TESTIMONY: China is keeping Russia at war — what NATO is finally documenting

TESTIMONY: China is keeping Russia at war — what NATO is finally documenting

Introduction: The report that says what everyone knew but refused to name

The NATO Association of Canada publishes a comprehensive report

The NATO Association of Canada published on June 26, 2026 a special report titled "China's Strategic Complicity and the Hidden Engine Behind Russia's War Effort." This report synthesizes trade data, supply chain analyses, and investigations into entities involved in goods transfers to Russia. Its conclusion is unambiguous: without China, Russia "would struggle considerably to wage its war in Ukraine." China is not a passive observer of this conflict — it is an active engine of it.

This report does not say something new for analysts who have closely tracked trade flows between Beijing and Moscow since 2022. But it says it with documentary rigor and a level of detail that makes denial difficult. It arrives at the moment when Western democracies are debating how to handle economic ties with China — a debate into which this report inserts itself as a factual argument that is hard to route around.

The numbers that don't lie: $240 billion in trade

An explosion of commercial exchanges since the invasion

Chinese customs data cited in the report is unequivocal: total trade between China and Russia reached $240 billion in 2023, representing growth of 26.3% compared to 2022. Chinese exports to Russia increased by 46.9% between 2022 and 2023, and by 64.2% between 2021 and 2023. China has become Russia's largest trading partner, surpassing the European Union.

This commercial boom coincides exactly with the imposition of Western sanctions following the 2022 invasion. Before sanctions, Russia had access to Western technologies, machinery, and components. After, those channels were cut. And China filled the void — not involuntarily, not out of ignorance, but deliberately. The NATO Association of Canada report concludes that China "has effectively replaced Western nations as a source of battlefield goods and critical components." The substitution was complete and it was chosen.

CNC machine tools: the invisible weapon

From 13% to 90% market share in six years

CNC machine tools — computer-numerically-controlled machines used in virtually every industrial sector and particularly in the defense industry — illustrate better than any other product the transformation of Russian supply flows. China's share of Russian imports of metalworking machine tools rose from 13% in 2017 to 28% in 2021, then to 60% in 2022 and 90% in 2023. In two years, China went from being one supplier among many to being the near-exclusive supplier.

These machines are used to manufacture missile casings, aircraft components, drone parts, ammunition, electronics, and armored vehicle components. The Russian defense industry consumes 70 to 80% of the country's CNC machine tools. An import substitution program that Russia had launched for these machines had "largely failed" according to the report. Without Chinese CNC machines, the Russian defense industry would slow dramatically — that is precisely as simple as it sounds.

Semiconductors and microelectronics: 88-90% Chinese origin

The chips that make Russian missiles function

China accounted for 88% of semiconductors exported to Russia in the first half of 2023, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). US officials stated that China provided Russia with 90% of its microelectronics over the preceding year. These components are used in manufacturing missiles, tanks, and aircraft. Chinese-origin microelectronics have been found in captured Russian cruise missiles, Russian battle tanks, and Orlan drones.

More revealing still: Chinese companies are shipping to Russia electronic components taken from common household appliances — microwaves, televisions — as lower-quality substitutes for high-technology components made inaccessible by sanctions. Russia is running its missiles on dishwasher chips. This is a real technological degradation — but a degradation that China allows Russia to partially compensate for. The chips are cruder. The missiles still fly.

Trucks, tractors, and the "Surovikin Line"

How China built Russia's ground defenses

Perhaps the least publicized aspect of Chinese support is also the most concrete: heavy vehicles. Chinese imports of super-heavy trucks by Russia increased by 728% in 2022 compared to 2021, totaling 45,000 units in 2023. Tractor imports went from zero in 2021 to 48,000 units between early 2022 and September 2023. Chinese exports of excavators to Russia more than quadrupled after September 2022.

This equipment had a direct and measurable impact on the battlefield. The Atlantic Council concludes that Chinese-origin earthmoving and excavation equipment "was instrumental in enabling Russian forces to fortify their positions" — including in the construction of the Surovikin Line, the deep-defense system that Ukraine encountered during its 2023 offensives. Chinese excavators dug the Ukrainian trenches that the Ukrainian army then had to cross under fire. The loop is complete.

