TESTIMONY: The Shahed-238 jet drone — when Iran arms Russia with a faster drone

Introduction: a threat that changes speed

The drones that no longer hum

Since 2022, residents of Ukrainian cities have learned to recognize the characteristic hum of Shahed-136 drones — that low, monotonous sound that precedes explosions. A terrible sound, but an identifiable one, allowing mobile defense teams and interception systems to react. In June–July 2026, that sound changes. Russia's Geran-3 drones — derived from the Iranian Shahed-238 with jet propulsion — do not hum. They whine. They emit the high-pitched sound of a turbojet engine, similar to that of a small commercial aircraft. And they arrive faster than their predecessors.

Analysts at Army Recognition, in an article published on June 29, 2026, document with precision the characteristics of this new challenge. The Geran-3 — the Russian designation of the Iranian Shahed-238 — reaches an estimated speed of up to 600 kilometers per hour, compared to approximately 180–200 km/h for the conventional Geran-2. Its maximum altitude is 9,000 meters. Its radar cross-section is estimated at approximately 0.05 square meters. These figures define a target considerably harder to intercept than what Ukrainian air defense had been accustomed to.

The context of the summer 2026 strikes

In June 2026, Russia used 60,849 drones of all categories — 13.3 times more than in June 2025, according to data from the Ukrainian General Staff. Within this massive flow of kamikaze drones, the Geran-3 jet variants represent a fraction — but an increasingly significant and strategically important fraction. Their role is not to replace the conventional Geran-2, but to accompany them in layered strikes: the Geran-2 saturates defenses, the faster Geran-3 pierces the weakened links.

Anatomy of the Geran-3: what the data reveals

An Iranian derivative with formidable specifications

The Iranian Shahed-238, first presented publicly in November 2023, is an evolution of the Shahed-136 that replaces its piston engine with a turbojet. The Russian version — the Geran-3 — uses a Tolou-10 or Tolou-13 engine. These engines are themselves described by analysts as unauthorized derivatives of the Czech PBS TJ100 and TJ150 turbojets. This is yet another illustration of the high-tech supply chain circumvention that Russia and Iran have developed together since 2022.

The Geran-3 weighs approximately 380 kilograms at takeoff — compared to 250 kg for the Geran-2. Its warhead varies from 50 to 300 kilograms depending on configuration, with observed variants carrying thermobaric charges. Its length is approximately 3.5 meters with a 3-meter wingspan. Its flight endurance is approximately two hours. These characteristics make it, as Army Recognition notes, an object that sits "between traditional drones and cruise missiles" in terms of flight behavior and operational employment.

Guidance: multiple variants for multiple threats

The base version of the Geran-3 uses combined satellite and inertial guidance integrating GPS and GLONASS. But analysts have documented more sophisticated variants: a model with an infrared seeker for passive terminal guidance, a variant with passive radar guidance capable of targeting the emissions of air defense systems themselves, and a fourth variant with an electro-optical sensor for reconnaissance or visual guidance. This diversification of guidance modes represents a significant technological escalation: the Geran-3 can adapt to different electronic countermeasure environments.

Ukrainian authorities have confirmed the recovery of Geran-3 debris bearing serial number U-36 in June 2025. Production is located — according to OSINT sources and Ukrainian military intelligence — at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan. The same factory that Black Spark infiltrated in 2026.

The challenges for Ukrainian air defense

Speed, altitude, signature: a triple challenge

Ukrainian air defense has developed since 2022 remarkable expertise in intercepting Shahed-136/Geran-2 drones. Mobile teams with vehicle-mounted machine guns, infrared-guided MANPADS, locally developed high-speed FPV interceptor drones: Ukraine has built an effective multi-layered defense against the slow propeller drone. The Geran-3 simultaneously challenges several of those layers.

Its speed — up to 600 km/h, or more than 500 km/h according to Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Yurii Ihnat — places it in the flight parameter category of cruise missiles on radar. Mobile teams armed with machine guns, effective against slow drones, struggle to engage it. Its maximum altitude of 9,000 meters puts it out of reach of many portable interception systems. Its radar cross-section of 0.05 m² makes it difficult to detect and track for surveillance systems.

