TESTIMONY: Two North Korean soldiers captured in Ukraine refuse to return to Kim's country

Introduction: Two men between two states, two systems, two worlds

January 2025, Kursk region: the capture that changes everything

In January 2025, in the Kursk region, Ukrainian forces captured two soldiers who matched no expected description: men in Russian uniform, but whose language, papers, and physical characteristics revealed a different identity. They are North Korean soldiers. Sent by Kim Jong-un to fight alongside the Russian army under the mutual defense treaty signed between Moscow and Pyongyang in 2024, they are the first confirmed prisoners from a North Korean contingent in which more than 7,000 soldiers were killed or wounded in that same Kursk campaign.

Since their capture, an unprecedented question in the history of contemporary international humanitarian law has arisen: what to do with North Korean soldiers who refuse to return to North Korea? On June 30, 2026, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha and his South Korean counterpart Cho Hyun held talks in Seoul described as "constructive" on this question. Eighteen months after the capture, the answer is still not settled. But the elements needed to understand it are in place.

One sentence that sums it all up

One of the two soldiers held by Ukraine told South Korean broadcaster MBC earlier in the year: "If I am not brought to South Korea, I will die." This sentence is not a metaphor. It is the expression of a documented reality: North Korean soldiers who surrender to the enemy or are captured without fighting to the death risk, upon return to Pyongyang, punishments extending to their entire families. The concept of collective shame in the North Korean regime is institutional. Human rights groups and subject-matter experts have formally warned that these two men, if returned to the North, could be executed or interned in the camps of the North Korean prison system.

Seoul's position: a constitution as legal shield

All Koreans are citizens of the Republic of Korea

South Korea's position rests on a precise constitutional foundation. The South Korean Constitution defines its territory as the entire Korean peninsula and recognizes all inhabitants of that peninsula as its citizens — including, therefore, citizens of North Korea. In practice, this means that any North Korean who requests admission to South Korea is legally considered a defector-refugee entitled to citizenship status. Seoul therefore maintains that these two soldiers are, constitutionally, citizens of the "Republic of Korea" and that their transfer request must be honored.

This is not a new position — it is Seoul's consistent policy since the division of the peninsula. In March 2026, Minister Cho had stated that Kyiv had given him assurances that the two soldiers would not be repatriated to North Korea against their will. The June 30 meeting aimed to formalize the practical arrangements for this transfer, including questions of documentation, secure transit, and diplomatic coordination with Ukraine.

The obstacle of Ukrainian sovereignty

Ukraine, for its part, finds itself in a delicate position. These soldiers are legally prisoners of war under international humanitarian law — a status that creates obligations for the detaining state. The Geneva Convention establishes that prisoners of war may be held only during the conflict and must be repatriated at its end. But it also prohibits "refoulement" toward a country where they face serious persecution. Kyiv must navigate between these two obligations, while maintaining constructive diplomatic relations with Seoul — one of its most active supporters in the Asian region.

Moscow and Pyongyang: the two capitals demanding the return

The Kim-Putin military alliance put to the test

Both North Korea and Russia have formally demanded the repatriation of the two soldiers. For Pyongyang, their transfer to South Korea would be a major political humiliation — public confirmation that its soldiers fought in Ukraine, something the regime has never officially acknowledged, and that some of them chose to desert rather than go home. For Moscow, allowing these soldiers to pass to South Korea amounts to admitting that its alliance with Pyongyang produces deserters — a politically catastrophic image.

The mutual defense treaty signed in 2024 between Russia and North Korea obliges each party to provide military assistance "without delay" in the event of an attack. The participation of North Korean soldiers in the war in Ukraine falls within this framework — estimated at several tens of thousands of combatants, with more than 7,000 killed or wounded in the Kursk campaign alone. That Kim sends his men to die for Putin in exchange for financial aid, military technology, food, and energy: that is what analysts and intelligence agencies cited by the Kyiv Independent attest.

North Korea's silence and what it reveals

Pyongyang has never officially acknowledged the presence of its soldiers in Ukraine. This official denial makes its repatriation demand doubly hypocritical: it demands the return of soldiers whose existence it denies. This paradox reveals the fragility of the regime when confronted with a truth its own citizens — and its own soldiers — now know. For the two prisoners had access to information, to interlocutors, to a view of the outside world that North Korea had systematically hidden from them. Their refusal to return is also, in its way, a testimony to what life is like inside the dictatorship of Kim.

