INVESTIGATION: At Bürgenstock, who really speaks for Tehran behind the scenes of the MoU?

Introduction: A delegation that looks like an entire government

The unprecedented composition that stunned observers

On June 21, 2026, an Iranian delegation of unparalleled scale landed in Zurich before making its way to the Bürgenstock Resort on the shores of Lake Lucerne in Switzerland. This was no team of seasoned diplomats there to negotiate wording. It was, in the words of an analyst quoted by Fox News, "an entire government crammed into a single plane." Parliament, foreign affairs, the central bank, oil, national security, and legal affairs — every economic and strategic lever of the Islamic Republic was represented.

To understand what Tehran really wanted to get out of Bürgenstock, one need only read the list of Iranian participants. Leading the delegation, coded "Minab 168" by Iranian state media, was Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Iranian parliament and chief negotiator. Alongside him: Abbas Araghchi, foreign affairs minister; Ali Bagheri Kani, deputy secretary of the Supreme National Security Council; Abdolnaser Hemmati, governor of the Central Bank of Iran; Hamid Bord, deputy oil minister and head of the National Iranian Oil Company; and Kazem Gharibabadi, deputy foreign affairs minister for international legal affairs.

The Versailles MoU: starting point of a chess match

To understand what was at stake at Bürgenstock, one must go back to June 17, 2026 — the date a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed between Donald Trump and Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. The document, whose exact contents have never been made public, established a 60-day framework for negotiating the open files: Iran's nuclear program, the gradual lifting of sanctions, regional security — notably Lebanon and the Strait of Hormuz. The talks began at Bürgenstock on June 21, mediated by Qatar and Pakistan.

The pragmatists at the helm: Ghalibaf and Araghchi on the front line

Ghalibaf, the man for hot-button files

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is an unusual profile in Iranian diplomacy. A former commander of the Iranian police force, former mayor of Tehran, multiple-time presidential candidate, he embodies the pragmatic conservative faction — officials who are willing to negotiate with the West in order to extract tangible economic benefits, without questioning the revolution's core dogmas. At Bürgenstock, it was he who led the direct negotiating sessions with the American delegation headed by Vice President JD Vance.

Ghalibaf himself posted on X (formerly Twitter) on June 22 that if the American threat had been the least bit effective, the two countries "would not have reached this point of desperation." That sentence — cynical, strategic — betrays the Iranian position: Tehran acknowledges the impasse the war with the United States has put it in, while refusing to appear weak. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the very composition of the delegation "clearly shows the intention to focus on discussing sanctions relief and the unfreezing of assets."

Araghchi, the diplomat under pressure from hardliners

Abbas Araghchi, foreign affairs minister, has been the architect of Tehran's diplomatic line for several years. A former nuclear negotiator under Rouhani, he knows the intricacies of talks with Washington better than anyone. But at Bürgenstock, he operated under constraint: Iranian conservative media accused his team of ignoring the objections of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. A symbolic incident crystallized the tensions: the Iranian delegation refused to participate in the planned photo session with the Americans, and images released by the semi-official Tasnim agency showed Araghchi leaving the room moments before the group photo with Vice President Vance.

The hardliners in ambush: Jalili and the hard right at the heart of the reactor

Saeed Jalili, the enemy within

The Straits Times reported on June 24 clear signs of dissent within the Iranian apparatus. The most visible was Saeed Jalili, an ultra-conservative, former chief nuclear negotiator, and former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Jalili is publicly opposed to any deal with Washington, which he views as a disguised capitulation. He was not at Bürgenstock — but his influence weighed on every clause of the MoU negotiated by his compatriots.

The fracture between pragmatists and hardliners is structural in the Iranian political system since the 1979 revolution. It manifests in discussions on uranium enrichment: President Masoud Pezeshkian firmly declared that the right to enrichment is "non-negotiable," a position that directly complicates the American demand for immediate access by IAEA inspectors to nuclear sites.

The dispute over nuclear inspections: who is telling the truth?

On June 26, a public dispute erupted between the two delegations. Vice President Vance stated that Iran had "agreed to invite IAEA inspectors" back into the country, calling it a "major milestone." Trump amplified the announcement on Truth Social. But Iranian deputy foreign affairs minister Kazem Gharibabadi categorically denied it: Tehran had contracted no new commitment, and nuclear inspections would only be considered "after a final agreement and practical action on the lifting of all sanctions." According to The Eastern Herald, both accounts cannot be simultaneously true. The MoU itself, signed on June 17 in Versailles, has never been made public.

