Washington Plays the F-35 Card to Win Over Erdogan Before NATO

Introduction: a two-track deal between Washington and Ankara

Two files, one strategy

There are weeks when military diplomacy looks like a poker game where everyone already knows the other's cards. This week, it is Washington and Ankara facing off at the table, with F-35 fighter jets and General Electric engines worth more than $700 million on the line. The Trump administration has formally notified Congress of its intent to authorize the sale of dozens of F110 engines for the Turkish KAAN fighter, while the far more explosive file of Turkey's return to the F-35 program resurfaces.

The timing is no accident. The NATO summit is being held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026, and Donald Trump appears to want to arrive with his hands full for his counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This is exactly the kind of transactional calculation that has defined the entire foreign policy of the American president since his return to power: military concessions in exchange for political loyalty, regardless of who else pays the strategic price.

The vice president in damage-control mode

Asked what it would take to finalize an F-35 deal, Vice President JD Vance replied that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and his team were checking the boxes required to comply with American law. A cautious phrasing that stands in sharp contrast to the president's enthusiasm, who hinted he was about to do something that would make Erdogan very happy.

The problem is that the law is not negotiated with a pat on the back in the Oval Office. Turkey was expelled from the F-35 program in 2019 after acquiring the Russian S-400 air defense system, and Congress has explicitly banned any transfer until Ankara proves it no longer possesses it.

The engine moves forward while the fighter jet stalls

A bypass of Congress, openly acknowledged

The F110-GE-129 engine package, manufactured by General Electric, is meant to equip the first production units of the KAAN, the fifth-generation combat aircraft developed by Turkish Aerospace Industries. According to reports from American news agencies, about 80 engines would be involved, intended to support flight testing and low-rate production of the aircraft.

What is shocking is not so much the sale itself as the way it was announced. Democratic Representative Gregory Meeks, the top-ranking minority member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, denounced the fact that the administration informed him it would once again bypass congressional review for more than $700 million in military equipment destined for the Turkish army.

A maneuver we've seen before

Meeks noted that the State Department did not even attempt to justify its decision, providing no written justification, briefing Congress on nothing, and invoking no emergency power. This is standard practice under this administration: act fast, never apologize, and let lawmakers discover the fait accompli in the press.

The White House simply judged that the 15-day window for a congressional disapproval resolution was enough to cover its legal bases, even if that means letting political pushback fizzle out afterward.

The ghost of the S-400 continues to haunt Ankara

A sanction that refuses to disappear

It's worth remembering why all this is so tense. In 2019, the Pentagon warned that Turkey could not possess both the Russian S-400 and the American F-35, since the Russian system could gather intelligence on the fighter's stealth characteristics. Turkey was removed from the program, losing access to the aircraft and more than $9 billion in planned industrial participation.

The CAATSA law (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) explicitly bans any return to the program as long as Ankara possesses the S-400. Yet the latest reports indicate the system is inactive but still physically intact on Turkish territory, which technically does not meet the legal requirements to lift the sanctions.

Rubio and Vance, two different tunes

What makes the affair even stranger is the disconnect between cabinet members. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had stated earlier this month before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that Turkey remained barred from acquiring F-35s until the S-400 issue was resolved in accordance with American law. He asserted this was not a choice, since it is governed by law.

Two senior officials from the same administration publicly contradicting each other on a major national security issue creates palpable confusion even within the ranks of Congress.

The ambassador who sets his conditions

An officially maintained red line

The American ambassador to Turkey, Tom Barrack, had stated in April that any agreement allowing Turkey to rejoin the F-35 program would require Ankara to fully comply with American law by verifiably ending its possession and use of the S-400. He specified that any resolution would need to satisfy Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act, requiring certification to Congress that Turkey no longer possesses the system.

This requirement is not symbolic. It demands concrete, verifiable proof that the Russian system no longer poses a threat to the F-35's sensitive technology. Nothing in the current public record suggests Ankara has begun any such process of disengaging from Russian equipment.

Congress prepares its counterattack

A group of American lawmakers, led by Democratic Representative Dina Titus, is preparing a letter calling on House leaders to be ready to block any administration attempt to let Turkey acquire F-35s without meeting American legal requirements. The letter already describes the GE engine sale as a major gift to Erdogan.

The NATO summit calendar weighs on every decision

Ankara, host and beneficiary

The fact that the NATO summit is being held in Turkey in early July gives this sequence a particular flavor. Trump has floated the possibility of arriving with a big bag of gifts for Erdogan, potentially including approval of the F-110 engines and F-35 fighters. The American president has even called Erdogan a friend and a strong member of NATO.

This friendly rhetoric barely conceals a harsher reality: Turkey has systematically played both sides, maintaining ties with Moscow while remaining a member of the Atlantic Alliance. NATO cohesion, supposedly strengthened against the Russian threat, finds itself weakened by the small bilateral arrangements of an American president eager to score personal points.

