strengthen the industrial base of the West.

This argument is often overlooked in debates about defense spending: money invested in defense does not disappear — it circulates in the economy, funds research, trains engineers. In a context of technological competition with China, defense investments can also be investments in overall economic competitiveness.

Some will see in this logic a convenient justification for the military-industrial complex. I understand the wariness. But when the alternatives are military weakness in the face of armed authoritarian regimes, or defensive spending, I choose the second option without hesitation. The real world does not permit the luxury of pure pacifism.

Beyond Ankara's immediate decisions

The Ankara summit matters. But it is only one step in a deeper transformation of Western defense. The decisions made there — budget commitments, defense contracts, eastern flank reinforcements — must be part of a long-term vision, not crisis management. NATO needs a strategic direction for the next ten years, not just the next ten months.

That strategic direction means answering difficult questions: how to maintain alliance coherence in the face of American unpredictability? How to balance Ukraine's immediate needs and long-term investments in the defense industrial base? How to build credible deterrence against multiple simultaneous threats? These questions will not find definitive answers at Ankara — but the summit can lay the foundations of a process that progressively addresses them.

The role of each ally in the collective transformation

Transforming NATO into a 21st-century alliance is a collective responsibility requiring every member to carry its share. The large countries — France, Germany, United Kingdom — must take budgetary and political leadership. The smaller countries of the eastern flank must keep setting the example of maximum commitment. And the United States must decide whether it wants to be a reliable partner or an unpredictable actor.

These individual choices, multiplied by the 32 members of the alliance, collectively define NATO's trajectory. The Ankara summit is the opportunity to reinforce the coherence of these individual choices around a shared vision — carried by Rutte and backed by the most committed members.

Poland at 4% of GDP, Estonia at 3.4%: these countries understood before the others. Their example should be a spur to the larger European countries still dragging their feet. The threat does not wait for political calendars.

What the stakes demand of those who decide

The heads of state and government gathering in Ankara on July 7 and 8, 2026 carry a historical responsibility that no speech drafted by their diplomats can erase. They are meeting at the moment when Europe is more vulnerable than at any point since the end of the Cold War. And their decisions — or absence of decisions — will have lasting consequences.

History judges leaders not on their intentions but on their actions. Churchill is celebrated because he acted when others hesitated. Chamberlain is criticized because he yielded when he should have held firm. The question the Ankara summit poses is simple: which leaders do those gathered want to be in the history books? Those who stood firm against Putin, or those who temporized until it was too late?

Ukraine as the measure of Western credibility

The way NATO treats Ukraine is the most direct measure of its credibility. A country fighting with heroism for more than two years, striking Russian refineries at 1,300 km, liberating its prisoners exchange after exchange: that country deserves the unconditional support of the alliance. Not out of sentiment, but because Ukraine is Europe's first line of defense.

If NATO abandons Ukraine — or if it lets American hesitation erode its support — the message sent to every other actor in the world will be devastating. Conversely, a firm and continuous commitment to Ukraine demonstrates that the alliance is serious, that its guarantees are worth something, and that Putin will not win through attrition.

5% of GDP by 2030: that is the achievable target for serious countries. The key is that trajectories be credible and budgets actually voted — not campaign promises that evaporate at the first difficult vote.

The test of collective political will

The 5% of GDP target will be the major test of the Atlantic Alliance's political will over the coming years. Not because all members will reach it immediately — that will not happen. But because the direction taken, the national trajectories defended, the contracts signed and budgets voted in the months following Ankara will reveal whether the commitments are real or rhetorical.

Putin is watching. Xi Jinping is watching. Kim Jong-un is watching. Tehran is watching. What they are trying to see is whether the West is serious. The 5% of GDP, fully owned and implemented, is the clearest possible answer. And that answer — no one can misinterpret.

A number, but a civilization behind it

At its core, 5% of GDP is not just a budgetary target. It is the translation into financial terms of an existential question: does the West want to defend its model of society, its values, its security? Or does it prefer to doze in comfort and hope the threats pass? The history of 2022 gave the answer to that question in the form of tanks and missiles. Now it is up to political decision-makers and taxpayers to give their answer in euros, pounds, and dollars.

5% of GDP: a figure that will define whether this generation of European leaders was equal to the historical challenge placed before them. Trust is bought with actions, not speeches.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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