Seven Central European Countries Finally Cross the 2% Defense Threshold

Introduction: a symbolic milestone reached after years of delay

Seven countries finally join the front pack

Just days before the NATO summit in Ankara, scheduled for July 7 and 8, 2026, a factbox published by the Anadolu news agency confirms particularly encouraging news for the solidity of the Atlantic Alliance: Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Italy, Montenegro, Slovakia, and Slovenia all reached, in 2025, the 2% of GDP threshold devoted to defense, after years below the target set at the Wales summit in 2014.

This progress is not trivial: for the first time since that target was established more than a decade ago, all 32 members of NATO have now reached or exceeded the 2% threshold, a collective milestone that would have seemed unlikely just a few years ago given the persistent reluctance of several European capitals.

Why this moment deserves to be celebrated without naivety

This collective catch-up comes amid a geopolitical context in which the Russianthreat, illustrated daily by the war in Ukraine, has finally convinced even the most reluctant governments in Central Europe that military deterrence can no longer rest on declaratory goodwill alone.

I will say it with unapologetic frankness: it took Russian aggression against Ukraine for Central Europe to finally take its defense commitments seriously. It is late, but it is good news that deserves to be welcomed without reservation, because it concretely strengthens Western deterrence against Moscow.

Poland, the model student that far outpaces its neighbors

An extraordinary military effort at 4.48% of GDP

While seven countries have just crossed the 2% threshold, Poland has for several years already distinguished itself with a significantly higher defense effort, reaching 4.48% of its GDP devoted to military spending, a level that places it among the most committed contributors in the entire Atlantic Alliance.

Massive acquisitions reflecting a clear doctrine

This investment translates concretely into the acquisition of American F-35 fighter jets, South Korean K2 tanks, HIMARS rocket launcher systems, and Patriot air-defense batteries, a coherent arsenal reflecting Poland's conviction that NATO's eastern flank must be defended with tangible means rather than mere statements of intent.

I consider Poland to now offer the most complete model of what a serious Western defense posture against Russia should look like: concrete budgets, coherent acquisitions, and a clear doctrine rather than repeated promises with no follow-through.

The Baltic states, on the front line against the Russian threat

Lithuania and Latvia well above the threshold

Alongside Poland, the Baltic states also demonstrate a defense commitment well above the Alliance's average: Lithuania now devotes 4% of its GDP to defense, while Latvia reaches 3.73%, levels reflecting these countries' immediate geographic proximity to Russia and Belarus.

A geography that demands strategic clarity

This direct proximity to Russian or Belarusian borders explains why the Baltic states have never had the luxury of strategic complacency that other, more distant NATO members have sometimes allowed themselves over recent decades.

I think the strategic clarity of the Baltic states should serve as an example for all of Western Europe: when you share a direct border with Putin's Russia, you do not negotiate with the reality of the threat, you concretely prepare for it.

The ambitious 5% target set in The Hague in 2025

A new threshold that redefines collective ambition

At the The Hague summit in June 2025, NATO members committed to a target far more ambitious than the historic 2% threshold: reaching 5% of GDP by 2035, split between 3.5% in direct military spending and 1.5% devoted to broader security investments.

A long road ahead despite recent progress

While all 32 members reaching the 2% threshold marks an encouraging step, the road toward this 5% target remains considerable for the vast majority of European countries, many of which will need to more than double their current defensebudgets over the next decade.

I believe this 5% target set in The Hague is the real credibility test for the Alliance over the coming decade. Reaching 2% was a symbolic minimum; aiming for 5% will require far more painful budget choices for European governments accustomed to the ease of the American umbrella.

The Ankara summit, a showcase for this rearmament drive

Zelensky expected among the summit's guests

The NATO summit in Ankara, scheduled for July 7 and 8, 2026, is expected to welcome Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, a presence that symbolizes the enduring centrality of the Ukrainian issue in the Atlantic Alliance's strategic discussions despite more than three years of war.

A Turkish setting that is far from neutral

The choice of Ankara as the venue for this summit is not geopolitically neutral: Turkey, a longstanding NATO member with a sometimes ambiguous stance toward Moscow, is hosting an event that highlights precisely the Alliance's renewed cohesion on defense spending.

