ANALYSIS : Hegseth calls allies "shameful" for refusing bases during the Iran strikes — the shockwave across Europe

Introduction: A word like a bomb in the allies' chamber

June 18, 2026, Brussels, NATO headquarters: a slap in twelve minutes

This was no ordinary diplomatic meeting. When Pete Hegseth, the U.S. Secretary of Defense — who personally prefers the title Secretary of War — took the floor before the thirty-one other NATO defense ministers at alliance headquarters in Brussels, he made no effort to spare feelings. In twelve minutes flat, he set the room on fire. His remarks created, according to the New York Times, a palpably tense atmosphere in a meeting ostensibly meant to lay cooperative groundwork for the leaders' summit scheduled in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026.

The word he chose — "shameful" — still echoes through the corridors of European chancelleries. Hegseth literally accused NATO allies of endangering America's sons and daughters by denying access to the bases and airspace the United States needed to strike Iran. It was a level of public accusation between allies not seen in decades.

The immediate context: the war against Iran and its transatlantic fractures

The facts: on February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel jointly launched military strikes against Iran — Operation Epic Fury — without prior consultation with their NATO allies. That unilateral decision immediately created fault lines. Spain closed its airspace to American aircraft participating in operations against Iran as early as March 2, confirming its position officially on March 30. France, Italy, and other allies either restricted or conditioned access to their bases and airspace. These countries invoked national sovereignty, international law, and the plain fact that they had simply never been consulted before hostilities began.

Hegseth sees it differently. And he said so publicly, without equivocation, in front of the very allies in question. This sequence — the allied refusals, then Washington's public fury — constitutes a political shockwave whose aftershocks Europe has yet to fully measure.

What Hegseth actually said: the words that burn

Verbatim: "shameful," "paper tiger," "one-way street"

Hegseth's remarks in Brussels deserve to be quoted as close to primary sources as possible, because the precision matters. According to Defense News and the New York Times, here is what he told the thirty-one other assembled defense ministers: "Too many of our partners have refused, or have tried to tie us up in convoluted legal discussions, or have publicly condemned us for actions they are not willing or able to take themselves." Then, directly: "That was shameful." And finally, the most explosive line: "Those allies endangered our sons and daughters by denying them predictable access to bases and overflight rights that should never have been questioned."

Hegseth did not stop there. He called NATO a "paper tiger" and a "one-way street" since the Cold War ended. He lambasted allies for their focus on gender equity and climate change and condemned their immigration policies. He also announced a six-month review — which he calls the "NATO 3.0 review" — of U.S. military posture and deployment in Europe, with an explicit warning: some countries will succeed, others will "fail."

Washington's logic: "it's a one-way street and we've had enough"

To understand Hegseth's rage, you have to grasp the Trump administration's worldview. In this vision, the United States has maintained a military presence in Europe for decades, guaranteeing allied security — and those same allies, at the critical moment when Washington strikes a country whose missiles, Hegseth says, "threaten European allies more than American territory" — refuse to facilitate American operations. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had already framed the question in blunt terms back in March: "If NATO means us defending Europe when they're attacked, but them denying us basic access rights when we need it, that's a pretty bad deal."

This reasoning has a certain internal coherence — which is precisely what makes it dangerous for Europeans: it is hard to contest on pure reciprocity grounds without admitting a real asymmetry. But it conveniently omits that the United States launched a war without prior consultation and then expects its allies to bear the operational cost.

Spain at the center of the storm: Morón, Rota, and the Sánchez decision

A sovereignty decision with concrete operational consequences

Spain is the most emblematic, best-documented, and most symbolically significant case of allied refusal. According to Army Recognition, from March 2, 2026 onward Spain began restricting American access to its bases, officially confirming on March 30 the complete closure of its airspace to U.S. aircraft engaged in operations against Iran. Defense Minister Margarita Robles was explicit: "We are not authorizing the use of military bases nor the use of airspace for actions related to the war in Iran." Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez rejected 100% of flight plans tied to the operation.

The operational consequences were immediate and severe. Morón Air Base (56 km southeast of Seville, with a 3,597-meter runway) and Naval Station Rota (near Cádiz, with direct access to the Strait of Gibraltar) are critical logistics nodes for U.S. operations toward the Middle East. Their closure forced the rerouting of American bombers through the United Kingdom and Portugal, lengthening missions by 25 to 35%, increasing fuel consumption by 20 to 30% per sortie, and requiring 30 to 50% additional tanker aircraft to maintain operational coverage.

