ANALYSIS: The Chinese Coast Guard legalizes boarding: Taiwan in a vise

ANALYSIS: The Chinese Coast Guard legalizes boarding: Taiwan in a vise

Introduction: when Beijing redraws maritime law by force

A "law enforcement operation" that is nothing of the sort

Since June 1, 2026, vessels of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) have been patrolling continuously in the waters east of Taiwan, in what Beijing calls a special maritime law enforcement operation. Between June 6 and 10, a flotilla of five Chinese vessels hailed three foreign merchant ships by radio — registered in Singapore, Liberia, and Benin — requesting their port of destination, point of origin, and crew count. These waters are not Chinese territorial waters under international law. But Beijing claims them as part of its exclusive economic zone, derived from its assertion of sovereignty over Taiwan.

The AEI (American Enterprise Institute) analyzed the significance of these operations in detail in its China and Taiwan update of June 26, 2026: China is seeking to erode Taiwanese sovereignty and establish itself as the sole legitimate manager of Chinese maritime borders, including those surrounding Taiwan. In doing so, it is attempting to normalize an administrative presence in waters where it holds no recognized jurisdiction — and it is doing so gradually, methodically, below the threshold that would trigger a direct military response. This is the grey zone strategy at its most refined.

Context: the Japan-Philippines dispute as pretext

Officially, Chinese patrols east of Taiwan are framed as a response to Japan and the Philippines announcing negotiations to delimit their overlapping exclusive economic zones in the area. Beijing seized this pretext to assert that these bilateral Japan-Philippines negotiations violate its maritime rights — rights it derives from its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun declared that CCG patrols constitute "legitimate actions" to exercise jurisdiction over its "exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the waters east of China's Taiwan Island."

This formulation is politically and legally explosive. By calling Taiwan "China's Taiwan Island," Beijing presupposes what it must demonstrate: that Taiwan is part of China. By deriving maritime rights east of Taiwan from that claim, it is progressively building a fictional legal architecture that would, at the right moment, justify more coercive action. This is not diplomacy — it is narrative construction preceding planned physical action.

The "Kinmen model" exported across Taiwan

From Kinmen to east of Taiwan: the CCG's methodical escalation

To understand what is happening east of Taiwan, one must know the Kinmen model. Since February 2025, the CCG has established a regular presence around the Kinmen islands, Taiwanese territory located just kilometers from the Chinese coast. By 2026, there had already been 21 confirmed incursions near the Kinmen archipelago and 29 grey zone operations along Taiwan's maritime boundaries in total. On June 17, 2026, four CCG vessels entered restricted waters around Kinmen, forcing the Taiwanese Coast Guard to intervene for two hours before the vessels withdrew.

This model — establishing a regular presence, progressively normalizing it, gradually widening the perimeter — is now being exported east of Taiwan, on the island's opposite side. According to the AEI, the account Yuyuan Tantian, linked to state broadcaster CCTV, described the operations in June 2026 as a model of "nearshore governance" intended to become routine. The same account had introduced the term "Kinmen model" in 2024. This recurrence is not accidental — it is deliberate strategic communication, conditioning both Chinese and international public opinion to see these operations as normal and legitimate.

The blockade rehearsal: a full-scale operational drill

On June 25, 2026, the Taiwanese government conducted a tabletop drill simulating a response to a Chinese maritime blockade. This scenario — China requiring all commercial vessels destined for Taiwan to obtain prior authorization from Beijing — was until recently considered an extreme scenario. It is now taken seriously by Taipei, precisely because the recent CCG patrols east of Taiwan represent rehearsals for maritime traffic control.

President Lai Ching-te described Chinese activities during the exercise as "expansionism disguised as law enforcement" that threatens regional security, peace, and stability. The Washington Times reported that sources in Seoul describe the CCG patrols as "rehearsals for a Taiwan blockade." This is not paranoia — it is the sober analysis of defense professionals who track vessel movements and their coordination with PLAN naval exercises.

International reactions: strong in words, limited in deeds

Washington, Paris, Berlin, London: condemnations in chorus

The international reaction to CCG patrols east of Taiwan was notable for its breadth but questioned for its practical effectiveness. The United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany all condemned Chinese actions, with the Wall Street Journal reporting that Washington had officially criticized the operations. Taipei stated that CCG vessels had "harassed" commercial ships and violated international law. Taiwan's National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu called China's actions a "major escalation of regional tensions" on X.