I find it significant that this summit is being held in Turkey, a country whose relations with Russia have sometimes seemed ambivalent. That sends an additional signal: even the Alliance's most complicated members are now rallying around the logic of collective rearmament against the Russian threat.

The Alliance's total spending exceeds 1.4 trillion dollars

A collective effort of historic scale

NATO's total defense spending now exceeds 1.4 trillion dollars annually, a colossal sum illustrating the scale of the Western remilitarization launched since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The United States, still the top contributor but in declining proportion

The United States continues to represent roughly 60% of the Alliance's total nominal defense spending and 43% of members' combined GDP, a proportion that has nonetheless dropped from the 72% recorded in 2016, a sign that the transatlantic rebalancing demanded for years is finally starting to materialize.

I think this drop in the American share, from 72% to 60% in under a decade, may be the single most important statistic in this whole story: it proves that American pressure for a fairer burden-sharing eventually produces measurable results, even if they remain insufficient.

Donald Trump's ambivalent but decisive role

Harsh words toward European allies

US President Donald Trump had called some European allies "cowards" back in March and described NATO as a "paper tiger," remarks of unusual harshness for an American leader toward his own historic Alliance partners.

Pressure that paradoxically accelerated rearmament

Despite the brutality of these statements, it must be acknowledged that the pressure Trump has exerted since returning to the White House has helped concretely accelerate the pace at which European defensebudgets are rising, a paradox even some European diplomats privately admit.

I consider Trump to perfectly illustrate the formula of a necessary evil for the West on this particular issue: his statements are often excessive and hurtful toward democratic allies, but their practical effect has been to force a European rearmament that decades of polite diplomacy never managed to achieve.

Defense Secretary Hegseth demands even more effort

Satisfaction tinged with impatience

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, while praising the progress made by NATO's European members, reminded them that they must "do even more," a phrase reflecting Washington's persistent impatience with a transatlantic rebalancing it still considers too slow.

The specter of a partial American disengagement

This American impatience comes with an underlying worry in several European capitals: that of a partial United States disengagement from its European defense commitments if the pace of national budget increases does not accelerate sufficiently in the coming years.

I think this worry over a partial American disengagement, though never officially confirmed, is probably the most powerful psychological driver behind the current acceleration of European defense budgets, more so than any spontaneous strategic conviction.

The spectacular rise of European defense stocks

An industrial sector transformed by demand

This rearmament drive is also showing up in financial markets: shares of European defense companies are seeing sharply rising valuations, driven by government order books that have been steadily expanding since the start of the war in Ukraine.

An industry that must now keep pace with political demand

This stock market surge nonetheless poses a concrete industrial challenge: European production capacity must now keep pace with announced political commitments, a logistical and human challenge that could limit how quickly the newly approved budgets are actually implemented.

I believe this gap between stated budget ambition and actual industrial capacity is the next great challenge of this European remilitarization. Approving budgets is one thing; actually producing tanks, ammunition, and defense systems is another, far more complex matter.

What this buildup changes for Ukraine

Potentially strengthened military support over the long term

For Ukraine, which continues to resist Russian aggression since February 2022, this collective buildup of Western defensebudgets represents a source of cautious optimism regarding the durability of the international military support on which its long-term capacity to resist depends.

Broader deterrence that extends beyond the Ukrainian case alone

Beyond direct support for Kyiv, this collective remilitarization of Central Europe and the Alliance as a whole also constitutes broader deterrence meant to discourage any future temptation by Moscow to extend its aggression beyond Ukraine's current borders.

I think this broader deterrence dimension deserves more emphasis: every additional percentage point of GDP devoted to defense in Central Europe does not only help Ukraine indirectly, it also makes any future military adventure by Putin against a NATO country more costly and more risky.

Persistent criticism over the quality of announced spending

A debate over the true substance of certain budgets

Despite these encouraging figures, several international relations analysts point out that reaching a given GDP percentage does not automatically guarantee genuinely operational military capability, as some national budgets include personnel or infrastructure spending whose direct impact on combat power remains debatable.

The need for qualitative, not just accounting, evaluation

This nuance is a reminder that the debate over Western rearmament cannot be reduced to a simple accounting of percentages: the quality of the equipment acquired, interoperability among allied forces, and the actual operational readiness of units matter just as much as the raw amount of approved budgets.