A signal sent to the whole Alliance

If Washington ultimately gives in on the F-35 without demanding verifiable disengagement from the S-400, the message sent to other NATO members will be crystal clear: collective security rules can be negotiated case by case according to the president's mood of the moment.

This dynamic particularly worries Eastern European capitals, on the front line against the Russian threat, who had hoped for a stricter and more predictable sanctions doctrine from their most powerful ally.

The KAAN, a symbol of Turkish autonomy

A fighter jet that needs American engines

The KAAN program illustrates Turkey's ambition to build an independent defense industry. But for now, the aircraft remains dependent on American technology. Under a contract signed in May 2026 at the SAHA Expo trade show, Turkey initially acquired a batch of 20 Block 10 aircraft, with deliveries expected between 2028 and 2030, all equipped exclusively with American F110 engines.

Ankara is meanwhile developing its own engine, the TF35000, but this project remains at an early stage. In the meantime, American engines represent an industrial lifeline that allows the program to move forward without major interruption.

A dependency that becomes leverage

This technological dependency gives Washington considerable leverage over Ankara, but it also serves as a negotiating card in the other direction. Every time the United States approves a new batch of engines, it strengthens its influence over Turkey's industrial timeline while avoiding the transfer of the F-35's most sensitive technology.

European allies watch with skepticism

A trust already dented

Several European NATO member countries are following this file with particular attention, knowing that the Turkish question touches on the overall credibility of Western military export control mechanisms. If the United States relaxes its own rules for an ally deemed strategically useful, it weakens the argument that Western sanctions against Russia and its partners must be applied rigorously and universally.

The coherence of Western policy toward Moscow depends partly on its ability to maintain uniform standards, including toward its own allies who flirt with Russian military equipment.

Greece and Cyprus, worried onlookers

Tensions between Turkey and Greece, as well as Turkish military activities around Cyprus, are also among the concerns cited by congressional staffers to justify their opposition to the sale. These are not merely abstract considerations of American national security: they are very real regional rivalries that risk worsening if Ankara feels militarily strengthened without any diplomatic counterpart.

The 2019 precedent remains a warning

What Turkey has already lost

It's worth recalling the scale of what Turkey lost in 2019. Beyond the aircraft themselves, an entire industrial supply chain collapsed for Turkish companies involved in manufacturing F-35 components. This loss remains an open wound in bilateral relations, and it partly explains Ankara's eagerness to regain its place in the program.

For Washington, reintegrating Turkey without solid guarantees would amount to erasing, with a stroke of the pen, six years of coherent sanctions policy, for the sake of a short-term political calculation tied to a diplomatic summit.

The weight of presidential statements

Every public statement Trump makes on this file seems to redefine the official line of the moment, creating permanent uncertainty for the diplomats tasked with implementing American policy toward Turkey.

A cautious reading of the compromise solution

The engines as low-hanging fruit

According to several defense-specialized analyses, approving the F110 engines represents a limited concession rather than a complete reset of bilateral relations. It sustains the combat aviation continuity of a NATO ally without transferring the most sensitive F-35 technology, while keeping Turkey partially dependent on American licenses and logistical support.

Gonul Tol, founding director of the Turkey program at the Middle East Institute, called the engine sale the easiest fruit to pick, arguing it should not face major opposition in Congress, unlike the broader F-35 file.

The real test is still to come

The practical outcome, according to this reading, would be a compromise: the KAAN gets the engines it needs to continue development, Congress keeps the F-35 issue separate, and the American-Turkish defense relationship remains functional but conditional. It remains to be seen whether Trump will accept this institutional caution or force the issue at the Ankara summit.

What this means for Western collective security

An Alliance that must choose its coherence

NATO is going through a period where its collective credibility against Russia directly depends on its ability to enforce uniform rules, including toward its own members. If Turkey gets favorable treatment simply because it is hosting the next summit, it sends a dangerous signal to other capitals tempted to play multiple geopolitical sides.

The West cannot demand firmness toward Vladimir Putin while turning a blind eye to the presence of Russian systems in an ally that is a member of the Atlantic Alliance. Coherence is not optional; it is a condition of strategic survival against adversaries who exploit every crack.

The Chinese precedent not to forget

China closely watches every Western hesitation on these sanctions files, drawing valuable lessons for its own future workaround strategies against international pressure mechanisms.

The role of Congress facing an impatient executive

A 15-day window, no more, no less

The legal mechanism gives Congress 15 days to introduce a joint disapproval resolution after formal notification. Such a resolution would need to pass both chambers and could be vetoed by the president. In practical terms, this means the administration effectively has the final word, barring an exceptional and bipartisan mobilization of Congress.

It is this institutional asymmetry that allows the executive branch to multiply controversial arms sales without fear of real pushback, as long as opposition remains confined to public statements without a sufficient majority to block the process.

