To NATO, the Missile Contract Proving the West Is Truly Rearming

Introduction: A $241 Million Contract That Speaks Louder Than Speeches

What Washington Just Signed With Oslo

On June 5, 2026, the US Air Force awarded Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace, the Norwegian company, a fixed-price contract worth $240,904,098 for production of Lot 2 of the Joint Strike Missile (JSM), according to the official announcement from the US Department of War. The contract, numbered FA8681-26-C-B002, was issued by the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center based at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida.

This is not a routine purchase order buried in Pentagon paperwork. It is a clear signal to everyone who still doubts the West's willingness to seriously rearm against the threats piling up, from Moscow to Beijing.

Why I'm Writing This Open Letter

I am addressing this directly to NATO leaders and to Western citizens who follow, often with weariness, the endless news of a perpetually promised rearmament that too rarely gets delivered. This contract deserves attention precisely because it shows something different: a concrete production chain, precise delivery dates, a real budget commitment.

I am also writing because the transatlantic cooperation between the United States and Norway, a front-line NATO ally against Russia in the Arctic, deserves to be told for what it is: an example of what the Western alliance can still achieve when it works well.

I believe this contract, technical as it may look, tells a bigger story than its dollar figure: that of a West which, despite its internal divisions, keeps building the tools of its own defense.

The Joint Strike Missile, a Weapon Built for Modern War

A Stealth Missile Designed for the F-35A

The JSM is a fifth-generation stealth cruise missile designed to be carried inside the internal weapons bay of the F-35A, preserving the aircraft's reduced radar signature, according to technical details reported by InsideDefense.com. That feature fundamentally changes the equation against increasingly sophisticated air defenses.

Built primarily to strike maritime and land targets from a safe distance, the JSM lets Western pilots engage heavily defended targets without needlessly exposing their aircraft, a crucial strategic capability given growing Russian and Chinese threats.

An Adoption Reach That Goes Well Beyond the United States

The missile has already been selected by Japan, Norway, Australia, Germany and the United States, according to Kongsberg itself, making it a truly multinational weapon at the heart of the modern Western arsenal.

This broad adoption among allied democracies strengthens interoperability between Western forces, a factor often underestimated but absolutely decisive during joint operations in a real crisis.

Seeing so many allied democracies choose the same weapon reassures me about the West's strategic coherence, even when internal political tensions sometimes suggest otherwise.

The Financial Details of a Contract Spanning Two Fiscal Years

Funding Split Across Two Budget Years

The contract draws on $137,970,866 in fiscal year 2024 funds earmarked for missile purchases, plus $102,933,232 from fiscal year 2025, according to the official Department of War release dated June 5, 2026.

This budget split across two distinct fiscal years illustrates the normal complexity of major Western weapons programs, where multi-year planning remains essential to guarantee continuity of defense-industrial production.

A Sole-Source Award, Justified by Expertise

The award was made on a sole-source basis, without a competitive process, since Kongsberg is the only designer, developer and manufacturer of the JSM, under the rules of FAR Part 6 cited by GovConFeed. This type of award remains perfectly legal when no other company can meet the stated need.

Far from being an anomaly, this practice simply reflects the industrial reality of Western defense, where certain cutting-edge technologies are mastered by only a small handful of highly specialized companies.

I have no problem with a sole-source award when it rests on real, verifiable technological expertise rather than disguised political favoritism.

A Delivery Timeline Running Through 2028

Production Concentrated on Norwegian Soil

Work will be carried out in Kongsberg, Norway, and is expected to be completed by November 30, 2028, according to the Pentagon's statement. This location confirms the central role of the Norwegian defense industry within the NATO military ecosystem.

The choice to keep production in Norway, rather than importing it entirely onto US soil, also reflects a form of mutual industrial trust between allies, essential to maintaining a diversified and resilient Western defense-industrial base.

A Contract That Builds on the Continuity of Lot 1

This new deal comes more than two years after Kongsberg was awarded the first Lot 1 production contract, in May 2024, worth roughly $141 million, according to InsideDefense.com, confirming the long-term continuity and credibility of this transatlantic industrial partnership.

This contractual continuity, rare in major weapons programs often marked by delays or cancellations, deserves to be recognized as an example of relatively effective military project management.