France, Italy: a collective refusal revealing a deep fracture

Spain was not alone. According to Arab News and Eurasia Review, France blocked aircraft carrying military supplies to Israel through its territory. Italy denied American bombers landing rights at Sigonella air base in Sicily, citing the absence of a prior authorization request compliant with bilateral agreements. The Italian presidency recalled that Italy "acts in full compliance with existing international agreements and with the political guidelines expressed by the government before Parliament." Trump called France "very uncooperative" on Truth Social, to which the French presidency responded that it was "surprised" by the post.

These collective refusals — Spain, France, Italy, and to a lesser extent others — exposed a structural reality Washington may not have fully anticipated: American bases in Europe are not unconditional American property. They exist under bilateral agreements that precisely define permitted uses. Employing those bases for a war that host nations consider illegal under international law means stepping outside the frame of those agreements.

The six-month review: leverage or genuine threat?

The official contours of the "NATO 3.0" review

Hegseth announced on June 18, 2026 a six-month review — which he himself christened the "NATO 3.0 review" — of American military posture and bases in Europe. The review, he specified, will be conducted with input from U.S. European Command (EUCOM), with consultations from the U.S. Congress — which has codified by law a minimum level of American forces in Europe — and with the allies themselves. It will last "up to six months, maybe less."

The stated objectives, according to Defense News and Breaking Defense, are to ensure NATO is moving "quickly and irreversibly" toward Europe taking primary responsibility for its own defense, to ensure U.S. forces are positioned to meet Washington's global needs, and to ensure that American basing and overflight rights are clearly defined and guaranteed. This last condition is directly linked to the Spanish, French, and Italian refusals: Hegseth wants contractual guarantees that what happened during the Iran war will not happen again.

Already-tangible consequences: immediate reductions in NATO assets

The review is not only a threat for the future — cuts have already been enacted. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte confirmed on June 18 that the reduction in U.S. contributions to alliance crisis forces was "immediate." According to military sources cited by Reuters and relayed by Defense News, the number of American F-15 and F-15E fighters available to NATO will drop by one third, down to 99 aircraft. The number of MQ-4 and MQ-9 Reaper drones will be halved, to 12 units. Tanker aircraft, warships, and other deep-strike capabilities are also affected.

Rutte attempted to downplay the cuts, noting that in the event of actual war, "all allies, including the United States, would maximize what they can do." But the message landed: American guarantees for peacetime or crisis scenarios are now conditional. Europe must fill gaps it is not yet able to fill quickly, as German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius acknowledged, citing deep-strike missiles as a capability "difficult to replace."

The European response: real effort and contained outrage

The numbers that inconvenience Hegseth: $90 billion in additional spending in one year

Europeans have not been sitting still under American pressure, and the numbers speak for themselves. Rutte said so himself in Brussels: European allies and Canada collectively increased defense spending by $90 billion in 2025, a 20% rise from 2024. Countries like Belgium, represented by Defense Minister Theo Francken, committed to contributing more to NATO crisis forces, specifically with F-16 fighters and MQ-9B SkyGuardian drones. Germany, under Pistorius, is deploying a brigade of over 2,900 troops to Lithuania under the Freedom Shield exercises, with a commitment to a full brigade of 5,000 soldiers by end of 2027.

These efforts are real, measurable, and recognized even by critics of Hegseth's posture. The problem is that Washington does not seem to factor them sufficiently into its public rhetoric. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz responded with characteristic restraint: "We know we need to do more and we are doing it." That measured tone contrasts sharply with American fury and perfectly illustrates the current dynamic: Europeans comply in silence while Washington shouts.

Think-tank outrage and the fracture of trust

The European response is not limited to budget figures. Behind the scenes in Brussels, the anger is palpable. A think-tank expert quoted by PBS NewsHour — Rachel Ellehuus, Director General of the Royal United Services Institute — was direct: "It's a protection racket that undermines solidarity, the U.S. commitment to NATO, and, ultimately, U.S. security interests themselves." She also warned that tying force posture to reward or punishment "communicates to adversaries that U.S. security commitments come with a price tag" — a dangerous signal to send to Moscow and Beijing.

That fracture of trust may be the most lasting damage in this entire sequence. Europeans can replace military capabilities, increase budgets, send troops east. What they cannot quickly rebuild is the certainty that their American ally will respect the rules of the collective game — prior consultation, transparency, consistency. These are the mortar of the alliance. And the mortar is cracking.

