TESTIMONY: The Kyiv-Berlin agreement — anti-ballistic missiles and Termit drones, an alliance forged in war

TESTIMONY: The Kyiv-Berlin agreement — anti-ballistic missiles and Termit drones, an alliance forged in war

Introduction: June 18, 2026 — a $400 million defense deal that changes the equation

What was signed and what it means

On June 18, 2026, Ukraine and Germany concluded a $400 million bilateral defense agreement that goes beyond any previous arms package in its strategic depth. The deal covers two distinct but complementary axes: the delivery of PAC-3 anti-ballistic missiles compatible with Ukraine's existing Patriot air defense systems, and the co-production of Termit unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). It is not just a transaction — it is the foundation of a defense industrial partnership.

The context matters. This agreement was signed within days of Chancellor Friedrich Merz's historic visit to Kyiv, where he and President Zelensky signed the Strategic Partnership Declaration. That political framework gave birth to this concrete military-industrial deal. Words became hardware. Declarations became deterrence. The Kyiv-Berlin axis in 2026 looks nothing like the Germany that sent helmets to Ukraine in February 2022.

The participants: Germany's defense industry takes a decisive step

The German defense industry — anchored by companies like Rheinmetall, KNDS Germany, and the suppliers integrated into the Patriot system consortium — has undergone a structural transformation since 2022. The agreement on PAC-3 missiles draws on this transformation: German production lines have been retooled and accelerated to meet commitments to Ukraine. The Termit UGV co-production component is even more forward-looking — it creates a shared development and manufacturing capacity that will outlast this war.

On the Ukrainian side, the deal engages Ukroboronprom and the emerging network of Ukrainian private defense firms that have grown rapidly since 2022. Ukraine's defense industry has proven its capacity to produce, adapt, and innovate under combat conditions — a track record that makes it a credible co-production partner rather than merely an end-user. This peer-to-peer dimension of the deal is what distinguishes it from simple arms deliveries.

The PAC-3 missiles: what they bring to Ukraine's air defense

The technical specificity of PAC-3

The PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3) is the most advanced interceptor in the Patriot system family. Unlike earlier Patriot variants that use fragmentation warheads to destroy targets in proximity, the PAC-3 uses hit-to-kill technology — it physically collides with incoming ballistic missiles to destroy them. This makes it far more effective against modern ballistic threats, including the Iskander-M missiles that Russia has deployed extensively against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.

Ukraine has operated Patriot systems since 2023, delivered initially by the United States and subsequently by Germany and other allies. But the supply of PAC-3 interceptors has been a persistent bottleneck — the missiles are expensive, production-limited, and in high demand across NATO allies. The June 18 agreement commits Germany to a specific tranche of PAC-3 missiles that will meaningfully increase Ukraine's ballistic missile defense capacity.

The operational impact: protecting cities from Iskander strikes

Iskander-M ballistic missiles have been among the most destructive weapons in Russia's arsenal against Ukrainian urban areas. Their high speed, quasi-ballistic trajectory, and precision make them extremely difficult to intercept with older systems. The PAC-3's hit-to-kill capability is specifically designed to address this threat profile. Every additional PAC-3 interceptor in Ukraine's inventory reduces the probability that an Iskander reaches its target — a hospital, an apartment building, an energy facility.

The strategic value of these missiles goes beyond individual intercepts. Their presence in Ukraine's air defense architecture changes the calculus for Russian missile planners. When a high-value target is covered by PAC-3 capable systems, it requires more missiles to saturate the defense — increasing the cost of each attack. This deterrent effect, multiplied across Ukraine's critical infrastructure, is why air defense investment is described as force-multiplying. The June 18 deal is a direct contribution to this effect.

The Termit UGV: co-production as a new model of partnership

What the Termit is and what it does

The Termit UGV (Unmanned Ground Vehicle) is a Ukrainian-developed robotic combat platform designed to operate in the contested, heavily mined, and drone-saturated environments of the current front lines. It can carry weapons, evacuate wounded soldiers, deliver supplies, or conduct reconnaissance — all without risking a human life in situations that would otherwise require soldiers to enter the most dangerous zones. Ukraine's experience with the Termit and related platforms in combat has produced battlefield data that no European laboratory or test range can replicate.