A weapons program that stays on schedule across several consecutive years is, in the world of defense, close to a feat, and that deserves to be acknowledged publicly.

The Scale of the Total Order Planned by the Air Force

A Final Inventory Targeting 263 Missiles

According to InsideDefense.com, the US Air Force's fiscal year 2027 budget request indicates that the total JSM inventory should ultimately reach 263 missiles, a figure that gives a precise sense of the scale of precision rearmament undertaken by American air power.

The service plans to buy 100 JSMs next year for about $384.6 million, followed by 41 more missiles in 2028 for $179.56 million, before halting purchases beyond that point under the current budget planning.

One Milestone Among Others in F-35 Modernization

This ramp-up of the JSM fits into a broader effort to modernize the arsenal tied to the F-35, where each new weapons capability reinforces the overall strategic value of this aircraft platform at the heart of Western deterrence posture.

Integration of the missile onto the F-35B and F-35C variants remains planned but not yet complete, meaning this contract is, for now, specifically tied to the F-35A program, according to details from GovConFeed.

Seeing an acquisition plan this detailed, with precise figures spread across several years, convinces me that Western military modernization goes well beyond one-off announcements.

A Value in Norwegian Kroner That Says Everything About the Scale

A Contract Valued at 2.7 Billion Kroner

Kongsberg itself confirmed the signing of this contract for the delivery of additional missiles, valuing it at roughly 2.7 billion Norwegian kroner, with deliveries planned through the end of 2029, according to the company's official statement published on June 8, 2026.

This separate announcement, coming directly from the manufacturer, confirms and completes the information released by the Pentagon, reinforcing the credibility of all the published data on this bilateral weapons program.

A Tangible Economic Impact for Norwegian Industry

This contract represents a major economic boost for the Norwegian defense industry, cementing Kongsberg's position as an indispensable strategic supplier within the Western military supply chain, well beyond Scandinavia's own borders.

This economic dimension also shows how Western rearmament directly benefits allied economies, creating skilled jobs and strengthening industrial ties between NATO partners over the long run.

I find it reassuring to see Western rearmament also translate into concrete economic returns for allied countries, rather than a one-way dependency on a single dominant supplier.

The Broader Strategic Context of This Rearmament

A Direct Response to Russian Ambitions in the Arctic

Norway, a direct neighbor of Russia in the Far North, holds a front-rank geostrategic position against the Kremlin's military ambitions in the Arctic, a region whose strategic importance keeps growing as the ice melts and new shipping routes open.

Strengthening the Norwegian defense industry, through contracts like this JSM deal, feeds directly into this logic of deterrence against a Russia whose aggression in Ukraine since 2022 has reminded all of Northern Europe of the urgency of serious preparation.

Credible Deterrence Against China in the Pacific

Adoption of the JSM by allies such as Japan and Australia also shows how this weapon fits into a broader Western strategy of deterrence against China's expansionist ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, where tensions over Taiwan remain a constant source of concern.

This convergence between the European and Indo-Pacific theaters confirms that the West now thinks about its rearmament globally, linking Russian, Chinese, Iranian and North Korean threats within a coherent rather than fragmented defense architecture.

This strategic convergence between the Arctic and the Pacific looks to me like exactly the kind of global thinking the West needs to confront adversaries who are already coordinating their interests closely.

Trump's Role in Accelerating Western Rearmament

An Administration Pushing Defense Production

It must be acknowledged, without excessive indulgence, that the Trump administration has maintained and at times accelerated certain military modernization programs inherited from previous administrations, of which this kind of contract with NATO allies like Norway is a concrete example.

This continuity in defense priorities, despite the many domestic political controversies surrounding this administration, deserves to be credited for what it is: a choice to maintain a credible deterrence posture against the West's strategic rivals.

Constant Pressure on Allies to Share the Burden

The American administration also continues to push its NATO allies to raise their own defense spending, pressure that, however diplomatically frustrating for some European governments, has helped speed up rearmament decisions long put off across the continent.

This contract with Norway shows exactly how that pressure can translate into concrete industrial partnerships rather than mere declarations of intent at NATO summits.

I credit this administration for its firmness on questions of military deterrence, while refusing to look away from the domestic political excesses that deserve equally firm criticism.