NATO 3.0 according to Hegseth: an alliance recentered on hard power

The vision of an alliance without shared values — only capabilities

Hegseth articulated his vision of a "NATO 3.0" several times during the Brussels meeting and in his press statements. This version of the alliance would be, in his words, "a post-Cold War acknowledgment that NATO needs to return to a true hard-line military alliance, with real military capabilities capable of deterring threats to the continent and leading Europe's conventional defense." This explicitly hard-power-centered vision rejects what he calls the distractions of deindustrialization, demilitarization, and free-riding.

What this vision deliberately omits is that NATO's cohesion since 1949 has rested not only on shared military capabilities, but on shared values — democracy, rule of law, peaceful resolution of conflicts, mutual consultation. An alliance reduced to its coercive dimension, where powerful members threaten weaker ones, is no longer an alliance of democracies: it is an imperial structure dressed up as a partnership.

The Ankara summit: an existential test for the alliance

All eyes now turn to the NATO summit in Ankara, scheduled for July 7–8, 2026 — less than a month after Hegseth spoke in Brussels. Allies are bracing for how President Trump — who called his NATO counterparts "a nice group of people" after the previous summit before adopting the current posture — will behave at this gathering. Rutte is trying to manage expectations, but his very caution reveals the depth of anxiety.

The central question at Ankara will be whether Europeans, who have massively increased spending and begun a historic remilitarization, will receive acknowledgment from Washington — or whether Trump and Hegseth will arrive with a new list of demands, a new threshold to clear, a new definition of the "good" and "bad" allies. It is against this backdrop that Hegseth's declaration about Iran bases takes its full significance: it has redefined what Washington means by allied loyalty.

Germany, reluctant pivot: Pistorius caught between two fires

Berlin's dilemma: between Atlantic loyalty and strategic independence

Germany occupies a singularly uncomfortable position in this crisis. On one side, it hosts Ramstein Air Base, the largest American base in Europe, and Berlin had made clear early on that it would not restrict American access even as other allies did so. On the other, Germany is acutely aware that its own remilitarization — formalized in the historic Zeitenwende announced by former Chancellor Olaf Scholz in February 2022 and accelerated under Friedrich Merz — requires a certain degree of strategic autonomy that implies the capacity to say no when national interest demands it.

Pistorius has walked this tightrope with notable pragmatism. He has simultaneously defended the logic of allied access rights and demanded that Washington proceed with its base review in a "synchronized" manner to avoid creating dangerous gaps. He did not condemn the Spanish or French refusals publicly — but he did not endorse them either. His position: Europe must build its own capacity while managing the transition with the Americans, not rupturing with them. It's a reasonable position. Whether it's still tenable after Ankara is another question.

Spain's case: the question of base legality and sovereignty

The Spanish case deserves separate treatment because it is the most clearly articulated and most symbolically significant. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez made the denial of base access a matter of principle, not tactical posture. Minister Robles said without ambiguity that the bases at Morón and Rota — though jointly used — remain under Spanish sovereignty, and that sovereignty does not obligate Spain to participate in what the government considers an illegal war under international law.

Sánchez tied this position to Spanish history, invoking Spain's opposition to the Iraq War in 2003. Economist Carlos Cuerpo called the decision "consistent" with the policy of non-participation in a war "initiated unilaterally and against international law." Washington responded with threats — potential trade sanctions, even the possibility of expulsion from NATO — but according to an article on the ABHS site updated as of June 15, 2026, neither the trade embargo nor the withdrawal of troops from Rota and Morón had been implemented. Worse for American credibility: the United States had just signed a $400 million contract to remain at Morón.

NATO's conclusion on expulsion: impossible under the treaty

One essential fact: when rumors of an internal Pentagon email suggesting a possible suspension of Spain from NATO circulated, the alliance responded clearly. According to El-Balad citing an official NATO spokesperson, the alliance's founding treaty "contains no provision for the suspension or expulsion of a member state." That clarification directly torpedoed the American threat. Sánchez responded with characteristic composure: "We don't work from emails. We work with official documents."

This small episode reveals something important about the current American posture: the threat often precedes any legal analysis of its feasibility. Washington shouts, allies check the texts, and discover the threat is hollow. That's not merely embarrassing — it's corrosive for long-term credibility.