I think it would be naive to be satisfied with GDP figures alone without questioning the real quality of this spending. An impressive percentage on paper is worthless if the equipment purchased is not interoperable among allies or if ammunition stockpiles remain insufficient in a prolonged conflict.

The wider context of the threat posed by China and Iran

A deterrence posture that must now think beyond Russia alone

This European remilitarization also fits into a geopolitical context in which China and Iran represent growing strategic threats to the West, alongside Russia and North Korea, a quartet of authoritarian regimes whose informal coordination increasingly worries Western defense planners.

An Alliance that must rethink its doctrine against multiple threats

Facing this proliferation of potential flashpoints, NATO must now adapt its defense doctrine to a strategic environment far more complex than during the Cold War, when the main adversary was clearly identified and geographically contained.

I think the West makes a strategic mistake if it keeps treating Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as separate files. These regimes are increasingly coordinating their interests, and our collective response must reflect that reality instead of reasoning in outdated geographic silos.

Dissenting voices within the Alliance itself

Some governments remain reluctant despite the collective momentum

Despite this broadly positive momentum, some European governments continue to voice reservations about the pace and scale of this rearmament race, citing competing social, health, or environmental budget priorities that remain just as legitimate in the eyes of their respective publics.

A delicate political balance to maintain over time

This tension between defense imperatives and domestic social priorities represents a delicate political balance that every European government will have to keep negotiating over time, particularly if the economic context were to deteriorate significantly in the coming years.

I think this tension between defense and social priorities is legitimate and should not be waved away in the name of security urgency. A strong Western democracy also needs healthy, well-educated citizens, not just impressive arsenals.

What Central Europe's precedent teaches the rest of the continent

A catch-up model that can inspire other laggards

The path followed by Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Montenegro, Slovakia, and Slovenia to reach the 2% threshold offers a concrete model for other still-hesitant European countries, showing that rapid budgetary catch-up remains possible when national political will aligns with the Alliance's collective pressure.

A lesson in method as much as in will

Beyond political will alone, these Central European countries also had to resolve complex methodological questions about accurately accounting for their defense spending, a necessary technical exercise to guarantee the credibility of the figures announced to their NATO partners.

I think this methodological rigor, often overlooked in commentary on European rearmament, deserves to be highlighted: credible, verifiable figures are worth infinitely more than unverifiable political announcements that would collapse under the first serious audit.

Conclusion: a milestone crossed, a long road still ahead

A real step that should not obscure the scale of the work remaining

All 32NATO members reaching the 2% of GDP threshold, including these seven long-lagging Central European countries, is a real and measurable step in strengthening Western deterrence against Russia, without settling the debate over the scale of work still needed to reach the 5% target set for 2035.

Ankara, the next stage of a long-haul process

The Ankara summit will offer a chance to concretely gauge the Atlantic Alliance's collective political will to continue this trajectory, in a context where the war in Ukraine keeps daily reminding the world of the human and strategic cost of insufficient deterrence against a determined adversary.

I close this profile convinced that history will remember 2025-2026 as the period when the West stopped treating its own defense as a secondary option. The road to 5% remains long, but the course is now set, and that is already a victory against decades of strategic complacency.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my limits

I am a columnist and geopolitical analyst, not an expert in defense economics or NATO military doctrine. This collective profile draws on public data reported by specialized news agencies regarding member countries' defense spending, not on direct access to detailed national budget documents.

My acknowledged bias is clear support for strengthening Western deterrence against Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, which leads me to view this European rearmament momentum positively despite the internal budgetary tensions it may generate.

My method for this profile

This text draws on the factbox published by the Anadolu agency on July 1, 2026 regarding NATO members' defense spending, cross-referenced with background published by CNBC, Forbes, and Reuters on the Ankara summit and Europe's defense industry. No figure was invented beyond what these sources explicitly report.

Sources

Primary sources

Anadolu Agency — Factbox: NATO defense spending, where allies stand ahead of Ankara summit, July 1, 2026

CNBC — Europe defense stocks rearmament, July 1, 2026

Secondary sources

Global Affairs — Beyond defense spending, what's at stake at the NATO Ankara summit

Reuters — Aerospace & Defense

Wikipedia — 2026 Ankara NATO summit

Forbes — What defense leaders will discuss at the 2026 NATO summit, July 1, 2026