COMMENTARY : Taiwan's 2026 Defense Budget Sabotaged — Lai Ching-te Forced to Work Around It

Introduction: An Island Under Pressure, a Parliament Under Influence

A Budget Blocked for Nine Months — a Democracy in Peril

This is not a legislative footnote. It is not a mere accounting dispute between parliamentarians. What has been unfolding in Taiwan since autumn 2025 is of rare gravity: the general defense budget for 2026, submitted by the executive in August 2025, has been deliberately withheld for more than 290 days by the opposition parties — the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) — which together control a majority in the Legislative Yuan. Meanwhile, China has intensified its military operations around the island and its coast guard vessels have been patrolling uninterrupted in waters east of Taiwan since June 1, 2026.

On June 15, 2026, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) spokesperson Wu Cheng officially accused opposition legislators of deliberately sabotaging the budget process. The Cabinet warned that the delays risk forcing Taipei to simultaneously review the 2026 and 2027 budgets — an administratively absurd scenario for an island democracy that lives, every day, under the threat of a potential military invasion by Beijing.

A Permanent Threat Context the Opposition Refuses to Take Seriously

On June 20, 2026, while legislative committees were still squabbling over budget lines, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense reported the presence of 9 People's Liberation Army vessels in waters surrounding the island, including one aircraft that had crossed the strait's median line. This daily military ballet is the permanent backdrop against which the budget battle plays out in Taipei — a backdrop that too many parliamentarians have apparently decided to ignore in favor of short-sighted political calculations.

Lai Ching-te was elected in January 2024 on the promise of reinforcing the island's defenses. He kept his word by proposing a special budget of NT$1.25 trillion in November 2025 and setting a defense spending target of 3.3 percent of GDP. The opposition, wielding its Legislative Yuan majority won in those same elections, has systematically diverted, truncated, and delayed these efforts. The result is a democratic island whose president wants to defend it but whose parliament ties his hands.

The 2026 General Budget: NT$561 Billion in Defense Funds Held Hostage

Critical Funding for Taiwan's Armed Forces

The 2026 general budget allocates NT$561.4 billion (approximately US$17.8 billion) to the Ministry of National Defense. This amount represents an increase of approximately 20 percent over the 2025 allocation and forms a central pillar of President Lai Ching-te's strategy to raise annual defense spending to 3.3 percent of GDP. Taiwan currently spends only about 2.4 percent of GDP on defense — well below the stated target and far below what the geopolitical situation demands.

This budget covers absolutely non-negotiable items: personnel funding, logistics, operational maintenance of vital weapons systems such as the Harpoon anti-ship missile. These are not abstract budget lines. These are the munitions, the technicians, the spare parts that allow Taiwanese soldiers to be operational tomorrow morning if the People's Liberation Army decides to cross the strait. And the opposition has been holding them hostage for nine months, according to data published by the Institute for the Study of War on June 18, 2026.

A Gap Between Presidential Ambition and Legislative Reality

Lai Ching-te's objective is clear and documented: raise defense spending to 3.3 percent of GDP in 2026, then to 5 percent by 2030. This objective aligns with repeated demands from Washington, which presses its Asian allies to invest more in their own security. The 2026 general budget was the first structural step in that trajectory. By blocking it, the opposition is not merely delaying an accounting line — it is sabotaging a strategic roadmap on which Taiwan's deterrent credibility depends.

The difference between 2.4 and 3.3 percent of GDP may seem abstract. In dollar terms, on a Taiwanese economy worth hundreds of billions, that difference translates into billions of additional dollars for troop training, ammunition procurement, and indigenous weapons development. It is the difference between a functional defense and a credible one. It is precisely that gap that the KMT and TPP have decided to keep open — against a backdrop of a Chinese threat that takes no legislative recesses.

The KMT and TPP: Serial Blockades That Weaken the Island

A Methodical and Sustained Budget War

Since December 2024, the KMT-TPP duo has wielded its legislative majority as a tool of systematic sabotage. The special defense budget proposed by the executive — initially set at NT$1.25 trillion (approximately US$40 billion) over eight years — was blocked no fewer than ten times before a truncated version was finally adopted in May 2026. This reduced version, capped at NT$780 billion (approximately US$24.8 billion), represents a cut of 38 percent from the original request. Worse still, the opposition parties stripped the bill of all funding for locally produced drones and island-manufactured missiles, reducing the budget to a mechanism for purchasing already-approved American weapons.