NATO asset reductions: what Europe cannot quickly replace

One-third fewer fighters, half as many drones: the concrete numbers

Washington's announced cuts to U.S. contributions to NATO crisis forces are concrete and documented. According to military sources cited by Reuters and relayed by Defense News, the figures are stark: the number of F-15 and F-15E fighters available to NATO will fall from 148 to 99, a reduction of one third. MQ-4 and MQ-9 Reaper reconnaissance drones will be halved, dropping from 24 to 12 units. Tanker aircraft, warships, and other key capabilities are also affected.

Rutte confirmed these cuts are already in force — "It's immediate," he said. He nevertheless attempted to reassure, noting these assets are "planning tools" and that, in a real crisis, all allies including the United States would maximize their engagement. But military planners do not work from verbal promises of full mobilization in a crisis — they work with pre-positioned forces, already-deployed equipment, operational plans based on certified, available assets.

The capability gaps Europeans acknowledge themselves

Pistorius has been honest on this point — which contrasts with the defensive rhetoric from some of his counterparts: there are capabilities Europe simply cannot replace quickly. Deep-strike missiles top the list — a capability the Americans provide and Europeans do not yet possess in sufficient numbers. Tanker aircraft represent another critical gap, as demonstrated precisely by the operational difficulty created by the closure of Spanish bases.

Pistorius called for a "synchronized process" to avoid "dangerous capability gaps in Europe," inviting Washington to negotiate withdrawal timelines rather than making abrupt cuts. "We will need either transitional solutions or time," he said. That statement is simultaneously an admission of dependence and an appeal for responsibility: if you're leaving, leave in an orderly fashion — don't slam the door.

Transatlantic diplomacy under strain: Hegseth's early departure

A telling sign: Hegseth leaves the meeting before it ends

A significant detail, reported by PBS NewsHour, perfectly illustrates Washington's state of mind: Pete Hegseth left the NATO defense ministers' meeting before the session concluded. That gesture, seemingly trivial, carries enormous weight in diplomatic culture. A minister who leaves before the end of a crucial meeting sends a message to allies: this session is not worth my full attention. It is codified diplomatic contempt, and everyone around the table understood it.

It was not the first time Hegseth left a lasting impression — not a positive one — at allied meetings. According to PBS, his first major address to allies in February 2025 had already "left a lasting impression." He rarely attends NATO meetings, and when he does, it is generally to deliver ultimatums rather than conduct negotiations. This posture aggravates the underlying problem: Europeans don't know whom to talk to, or whether what they're told one day will still be true the next.

Unpredictability as policy: the tool and the poison

The Trump administration uses unpredictability as a deliberate pressure tool — compelling allies to take American demands seriously by maintaining permanent uncertainty. This strategy has an internal logic: if partners never know what Washington will do, they are incentivized to comply as a precaution. But it carries an enormous cost: it destroys the predictable trust on which any durable alliance depends.

Secretary General Rutte publicly admitted he did not know exactly what the outcome of Hegseth's review might be: "There is no clarity on the exact outcome because that will depend on the review. We'll see what happens." Diplomatic translation: we are operating in a fog, and managing as best we can. That is an uncomfortable position for the man charged with maintaining cohesion in a 32-member alliance facing the Russian threat.

The think-tank view: between protection rackets and forced strategic autonomy

Experts who no longer hesitate to call things what they are

The Hegseth sequence has loosened the tongues of analysts and experts who, until now, had carefully measured their words about the true nature of American pressure. Rachel Ellehuus of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) used unusually direct language, as quoted by PBS: "protection racket." That formulation — suggesting a mafia-like relationship in which protection is sold in exchange for compliance — traveled through European capitals. It crystallizes what many had been thinking privately but were not saying publicly.

Ellehuus also warned that tying American force posture to reward or punishment "communicates to adversaries that U.S. security commitments come with a price tag." That observation carries major strategic weight: if Moscow or Beijing calculate that Washington can be persuaded to abandon an ally based on political compliance, the deterrent calculus of the entire system changes fundamentally.

European strategic autonomy: from aspiration to urgent necessity

What the Brussels crisis has clearly accelerated is the transformation of European strategic autonomy from a philosophical aspiration into an urgent operational necessity. Two-thirds of EU member states also belong to NATO, and according to PBS, "the unpredictability of the Trump administration has only motivated them to move forward on their own." Decisions like accelerated ammunition production, investment in air defense systems, creation of European command structures — all of these were germinating before Trump, but they are notably accelerating under the pressure of American uncertainty.