The bypass route: Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan

How sanctions are circumvented through EAEU countries

Faced with Western sanctions, Chinese exporters and Russian importers developed bypass circuits through member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Kyrgyzstan is the most thoroughly documented example: its vehicle imports from China rose from $300 million to $3.1 billion between 2021 and 2023 — representing 22% of the country's GDP in imported Chinese vehicles alone. Chinese exports of ball bearings to Kyrgyzstan increased by 2,500% over the same period — bearings used in manufacturing Russian tanks.

Kazakhstan plays a similar role. Its vehicle imports doubled in 2023 compared to 2021. Third-party financial intermediaries facilitate payments for sanctioned goods, circumventing Western banking restrictions. The report notes that Chinese exporters and Russian importers are increasingly using these intermediaries — creating a sophisticated, deliberate bypass architecture that renders the sanctions partially permeable. It is not a loophole. It is an intentional infrastructure.

What the West can and must do

Secondary sanctions and diplomatic pressure

The NATO Association of Canada report calls for a Western response that "confronts this partnership through coordination" and "signals resolve." Secondary sanctions — targeting companies and banks in third countries that facilitate goods transfers to Russia — have been applied to a growing extent by the United States and European Union. But the report suggests these measures remain insufficient against the scale of the flows. More entities, more pressure, more consistency: the architecture of the response needs to match the architecture of the complicity.

US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen stated in November 2023 that it is private companies, not Chinese officials, who are responsible for sanctions evasion. But the report highlights that the level of oversight of Chinese company exports makes it probable that "Chinese officials are at least aware" of these flows. The line between state connivance and deliberate negligence is thin — and in either case, the consequences for Ukraine are identical. The causal chain ends the same way regardless of the intent at its origin.

Body armor and helmets: direct military support laid bare

Bulletproof vests and helmets purchased en masse by Russia

Beyond advanced technologies, Chinese support also includes basic but critical military equipment. Chinese exports of aramid fibers — used in bulletproof vests — to Russia increased by 350% between 2021 and 2022. By January and February 2023, these imports had already reached half the total annual volume of 2022. A Moscow-based company, Legittelekom, purchased 100,000 military-grade head protection items and 100,000 suits from Deekon Shanghai. Another company, Pozitron, founded in March 2021, saw its revenues rise from $400,000 in 2021 to $300 million in 2022 through imports of "airsoft helmets" and "various ceramics" from Chinese suppliers.

These personal protective items — vests, helmets, combat suits — are supplied directly to the Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine. These are not abstract technology transfers affecting distant production lines. These are items worn by the men advancing toward Ukrainian positions. China is not only equipping the Russian war economy — it is equipping the Russian soldiers themselves, individually, with the gear they wear into battle.

Conclusion: Naming the complicity to respond to it

What this report changes in the Western debate

This report will not change Beijing's policy overnight. China has its own strategic calculations — weakening Russia is not in its short-term interest, and directly confronting the West is not either. But publicly and precisely naming Chinese complicity creates a documentary basis for policy decisions that Western governments were hesitant to take without irrefutable evidence. This report provides that evidence. It now falls to elected officials and diplomats to use it.

The asymmetric calculus of proxy war

China helps Russia at a relatively low marginal cost to itself — commercial exports that generate profit, not a direct military commitment. The West, by contrast, must invest massively to maintain Ukrainian defense capacity. This asymmetry — cheap complicity against costly support — is the proxy war logic that Beijing has mastered. The response demands a strategy that raises the cost of this complicity for China, until that cost exceeds the benefits of partnership with Moscow. That calculation is achievable. It requires will.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Editorial positioning

This analytical testimony is written from the perspective of a columnist convinced that China's complicity in the Russian war effort is documented, real, and must be named. The author draws on the NATO Association of Canada report published on June 26, 2026 and the sources cited within it — including data from the KSE Institute, CSIS, the Atlantic Council, and the Carnegie Endowment.

Important nuances

The report distinguishes between private Chinese companies and government officials. It acknowledges that the line between state policy and deliberate negligence is difficult to trace precisely. The columnist maintains this nuance: what is documented is complicity in fact, independent of the question of explicit coordination between Chinese companies and the Chinese government.

Sources

Primary sources

NATO Association of Canada — China's Strategic Complicity and the Hidden Engine Behind Russia's War Effort — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 27, 2026 — June 27, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Context: Occupied Territories and Russian War Crimes — June 23, 2026

United24 Media — Context: Russia's Military Infrastructure Vulnerabilities — June 24, 2026

Euromaidan Press — Context: Russian Supply Chain and Belarus — June 24, 2026

Ukrainska Pravda — Context: Russian War Economy — June 26, 2026