COLUMN: Trump, Tariffs, and the Constitution — When the Supreme Court Reminds Everyone Who Runs America

Introduction: The world's richest president just got shown the door by the law

An $88 billion ruling

On February 20, 2026, the United States Supreme Court issued one of the most important economic decisions of the decade: the "reciprocal" tariffs imposed by Donald Trump on the basis of the IEEPA — the International Emergency Economic Powers Act — are unconstitutional. The decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump was adopted by a vote of 6 to 3. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority opinion. A few words summarize its essence: "The Founding Fathers did not delegate any part of the taxing power to the executive branch."

These seven words land like a constitutional uppercut. $88 billion in refunds ordered to American companies that paid those illegal tariffs. A potential total of $166 to $175 billion in possible refunds if courts follow through fully. And a president who finds himself, once again, facing the same institutional limit he has never truly accepted: in a constitutional democracy, no one is above the law — not even the man who occupies the Oval Office.

A man improvising under constraint

Trump responded as he always responds: by pivoting. By seeking another door. He immediately invoked Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, a provision allowing the president to impose a blanket tariff of 10% for a maximum period of 150 days. This transitional measure expires around July 24, 2026. And it is already being challenged in court, with the International Trade Court having already ruled these tariffs "invalid" for three plaintiffs before the administration appealed.

This is not a coherent trade policy. It is permanent improvisation under judicial constraint — and that improvisation has direct consequences for businesses, supply chains, and trading partners around the world. Canada understood this before anyone else, canceling its own digital services tax under American pressure to avoid additional punitive tariffs. Trump's policy is not played out in legislation — it is played out in fear.

The IEEPA — how Trump attempted to bypass Congress

A 1977 law transformed into an economic weapon

The IEEPA — the International Emergency Economic Powers Act — was adopted in 1977 to give the president emergency powers in the face of extraordinary threats to national security. For decades, it was used to freeze foreign assets, impose targeted sanctions, and respond to specific crises. No one had ever attempted to use it to impose generalized tariffs on all global imports. Trump did. It was creative. It was illegal.

The administration's reasoning was as follows: the American trade deficit constitutes a "national economic emergency." The IEEPA allows the president to act in the face of national emergencies. Therefore, the president can use the IEEPA to impose tariffs. The reasoning resembles law. It is not. The Supreme Court applied the "major questions doctrine": when an existing legislative provision is invoked to justify an extraordinary power with massive economic consequences, Congress must have explicitly authorized that power. It had not done so.

The major questions doctrine — the Constitution versus executive order

The major questions doctrine has become one of the most important constitutional doctrines of the Roberts Court. It reflects a growing mistrust of the expansion of executive powers through administrative reinterpretation. In previous decisions, the Court had already used this doctrine to limit the powers of the EPA on climate and of OSHA on vaccinations. Its application to Trump's tariffs was, in hindsight, almost inevitable.

What is striking is that the decision came from 6 justices — including conservatives nominated by Trump himself. Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett were all nominated by the current president. They voted against him. This is proof that American institutions, despite everything, retain a certain independence. Or at least — certain members of those institutions do.

$88 billion — the bill arrives

The ordered refunds and the ensuing chaos

Eighty-eight billion dollars. That is the estimate of refunds immediately ordered to American companies that paid the illegal tariffs based on the IEEPA. The total potential amount — including all ongoing proceedings and expected claims — could reach between $166 and $175 billion. For an already heavily deficit-laden American treasury, this is a painful bill.

For American businesses, this is good news in principle — but the administrative chaos of recovering these refunds is real. American customs authorities are not equipped to process thousands of refund requests on transactions dating back months or years. Delays will be long. Individual disputes, numerous. And in the meantime, tariff uncertainty continues to weigh on investment and sourcing decisions.

The impact on trading partners

In Canada, in Europe, in Japan — everywhere that exporters had adapted their logistics chains in response to Trump's tariffs — the Supreme Court decision creates new uncertainty. Some had invested to diversify their markets, reduce dependence on the American market, or absorb the cost of tariffs. These decisions do not reverse overnight, even if the tariffs are legally annulled.

The European Union, negotiating with Washington for months to avoid automobile tariffs, finds itself in an ambiguous position. On one hand, the judicial decision relieves some immediate pressures. On the other, the unpredictability of American trade policy — now documented at the level of the Supreme Court — reinforces the European argument in favor of strategic autonomy and diversification of trade partnerships.