Exploitable vulnerabilities: heat and sound

None of these characteristics make the Geran-3 invulnerable. Its thermal signature — the heat emitted by its turbojet engine — makes it detectable and targetable by infrared-guided missiles such as Stingers, Pioruns, and Strelas. Expert Valerii Romanenko has indicated that systems like the German Gepard are capable of engaging targets faster than the Geran-3. But these systems are limited in number, and their optimal deployment requires real-time information on trajectories.

The sharp sound of its turbojet, while complicating acoustic detection by systems like Sky Fortress (designed for the Shahed-136's sound profile), provides on the other hand a distinctive signal to other warning systems. The different acoustic signature is not necessarily an advantage: it can alert operators who know what they are hearing and rapidly direct appropriate systems to the threat. Adaptation on both sides is constant.

The cost and production: a revealing economic asymmetry

20,000 dollars against 1.4 million

One of the most revealing data points in this technological evolution is the cost differential between the two generations of drones. A Shahed-136/Geran-2 costs between $20,000 and $50,000 to produce. A jet-powered Shahed-238/Geran-3 can cost up to $1.4 million per unit, according to estimates by Army Recognition. That is a ratio of 30 to 70 times more expensive.

This cost asymmetry has direct implications for Russian strategy. Russia has announced plans to increase production of Shahed-136-type drones from 2,000 to 5,000 per month. That production volume is achievable for units costing $20,000–$50,000. It becomes considerably harder to sustain for units costing $1.4 million. The jet propulsion and additional guidance systems inevitably slow the production rate. The Geran-3 therefore cannot replace the Geran-2 in mass strikes — it complements it in precision high-value strikes.

North Korea in the equation

Ukrainian reports, referenced in the article lot summary, indicate thousands of North Korean workers deployed to help Russia produce long-range drones on its territory. This information, if confirmed in its scope, adds another dimension to the Russian drone production chain. North Korea has long experience producing military equipment under severe sanctions — it has developed alternative supply and manufacturing capabilities under constraint that Russia, less experienced in this regime, can leverage.

This Iran-Russia-North Korea trilogy in the drone production chain illustrates the collective dimension of the axis of threats challenging democracies in 2026. These three states, each under international sanctions for different reasons, share technologies, personnel, and know-how within a parallel war economy that Western sanctions have not yet managed to dismantle.

The impact of strikes: numbers that speak

The night of July 30, 2025: a documented case

Data on the operational use of Geran-3 drones remains partially visible in public reports. Army Recognition documents in particular the attack of July 30–31, 2025, during which Ukrainian authorities reported the use of at least 8 jet-powered Shahed drones among the 78 Shahed drones launched. In that attack, 51 drones were neutralized by electronic warfare, interceptor drones, mobile firing teams, and anti-aircraft missiles. 27 drones nonetheless impacted 7 sites, causing 13 deaths and more than 130 wounded.

These figures illustrate two simultaneous realities: Ukrainian defense is effective (two-thirds of drones neutralized), but even when effective, it cannot intercept everything. The 27 drones that reached their targets represent a third of the volume launched — and that third is enough to cause significant civilian casualties. The increasing frequency of attacks and the introduction of faster vectors mechanically increase the number of successful strikes.

The evolution of the penetration rate

Data compiled by Army Recognition shows that the percentage of successful drone strikes (those that reach their target) rose from 5% in the first quarter of 2025 to 15% in the second quarter of 2025. This threefold multiplication of the penetration rate coincides with the increased use of Geran-3 drones, even if the causal link has not yet been formally established. Analysts note that it is not yet clear whether the Geran-3 is directly responsible for this increase, or whether other factors (higher total volume, improved saturation tactics) explain the evolution.

What is known with certainty: the combination of large numbers of Geran-2 (saturation) and faster Geran-3 (penetration) forms an employment doctrine aimed at exhausting Ukrainian missile stocks and reducing the number of interceptors available for more serious ballistic threats. It is a strategy of defensive resource attrition, not only of target destruction.