But these statements did not stop the patrols from continuing. The CCG maintained its continuous presence east of Taiwan throughout June 2026, according to vessel-tracking data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence. UNCLOS prohibits one state from exercising coast guard functions in another state's EEZ — but enforcement remains difficult without a coercive mechanism. China, having refused to comply with the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on its South China Sea claims, has already demonstrated that it does not recognize the authority of these international bodies.

Taiwan facing this alone: the limits of Western support

Faced with these escalating provocations, Taiwan deployed its own coast guard vessels, instructing foreign commercial ships to ignore CCG communications and report them to Taiwanese authorities. The Taiwanese Coast Guard also developed a clear counter-narrative: "These are the waters of the Republic of China's exclusive economic zone. China has no jurisdictional rights here. Maintain normal navigation and ignore communications from Chinese official vessels." This is precise, legally grounded, and operationally coherent.

But the disparity in forces remains striking. The Chinese CCG deploys vessels of several thousand tonnes, some armed. The smaller Taiwanese Coast Guard must simultaneously manage incursions near Kinmen, Matsu, the Pratas Islands, and now east of the main island. The CSIS has documented that CCG patrols are coordinated with PLAN exercises, in a division of roles where the CCG covers the Taiwan Strait while the navy handles approaches east of the island — a configuration directly modeled on blockade scenarios.

The Chinese Coast Guard law: the legal architecture of legalized boarding

A 2021 law that formalizes coercion

The 2021 Chinese Coast Guard Law is the legal foundation for current actions. It authorizes the CCG to conduct "law enforcement operations in maritime zones under Chinese jurisdiction" — without precisely defining those zones — and to use force against foreign vessels that "violate Chinese law." In 2024, China adopted supplementary regulations authorizing the CCG to board and detain foreign vessels that have "illegally entered Chinese waters" and to interrogate and hold foreign nationals for up to 60 days.

The combination of these texts creates a legal arsenal that theoretically allows the CCG to board any vessel transiting waters that Beijing claims — which includes, based on its sovereignty claim over Taiwan, waters east of the Taiwanese main island. The AEI notes that the extension east of Taiwan could allow the PLAN to devote more resources to missions beyond the first island chain, while the CCG manages immediate approaches. This is a coherent and sophisticated military-legal architecture.

The "nearshore waters" strategy: preparing administrative annexation before physical annexation

The assertion by the Yuyuan Tantian account that the zone east of Taiwan constitutes "Chinese nearshore waters" (近岸) is a semantic innovation worth noting. In Chinese administrative vocabulary, "nearshore waters" are zones over which the state exercises daily sovereignty — patrols, regulations, navigation authorization. This term is not used for merely claimed zones: it applies to zones that are effectively controlled. By using it for waters east of Taiwan, China signals its intention to establish a regular administrative presence there — a first step toward what analysts call grey annexation: the gradual integration of a territory without a formal act of war.

The comparison with Russia's strategy in Crimea is unavoidable: Moscow first established a de facto presence, created facts on the ground, then formalized annexation through a coerced referendum. Beijing watches and learns. The strategy east of Taiwan in 2026 dangerously resembles the early stages of a similar scenario — adapted to the maritime context and current global balances of power.

Taiwan's blockade-response exercises

Taipei taking the blockade scenario seriously

Taiwan's tabletop exercise on June 25, 2026 was not symbolic. It tested real procedures for coordinating responses across the government, armed forces, coast guard, and ministries of foreign affairs and defense in the face of a progressive blockade. The simulated scenario included concrete steps: Beijing first requires vessels to declare themselves, then inspects certain vessels, then seizes suspect cargo, then completely blocks all traffic without prior authorization. Each step progressively escalates pressure without clearly crossing the threshold of an act of war.

Taiwan also reinforced its own economic resilience capabilities: strategic stockpiling of raw materials, development of alternative supply routes, five-day combat readiness exercises conducted in June 2026. The awareness that time is pressing is palpable in Taipei. Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim stated that the "response time to a Chinese attack is shrinking" and that preparations must accelerate. These preparations reflect a serious threat assessment, not alarmism.