The pivot to Section 122 — the spare tire

A limited and already contested power

When the Supreme Court closed the IEEPA door, Trump immediately produced another key: Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. This text authorizes the president to impose a blanket tariff of a maximum of 10% on all imports, but for a strictly limited period of 150 days. This measure expires around July 24, 2026.

Even this limited power is now being challenged. The International Trade Court has already ruled, for three plaintiff companies, that these 10% tariffs are "invalid." The administration immediately appealed, maintaining the tariffs in force while the proceedings unfold. The most likely outcome: a new series of unfavorable rulings, new improvised adaptations, a new cycle of uncertainty.

The Constitution as a permanent constraint

What emerges clearly from this legal saga is the relative solidity of constitutional constraints on American executive power in trade matters. Congress holds the taxing power. The president can negotiate, recommend, apply pressure — but cannot unilaterally impose generalized tariffs without an explicit legal basis. This constraint was written into the Constitution since 1787. Trump simply attempted, once again, to push it beyond its limits.

The outcome was predictable to anyone who honestly read the constitutional text. But the attempt itself had real effects on the global economy. Importers paid. Prices rose. Supply chains were disrupted. The policy of the fait accompli, even when illegal, leaves scars.

The digital tax threat — Trump's latest move

100% tariffs for digital taxes

On June 26, 2026, as this file was boiling, Trump added a new layer: he threatened to impose 100% tariffs on imports from any country that imposed a digital services tax affecting American companies. On Truth Social, he wrote: "This TARIFF will supersede any trade deal made with the country, whether implemented, signed or not."

The obvious target is the European Union, which has maintained or is considering digital taxes touching giants like Apple, Google, Meta, and Amazon. France, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom all have digital taxation mechanisms that could fall under the scope of this threat. Canada, for its part, had already canceled its own digital services tax under prior American pressure.

A policy based on fear rather than law

Here is the Trump model in full undress: threaten, intimidate, force concessions through fear of economic escalation, then call it "negotiation." Canada folded. Others will fold. Some will resist. And in all cases, the threat itself — even unexecuted — imposes a real cost on governments that must choose between fiscal sovereignty and access to the American market.

What this policy reveals is a fundamental contempt for international commercial law, WTO rules, and bilateral agreements negotiated over years. Trump does not see treaties as binding commitments — he sees them as starting points for future threats. This is a transactional conception of international relations that erodes multilateral trust at an alarming rate.

Congress — absent, complicit, or powerless?

The silent delegation of fiscal powers

The American Constitution is clear: it is Congress that holds the taxing power and the power to regulate international commerce. For decades, Congress has progressively delegated part of these powers to the president through legislation like the IEEPA, Section 232 on national security, and Section 301 on unfair trade practices. These delegations were intended for specific and exceptional situations.

Trump — and before him other presidents to a lesser degree — transformed these exceptions into a general rule. The IEEPA, designed for specific national emergencies, became the instrument of a comprehensive trade policy. Congress, by not intervening earlier to clarify and limit these delegations of power, bears part of the responsibility for this distortion.

The Republican Congress — between party loyalty and constitutional responsibility

The Republican Congress of 2025-2026 is the political institution that would have the power to end this permanent tariff improvisation — by legislating clearly on the limits of presidential powers in trade matters. It did not. Partisan loyalty to Trump prevailed over constitutional responsibility. Elected officials who, in other circumstances, cite the Founding Fathers at every opportunity, remained silent when their president was trampling Article I of the Constitution.

It was the Supreme Court that had to play the role that Congress should have played itself. This transfer of constitutional responsibility to the judiciary is itself a symptom of American political dysfunction. A healthy democracy should not need to rely on judges to remind a president that he is not a king.

The allies — between irritation and adaptation

Europe seeks commercial independence

In Europe, Trump's tariffs have accelerated a reflection already underway on economic strategic autonomy. The European Union has strengthened its trade defense instruments, multiplied bilateral agreements with non-American partners, and developed the concept of "strategic diversification" of supply chains. This movement, born as a defensive response to Washington's policies, paradoxically creates a more robust and less dependent EU.