The architecture of the Iranian delegation: who really holds the purse strings

Hemmati: the man of the frozen assets

Abdolnaser Hemmati, governor of the Central Bank of Iran, is the linchpin of Tehran's economic expectations at Bürgenstock. His presence in the delegation sends an unambiguous message: Iran has come for immediate liquidity. Iranian assets frozen in banks and accounts abroad are estimated at several hundred billion dollars — some sources citing as much as 600 billion rupees locked in various mechanisms, according to media exchanges reported by Pakistani analysts. The most concrete case involves funds frozen in Qatar: according to Reuters, the United States was prepared to unfreeze "several billion dollars" in exchange for Iranian consent to host IAEA inspectors.

Hemmati had already participated in the previous negotiations in Islamabad in April 2026 — making him one of the few delegation members with direct knowledge of all phases of the peace process. His role at Bürgenstock was to lead the "economic committee" of the Iranian delegation, distinct from the security track led by Bagheri Kani.

Hamid Bord and oil as leverage

Hamid Bord, deputy oil minister and head of the National Iranian Oil Company, is the other key figure in the delegation. His presence illustrates a crucial issue: Iran wants sanctions on its oil industry lifted as a priority. Tehran currently exports oil despite sanctions — mainly to China — but at heavily discounted prices. An official lifting of sanctions would allow it to restore full-price exports to Europe and other markets. An analyst quoted by Fox News summed up the Iranian strategy thus: "Iran didn't just send diplomats; it sent the foreign ministry, the security state, the central bank, legal affairs, and oil. This is a delegation built around implementation, money, leverage, and red lines."

The four-track negotiating method: the Swiss labyrinth

An unprecedented format: four countries around the same table

The format adopted at Bürgenstock was unprecedented: bilateral sessions between the United States and Iran in the morning, followed by a "quadrilateral meeting" including Qatar and Pakistan in the afternoon. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief Asim Munir had made the trip themselves, signaling the importance Islamabad attached to this process. Qatar brought its experience in complex mediations — notably its long practice of negotiations with non-state actors in the Middle East.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi was also present at Bürgenstock, although no official Iranian confirmation of a meeting with him was obtained. Grossi himself posted on X that he had met Swiss foreign affairs minister Ignazio Cassis to discuss "recent developments concerning Iran." His presence symbolized international pressure for a resumption of nuclear inspections — and Iranian resistance to that pressure.

The 18-hour marathon and its concrete results

The negotiations lasted 18 hours — a marathon whose main outcome was the creation of institutional structures: a "conflict prevention mechanism" to oversee the ceasefire in Lebanon, a "communication channel" to guarantee the passage of merchant ships through the Strait of Hormuz, a "high-level committee" to oversee subsequent negotiations on the MoU, and a "working group" targeting nuclear issues, sanctions, and disputes. These results are modest given the scale of what is at stake. The Korean Chosun Ilbo, which covered the negotiations in detail, reported that the discussions on Lebanon were "fragile."

Iran's internal fractures on the nuclear file

Pezeshkian versus the hardliners: enrichment as an absolute red line

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, even before the Bürgenstock talks began, had drawn a clear line: Iran's uranium enrichment program is "completely non-negotiable." That declaration, relayed by Al Jazeera on June 21, complicated the task of the delegation on the ground. For Washington, the priority is precisely to impose limits on enrichment and obtain transparency on stocks of highly enriched uranium — of which Iran now possesses enough to build several nuclear bombs if it were to go all the way.

The position of Iran's hardliners is even more intransigent: they view any nuclear agreement as capitulation. Jalili and his allies believe that Iranian nuclear deterrence — even implicit, even unformalized — is the only guarantee of the regime's survival in the face of American pressure. The example of Gaddafi's Libya, which renounced its nuclear weapons in 2003 before being overthrown in 2011, is regularly invoked in Iranian conservative circles as a lesson not to be repeated.

The shadow of Khamenei over the entire delegation

Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei was not at Bürgenstock, but his authority hung over every exchange. Iranian conservative media accused delegation members of ignoring his objections. This reveals a fundamental structural tension in the Iranian system: the government of Pezeshkian, elected on a platform of relative reform, and the Parliament represented by Ghalibaf, are theoretically on the same pragmatic wavelength. But the Supreme Leader remains the ultimate authority — and his final decision on any nuclear agreement is unpredictable.