The co-production agreement with Germany transforms the Termit from a Ukrainian product to a jointly-developed platform with access to German engineering precision, quality control processes, and supply chains. German expertise in electronics, sensors, and mechanical engineering complements Ukrainian combat experience and rapid iteration capacity. The result should be a more capable, more reliable platform — and a joint manufacturing capacity that can scale to meet both Ukrainian wartime needs and NATO's growing interest in UGV technology.

UGVs and the future of European land warfare

The Termit co-production deal is not just about today's war. It is a signal about where land warfare is heading. European armies have watched the Ukrainian conflict produce innovations in drone warfare, electronic countermeasures, and robotic ground vehicles that will shape military doctrine for the next two decades. Germany, through this deal, is not just supporting Ukraine — it is positioning itself at the frontier of these innovations. This is defense industrial policy as much as military aid.

NATO member states have been debating UGV integration into combined arms doctrine for years. Ukraine has been doing it in practice, under fire, and iterating faster than any development program in peacetime conditions could. The knowledge embedded in the Termit platform — hard-won in the most difficult operational environment imaginable — is a strategic asset. The co-production deal with Germany begins the process of transferring that knowledge into NATO's broader industrial and doctrinal development.

The Ramstein Group 35: the broader context

The Ukraine Defense Contact Group at its 35th meeting

The June 18 agreement occurred in the context of the 35th meeting of the Ramstein Group — the Ukraine Defense Contact Group that has coordinated allied military support to Ukraine since April 2022. With over 50 nations participating, the Ramstein format has been the primary mechanism for aligning defense commitments, avoiding duplication, and ensuring that Ukraine receives the specific capabilities it needs most urgently. The bilateral German-Ukrainian deal was announced alongside other national commitments at this meeting.

The Ramstein framework's value has been its ability to translate political commitments into practical coordination. When Ukraine identifies a gap — such as the shortage of PAC-3 interceptors — the Ramstein process creates the space for individual allies to step forward and fill it. Germany's June 18 commitment on PAC-3 is, in part, a response to precisely this kind of gap identification. The process works — imperfectly, with delays that cost Ukrainian lives — but it works.

What the 35th meeting delivered overall

The 35th Ramstein meeting produced a package of commitments that extended well beyond the German-Ukrainian bilateral deal. Multiple allies announced additional artillery ammunition deliveries, drone systems, electronic warfare equipment, and financial contributions to Ukraine's defense budget. The cumulative effect of these commitments, meeting after meeting since April 2022, has been the transformation of Ukraine's military capacity from an outnumbered defender to one of the most experienced and well-equipped ground forces in the world.

That transformation is not yet complete. Ukraine still faces shortages in critical areas — interceptor missiles, long-range precision strike capabilities, armored vehicle replacement rates. But the trajectory is clear: each Ramstein meeting builds on the previous, and the coalition's commitment to Ukraine has deepened rather than weakened over time. The June 18 bilateral agreement is one data point in a much larger picture of sustained alliance support.

Starmer's statement and UK participation

The British dimension of the June 18 commitments

At the 35th Ramstein meeting, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced a continuation and expansion of the UK's military support commitment to Ukraine. While the German-Ukrainian deal was the headline bilateral announcement, the British commitments — including continued delivery of Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles, additional air defense components, and expanded military training programs — form an essential complement to the German package. The UK has consistently been among the most operationally significant contributors to Ukraine's air and precision strike capabilities.

The UK's participation in the Ramstein format despite its post-Brexit position outside EU structures demonstrates the same logic that drives its participation in the E5 format: British strategic interests are directly engaged by the outcome of this war, and London has chosen to act on that reality rather than hide behind institutional separation from European mechanisms. Starmer's personal conviction on Ukraine — stated explicitly at multiple forums — gives the British commitment a durability that goes beyond tactical political calculation.

Training as a strategic multiplier

The UK's military training program for Ukrainian forces — which has trained over 50,000 soldiers since 2022 — is among the most impactful, and least discussed, contributions to Ukraine's defense capacity. Weapons without trained operators are underutilized. The British program, combined with EU training missions and bilateral programs from multiple allies, has created a generation of Ukrainian soldiers trained to NATO standards. This investment in human capital will matter as much as the weapons themselves — both during this war and in building Ukraine's long-term defense capacity.