A test for American democracy as much as for diplomacy

Beyond the Turkish file itself, this sequence illustrates a broader tension within the American system: how far can a president stretch executive power over foreign policy before parliamentary oversight mechanisms become relevant again? The answer, for now, seems to be: quite far.

Chinese and Russian influence lurking on the KAAN file

Beijing and Moscow, fallback partners

It is telling to note that North Korea and other actors could rely on their ties with Russia or China to develop technological capabilities they cannot master on their own. The same dynamic potentially looms over Turkey if Washington keeps indefinitely delaying its reintegration into the F-35 program: Ankara could be tempted to seek fallback technological partnerships elsewhere.

This is an argument regularly used by advocates of a quick relaxation of restrictions: better to keep Turkey close to the Western industrial ecosystem than to push it toward Russian or Chinese alternatives out of sheer bureaucratic rigidity.

A difficult balance to maintain

But giving in too quickly would validate the calculation that it's enough to simply hold onto Russian equipment long enough for Western sanctions to eventually fade away on their own. This is exactly the kind of signal Moscow and Beijing are analyzing with great interest for their own future workaround strategies.

The silent testimony of defense manufacturers

Lockheed Martin and General Electric, discreet arbiters

Lockheed Martin, the F-35's manufacturer, and General Electric, the maker of the F110 engines, have an obvious commercial interest in seeing this file resolved quickly. Every delayed contract represents potential losses of several hundred million dollars for these companies, a factor that weighs discreetly but genuinely on political decisions in Washington.

This industrial dimension partly explains why some American officials are actively pushing for a quick resolution, independent of considerations strictly tied to the S-400's strategic weight.

A lobby that weighs on the calendar

The economic weight of these contracts adds pressure on decision-makers, who must weigh the legal rigor demanded by Congress against the commercial interests of industrial flagships employing tens of thousands of American workers.

The symbolic weight of Ankara as summit host

A double-edged diplomatic showcase

Hosting the NATO summit gives Turkey visibility and influence disproportionate to its usual weight in arms negotiations. Erdogan knows how to exploit this host position to maximize his diplomatic gains, knowing Trump will want to avoid any scandal that would tarnish the summit's image.

This host-guest dynamic creates a structural imbalance in negotiations: Turkey negotiates from a position of temporary strength, while other NATO members, including several worried European allies, remain mere spectators of a bilateral arrangement that nonetheless concerns them directly.

A precedent for future summits

If this strategy works for Erdogan, other leaders could be tempted to replicate the same approach at future summits they host, turning every Atlantic Alliance meeting into an occasion for bilateral bargaining rather than an exercise in collective cohesion against Russia.

Conclusion: a credibility test for the entire West

What this file truly reveals

This diplomatic saga is not just about airplane engines or stealth fighters. It is a revealing look at how the Trump administration conceives its alliances: as personal transactions rather than long-term strategic commitments grounded in shared rules. Turkey, a historic NATO member but an ambiguous partner since acquiring the S-400, is testing the limits of American institutional patience, and for now, it is gaining ground.

The real question that remains open

It remains to be seen whether the Ankara summit will produce a further concession or whether Congress will finally manage to impose a credible red line. In a world where Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea watch every Western hesitation as an opportunity, firmness is not a symbolic luxury: it is a strategic necessity that Washington sometimes seems to forget in favor of the diplomatic photo of the moment.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my acknowledged biases

I sign this column as an engaged analyst, not as a neutral journalist. I hold a pro-Western, pro-NATO editorial line, and I am critical of any concession granted to regimes or partners who maintain ambiguous ties with Moscow. This perspective inevitably colors my interpretation of the facts, even though the facts themselves come from verified sources.

I do not claim to know the exact intentions of the White House or the content of internal discussions between Trump, Vance, and Hegseth. What I put forward rests solely on public statements and press reports corroborated by several independent sources.

What I don't know and my method

I don't know whether the NATO summit in Ankara will actually produce an announcement regarding the F-35. Nor do I know whether Congress will manage to block the engine sale. My method consists of cross-referencing several primary and secondary sources considered reliable, explicitly citing my sources, and flagging any uncertainty rather than hiding it to make the story more dramatic than it actually is.

Sources

Primary sources

Jerusalem Post — Original article on the U.S. review of the F-35 sale to Turkey — June 2026

Reuters — Trump notifies Congress of engine sale to Turkey — June 25, 2026

Jewish Insider — Vance confirms review of Turkish F-35 eligibility — June 25, 2026

Secondary sources

Jerusalem Post — Additional analysis on the U.S. Congress position

ANews — Trump administration bypasses Congress on jet engine sale — June 25, 2026

Army Recognition — U.S. set to approve GE F110 engines for KAAN — June 29, 2026

Turkish Minute — U.S. lawmakers prepare resolution to block Turkey's F-35 return — June 29, 2026

Mid-Day — Trump signals progress on F-35 deal with Turkey — June 25, 2026