The American delegation: asymmetry of profiles, asymmetry of objectives

Vance, Witkoff, Kushner: a political rather than technical team

Facing the sprawling Iranian delegation, the American team was remarkably lean: JD Vance, Vice President of the United States; Steve Witkoff, special envoy for peace missions; and Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and informal advisor. Vance had himself warned he would only stay "a day or two" before departing for Washington. This asymmetry in the delegations' composition is analytically telling: Iran sent technocrats and experts; the United States sent politicians.

The counter-terrorism analyst quoted by Fox News summarized the asymmetry as follows: "This Iranian delegation is not designed to end Iranian leverage. It is designed to collect the benefits of the pause, preserve the regime's pressure points, and carry them into the next stage." The American delegation, by contrast, had two immediate priorities: Iran's nuclear program and the stabilization of Lebanon — without the technical tools to address either in depth during this first session.

Vance's trump card: pressure from the U.S. Congress

Vance was carrying a clear political message: Republican skeptics in the U.S. Congress — who had passed a resolution 50-48 under the War Powers Act demanding the withdrawal of U.S. forces from hostilities — demanded concrete results on the nuclear question before supporting any sanctions relief. This domestic political constraint paradoxically gave weight to Vance's positions: he could not concede on nuclear matters even if he had wanted to, as Congress would have held it against him.

Qatar and Pakistan: mediators with their own interests

Doha, trusted intermediary for both parties

Qatar played a crucial role at Bürgenstock. Doha maintains relations with both Washington and Tehran — hosting the Al-Udeid American air base while maintaining active diplomatic ties with Iran. Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani was on site. According to reporting from Reuters and the Financial Times, Thani notably played a role in the discussions on the Strait of Hormuz, stating that Qatar was open to discussions on the management of the strait but categorically rejecting any system of Iranian "control" or "tolls" on this international waterway.

Pakistan, for its part, had a more direct motivation: its own energy security depends partly on its relationship with Iran, and Islamabad sought to position itself as a credible mediator to strengthen its regional diplomatic standing. Some Pakistani analysts were already envisioning that technical negotiations on nuclear issues might continue in Islamabad — giving Pakistan unprecedented international visibility.

France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy as observers

The leaders of the E4 — Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom — welcomed the signing of the MoU according to a document from the Robert Schuman Foundation dated June 22. But their physical absence from Bürgenstock is significant: Europe was marginalized in this peace process, as it had been when the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. Brussels observes, applauds cautiously, but is not in the room where it happens.

The concrete obstacles: sanctions, uranium, Lebanon

Three intertwined files, each blocking the others

The MoU is structured around three interconnected major domains: sanctions, the nuclear program, and regional security (Lebanon, Strait of Hormuz). These three files mutually block each other. Tehran conditions nuclear progress on sanctions relief. Washington conditions sanctions relief on nuclear concessions. And both parties condition advances on Lebanon to progress on the other points. It is a circular structure where no point advances unless all others advance simultaneously.

Iran International noted on June 20 that even in the best-case scenario, "the economic promises of the MoU remain uncertain and some could prove difficult to honor even if negotiations succeed." The legal obstacles in the U.S. Congress to any significant sanctions relief are considerable — a point we will revisit in a separate article focused specifically on this dimension.

The question of who speaks for the Islamic Republic

Behind all of this diplomatic machinery lies a fundamental question that outside observers struggle to resolve: who actually speaks for Tehran? Is it Ghalibaf, the chief negotiator? Araghchi, the diplomatic architect? Pezeshkian, the elected president? Or Supreme Leader Khamenei, whose approval is required for any major decision? The answer is probably: no one alone. And that is precisely what makes these negotiations so difficult.

The stakes of the Strait of Hormuz and the geoeconomic dimension

Hormuz: 20% of the world's oil trade

The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's oil trade passes, was at the center of discussions at Bürgenstock. The MoU stipulates that Iran must guarantee free passage through the strait for 60 days — although Tehran raised the possibility of imposing transit fees or environmental charges on ships passing through. Qatar and Saudi Arabia categorically rejected this possibility. ISW had reported as early as June 24 that Iran sought to use the Hormuz discussions to obtain a "new regional architecture" favorable to its interests.