International law put to the test

Non-refoulement and prisoner-of-war status

Ministers Sybiha and Cho agreed on June 30, 2026 to be guided by "international law and humanitarian principles." This elegant formulation conceals a real legal tension. The Third Geneva Convention governs the treatment of prisoners of war: they enjoy specific protections during detention and must be repatriated at the end of hostilities. But international refugee law — notably Article 33 of the 1951 Convention — prohibits refoulement to a territory where a person's life or freedom is threatened.

Precedents exist, notably for prisoners of war from the 1950–1953 Korean War, where the right to choose was ultimately recognized. International humanitarian law experts have begun documenting this case as a potential precedent for future conflicts involving states that deny the very identity of their own soldiers deployed abroad. The decision made by Ukraine and South Korea in this matter will set a precedent.

Kyiv-Seoul cooperation: a strategic axis taking shape

Beyond the case of the two prisoners, the June 30 meeting is part of a broader dynamic of rapprochement between Ukraine and South Korea. Seoul has progressively increased its support for Kyiv, moving from humanitarian aid to more substantial material assistance. Bilateral defense cooperation — drone technologies, artillery systems, intelligence on North Korean tactics — represents a strategically valuable asset for Ukraine. Treating these two North Korean soldiers correctly is also, in this context, an investment in the relationship with Seoul.

What these two men represent

A symbol of the human cost of the authoritarian axis

It would be reductive to see in these two North Korean soldiers only a diplomatic or legal issue. They are also human beings sent to fight for a regime that does not publicly acknowledge them, in a war that is not their own, in a territory they likely did not even know existed before their deployment. They embody the concrete human cost of the alliance between Putin and Kim — an alliance that uses men as currency in a geopolitical transaction of which they are the voiceless victims.

The statement made by one of them to South Korean television is a historical document in its nakedness: "If I am not brought to South Korea, I will die." This is not propaganda. This is the truth of a man who has glimpsed the possibility of another life — and who knows what his regime would do with him if he were returned. This testimony goes beyond geopolitics. It touches on what it means to be human in a world where regimes use their own citizens as mere military resources.

The other North Korean soldiers: the hidden stakes

If Ukraine and South Korea find a humane and legal solution for these two prisoners, it could have effects on the ground beyond the individual case. Thousands of North Korean soldiers are still fighting in Russia — or what remains of them after the massive losses. The news that surrendering to Ukrainian forces is not a one-way ticket to execution in Pyongyang, that an alternative exists, is information that circulates. This is not a call for mass desertion — conditions do not permit that — but it is a factor that counts in the psychology of soldiers and in the architecture of the Moscow-Pyongyang alliance.

North Korean participation in the war: the scale of the phenomenon

Tens of thousands of soldiers sent by Kim

To understand why these two prisoners matter, one must grasp the scale of North Korea's military participation in Ukraine. Under the mutual defense treaty signed between Russia and North Korea in 2024, Kim Jong-un deployed several tens of thousands of soldiers to fight alongside the Russian army. In the Kursk region alone, more than 7,000 North Korean soldiers were killed or wounded during the 2024–2025 campaign, according to Ukrainian military intelligence cited by the Kyiv Independent. These figures exceed the losses of some NATO countries across decades of combined operations.

In exchange for this human sacrifice, Pyongyang receives from Moscow financial aid, military technology, food, and energy. It is a geopolitical transaction bordering on barbarism: North Korean lives exchanged for resources and technologies for a regime that starves its own citizens. The two soldiers detained in Ukraine are the visible survivors of a machinery that has ground thousands of men into anonymity on Russian battlefields.

What this reveals about the authoritarian axis

The presence of North Korean soldiers on the Ukrainian front is the most tangible proof that the war in Ukraine is no longer a European conflict — it is a conflict in which the global authoritarian axis (Russia, North Korea, Iran, and indirectly China) has invested real resources, both human and material. On July 1, 2026, Kim Jong-un publicly celebrated his "unshakeable will" to strengthen ties with China during a meeting with President Xi Jinping. This axis is not dissolving — it is consolidating. And Ukraine is paying the price in soldiers and munitions, facing a coalition that the West still underestimates.