Six legislative committees were still awaiting finalization of their general budget reviews as of June 15, 2026. These six committees were all chaired by KMT or TPP legislators. No coincidence: according to data compiled by Taiwan Sounds and relayed by Taiwan News, committees chaired by DPP legislators had all completed their reviews well before June. The geography of the sabotage is perfectly identifiable.

The KMT Leader Meets Xi — While the Island Bleeds

In April 2026, KMT President Cheng Li-wun met with Chinese President Xi Jinping — at the very moment her party was blocking Taiwan's defense budget for the ninth time. She returned with praise for Xi, whom she described as "very gentle, very pleasant." This characterization, reported by Politico on June 17, 2026, sent shockwaves through American diplomatic circles. The image of a Taiwanese party leader showering verbal bouquets on the man threatening to invade her island is, to put it plainly, astonishing.

The U.S. State Department had already publicly warned that the delay in approving the defense budget constituted "a concession" to Beijing. The KMT leadership rejected these accusations, claiming to support defense while demanding greater fiscal rigor and transparency in military procurement. But between words and deeds, the reality of ten successive blocking votes speaks for itself.

The Truncated Special Defense Budget: What Was Saved, What Was Sacrificed

A Compromise That Buries the Porcupine Strategy

What the legislature finally adopted on May 8, 2026 is, according to analysis published by War on the Rocks on June 2, 2026, "a significant but incomplete victory." The NT$780 billion version authorizes funding for already-approved American weapons purchases — including systems such as HIMARS, Patriot missiles, Javelin missiles, and TOW 2B missiles. A separate tranche of NT$8.81 billion was approved on May 27, 2026 for specific asymmetric purchases including self-propelled M109A7 howitzers, AAWS-M anti-armor missiles, and TOW 2B missiles.

But what was sacrificed may be more important than what was preserved: all funding for the national drone industry, Strong Bow missiles, additional ammunition, AI-driven combat systems, and Taiwan-U.S. cooperation on indigenous defense was eliminated. The "porcupine strategy" — making the island so costly to invade that no rational calculation could justify an attack — rests precisely on these indigenous asymmetric capabilities. By amputating them, the KMT and TPP did not merely cut budget lines: they eroded the very doctrine of Taiwanese deterrence.

More Than 8,000 People in the Streets: Civil Society Sounds the Alarm

On May 23, 2026, more than 8,000 people demonstrated in Taipei against the defense budget cuts. Participants called on the Cabinet to propose a new budget draft. Lai Chung-chiang, organizer of the Taiwan Economic Democracy Union, stressed at the rally that the problem with the revised budget was not only its reduced amount, but above all the elimination of essential elements: unmanned vehicles, Strong Bow missiles, additional munitions, AI combat systems, and Taiwan-U.S. defense collaboration. The Taiwanese public understands what certain parliamentarians appear to feign ignorance of.

Demonstrators particularly emphasized a point confirmed by strategic analysis: the residual budget primarily funds purchases from American suppliers, while funding for domestic arms manufacturers was eliminated. Defensive autonomy — Taiwan's capacity to produce its own weapons and not depend entirely on foreign deliveries that could be interrupted — is precisely what the original budget aimed to build. And precisely what the opposition chose to amputate.

Lai Ching-te Fights Back: The Workaround Strategy

The June 16 Declaration: "We Are Not Giving Up"

On June 16, 2026, during a visit to the Guandu zone command in northern Taiwan for the Dragon Boat Festival, President Lai Ching-te spoke the words his supporters had been waiting for: "We are not giving up." Addressing the opposition-imposed cuts directly, Lai announced a multi-pronged strategy to circumvent the legislative blockade: filing a new special bill, using supplementary budgets, and increasing annual general budget allocations to support military programs. He also announced the creation of a drone squadron within the army, planned for July 2026, at the Guandu command itself.

That same day, Lai observed performances by the ALTIUS-600M attack drone — an AI-guided loitering munition manufactured by Anduril Industries. The 291 units ordered were all delivered — a delivery record for an American arms sale to Taiwan, according to local defense media. During live-fire exercises on June 3, 2026 in Yilan County, these drones achieved a 100 percent success rate against maritime targets, following software modifications that corrected issues that had appeared during the first test.