The June 18 Ramstein meeting reinforced commitments to continue and expand training programs. The German-Ukrainian deal's co-production component on the Termit platform has a training dimension built in — joint production requires joint technical knowledge transfer, which is a form of extended training for Ukrainian defense industry personnel. These multiplier effects are why the most significant agreements in this war are often not the ones that make the biggest headlines.

What the deal means for Ukrainian sovereignty and defense independence

Moving from dependency to partnership

One of the most significant aspects of the June 18 agreement is what it signals about the evolution of Ukraine's relationship with its Western defense partners. In the early months of the war, Ukraine was largely a recipient of whatever allied nations were willing to provide from existing stocks — used equipment, weapons systems being phased out, surplus ammunition. The Termit co-production deal represents something fundamentally different: Ukraine as a co-developer, bringing intellectual property and combat-tested know-how to a joint product.

This shift matters enormously for Ukraine's long-term defense posture. A country that can co-produce advanced defense systems is less vulnerable to supply chain disruptions, political shifts in donor countries, or the emergence of capability gaps in weapons systems it does not control. The defense industrial partnership being built with Germany is a step toward the kind of sovereignty in defense that Ukraine's security situation ultimately requires. It will take years — but the direction is set.

The Zeitenwende and its military-industrial manifestation

Germany's Zeitenwende — the strategic transformation announced by then-Chancellor Scholz in February 2022 and accelerated by Merz since taking office — finds its most concrete military-industrial expression in deals like the June 18 agreement. Abstract commitments to increased defense spending and support for Ukraine materialize as production contracts, delivery schedules, and co-development agreements. The $400 million deal is the Zeitenwende made tangible.

Germany still has work to do. Delivery timelines for committed systems have sometimes lagged behind announcements. The gap between political commitment and operational delivery remains a source of frustration in Kyiv. But the direction is clear, and the June 18 agreement is a significant data point in the right direction. Germany is becoming the strategic partner that Ukraine needs — not perfectly, not fast enough, but genuinely and with increasing depth.

Russia's reaction and the escalation dynamic

Moscow's response to the bilateral deal

Moscow responded to the German-Ukrainian defense deal with predictable rhetoric about Western escalation and Russia's right to respond proportionally. This response is itself part of Russia's information warfare: every Western military support decision is framed as an escalation to deter future commitments, create political friction in donor countries, and provide domestic propaganda material. The framing is false, but it is consistent — and it works, to a degree, on audiences that are not closely following the facts of this war.

The reality is the inverse: it is Russia that has escalated, consistently and deliberately, at every stage of this conflict. The June 14–15 attack on the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra was Russia's escalation. The deployment of North Korean troops to Russian front lines was Russia's escalation. Russia's use of Iranian drones and Chinese dual-use technology is Russia's escalation. Western defense support to Ukraine is not escalation — it is a measured response to escalation. That distinction matters, and it must be stated clearly every time Moscow attempts to reverse it.

The deterrence calculation

The fundamental logic of the June 18 deal — and all Western military support to Ukraine — is deterrence. Each additional capability delivered to Ukraine raises the cost of continued Russian aggression. More air defense means more Russian missiles are intercepted, increasing the cost of each strike. Co-produced UGVs mean more effective Ukrainian ground operations, raising the cost of Russian advances. Sustained military support means Russia's war of attrition will fail, because Ukraine's attrition rate is offset by allied supply chains in a way that Russia's is not.

This deterrence logic has limitations. It has not deterred Putin from continuing the war. But it has deterred a Russian military breakthrough. Ukraine has held — not without territorial losses, not without enormous cost — but it has held. The $400 million deal signed on June 18 is another contribution to the capacity that makes holding possible. In a war of attrition, every investment in that holding capacity has direct strategic value.

The broader picture: building Ukraine's future defense architecture

Bilateral deals as building blocks of post-war security

The June 18 German-Ukrainian defense deal is one building block in what is gradually becoming a coherent architecture for Ukraine's long-term security. Alongside it sit: the Strategic Partnership Declaration with Germany, the UK-Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the US-Ukraine minerals fund, the network of bilateral agreements that Ukraine has signed with dozens of partners since 2024. Each is imperfect. None is a substitute for NATO membership. Together, they create a web of commitments that is harder to unravel than any single agreement.