What This Contract Reveals About the Western Defense-Industrial Base

A Supply Chain Tested by Rising Demand

The growing number of contracts like this one, amid rising global demand for precision weapons systems, is putting pressure on Western defense supply chains, an industrial challenge that allied governments must confront together to avoid critical bottlenecks.

Kongsberg's ability to meet precise delivery deadlines despite this rising demand nonetheless demonstrates an industrial resilience that compares favorably with the difficulties faced by some other, more heavily publicized Western weapons programs.

A Model to Replicate for Other Critical Capabilities

This partnership between the United States and Norway could serve as a model for other critical military capabilities where the West depends on a limited number of specialized suppliers, reinforcing the need for coordinated industrial investment among allies rather than costly, inefficient duplication.

This logic of deliberate industrial specialization, rather than sterile competition among allies, could well represent the future of a Western rearmament that is both faster and more financially sustainable over the long term.

I believe this deliberate industrial specialization among allies, rather than sterile competition, is exactly the kind of strategic maturity the West needs to stay the course against its rivals.

The Limits and Gray Areas That Must Also Be Acknowledged

A Dependency That Carries Its Own Risks

This reliance on a single supplier, however reliable it has proven so far, carries structural risks: any major disruption to Norwegian production, whether industrial, political or geopolitical, could directly affect the availability of this capability for all the allied air forces that depend on it.

This vulnerability deserves to be taken seriously by Western defense planners, who should consider diversification mechanisms or licensed production to reduce this long-term risk of excessive dependency.

Budget Transparency Still Needs Improvement

Despite the publication of this precise contractual information, the exact number of missiles delivered under this specific contract remains unclear, a relative opacity that, without being scandalous, ought to be clarified further by American authorities for more rigorous public tracking of these considerable military expenditures.

This demand for transparency does not stem from excessive suspicion of Western defense institutions, but simply from the elementary democratic principle that taxpayers deserve to know precisely what their money is funding.

I refuse to turn this letter into unqualified praise: even a good defense contract deserves a minimum of public scrutiny over its execution details.

Why This Contract Deserves Your Attention, Even Far From the Spotlight

A Concrete Example Rather Than an Abstract Promise

In a media environment saturated with spectacular statements about Western rearmament, this $240.9 million contract offers the rare advantage of being verifiable, dated, quantified and documented by multiple official sources, rather than resting on mere political promises.

This verifiability should, in my view, serve as the standard for judging every other piece of rhetoric on Western rearmament: less talk, more contracts signed, delivered and publicly documented like this one.

A Reminder That Deterrence Is Built Over Time

Western military deterrence is not built in a day or through a single spectacular contract, but through the patient accumulation of solid industrial partnerships like this one, repeated year after year among trusted allies sharing the same fundamental democratic values.

It is this quiet but steady accumulation that will ultimately determine whether the West keeps or loses its strategic edge against rivals who, for their part, do not hesitate to invest massively in their own military capabilities.

I far prefer this discreet accumulation of verifiable contracts to grandiloquent speeches that, too often, never translate into a single concrete delivery on the ground.

What I Now Expect From Western Decision-Makers

Stronger Transparency on Future Deliveries

In this open letter, I am asking American and Norwegian authorities to publish regular, precise updates on the progress of Lot 2 production, allowing for dignified public tracking of the considerable sums committed to this strategic weapons program.

This enhanced transparency would not harm the program's operational security in any way, while reassuring Western citizens about the proper use of public funds allocated to their own collective defense.

Replicating This Model With Other Strategic Allies

I also hope this kind of industrial partnership serves as a model for similar collaborations with allies such as Poland, Finland or the Baltic states, whose geographic proximity to Russia makes their industrial integration into Western defense just as strategically essential.

These are the concrete industrial choices, far more than diplomatic summits or solemn communiqués, that will actually determine the credibility of Western deterrence in the years ahead against determined adversaries.

I close this letter hoping that this contract, almost a footnote in today's news, will one day be cited as one of the many quiet milestones that let the West preserve its strategic freedom of action.

The Lot 1 Precedent and the Lessons for What Comes Next

A First Contract That Had Already Proven Itself

The original Lot 1 contract, signed in May 2024 for roughly $141 million, had already tested Kongsberg's ability to deliver on schedule, a successful track record that directly eased negotiation of this larger second contract.