The July Squadron: An Institutional Response to the Parliamentary Impasse

The announcement of a drone squadron to be formed in July 2026 at Guandu is more than a symbolic gesture. It means that the Lai government is prepared to use existing resources — the 291 ALTIUS-600M drones already delivered, funded by prior appropriations — to build real operational capability, independent of ongoing budget battles. The message to the Legislative Yuan is clear: block our bills if you like; the Taiwanese military is preparing anyway.

During his visit, Lai also conveyed a message to soldiers deployed during the national holiday: "Defending the nation has no days off." And: "Because you hold your posts, the people can celebrate in peace." These words, addressed to military personnel who know their parliament refuses to adequately fund their defense, carry a particularly poignant resonance. These are men and women asked to do more with less — and doing it anyway.

The NT$210 Billion Drone Bill: A New Workaround Attempt

The Executive Plays Its June 18 Card

On June 18, 2026, the Taiwanese Cabinet approved a special bill titled the "Special Act for Procurement of Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles for National Defense." The bill allocates up to NT$210 billion (approximately US$6.6 billion) over six years — from August 2026 to December 2031 — for the purchase of locally produced drone systems. Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim publicly called on June 19, 2026 for multiparty support, stating that national security should not be politicized.

The procurement plan is clinically precise: 1,446 coastal surveillance drones, 208,200 coastal attack drones of four different types, and 1,320 small unmanned suicide boats. These figures correspond exactly to prior defense planning. Funding could come from previous-year surpluses or government borrowing. Lieutenant General Huang Wen-chi, director of strategic planning at the Defense Ministry, cited lessons from the conflict in Ukraine — notably the continuous learning dynamic between offensive and defensive systems — to justify the bill's urgency.

The Ukrainian Lesson Cited by a Taiwanese General

The reference to Ukraine, made by Lieutenant General Huang in an official document published by Radio Taiwan International, deserves to be quoted in full: "The reason Ukraine has been able to grow so rapidly in the Russia-Ukraine war is that it has continuously accumulated experience by employing both anti-drone and unmanned systems together in an iterative approach. It is essentially the constant mutual development between attack and defense that has enabled rapid gains." These words from a Taiwanese general are not idle talk — they describe exactly the doctrine the government wants to fund, and that the opposition refuses to fund.

Premier Cho Jung-tai added that the drone industry could stimulate investment, employment, and supply chains independent of China, while reinforcing Taiwan's defensive and industrial resilience. The argument is simultaneously strategic and economic: by forcing the development of a national drone industry, Taiwan would reduce its dependence on American deliveries — a dependence that Trump himself has transformed into a "negotiating asset" with Beijing.

American Pressure: Washington Gets Angry

The Freeze-Out of Cheng Li-wun: An Unambiguous Signal

KMT President Cheng Li-wun made a two-week visit to the United States that ended on June 15, 2026. The result was, according to Politico's detailed account published on June 17, 2026, a series of calculated diplomatic humiliations. The White House cancelled a scheduled meeting between Cheng and National Security Council officials. The State Department officially described itself as still "furious" over Cheng's behavior regarding defense spending. A source familiar with the delegation's itinerary stated: "They asked for meetings with a lot of legislators and didn't get many."

More significantly: according to a source close to the cancelled White House meetings, NSC officials "were very upset that she had gutted the special defense budget on which they had provided extensive consultation." Cheng, for her part, maintained she was the victim of "rumors to discourage my meetings" and denied acting as a mouthpiece for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party. She had, however, met Xi Jinping in April 2026 — at the very moment her party was blocking the defense budget for the ninth time — and described him as "very gentle, very pleasant." The scene surpasses political fiction.

Sullivan, Bacon, and the Nine Legislators Who Agreed to Meet Her

Only nine American legislators agreed to meet Cheng Li-wun during her Washington stay. Among them: Republican Senator Dan Sullivan (Alaska), and Representatives Don Bacon (Nebraska) and Tom Suozzi (New York). Sullivan used the meeting to urge Cheng to work with Lai's DPP to "finish the defense budget" — a formulation that leaves no ambiguity about Washington's position. Bacon's office stated that "the KMT is moving in the right direction on our shared desire to defend Taiwan" — a carefully positive formulation that barely conceals Washington's impatience.