The geoeconomic dimension is massive: even a partial or temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz would trigger an immediate and violent spike in global oil prices. That is why the countries of the Persian Gulf, the United States, and Europe share a common interest in guaranteeing free navigation in these waters — but the terms of that guarantee are at the heart of an intense standoff with Tehran.

The symbolic stakes of Iranian maritime sovereignty

For Iran, the Hormuz question is not only economic — it is existentially tied to its identity as a regional power. Tehran claims a form of co-management or supervision of the strait as a riparian state. Yet international maritime law, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), guarantees the right of innocent passage through international straits — without this being conditioned on the agreement or payment of the riparian state. Any Iranian attempt to impose a toll or control system "would erode long-standing international norms," as ISW underscored.

Looking ahead: working groups and the 60-day countdown

The post-Bürgenstock structure: three distinct tracks

At the conclusion of the negotiations on June 21-22, the process was structured into several parallel tracks: nuclear discussions — potentially in Islamabad under Pakistani mediation; negotiations on frozen assets — probably in Doha; and discussions on Hormuz and regional security, whose format remains to be defined. The high-level committee created at Bürgenstock is meant to oversee everything and report to the leaders of each country. The countdown: 60 days from June 17, that is, through mid-August 2026.

ISW had already noted in its June 20 report that one of the fundamental unresolved questions was whether Iran would agree to discuss its nuclear program at Bürgenstock — the answer was no, at least not in any concrete way. The Iranian delegation had conditioned any nuclear discussion on the prior implementation of the first point of the MoU: a general ceasefire including Lebanon. This sequence imposed by Tehran mechanically delays any progress on the nuclear file.

Scenarios for the weeks ahead

Three scenarios are taking shape for the continuation of the process. In the optimistic scenario, technical negotiations progress quietly on financial matters (partial unfreezing of assets), maintaining diplomatic momentum while avoiding the thorniest subjects. In the stagnation scenario — the most probable according to many analysts — working groups meet regularly without producing substantial results, stretching the process beyond the 60-day deadline. In the breakdown scenario, a provocation — a new partial closure of Hormuz, a resumption of hostilities in Lebanon, or an American announcement on nuclear matters poorly received in Tehran — interrupts negotiations.

The role of Moscow and Beijing behind the scenes

Russia: present by its absence

Neither Russia nor China was officially present at Bürgenstock — but their shadow hung over every negotiation. Moscow maintains a deep alliance with Tehran since the start of the war in Ukraine: Iran supplied Russia with Shahed drones that struck Ukrainian cities; in exchange, Russia offered Iran diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council and military technology transfers. Any Iranian-American deal that would strengthen Iran economically could paradoxically reduce its dependence on Russia — something Moscow monitors with unease.

China, for its part, is the primary buyer of Iranian oil sold in defiance of sanctions at discounted prices. An American-Iranian agreement that would reopen Western markets to Tehran's oil would strip Beijing of that competitive advantage. Xi Jinping therefore has an interest in the sanctions persisting — or in any eventual agreement granting him guarantees on his Iranian oil imports.

The regional security architecture: a landscape in complete recomposition

What is playing out at Bürgenstock goes beyond bilateral Iranian-American relations. It is the Middle East security architecture that is being redefined. With Iran weakened militarily but still standing politically, with Israel in a difficult post-war situation, with Gulf states seeking new security guarantees, and with the United States reorienting its strategic priorities toward the Asia-Pacific to contain China, the great regional bargaining is underway. The Iranian-American MoU is just one episode — perhaps the most important, but not the only one.

Analysis: fractures and fault lines within the Iranian delegation

The Ghalibaf generation versus the Jalili generation

The deepest fracture within the Iranian establishment pits two generations and two worldviews against each other. The Ghalibaf generation — pragmatic, technocratic, born with the revolution but shaped by the realities of an economically troubled state — accepts negotiating with the enemy if it can revive the Iranian economy and consolidate the regime. The Jalili generation — ideological, doctrinaire, convinced that any concession is weakness — prefers total resistance, even at the cost of further impoverishing the Iranian people.

This fracture is aggravated by the question of democratic legitimacy: Pezeshkian was elected on a reformist platform, and his supporters expect concrete results. But the non-elected institutions — the Guardian Council, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Supreme National Security Council — retain formal or informal vetoes over any major decision. This is what political scientists call Iran's "dual government system": a democratic facade and an opaque decision-making apparatus.