Taiwan's military exercises: a signal to Beijing and Washington

Taiwan's five-day combat readiness exercises in June 2026 also had a political dimension: showing both Beijing that Taipei is prepared to resist, and Washington that Taiwan is pulling its weight. This "self-reliance" matters for maintaining American support in a context where the Trump administration has clearly signaled that it expects its allies to invest more in their own defense. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan continued in 2026, but with the implicit condition of greater defensive autonomy.

The warnings from the UK, France, and Germany about Chinese carrier movements around Taiwan in June 2026 are an encouraging sign of growing European awareness of the threat. But Europe remains at a considerable distance from a meaningful naval power-projection capability in the Pacific. The defense of Taiwan, if it were to become necessary, would rest primarily on the United States, Japan, and Taiwan itself. And all three know it.

The impact on global freedom of navigation

A precedent threatening all maritime trade

The waters east of Taiwan form a crucial maritime shipping lane. Thousands of vessels transit the Western Pacific zone every year, carrying goods between Northeast Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) and the rest of the world. If China succeeded in establishing effective jurisdictional authority over these waters, it could require authorization for any vessel transiting to or from Taiwan, creating a colossal economic lever over global trade without firing a single shot.

The concerns of trading nations are legitimate. Xinhua reported that during the special operation of June 2026, the CCG "inspected 198 vessels." The three officially acknowledged hailings by Taipei of vessels registered in Singapore, Liberia, and Benin may be only the visible portion of a much larger pattern. If this practice becomes normalized and expands, the entire freedom-of-navigation regime — one of the pillars of commercial globalization — is at risk.

International law facing coercion: a survival test

The crisis east of Taiwan poses a fundamental question about the capacity of international law to resist coercion by a major power. UNCLOS, of which China is a signatory, is clear about EEZ rights. The 2016 PCA ruling on Chinese South China Sea claims is unambiguous. But legal texts without enforcement mechanisms remain wishful thinking when faced with a maritime power willing to violate them systematically.

The practical question for the West is therefore this: is it prepared to maintain a regular naval presence in the waters east of Taiwan to physically contest Chinese claims? Naval transits by American, French, and British military vessels in the zone would send a clear signal. Their absence sends the opposite signal. The West must choose — between defending its principles or watching them dissolve under the pressure of Chinese coercion.

Military exercises and Taiwan's war readiness

Five days of "combat readiness": a message to Beijing

Taiwan conducted five-day combat readiness exercises in June 2026 — the most intensive in several years. These exercises involved coordination between regular armed forces, the national guard, civil defense forces, and local authorities in a simulated response to large-scale aggression. The message to Beijing was clear: Taiwan is not a passive target. It has invested in its capacity to resist, adapt, and maintain organized resistance even under maximum pressure.

These exercises are part of a broader strategy of national resilience-building. Taipei has developed strategic stockpiles of essential raw materials — oil, steel, semiconductors — to withstand a prolonged economic blockade. Alternative supply routes via airspace and secondary maritime lanes have been mapped and tested. The awareness that the preparation window is limited is evident in every strategic decision of the Lai Ching-te government.

Deepened cooperation with the United States and allies

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan continued in 2026 despite Chinese diplomatic pressure. Delivered systems include anti-ship Harpoon missiles, mobile coastal defense systems, and electronic warfare equipment adapted to CCG capabilities. These deliveries send an important deterrent signal: the strategic interdependence between Washington and Taipei is real, even if American strategic ambiguity about direct intervention remains officially maintained.

Japan is also playing a growing role in Taiwanese security — without expressing this officially. The modernization of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, joint exercises with the United States, and the revision of Japan's national security doctrine in 2022-2023 have created an Indo-Pacific deterrence architecture of which Taiwan is a central element. For Beijing, any military action against Taipei would necessarily require an assessment of potential reactions from Tokyo and Washington.