The leak to the Financial Times of the names of NSC officials Cheng was to meet was the immediate trigger for the White House meeting's cancellation. American officials accused the KMT of having deliberately leaked these names, constituting in their view "a violation of a basic protocol that was a precondition for the NSC meeting." Whether intentional or not, the leak served as a convenient pretext for a diplomatic sidelining Washington had clearly wanted to carry out for some time.

Chinese Military Activity: The Pressure Does Not Let Up

Ships, Drones, and Maneuvers East of Taiwan

While the Taiwanese parliament squabbles over budget details, the People's Liberation Army and the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) are busy. According to data gathered by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and published on June 18, 2026, China has deployed at least two coast guard vessels to patrol continuously east of Taiwan since June 1, 2026. From June 6 to 10, four civilian law enforcement ships conducted a "special maritime law enforcement operation" under CCG escort.

From June 16 to 18, 2026, the research vessel Xiang Yang Hong 22 — belonging to the East China Sea Bureau of China's Ministry of Natural Resources — conducted a "marine environmental survey" east of Taiwan, escorted by two CCG ships according to maritime tracking data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence. Beijing described the operation as measuring the health of marine ecosystems. ISW analysts note that China regularly uses environmental pretexts to assert territorial claims — a practice documented in the South China Sea and around Scarborough Shoal.

Waters East of Taiwan: A Space Being Systematically Mapped by Beijing

The ISW notes in its June 18, 2026 report that the waters east of Taiwan being operated in by Chinese vessels adjoin the Bashi Channel and the Miyako Strait — two critical maritime chokepoints that China will seek to control in any blockade or invasion operation against Taiwan. The presence of environmental survey ships escorted by coast guard vessels in precisely these waters is not coincidental. It is systematic military mapping of the island's maritime approaches, conducted under scientific cover.

Additionally, since May 19, 2026, a PLAN carrier strike group has been deployed in waters east of the Philippines. This prolonged deployment, combined with continuous CCG patrols around Taiwan, constitutes a multi-front show of force. China is testing not only Taiwanese defenses but also the cohesion of regional alliances among Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines — precisely the nations Lai Ching-te is seeking to unite in collective defense.

Air and Naval Sorties: Daily Documented Pressure

Saturday, June 20, 2026: 5 Air Sorties, 9 Ships, 5 Official Vessels

On June 20, 2026, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced detecting, up to 6:00 a.m. (UTC+8), 5 PLA aircraft sorties, 9 PLA Navy (PLAN) vessels, and 5 official ships operating around Taiwan's territory. Of the five air sorties, one crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered the southwestern portion of Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). The Republic of China armed forces monitored the situation and responded accordingly, according to the MND's official post on the social network X.

The previous day, Friday, 8 PLAN vessels were operating in waters surrounding Taiwan — with no air activity detected that day. On Thursday, another 8 naval vessels had been spotted. This rhythm of near-daily naval presence is meticulously documented by the MND on its official accounts. The continuity of these figures — never zero, never merely symbolic — describes a permanent and calculated Chinese military presence around the island, designed to normalize pressure and test Taiwanese responses.

A Strategy of Permanent Psychological and Operational Attrition

Analyzing this data over several weeks reveals a coherent strategy: maintain a military presence sufficient to force Taiwan to mobilize its defense forces daily, while remaining below the threshold that would justify an international response. Every interception, every surveillance vessel deployment forces Taiwan's armed forces to expend energy, fuel, and flight hours — resources that wear down and require replacement and maintenance budgets.

According to ISW data, since May 28, 2026, Beijing has also protested against the intention of the Japanese Prime Minister and the Philippine President to delimit their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in overlapping waters east of Taiwan. China is simultaneously playing on multiple fronts — military pressure on Taiwan, maritime contestation with Japan and the Philippines, prolonged naval deployments — while the Taiwanese parliament debates budget lines. The contrast is striking.

The Indigenous Submarine: A Symbol of Autonomy Beneath the Waves

Taiwan's First Indigenous Submarine at Sea Trials

Among the rare good news of this period, Focus Taiwan reported that Taiwan's first indigenously built submarine left the port of Kaohsiung in early June for its fifteenth series of sea trials — including its ninth submerged navigation test. This program represents a sovereign armament effort that depends neither on blocked special budgets nor on American weapons sales potentially frozen by Washington's diplomatic calculations. The submarine advances on its own schedule, outside the legislative minefields the KMT and TPP have sown along the path of Taiwan's rearmament.