The threat of 100% tariffs on countries maintaining digital taxes was received in Brussels with contained irritation. The European Commission has tools — the anti-coercion instrument, retaliatory tariffs, WTO complaints — to respond. But it also knows that a tariff escalation with the United States would serve neither its businesses nor its citizens in the short term. The calculation is difficult, and Washington knows it.

Canada — the most vulnerable, the most exposed

Canada, by virtue of its geographical proximity and economic integration with the United States (75% of its exports go to the American market), is the most exposed to American tariff pressure. The cancellation of the digital services tax illustrates this vulnerability. Ottawa must constantly navigate between defending its economic sovereignty and the necessity of maintaining access to its main commercial outlet.

But things must be named clearly: Trump's trade policy toward Canada — NAFTA renegotiated, tariffs on steel and aluminum, repeated threats, rhetorical annexation — is hostile. It treats a partner and ally as an adversary. And successive Canadian governments that have responded with capitulation rather than coordinated resistance have encouraged this approach.

The American economy — the real costs of tariffs

Imported inflation and American consumers

Trump's rhetoric presents tariffs as a tax on foreigners, a way to make countries that export to the United States "pay." Economics is less romantic: tariffs are a tax on American importers, who pass it on to American consumers. A pair of shoes made in China and taxed at 25% at the American border costs more to the American who buys it — not less to the Chinese company that manufactures it.

Economists have documented this reality clearly. The tariff policy of 2018-2019 and that of 2025-2026 contributed to inflationary pressures on specific product categories — electronics, clothing, construction materials. These pressures are not dramatic on a single product. Cumulated across the entire consumption basket, they represent a real cost for American households with modest incomes, who devote a higher proportion of their earnings to these product categories.

American businesses trapped by uncertainty

For American businesses with global supply chains, tariff uncertainty is perhaps the most serious cost. A manufacturer hesitating to sign a three-year supply contract because it does not know whether applicable customs tariffs will be 0%, 10%, 25%, or 100% in six months cannot optimize its costs, inventories, or prices. This uncertainty translates directly into delayed investments and slowed growth.

The GBA Tariff Tracker has documented in detail the chaotic timeline of Trump's tariffs — announced, then delayed, then partially reversed, then reimposed, then contested in court. This chronic instability is the antithesis of the predictable environment that businesses demand for long-term investment. It is also, ultimately, bad for the American workers that Trump claims to defend.

The WTO — a powerless arbiter

The World Trade Organization facing American unilateralism

The World Trade Organization has dispute settlement mechanisms that, in theory, allow nations to challenge illegal tariffs imposed by their trading partners. In practice, the United States under Trump has blocked the normal functioning of the WTO's appellate body by refusing to appoint new members, rendering the institution paralyzed at the appeals level.

This institutional paralysis is deliberate. A functioning dispute settlement system would be an additional constraint on American tariff policy. By neutralizing it, Washington has freed itself from an international discipline that could have contained the abuses. This is a form of institutional unilateralism that undermines the international commercial order built since 1947.

The return of brutal bilateralism

In the void left by the paralyzed WTO, brutal bilateralism takes hold. Nations wanting access to the American market must negotiate directly with Washington, accepting Trump's conditions or facing tariff consequences. This return to 19th-century trade diplomacy — based on the balance of power rather than rules — weakens medium powers, favors large economies capable of resisting pressure, and creates a world of trade blocs rather than an integrated global market.

China watches this dynamic attentively. Every time the United States weakens multilateral institutions, Beijing advances its own alternatives — the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, regional free trade agreements, the new Silk Roads. The institutional void that Trump creates, Xi Jinping hastens to fill.

The judicial decision in American history

Roberts and constitutional continuity

Chief Justice John Roberts's decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump fits within a coherent constitutional tradition. Roberts has, on multiple occasions in his career, sought to preserve the institution of the Supreme Court from accusations of politicization. His 6-3 majority on a question as politically charged as Trump's tariffs sends a strong signal: the Court is not an extension of executive power.

This decision will be studied in law schools for decades. It clarifies the limits of the IEEPA and of the national emergencies doctrine as a basis for generalized trade policies. It reinforces the separation of powers on fiscal questions. And it reminds us that even in a political environment as polarized as that of the United States of 2026, certain institutional limits hold.