This logical progression from one lot to the next, rather than a break or a rethinking of the partnership, demonstrates the strength of an industrial relationship built on mutual trust and concrete, on-time results.

Lessons Applicable to Other Weapons Programs

Pentagon officials responsible for other weapons programs could draw directly on this incremental method, where each additional production lot builds on the measurable results of the previous one rather than on unverified promises.

This methodical approach, far from spectacular, nonetheless represents one of the best guarantees of the long-term credibility of Western rearmament against rivals who are also pursuing long-term industrial trajectories.

I see in this methodical, lot-by-lot progression proof that industrial discipline, even less spectacular than grand announcements, remains the true engine of sustainable Western rearmament.

What European Allies Can Take Away From This

An Example of Successful Industrial Specialization

European governments still struggling to coordinate their own defense investments could take an interested look at this US-Norwegian partnership, where the deliberate industrial specialization of a smaller ally led to producing a weapon adopted well beyond its own borders.

This Norwegian success shows that a mid-sized country, properly integrated into the Western defense-industrial chain, can play a strategic role disproportionate to its demographic or economic size.

An Invitation to Invest Further in the Defense Industry

This success should encourage other European capitals to invest more resolutely in their own defense-industrial capabilities, rather than relying exclusively on outside purchases that, over time, weaken the continent's strategic autonomy against future crises.

It is precisely this kind of coordinated national industrial investment, modeled on the Norwegian example, that will let Europe carry more weight in its own defense choices within the Atlantic alliance.

I hope the Norwegian example inspires more European capitals to invest in their own defense industry, rather than settling for buying solutions already developed elsewhere.

Conclusion: Rearmament Is Judged by Contracts, Not Speeches

One Signal Among Others, But a Real One

This $240.9 million contract between the US Air Force and Kongsberg will not, on its own, guarantee the West's security against its strategic rivals. But it is precisely the kind of concrete, verifiable and documented proof our side needs to show that rearmament is not just an election-campaign slogan.

It is in the accumulation of dozens of similar contracts, among trusted allies sharing the same fundamental values, that the deterrence patiently being built will, hopefully, keep protecting our democracies against the ambitions of Moscow, Beijing, Tehran and Pyongyang.

A Call for Vigilance and Consistency

I close this open letter by calling on Western decision-makers to maintain this consistency in the years ahead, yielding neither to complacency over progress made, nor to fatalism over the scale of work still needed to guarantee credible, durable deterrence.

History will judge harshly the Western democracies that had the means to rearm seriously but chose, out of comfort or internal division, not to do so in time against threats that were, in fact, clearly identified.

I sign this letter with the conviction that contracts like this one, repeated and multiplied, will remain the best concrete answer the West can offer to those who still doubt its resolve.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I Am and My Acknowledged Biases

I am a columnist for mad-m.ca. On questions of defense and NATO, my acknowledged bias is clearly pro-Western and pro-deterrence: I consider the rearmament of allied democracies against Russia, China, Iran and North Korea to be a legitimate strategic necessity.

I have no professional ties to Kongsberg, the US Department of War, or any defense company cited in this letter. My analysis rests exclusively on public contractual documents and verifiable specialized journalistic sources.

What I Don't Know and My Method

I cannot independently confirm the exact number of missiles delivered under this contract, since that information has not been made public by the authorities involved at this stage. I am flagging that explicitly rather than putting forward an unverified figure.

My method consists of cross-referencing official statements from the Pentagon, Kongsberg and several specialized defense outlets, systematically citing the origin of every financial or technical figure put forward in this text.

Sources

Primary sources

Contracts for June 5, 2026 — US Department of War, June 5, 2026

KONGSBERG to deliver more JSM missiles to US Air Force — Kongsberg, June 8, 2026

Air Force Awards Kongsberg $241M Sole-Source Contract for Joint Strike Missile — GovConFeed, June 7, 2026

Secondary sources

Air Force awards $240M for Joint Strike Missile — InsideDefense.com, June 5, 2026

USAF Contracts Kongsberg for $240.9M in Joint Strike Missiles Production — SamSearch, June 8, 2026

USAF selects Kongsberg joint strike missiles for F-35A — Aerospace Global News