This is not an anecdotal detail. An operational submarine capable of diving transforms the strategic equation: it introduces a durable asymmetric threat against any invasion or blockade fleet. China devotes considerable resources to anti-submarine warfare precisely because it knows that capable submarines, dispersed in the depths, make maritime dominance scenarios far more costly. The fact that Taiwan is advancing on this front, despite parliamentary headwinds, testifies to the institutional resilience of the island's armed forces.

Strategic Autonomy as a Response to Legislative Blockade

The indigenous submarine program illustrates a truth the Lai administration has clearly internalized: certain defense programs must be designed to survive parliamentary vicissitudes. Once initial funding is secured and the shipyard is mobilized, it is difficult — politically and practically — to stop a submarine's construction midway. It is the durability of institutional commitment that protects this program where others are vulnerable to the opposition's budget veto.

This lesson is not lost on the Lai administration. The workaround strategy announced on June 16 — special bills, supplementary budgets, increased annual allocations — aims precisely to anchor programs in mechanisms less susceptible to being blocked in a single parliamentary session. Institutional resilience has become a governance doctrine in Taipei, out of necessity as much as calculation.

The Paralyzed General Budget: Beyond Defense

19 Government Agencies Waiting — Public Services Held Hostage

The obstruction is not limited to military credits. According to data published on June 15, 2026 by Taiwan News, some 19 government agencies were still awaiting review of their portion of the 2026 general budget. Taiwan's entire general budget totals NT$2.992 trillion (approximately US$95.6 billion), a substantial portion of which remains frozen. The government risks having to simultaneously review the 2026 and 2027 budgets — a Kafkaesque situation that threatens basic administrative continuity.

Premier Cho Jung-tai warned that the delays could prevent the government from accessing secondary reserve funds and natural disaster relief funds when needed. Taiwan is an island prone to typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis. Stripping it of its budgetary safety net for reasons of partisan tactics goes beyond political irresponsibility — it is institutional negligence that Taiwanese voters will need to weigh at the next elections.

The Opposition Also Blocks Nominations and Democratic Institutions

DPP spokesperson Wu Cheng revealed that the opposition is also blocking confirmations for key government positions: members of the National Communications Commission, the attorney general, the board of the public television service, and Constitutional Court justices. These blockades compound the budget freeze to paint the portrait of an opposition systematically paralyzing state institutions — not just their finances.

KMT legislator Weng Hsiao-ling also proposed cuts of NT$47.3 million to the Culture Ministry's budget, targeting Taiwan's international visibility programs. The DPP responded that such cuts would weaken the island's international presence — a presence China is precisely seeking to erode through its cognitive warfare and disinformation strategy. Blocking Taiwan's international communications funding at the exact moment Beijing is intensifying its information warfare: the timing, again, is difficult to call a coincidence.

The Washington Signal: American Pressure on the Defense Budget

Trump, Weapons, and the "Very Good Bargaining Chip"

Geopolitics further complicates the picture. On June 19, 2026, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te urged China to renounce the use of force and called for rapid approval of a US$14 billion arms contract with the United States. This appeal came after President Donald Trump declared in a television interview that the decision on this weapons package could depend on China, calling it "a very good bargaining chip." The formulation sent shockwaves through Taipei and among American allies in the region.

Lai responded by emphasizing that Taiwan was ready to "assume collective defense responsibilities" alongside the international community. He called on regional nations — notably Japan and the Philippines — to collaborate to maintain peace and stability through collective defense, in order to avoid being "divided and conquered" by China. The rhetoric is strong, but the budgetary resources to sustain it are precisely what the opposition refuses to vote.

Lai Calls on Japan and the Philippines: A Collective Defense in Construction

In his June 19, 2026 statements, Lai expressed hope for cooperation with Japan to protect critical infrastructure and reinforce economic security. He mentioned potential collaborations in areas such as cybersecurity, drones, and quantum computing, emphasizing that "both sides can contribute to building trusted and resilient democratic supply chains." These words echo Lai's concerns about China's gray zone warfare tactics — disinformation and cognitive warfare — which Taiwan and Japan face together.