What history will say of this period

When historians analyze American trade policy from 2025 to 2029, they will note a fascinating contradiction: a president who presented himself as the defender of American workers imposed policies that inflated prices for those same workers, sowed confusion in American businesses, and weakened the multilateral institutions that protect American long-term interests. And he did so in a constitutionally defective way that his own Supreme Court denounced.

This is a heavy record. And the most tragic part is that it was not inevitable. A muscular but legally grounded trade policy, a renegotiation of existing agreements within constitutional processes, pressure on partners that respects WTO rules — all of this was possible. Trump chose permanent improvisation. And the world pays the price.

The precedent for future presidents

A decision that protects future institutions

Beyond the specific tariff file, the Supreme Court's decision in Learning Resources v. Trump establishes a crucial precedent for future presidents. It says clearly: you cannot use emergency laws as a substitute for a trade policy that Congress has not authorized. It is the elected representatives — not the president — who hold the taxing power. This clarification benefits American democracy beyond the current political context.

A future Democratic president will also be unable to use the IEEPA to impose taxes with climate or social purposes without explicit legal basis. The decision is binding in both directions. This is what makes it a true constitutional decision — not a partisan ruling, but a reaffirmation of founding principles.

The lasting fragility of the global commercial order

But the judicial decision is not sufficient to rebuild what has been damaged. Trust in American predictability — an essential element of any international commercial system — has been eroded. The United States' trading partners, whether allies like Canada or competitors like the EU, now know that an election can overturn everything. That carefully negotiated agreements can be canceled by a tweet. That American law can be bypassed for months before courts intervene.

This structural uncertainty is the true legacy of Trump's tariff policy. The Supreme Court ruling puts an end to a specific illegality. It does not repair the broken trust. And that, no court can do.

What this concretely changes for global trade

The 10% tariffs — temporary or permanent?

The practical question that arises on this June 26, 2026 is simple: what happens when the 10% tariffs based on Section 122 expire around July 24, 2026? The administration can ask Congress for a new authorization. It can attempt other legal bases. Or the tariffs can simply fall — at least temporarily — creating a new period of uncertainty about what comes next.

Legal experts are closely watching the ongoing appeals process on the 10% tariffs. If the appeals courts confirm their invalidity, the administration will find itself in an even more constrained position. The legal window for maintaining generalized tariff pressure without Congressional authorization is narrowing. And Congress, even Republican, is not enthusiastic about explicitly voting for tariffs that could fuel inflation before the midterm elections.

The new normal — unpredictable but constrained

What one can reasonably anticipate for the coming months is a tariff landscape that remains chaotic but increasingly constrained by the courts. Trump will continue to threaten, to improvise, to find new legal vehicles. Businesses will continue to adapt. Trading partners will continue to negotiate under pressure. And the Supreme Court will continue to remind of constitutional limits when they are too manifestly crossed.

This is a degraded normal by the standards of a great commercial democracy. But it is, for now, the reality. And in that reality, the decision of February 20, 2026 remains a bright spot — proof that institutions can hold, even under pressure. Even when a president seeks to circumvent them. Even when Congress abdicates its responsibility.

The digital tax — next front in the trade war

American tech giants as diplomatic weapons

The threat of 100% tariffs against nations that tax American digital services illustrates a new geopolitical reality: the GAFAM — Google, Apple, Facebook/Meta, Amazon, Microsoft — have become strategic assets that the Trump administration defends with the same tools as steel or aluminum. Their global dominance generates immense financial flows toward the United States, and any foreign attempt to tax them is perceived as an attack on American interests.

This framing is politically skillful, economically contestable. European digital taxes aim to correct a real fiscal asymmetry: companies generating immense profits in European markets but paying very little in local taxes through tax optimization. These taxes respond to a legitimate demand for fiscal equity from democratic governments and their citizens.

Fiscal sovereignty versus market access

The dilemma posed by Trump's threat is fundamental: do nations have the sovereign right to tax companies operating on their territory, regardless of those companies' nationality? The answer in international law is yes. The practical reality is more nuanced: a country that dares to exercise that sovereign right in the face of American opposition must be prepared to absorb the commercial consequences.

The European Union as a whole has the critical mass to resist. Individual nations — like Hungary, Greece, or the Netherlands — do not. This asymmetry pushes toward a coordinated European response, fiscal solidarity at the scale of the bloc. This is, paradoxically, one of the best reasons to strengthen European integration: faced with American unilateralism, unity is strength.