The IRGC: an unavoidable actor absent from the official delegation

Conspicuously absent from the official delegation: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a veritable economic and military empire controlling a massive share of the Iranian economy. The IRGC has its own interests in sanctions — part of its economic model rests precisely on sanctions circumvention, through parallel trade networks. A lifting of sanctions that would reintegrate Iran into the legal global economy could paradoxically weaken the economic power of the Revolutionary Guards. This internal Iranian conflict of interest is one of the least visible but most real obstacles to any durable deal.

Analysis: the broader geopolitical context

The structural forces shaping this file

This file cannot be understood in isolation. It is embedded in a broader geopolitical context in which the balance of power among great powers, regional alliances, and cross-cutting economic interests create constraints that individual actors can hardly ignore. Putin's Russia, Xi Jinping's China, the Guardians' Iran, Trump's United States — all these actors calculate their positions based on variables that go far beyond the immediate file analyzed in this article. Understanding these structural forces is essential to assess the probability of the scenarios described.

What the international dynamic reveals about coming trends

Analysts who follow long-term trends see in the events described here revealing signals of deeper dynamics. The West remains at the center of the international system, but its room for maneuver is shrinking as rival powers — China, Russia, Iran — coordinate their actions more systematically. This is not a reason for despair — it is a reason to strengthen democratic alliances with an urgency that the hour demands. Ukraine and its fighters understood this before many others. It is time for Western capitals to join them in that clarity.

Conclusion: Bürgenstock, beginning of a process or diplomatic mirage?

What the 60 days will reveal about the seriousness of the parties

Bürgenstock produced a concrete result: negotiating structures and an agreement on not using the Strait of Hormuz as an immediate weapon. This is thin given the scale of the open files. The real test of the 60 days will be whether the working groups on nuclear issues, sanctions, and regional security can reach measurable results. Iran has clearly prioritized the lifting of economic sanctions. The United States has clearly prioritized transparency on the nuclear program. These two priorities are not contradictory in principle — but they are in their sequencing.

The central question remains unanswered

At Bürgenstock, the investigation into who really speaks for Tehran has no simple answer. Ghalibaf's delegation spoke on behalf of the government, not the regime as a whole. Hardliners like Jalili continue to structure the limits of what the delegation can accept. And Supreme Leader Khamenei remains the final arbiter whose actual red lines are still unknown. For Washington, negotiating with Iran always means negotiating with this fundamental uncertainty — and learning to live with it.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Who I am and what my biases are

I am a columnist and analyst specializing in international affairs. I read the world from a pro-Western perspective: I firmly believe that the liberal international order, despite its flaws, is preferable to the authoritarian alternatives offered by Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing. My acknowledged bias: I am skeptical of regimes that subordinate individual rights to the ideological imperatives of the state — and the Islamic Republic of Iran is a paradigmatic example. I therefore instinctively distrust Iranian signals of goodwill, even though I recognize that diplomacy demands taking them seriously.

What I do not know — and my methodology

I do not have access to the full text of the MoU signed in Versailles on June 17, 2026 — no journalist does. I do not know what Khamenei actually said or agreed to in private. I do not know whether the Iranian hardliners are powerful enough to torpedo a deal that the pragmatists might have struck. These blind spots are real and inevitably affect any analysis. My sources for this article include dispatches from Al Jazeera, Reuters, Fox News, Iran International, Xinhua, Tehran Times, Middle East Eye, Chosun Ilbo, ISW, and the Robert Schuman Foundation — all published between June 20 and 26, 2026.

Sources

Primary sources

Al Jazeera — Khamenei's MoU stance stirs debate as Iran and US meet in Switzerland — June 21, 2026

ISW — Iran Update Special Report, June 20, 2026 — June 20, 2026

Fox News — Iran sends whole-regime delegation to US talks — June 21, 2026

Tehran Times — Iran seeking lasting and guaranteed US compliance — June 21, 2026

The Eastern Herald — Iran Denies Any IAEA Agreement Was Made — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

Robert Schuman Foundation — Europeans caught between trust and the need for protection — June 22, 2026

Straits Times — Iran US deal: Pragmatists vs hardliners — June 24, 2026

Iran International — Hardliners accuse negotiating team of ignoring Supreme Leader's objections — June 21, 2026

Xinhua — Explainer: How far can U.S.-Iran talks in Switzerland go? — June 21, 2026

Iran International — Iran may get a lifeline, but major obstacles remain — June 20, 2026