This web is Ukraine's insurance policy in the absence of formal NATO security guarantees. It is also the foundation from which post-war security guarantees — whatever form they ultimately take — will be built. The countries that are deepest in this web, that have invested most heavily in Ukrainian defense capacity, will have the strongest stake in ensuring that investment is protected by durable security arrangements. Germany's June 18 deal is an investment in exactly this future.

What co-production means for European defense integration

The Termit co-production agreement also has implications beyond the Ukrainian-German bilateral relationship. It is a template for how European defense integration might work in the future: not through top-down institutional mandates, but through bilateral co-development agreements driven by specific operational needs and industrial complementarities. Ukraine's combat experience and Germany's industrial precision are a natural pairing. Similar pairings — France's propulsion technology with Ukrainian drone design, Dutch electronics with Polish manufacturing — could produce a European defense industrial ecosystem that is both more capable and more resilient than the current fragmented model.

This vision of European defense integration is still nascent. The June 18 deal is a prototype, not a finished architecture. But it demonstrates that the path exists. War has accelerated what peacetime diplomacy could not achieve: genuine defense industrial convergence between Western European industrial capacity and Eastern European operational experience. That convergence will define European security for decades.

What Ukraine still needs

The gaps that remain after June 18

The June 18 agreement fills important gaps — but it does not fill all gaps. Ukraine's most urgent needs on the air defense front go beyond PAC-3 missiles. The country needs more Patriot batteries in total — the number currently deployed cannot cover all of Ukraine's critical infrastructure simultaneously. It needs continued supply of IRIS-T SLM systems from Germany. It needs the promised F-16 deliveries to continue and accelerate, because fighters with air-to-air missiles are an essential complement to ground-based air defense. And it needs the supply chains for all of these systems to be protected against the kind of production bottlenecks that have intermittently disrupted deliveries.

On the ground forces side, the Termit co-production deal is a start, but Ukraine's UGV fleet needs to scale dramatically to address the manpower pressures it faces. The mathematics of the current war — Russia's greater manpower reserves against Ukraine's smaller but better-trained force — make any technology that reduces the human cost of battlefield operations strategically critical. The June 18 deal opens a door. Ukraine needs that door to stay open and the production to accelerate.

The financial dimension: sustaining the industrial pipeline

Defense agreements of the scope signed on June 18 have financial implications that go beyond the headline $400 million figure. Co-production requires sustained investment in industrial infrastructure, workforce training, quality control systems, and supply chain development. Germany must be willing to maintain this investment over the multi-year horizon that real co-production capacity requires — through election cycles, budget pressures, and the inevitable political turbulence that all democracies experience.

Ukraine, for its part, must create the regulatory and institutional environment that makes foreign defense investment viable and attractive. This means continuing the anti-corruption reforms underway, strengthening intellectual property protections, and building the transparent procurement systems that Western defense companies require. These institutional requirements are demanding in peacetime — they are extraordinarily difficult to meet in wartime. That Ukraine is making progress on them is a testament to the extraordinary commitment of its government and civil service.

Conclusion: From allies to partners — a qualitative leap

What the June 18 deal says about Ukraine's place in the Western alliance

The $400 million German-Ukrainian defense deal of June 18, 2026 represents a qualitative leap in the relationship between Ukraine and its Western supporters. The shift from arms deliveries to co-production is not merely a change in commercial arrangement — it is a change in strategic relationship. A co-production partner is not an aid recipient. It is a sovereign defense industrial actor contributing know-how, manufacturing capacity, and strategic value to a shared enterprise. The June 18 deal treats Ukraine as that kind of partner. That is its deepest significance.

This qualitative shift matters for the entire Western alliance. Ukraine is not a burden to be managed — it is an asset to be developed. Its combat experience, its innovation capacity, its defense industrial base are resources that NATO needs as it adapts to the strategic environment that Russia's aggression has created. Recognizing and acting on this insight is what distinguishes the best Western policy responses from the merely adequate ones. The June 18 deal is an example of the former.