Merz framed it with almost stoic clarity: "We have known for years that the United States will progressively redirect some of its resources toward the Indo-Pacific. The main question now is to synchronize this process so as not to leave dangerous gaps in European defense capabilities." It is a serene acceptance of the new reality — and a roadmap for what Europe must build.

Trump: necessary evil or systemic threat — an impossible question

What Trump gets right on defense burden-sharing

It would be intellectually dishonest not to acknowledge that on the substance of the defense burden question, Trump is not entirely wrong. NATO long operated with a glaring asymmetry: the United States funded and underwrote a disproportionate share of collective defense while many European allies did the bare minimum. The 2% of GDP defense spending target, set in 2006 and reaffirmed countless times, was only being met by a minority of members as recently as three years ago. Trump's pressure — brutal methods aside — has produced results: the additional $90 billion in 2025 is proof.

On the question of bases and wartime access, American frustration is also understandable. Washington maintains a network of bases in Europe paid for by the American taxpayer, and host nations can, in certain circumstances, deny their use for operations those nations disapprove of. There is a genuine tension between national sovereignty and alliance logic that current basing agreements do not cleanly resolve. Hegseth is right to call out that ambiguity.

What makes Trump's method systemically dangerous

But acknowledging that Trump identifies real problems is not the same as endorsing his methods. The public humiliation of allies, threats that go unfulfilled, unpredictability elevated to doctrine, the deliberate conflation of serious allies with free-riders — all of this produces corrosive effects that go beyond individual files. The gravest is the progressive decoupling of trust: Europeans can no longer plan long-term with an American partner whose positions shift according to the moods of Mar-a-Lago.

European intelligence services, quoted by PBS, warn that Putin could attack elsewhere in Europe before the end of the decade if he perceives a victory in Ukraine or a weakness among the allies. In that context, the spectacle of Hegseth in Brussels — lashing allies who are arming, spending, and supporting Ukraine — is not merely counterproductive. It is a strategic weakness that only Moscow celebrates.

Conclusion: an alliance in transition, a Europe with no alternative

What Brussels changed and what remains to be built

The Brussels meeting of June 18, 2026 will go down in NATO history as a turning point. Not because Hegseth said things that were entirely wrong — some American frustrations are legitimate. But because the form and tone of his intervention revealed something irreversible in the transatlantic dynamic: Washington no longer sees itself as an equal partner in an alliance of democracies, but as a security provider whose terms of engagement are unilaterally defined. That shift is not trivial. It calls into question the security architecture built since 1949.

Europe has no alternative. It must build its own conventional defense capacity, close its capability gaps, harmonize its doctrines for the use of force, and negotiate with Washington basing and access agreements that are clear and binding — for both sides. That work is underway, too slowly in some eyes, too rapidly in others. Hegseth's six-month review, the Ankara summit, and the continuing war in Ukraine in the background: all are appointments that will reveal whether the West holds together or comes apart.

The final word: "shameful" or "revealing"?

Hegseth said the allies' behavior on the Iran bases was "shameful." Others will say it is Washington's behavior — launching a war without consulting its allies, then accusing them of not following — that is more so. The truth, as usual, is more complex than either side cares to admit. What is certain is that the shockwave from this sequence will travel through European defense policy for years to come. And that Europe, for its own survival, has no option but to take its security future into its own hands — with the United States when possible, without them if necessary.

Ukraine holds. Europe rearms. Democracy endures. And if Trump and Hegseth believe they are the sole masters of the game, they forget that their allies also have decisions to make — and that some of those decisions are already made, in the budgets, the brigades, and the bases of the new European defense that is being built before their eyes, with or without their approval.

Primary sources

Al Jazeera — Pentagon chief announces review of U.S. forces in Europe, slams NATO allies — June 18, 2026

Defense News — Hegseth announces review of U.S. troops in Europe, scorns some allies — June 18, 2026

United24 Media — As Washington looks to the Pacific, NATO races to prevent gaps in Europe's defense — June 18, 2026

Secondary sources

Breaking Defense — Hegseth announces six-month review of U.S. force posture in Europe — June 18, 2026

NBC News — Hegseth blasts NATO allies and announces review of U.S. forces in Europe — June 18, 2026

PBS NewsHour — Hegseth appears out of step in criticisms of NATO allies — June 19, 2026

The New York Times — Hegseth scolds NATO allies for "shameful" response to America's war in Iran — June 18, 2026

Army Recognition — U.S. bombers face longer missions against Iran as Spain blocks airspace and key military bases — May 30, 2026