Perspectives and next steps

Talks continue, a decision waits

Following the June 30, 2026 meeting, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the government "will continue to make diplomatic efforts to advance and resolve the issue of North Korean prisoners of war." Sybiha confirmed on social platform X that talks had addressed the matter "in detail." But no concrete timeline was announced, no transfer date, no formal procedure. Diplomacy is moving — but at a pace that these two men, in their place of detention, are probably tracking with an anxiety few of us can imagine.

The practical challenges of the transfer

Transferring these soldiers from Ukraine to South Korea poses real practical challenges. The direct route is impossible in the current geopolitical context. A transit through a third country — likely a neutral Western nation or an ally of both parties — will need to be arranged. Questions of documentation, transit security, identity protection, and media management will need to be resolved. These are manageable obstacles, but they require multilevel diplomatic coordination and sustained political will from both capitals.

What Russia gains from Western inattention

Moscow's complicit silence

Moscow is watching this matter with interested attention. As long as negotiations between Ukraine and South Korea remain quiet and slow, Putin avoids several embarrassments: the official confirmation that his forces integrate foreign soldiers, the proof that some of those soldiers prefer to defect rather than fight for him, and the image of a Russian army unable to convince its North Korean auxiliaries of its legitimacy. Every week of diplomatic deliberation benefits this comfortable status quo for Moscow.

Russia formally demanded the repatriation of the soldiers — a demand which, if satisfied, would allow it to "manage" these men discreetly, away from international scrutiny. Refusing that repatriation and making the decision visible sends a strong signal that the international community is monitoring the fate of these soldiers. It is a moderate but real pressure on the mechanics of the Moscow-Pyongyang alliance.

Information as a weapon

The two North Korean soldiers had access, during their detention in Ukraine, to information about the outside world that no ordinary North Korean citizen can access. They saw how a free society functions, how a government can treat its prisoners with dignity, and what the possibility of choice means. If these two men reach South Korea, they will become privileged witnesses — refugees whose testimonies, carefully documented, will feed the free world's knowledge of the North Korean army, its methods, its failures, and its soldiers. This too is a strategic asset for Seoul and its allies.

Conclusion: the free world tested by its own humanity

What this matter reveals about our values

The case of the two North Korean soldiers in Ukrainian detention is a touchstone for the values that the West and its allies claim to defend. Ukraine is fighting for its freedom, its sovereignty, its human dignity. South Korea is fighting symbolically for the reunification of a divided people. Both struggles would find a concrete and memorable expression in the decision to protect these two men and give them the life they have asked for.

A decision still waiting

On June 30, 2026, a meeting was held in Seoul. The right words were spoken. Commitments were renewed. Now the time has come to act. For these two men — who stated their truth as clearly as a man can — the waiting must end with one answer: a transfer, protection, a life.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

What I know and what I do not invent

This testimony rests exclusively on verified public information. I did not have access to the two soldiers, I did not speak with them, I do not claim to report their words directly — except for the MBC quote explicitly attributed. All data on North Korean casualties (7,000 killed or wounded), capture dates (January 2025), diplomatic meetings (June 30, 2026), and the positions of each government come from journalistic sources published between late June and early July 2026.

My stated biases

I am deeply opposed to the Kim Jong-un regime and the Russia–North Korea military alliance, which I consider a direct threat to regional and global security. I believe the protection of these two soldiers is both a humanitarian imperative and a politically sound decision for Ukraine and South Korea. These biases are stated and explicit in my analysis.

Sources

Primary sources

Channel NewsAsia — South Korea, Ukraine hold 'constructive' talks about North Korean POWs — June 30, 2026

Al Jazeera — North Korea's Kim hails 'unshakeable will' to develop ties with China's Xi — July 1, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Ukraine War Coverage — July 2026

Secondary sources

United24 Media — South Korea coverage — July 2026

Interfax Ukraine — Ukraine War Coverage — July 2026

Ukrinform — Ukraine War Coverage — July 2026