The path ahead: from partnership to security

The defense partnership cemented on June 18 is a step on a longer road. The ultimate destination — for Ukraine, for Germany, for Europe — is a security architecture in which Ukraine's defense is guaranteed not only by bilateral agreements and co-production deals, but by formal collective security commitments. That architecture is still being built. The OTAN Ankara summit showed how far the remaining obstacles are. The June 18 deal shows how much has already been built. Both truths need to be held simultaneously as the path ahead is navigated.

The strategic implications for China, Iran, and North Korea

What the Western defense industrial deepening signals to authoritarian states

The June 18 defense deal between Germany and Ukraine sends a message beyond the bilateral relationship. China — which has been supplying Russia with dual-use technology and economic lifelines — is watching the Western defense industrial response to this war. Every co-production agreement, every new capability delivered to Ukraine, is evidence that the Western alliance can adapt and sustain a high-tempo defense industrial response. This evidence matters for Beijing's calculations about Taiwan and about the credibility of Western security commitments.

Iran and North Korea — whose drone and ammunition supplies to Russia have been documented and sanctioned — are also watching. The message: arming Russia comes with costs, including the deepening of Western defense partnerships that directly counter the capabilities you provide. The June 18 deal's PAC-3 component is a direct response to the Iskander missiles and Shahed drones that Russia deploys against Ukrainian cities. Every interceptor delivered is a message to Tehran and Pyongyang: your contribution to Russia's war is being countered, systematically and sustainably.

The long game: outlasting Russia's war capacity

The fundamental strategic wager of the Western defense support to Ukraine — of which the June 18 deal is one expression — is that the Western alliance's industrial capacity and economic resources exceed Russia's war-making capacity over the long run. Russia has demonstrated remarkable resilience in sustaining its war economy under sanctions. But it is operating at the limits of its industrial capacity, relying on imported technology from China, Iran, and North Korea to compensate for Western technology it can no longer access.

The West, if it maintains and deepens its commitment, can outlast that capacity. The June 18 agreement is a commitment to the long game. It creates supply chains, production agreements, and industrial partnerships that are designed to be sustained over years, not months. That durability is the ultimate deterrent: not just that Ukraine has specific capabilities today, but that the pipeline to replace and expand those capabilities is secure.

Conclusion: A new chapter in European defense

The June 18 deal as historical marker

The $400 million German-Ukrainian defense agreement of June 18, 2026 will be studied by historians of European defense as a pivotal document. Not because of its specific dollar figure — there have been larger single transactions. But because of what it represents: the moment when the world's fourth-largest economy committed not just to arming a country at war, but to becoming its defense industrial partner. That commitment has consequences that extend well beyond the immediate battlefield.

It extends to the future of European defense integration. To the long-term deterrence architecture of the continent. To the question of what kind of Europe emerges from this war — one that has internalized the lessons of Russian aggression and built genuine collective defense capacity, or one that slides back into the strategic complacency that allowed this war to happen in the first place. The June 18 deal is a vote for the former. I hope it is remembered, and honored, as exactly that.

Ukraine's testimony to Western resolve

This testimony is addressed, ultimately, to the decision-makers in Berlin, in Brussels, in London, and in every capital that has committed to Ukraine's defense. What you have signed on June 18 was heard in Kyiv. It was heard in the apartments where families shelter during air raids. It was heard by the soldiers manning air defense batteries who now know that more interceptors are coming. Your commitment is not abstract to them. It is the difference between making it through tonight and not. Honor it. Deliver on time. Do not let the gap between the announcement and the delivery become the story.

What this agreement means for NATO's future

Co-production as a model for NATO defense industrial policy

The Termit UGV co-production model has implications for NATO's defense industrial policy that have not yet been fully articulated. NATO members have long struggled with the challenge of interoperability — building systems that work together across 32 national defense industries with different standards, procurement processes, and strategic cultures. Co-production agreements like the June 18 deal create an interoperability at the industrial level that top-down standardization mandates have never achieved.

If this model — bilateral or multilateral co-production driven by operational need and industrial complementarity — became a standard approach to NATO defense industrial cooperation, the results could be transformative. Systems designed to work together because they were built together. Supply chains integrated because they share components. Maintenance and upgrade programs coordinated because the original development was shared. Ukraine's co-production partnership with Germany is a proof of concept for this vision. NATO's leadership should be paying close attention.