China's long-term strategy: absorbing Taiwan without open war

Xi Jinping's goal: reunification before 2035

To understand the CCG patrols east of Taiwan, they must be placed within the framework of Xi Jinping's declared objective: reunification before the symbolic deadline of 2049, the centenary of the People's Republic's founding, with pressure to accelerate before 2035. This date is not arbitrary — it corresponds to the moment when demographers estimate the population imbalance between mainland China and Taiwan will reach its peak, and when some analysts see the most strategically favorable window for decisive action by Beijing.

Xi has clearly expressed his preference for "peaceful reunification" — meaning a Taiwan that would voluntarily integrate into China under the "one country, two systems" model, already largely hollowed out in Hong Kong. But he has also declared that China would never renounce the use of force if necessary. The CCG patrols are preparing the third option: grey annexation, progressive, making Taiwanese armed resistance progressively more costly without triggering a large-scale conflict.

Semiconductors: the global economic stakes of the Taiwan crisis

Beyond geopolitics, the Taiwan crisis has a global economic dimension that every rational actor should consider. Taiwan produces more than 90% of the world's advanced semiconductors through TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company). An interruption of that production — whether from military action, a blockade, or economic destabilization — would trigger an unprecedented global technology supply crisis. Phones, cars, weapons systems, computer servers — all depend on components made in Taiwan.

This economic reality is both Taiwan's best protection and its greatest vulnerability. It dissuades major powers from allowing the situation to escalate into open conflict — but it can also lead to unacceptable compromises to preserve supply chains. TSMC's decision to build plants in Arizona and Japan is an implicit acknowledgment of this concentrated vulnerability. But that diversification will take years to produce results, leaving Taiwan indispensable and exposed during the most critical period.

Conclusion: Taiwan is the credibility test of the international order

The hour of difficult choices is approaching

The events of June 2026 in the waters east of Taiwan are not a passing crisis — they are the beginning of a new phase in China's strategy of progressively absorbing Taiwan. The CCG has established a continuous presence. It claims jurisdiction. It hails foreign commercial vessels. It is rehearsing its blockade procedures. The intensity of these provocations will increase in the months and years ahead as Beijing tests the limits of international tolerance and Taiwanese resolve.

The columnist maintains full editorial responsibility for the analysis and judgments expressed in this article. Any errors of fact, should they be identified by readers, will be corrected in subsequent publications.

What the West must do now

The response cannot be limited to statements. The West must maintain regular naval transits in contested waters, accelerate deliveries of defensive weaponry to Taiwan, develop joint military exercises with Taipei, and clarify its position on the conditions under which it would intervene militarily in the event of Chinese action. Strategic ambiguity, which had its logic during the Cold War, has become counterproductive in the era of Chinese grey zone strategies. Deterrence demands clarity — and clarity demands political courage.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Transparency on doctrine

I am a partisan of Taiwan as a sovereign democracy and consider Chinese sovereignty claims over the island to be devoid of foundation in contemporary international law. I consider Communist China to be the primary threat to the liberal world order. These positions are deliberate. I acknowledge that other viewpoints exist — but they do not alter the fundamental legal facts I have cited.

These convictions inform the framing of this article but do not alter the factual record. Every claim of fact is sourced. Every editorial judgment is clearly marked as such in the mini editorial passages throughout the text.

Method and sources

This article draws primarily on analyses by the AEI, the CSIS, the Washington Times, official statements from the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and vessel-tracking data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence via the ISW. I have no access to classified intelligence regarding Chinese intentions.

All factual claims in this article are derived from open, publicly accessible sources. No classified information was consulted or referenced. The interpretation of facts reflects the columnist's analytical perspective and is clearly distinguished from the facts themselves throughout the text.

Sources

Primary sources

AEI — China & Taiwan Update, June 26, 2026 — June 26, 2026

The Washington Times — China patrols seen as rehearsals for Taiwan blockade — June 25, 2026

Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs — MOFA strongly condemns China for actions east of Taiwan — June 9, 2026

US News — Taiwan Simulates Countering a Chinese Maritime Blockade — June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

ISW — China & Taiwan Update, June 12, 2026 — June 12, 2026

Wall Street Journal — China's Assertions of Authority Over Foreign Ships Near Taiwan — June 24, 2026

Domino Theory — China Concludes Special Maritime Law Enforcement Operation Near Taiwan — June 10, 2026

CSIS — Responding to a More Coercive Chinese Coast Guard — July 2024