The institutional legacy — what this crisis leaves behind

A jurisprudence that protects the separation of powers

Beyond the refunds and the annulled tariffs, the legal legacy of the Supreme Court's decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump is lasting. It establishes clear jurisprudence on the limits of the IEEPA and on the application of the major questions doctrine to commercial law. This jurisprudence will outlast the current administration and guide lower courts in future disputes on executive powers in trade matters.

The decision also recalls a fundamental truth of American constitutional law: the taxing power is at the heart of representative democracy. It is precisely because the Founding Fathers refused to leave the power to tax in the hands of a monarch — or its modern equivalent, an omnipotent executive — that American democracy was able to function for two hundred and fifty years. This lesson, reaffirmed in the turbulent context of 2026, deserves to be celebrated.

Future trade policy — the lessons to retain

What trade policy can the current administration — and future ones — legitimately conduct? The answer is clear: an ambitious policy is possible, but it must go through Congress. Protective tariffs on strategic sectors, investigations into unfair trade practices, strengthened bilateral agreements — all of this is achievable within the existing constitutional framework. It is not commercial ambition that is unconstitutional. It is permanent improvisation through emergency decrees.

For the United States' trading partners — notably Canada and the European Union — the lesson is also one of institutional resilience. American institutions hold. They correct excesses. It takes time and costs money in uncertainty. But they hold. And in a world where many political regimes have far less robust institutions, this resilience deserves to be recognized — and to serve as a model.

American institutions have survived this constitutional crisis as they have survived others. This is not a reason to relax — it is a reason to invest even more in the health of democratic institutions, American and global. Institutions do not preserve themselves. They demand constant effort from citizens, legislators, and judges — all those who wish to preserve what two hundred and fifty years of American history have built.

Conclusion: The Constitution holds — for how much longer?

An institutional warning that deserves to be heard

The Supreme Court's decision in Learning Resources v. Trump is, at its core, an institutional warning. It says: the constitutional oversight mechanisms exist and still function. The president is not above the law. The taxing power belongs to Congress. These principles are not negotiable, not even for the signature policy of a popular president.

But this warning carries a cost: months of economic uncertainty, billions in refunds, degraded trade relationships, eroded international trust. The constitutional sanction arrived — it always does, in a true democracy. It does not always arrive quickly enough to prevent the damage.

The uncertain future of American trade policy

As long as the current administration occupies the Oval Office, American trade policy will remain unpredictable, provocative, and legally fragile. Businesses adapt to it, partners accommodate it, courts correct the most blatant excesses. But the international commercial world expected America to be an anchor of stability and predictability. That role, for now, is vacant.

And in that void, other actors advance. China strengthens its own supply chains, its own standards, its own trade alliances. Europe seeks its strategic autonomy. Canada diversifies its partnerships. The world is adapting to a less reliable America — and once accomplished, this adaptation will be difficult to reverse.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

Editorial position and sources

This column is based on public judicial decisions, verified official statements, and analyses by experts in constitutional law and trade policy. No facts have been invented. My editorial position is that of an observer favorable to an international commercial order governed by law rather than force — this position is transparent. I acknowledge that trade protection policies can be legitimate; it is the constitutional illegality and chronic unpredictability that I criticize here, not the principle of defending national interests.

What I do not know

I do not have access to the Supreme Court's internal deliberations. The refund estimates ($88 billion and $166–175 billion) come from published analyses and may evolve depending on the outcome of ongoing judicial proceedings. The evolution of tariff policy after the expiration of the Section 122 tariffs in July 2026 remains uncertain and I do not predict it — I analyze its possible contours.

Sources

Primary sources

CNBC — Trump tariff trade tech tax: Supreme Court, Section 122, digital services tax threats — June 26, 2026

Al Jazeera — Trump threatens 100% tariffs for countries levying digital services tax — June 26, 2026

Politico — Trump threatens additional tariffs on European countries over digital service taxes — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

GBA Tariff Tracker — Complete chronology of Trump tariffs 2025-2026

FEDA News — Court of Appeal keeps 10% global tariff in place for now — 2026

YouTube — Supreme Court STUNS Trump: $88 Billion in refunds, "limitless and dangerous" conduct — 2026