The Ukrainian response and prospects

Adaptation underway

Ukraine has not remained passive in the face of the Geran-3's emergence. It has developed and deployed high-speed FPV interceptor drones adapted to engage faster targets than propeller drones. Volodymyr Zelensky has called for producing 1,000 interceptors per day. Mykhailo Fedorov, Minister of Digital Transformation, has however signaled limitations in effectiveness against jet-powered Shahed drones — their superior speed complicates interception by drones that are themselves slower.

The most effective response appears to lie in the combination of German Gepards (capable of engaging fast targets), infrared-guided missiles (Stingers, Pioruns), and more precise radar data allowing the right systems to be directed toward the right targets at the right time. It is a systems-level response, not a single gadget — an integrated approach that demands exacting operational coordination, particularly during mass nocturnal strike conditions.

What the West must supply

The rising capability of the Geran-3 reinforces the urgency of certain Western deliveries to Ukraine. PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles (hundreds of which have been promised according to United24 Media) are capable of engaging high-altitude, high-speed targets — exactly the Geran-3's profile. German IRIS-T and American NASAMS systems are also relevant responses. But all these systems exist in insufficient numbers, and their munitions cost considerably more than the drone they destroy.

This is the fundamental economic asymmetry of air defense: a $1.4 million Geran-3 is destroyed by an interception missile that may also cost several million. Russia, Iran, and North Korea have calculated that even at that price, the pressure on Ukrainian defense stocks is strategically worthwhile. To counter it, Ukraine needs lower-cost solutions — and that is precisely what local interceptor drone programs seek to develop.

Electronic warfare: the third vector of defense

GPS jamming and autonomous navigation

Electronic warfare constitutes one of the most important axes of response against satellite-guided drones like the Geran-3. Ukrainian GPS jamming systems — deployed around urban areas and critical infrastructure sites — aim to disrupt the GLONASS/GPS signal the drone uses to navigate toward its target. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that more than 51 out of 78 drones were neutralized by electronic warfare during the July 30–31, 2025 attack — a proportion that exceeds combined missile and drone interceptions.

The challenge with the Geran-3 is that its navigation is not exclusively satellite-based. The hybrid inertial guidance variant can maintain an approximate heading even under intense jamming. The terminal infrared seeker variant does not depend on GPS signal at all for the final approach phase. This means that electronic warfare — effective against Geran-2 in more than half of cases — sees its effectiveness reduced against the most advanced variants of the Geran-3.

Western investment in Ukrainian electronic warfare

Germany, the United States, and other NATO partners have provided Ukraine with specialized electronic warfare systems whose details remain classified. What is publicly confirmed: Ukraine now integrates electronic warfare data into its air defense coordination centers, cross-referencing jamming zones with trajectories detected by radar and acoustic sensors. This multi-source integration is one of the keys to Ukrainian effectiveness — and one of the reasons Russia is developing drones with multiple independent guidance modes.

Ukrainian mobile electronic warfare teams — light units deployed to jam signals in anticipated approach zones — have become an essential component of Ukrainian air defense. They operate under real danger: a drone that loses its GPS signal may redirect its trajectory unpredictably, sometimes toward the jamming sources themselves. This is a known and accepted risk among operators.

Priority targets: energy, water, transport

A strategy of civilian infrastructure attrition

Analysis of targets struck by drone attacks from 2024 to 2026 reveals a coherent strategy: Russia prioritizes energy infrastructure (thermal power plants, electrical substations, gas pipelines), water infrastructure (pumping stations, treatment reservoirs), and transport infrastructure (rail nodes, fuel depots). These are not military targets in the strict sense — they are the systems that allow the Ukrainian civilian population to live. The stated objective in accessible Russian doctrinal documents is to break the will to resist through degradation of living conditions.