The message to Ukraine's allies yet to step up

Germany's June 18 commitment is also, implicitly, a challenge to allies who have committed less in proportion to their capacity. Within NATO, the distribution of support for Ukraine remains uneven — some members have given generously relative to their GDP, others have stayed at the level of symbolic contributions. The June 18 deal raises the bar. When Germany, which started this war sending helmets, is now co-producing unmanned ground vehicles with Ukraine, it becomes harder for other allies to justify the minimum.

The political will to match Germany's engagement exists in many capitals — what sometimes lacks is the institutional creativity to find the right format. Co-production deals, training programs, technology sharing, joint exercises — there are many ways to contribute beyond raw financial transfers. The allies that have not yet found their contribution at the level of Germany's current commitment need to keep looking. Ukraine's survival is a collective responsibility, and the June 18 deal is a reminder of what taking that responsibility seriously looks like.

Conclusion: A partnership built to last

The June 18 deal in five years

In five years, historians will look back at June 18, 2026 and see one of the moments when the German-Ukrainian defense partnership became irreversible. Not the first moment — the Zeitenwende speech, the first Leopard tank delivery, the Strategic Partnership Declaration all preceded it. But the moment when the relationship crystallized into the kind of industrial co-production partnership that endures through political cycles, budget pressures, and peace negotiations. That is the legacy of the $400 million deal.

Five years from now, Termit-variant UGVs built in joint German-Ukrainian facilities will be operating somewhere on the European continent. PAC-3 missiles with German and Ukrainian components will be protecting cities. The defense industrial partnership that was born on June 18, 2026 will have grown into something that both countries — and European security — depend on. That is the future this deal builds toward. It is a future worth building.

The final testimony

I want to close this testimony with a direct word to those who made the June 18 deal happen — the negotiators, the engineers, the defense ministers, the analysts, the politicians in both Berlin and Kyiv who found the common ground. You built something real. In the middle of a war, with all the pressures and distractions that entails, you built an agreement that will matter long after the specific circumstances that drove it are history. That is what partnership looks like. That is what honoring commitments looks like. Thank you for not waiting for a more convenient moment.

Conclusion: The alliance forged holds

Looking forward from the Ramstein room

The 35th Ramstein Group meeting will not be remembered as the most dramatic event of this war. There were no battlefield reversals, no peace breakthroughs, no prisoner exchanges on this day. What happened was more quiet and more durable: fifty nations met, coordinated, committed, and left with a clearer picture of how Ukraine will be defended in the months ahead. Germany and Ukraine signed an agreement that deepens their defense partnership in ways that will outlast this meeting by decades. That is how wars are ultimately won or lost — not in dramatic moments alone, but in the steady accumulation of commitments honored.

The alliance forged on June 18, 2026 holds. I believe it will continue to hold. And when Ukraine finally achieves the peace it has earned through its sacrifice and resilience, this day will be one of the markers on the road that made that peace possible.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My sources and their scope

This testimony is based on official Ukrainian government communications on the June 18, 2026 defense agreement, Ramstein Group meeting reports, and verified reporting from the Kyiv Independent and EuroMaidan Press on the bilateral deal. The figure of $400 million is drawn from official government sources. Technical details on PAC-3 capabilities are based on publicly available NATO and US Department of Defense documentation. My editorial position is explicitly pro-Ukraine and pro-Western alliance.

What I do not know

The specific delivery schedule for PAC-3 missiles under this agreement has not been made fully public. The technical specifications of the Termit UGV co-production arrangement are not fully disclosed. The full content of the 35th Ramstein meeting's collective commitments beyond the headline bilateral deal is not entirely public at the time of writing.

Sources

Primary sources

Kyiv Independent — Ukraine-Germany $400M defense deal: PAC-3 missiles and Termit UGV co-production — June 18, 2026

Ukrainian Ministry of Defense — Bilateral defense agreement with Germany, Ramstein Group 35 — June 2026

UK Government — PM Starmer remarks at Ramstein 35 — June 2026

Secondary sources

EuroMaidan Press — Germany-Ukraine defense deal: PAC-3 and Termit UGV at Ramstein 35 — June 2026

Ukrinform — Germany-Ukraine defense cooperation deepens — June 2026

Militarnyi — Germany-Ukraine PAC-3 and Termit agreement details — June 2026