Lai also warned against the risk of regional nations being "divided and conquered" by Beijing. This framing — democratic solidarity against authoritarian expansionism — is Lai's geopolitical vision, one that justifies his insistence on defense spending. Without adequate budgetary resources, this vision remains wishful thinking. It is billions of Taiwanese dollars blocked in the Legislative Yuan that separate promise from reality.

The Expanded 1260H List: The Pentagon Names Beijing's Military Enablers

Alibaba and Tencent Join the PLA-Affiliated Entity List

In a broader context, the U.S. Department of Defense expanded its so-called "1260H list" — which catalogs entities the Pentagon considers affiliated with the Chinese military — by adding 65 new entities, including tech giants Alibaba and Tencent. This decision, effective from June 30, 2026, will prevent the DoD from contracting with these companies. It is part of a broader strategy of technological and commercial decoupling between the United States and China, which directly intersects with Taiwan's concerns about its defense supply chain.

The ISW underscores in its June 18, 2026 report that this decision is inseparable from the Taiwan context: if Western allies understand the depth of interpenetration between Chinese commercial entities and Beijing's military apparatus, they also understand what it means to leave Taiwan without adequate defense funding against such an adversary. The threat is systemic, not episodic.

The Erased Line Between Commerce and War in China's Arsenal

The inclusion of Alibaba and Tencent on the 1260H list is not a classical economic sanction. The companies concerned are not directly barred from operating on the American market — but the DoD can no longer contract with them after June 30, 2026. The signal is above all symbolic and strategic: Washington officially acknowledges that in the Chinese system, the distinction between civilian tech company and military actor is a fiction.

For Taiwan, this American recognition validates what Taipei has been saying for years: China wages total war, encompassing economic warfare, information warfare, technological warfare, and military warfare as an indissociable continuum. Against such an integrated adversary, a fragmented defense — drones blocked here, missiles there, general budget frozen elsewhere — is not a strategy. It is an invitation to exploitation. Yet that is precisely what the Taiwanese opposition is imposing on the island, vote by vote.

Conclusion: Democracy Under Siege, Parliament Under Influence

Lai Ching-te Alone Against All — but Standing

Lai Ching-te governs an island under permanent threat with a parliament the opposition uses as a trench against its own defenses. The list of his workarounds — a new special drone bill at NT$210 billion, supplementary budgets, increased annual allocations, a drone squadron created for July 2026 — testifies to rare determination in the face of organized obstruction. On June 18, 2026, his Cabinet approved the drone bill. On June 19, his Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim issued a public call for multiparty support. On June 20, nine PLA vessels were patrolling around the island. The cycle is relentless — and Lai refuses to resign himself to it.

A Democracy Sabotaging Itself Before the Autocrat

What is playing out in Taiwan is not merely a domestic budget dispute. It is a test of democratic coherence in the face of an existential threat. Beijing does not need to send its missiles to Taipei to weaken Taiwan — it needs only to watch the KMT and TPP do the work for it, vote by vote, blockade by blockade, since December 2024. History will record that while China was mapping the seabed east of Taiwan with its "environmental research" vessels, while its planes crossed the median line and its carriers patrolled east of the Philippines, Taiwan's opposition refused to fund the drones, missiles, and budgets capable of responding to them. This paradox is the true headline of this period. And Lai Ching-te, alone against all, will continue improvising institutional paths to survival — until history proves him right, or until it is too late for that to matter.

Primary Sources

Institute for the Study of War (ISW) — China and Taiwan Update, June 18, 2026 — June 18, 2026

Mainichi Shimbun — Lai Ching-te urges China to renounce use of force — June 19, 2026

Awaz The Voice — Taiwan detects heightened Chinese military activity around its territory — June 20, 2026

Secondary Sources

TVBS News — Taiwan to form drone squadron, Lai vows budget fight — June 16, 2026

Politico — Washington freezes out Taiwan's opposition leader — June 17, 2026

Radio Taiwan International — Cabinet approves NT$210 billion drone bill — June 18, 2026

Taiwan News — DPP accuses opposition of delaying Taiwan's 2026 budget — June 15, 2026

Taiwan News — Hsiao calls for multiparty support for NT$210 billion drone bill — June 19, 2026