The rise of the Geran-3 in this context is significant: its capacity to fly at 9,000 meters altitude allows it to evade short-range systems protecting critical infrastructure sites. Its thermobaric charges — documented in certain configurations — are particularly destructive against industrial structures. And its multi-modal guidance precision allows it to hit substations or turbines with an accuracy the Geran-2 did not systematically achieve.

Reconstruction under fire: a Ukrainian paradox

Ukraine has developed a remarkable capacity for rapid infrastructure repair. Ukrenergo teams and regional distributors sometimes restore electricity within 48 hours of a strike. This resilience is real and documented. But it erodes under cumulative pressure: each repaired substation is a potential target in the next wave of strikes. High-power transformers, with order lead times of 12 to 18 months, constitute the most fragile link. Russia knows this, and targets these components as a priority.

The jet-powered Geran-3 fits into this logic of critical infrastructure attrition as the most precise and least easily intercepted tool in the system. It is no accident that its deployment coincided with an intensification of strikes on Ukrainian energy sites documented by Ukrinform and Kyiv Independent throughout the first half of 2026.

Conclusion: the technological war above Ukrainian cities

An evolution that will not stop

The Geran-3 is not the last evolution in Russia's drone warfare. The logic of this war — every defensive adaptation generates an offensive response — guarantees that new variants, new capabilities, new challenges will emerge. Russia's announcement that it is considering air-launched variants — still without evidence of operational deployment by mid-2025 according to analysts — suggests the program continues to evolve.

For Ukrainian defenders working every night under emergency conditions to identify, track, and intercept these threats, this technological evolution is a concrete and permanent reality. Their extraordinary adaptation — from defending against Shahed-136 in 2022 to defending against Geran-3 in 2026 — is a demonstration of resilience from which the entire world should draw lessons.

Iran in the background: weapons that kill Ukrainian civilians

It must be named clearly: the Iranian Shahed-238 → Russian Geran-3 chain means that Iran has provided Russia with the technology to strike Ukrainian cities more effectively. These drones fall on maternity wards, markets, and residential buildings. Every Geran-3 that penetrates Ukrainian defenses carries the shared responsibility of Tehran.

The Iran that claims to play a mediating role in the Middle East, the Iran that presents itself as a regional peacemaker, simultaneously arms one of the longest air terror campaigns in recent history against a civilian population. This contradiction must be kept at the forefront of every diplomatic discussion with Tehran. It is not there enough.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

The nature of this testimony

This text is titled testimony not because I was present in Ukraine during the described strikes, nor because I personally met members of Ukrainian air defense. I was not there. I have no direct contact with field operators. This testimony is that of a columnist who reads, synthesizes, and reports — and who refuses to claim a presence he did not have.

All factual data in this text comes from identified sources: primarily Army Recognition (June 29, 2026), Ukrainska Pravda (July 2, 2026), and data from the Ukrainian General Staff. The production, cost, and technical performance figures for the Geran-3 are those of Army Recognition, a serious specialized publication in the documentation of military equipment. I report them with their source, not as absolute certainties.

What I do not know

I do not know precisely how many Geran-3 drones have been used in total, nor their exact proportion in July 2026 strikes. I do not know whether the cost data ($1.4 million) is current or based on 2024–2025 figures. I do not know with certainty what proportion North Korean workers contribute to the production of these drones. These uncertainties are preserved in the text rather than erased.

My method: report what is documented, signal the limits of that documentation, and resist the temptation to extrapolate toward certainties the sources do not justify. The drone war is a rapidly evolving field where data becomes obsolete within weeks. Analytical caution is a necessity.

Sources

Primary sources

Army Recognition — Russia's jet-powered Shahed-238 drones introduce new challenges to Ukraine's air defenses — June 29, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — Operational update — July 2, 2026

Ukrinform — Coverage of drone strikes and air defense — July 2026

Secondary sources

Kyiv Independent — Coverage of Russian strikes and Ukrainian air defense — 2026

Militarnyi — Analysis of weapons systems in Ukraine — 2026

Al Jazeera — Russia reports downing 660 Ukrainian drones — June 26, 2026