REPORT: BEIJING SANCTIONS 10 US FIRMS AND BANS 46 FROM PUBLIC MARKETS — THE TRADE WAR RESUMES

Two simultaneous announcements, one single message

On Monday, June 22, 2026, as Washington was still digesting the fallout from its 1260H list expanded to 188 Chinese companies, Beijing responded with a double volley. First announcement: the Ministry of Commerce added 10 U.S. companies linked to the military sector to its export control list, barring them from receiving any dual-use materials of Chinese origin. Second announcement, almost simultaneous: the Ministry of Finance prohibited all Chinese government entities from purchasing products from 46 American companies. Both measures took effect the same day, without notice, without transition period. This is the signature of a decision made at the highest levels — swift, coordinated, politically calibrated. The Sino-American trade war, which the Trump-Xi summit of April 2026 had seemed to want to cool, has just resumed with a vengeance.

The list of 10 companies targeted by the export controls reveals a retaliatory logic focused on precise sectors. Teal Drones and Jaia Robotics, two American military drone manufacturers, find themselves cut off from Chinese exports of critical components. MP Materials and USA Rare Earth, players in American rare-earth extraction, see their access to Chinese processing materials potentially compromised — a direct blow to the American defense supply chain. Ball Aerospace Technologies, a provider of defense space systems, and Oshkosh Defense, the military vehicle giant, round out the picture. The selection is not random: it targets actors that have, in one way or another, a documentable dependence on Chinese-origin materials or technologies.

The 46 government bans: a list that strikes giants

The second measure may be the most symbolic. By barring Chinese government entities from purchasing products from 46 American firms, Beijing's Ministry of Finance struck directly at the heart of the American military-industrial complex. The list includes several divisions of Lockheed Martin — America's largest defense contractor —, of Raytheon Missiles & Defense, of General Dynamics, and other major players such as drone maker Dedrone (owned by Axon/Summit Technologies). According to the Ministry of Finance statement published on its website on June 22, 2026 and relayed by Xinhua, the measure applies to all bodies participating in government procurement activities — but does not apply to American-funded companies registered in China, a clause that preserves certain foreign investments.

That exemption clause for China-registered subsidiaries is revealing of the sophistication of Beijing's response. They do not want to shoot themselves in the foot by chasing away foreign capital. They want to strike Washington — not the American companies that chose to invest in China. It is an authoritarian state measure, yes — but from an authoritarian state that knows how to count.

Military drones in the crosshairs

Among the companies designated by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Teal Drones and Jaia Robotics, both based in Utah, were the first to attract attention. Teal Drones, based in South Salt Lake, is a tactical military drone maker well known to the American armed forces. Its products are used for short-range reconnaissance and surveillance missions. Jaia Robotics, based in Bristol, Rhode Island, specializes in autonomous underwater robots for military and research marine applications. For both companies, the designation means the legal impossibility for Chinese companies to export to them any dual-use item — a category that, in the drone context, can include electronic components, composite materials, or processing software.

The scope of the ban is broadened by a key provision of the Ministry of Commerce statement: "Organizations or individuals from any third country are prohibited from transferring or providing any dual-use item of Chinese origin" to these entities. In other words, a Taiwanese or Singaporean distributor that bought a component in China to resell to Teal Drones would also be in violation. This extraterritorial extension of the Chinese rule — a perfect mirror of American secondary sanctions — is a sign of the growing sophistication of China's legal arsenal in trade wars.

Rare earths: the strike to the soft underbelly

The inclusion of MP Materials (Las Vegas, Nevada) and USA Rare Earth (Stillwater, Oklahoma) on the export control list is the most strategically consequential decision of the June 22 double measure. China controls approximately 60% of global rare-earth production and an even larger share — estimated at more than 80% — of global refining and processing capacity for these critical materials. Rare earths are indispensable for producing permanent magnets used in drone motors, guided missiles, radar systems, and electric military vehicles. MP Materials operates the Mountain Pass mine in California, one of the few American rare-earth sources, but still partially depends on China for processing certain of its materials.

By targeting these two companies, Beijing sends a clear message: if Washington continues to expand the 1260H list, Beijing can significantly complicate the rare-earth supply chain that underpins American defense industrial capacity. This is not yet a total embargo — the measure concerns only direct exports to these two specific companies. But it is a warning whose systemic reach no one in Washington can ignore.

Rare earths. Again and again. It is the West's Achilles' heel in this confrontation. You can list 188 Chinese companies. You can ban BYD and Alibaba. But as long as a critical supply chain remains in China, the real balance of power tilts that way. MP Materials and USA Rare Earth are paying the price today. The message has been received — the question is whether Washington will finally act to break free from this dependence.

When giants end up on a Chinese list

Ball Aerospace & Technologies, based in Broomfield, Colorado, is one of the most discreet and most critical suppliers in the American defense complex. It designs sensor, space reconnaissance, and surveillance systems for the Pentagon and intelligence agencies. Oshkosh Defense, based in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, is the primary manufacturer of tactical military vehicles for the American armed forces — its trucks and light armored vehicles equip the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. L3Harris Maritime Services, in Norfolk, Virginia, provides naval communications and electronics systems. These 3 companies likely have no significant direct dependence on Chinese exports in their current supply chains.

That is precisely what makes their designation symbolic rather than substantive in the short term. Han Shen Lin, China country director at consulting firm The Asia Group, was direct in his analysis published in CNBC on June 22, 2026: these countermeasures "appear more symbolic than a genuine escalation, as many of the targeted companies have little or no significant commercial exposure in China." That assessment is honest — but it should not obscure the longer-term logic: Beijing is building an arsenal of regulatory precedents that can be activated at greater scale if the confrontation intensifies.

AVEOX, IMSAR, Red Cat Holdings: the lesser-known profiles

The list of 10 also includes less media-prominent but technically significant actors. AVEOX, based in Simi Valley, California, manufactures high-performance electric motors used notably in military drones — a component where dependence on Chinese magnetic materials is potentially real. IMSAR, in Springville, Utah, develops lightweight radar systems for military drones and surveillance aircraft. Red Cat Holdings, a publicly traded company, is a military drone enterprise that recently acquired Teal Drones — meaning both appear simultaneously in Beijing's crosshairs. These lower-profile names reveal that Beijing did not simply target the big names for media effect: it conducted a precise supply-chain analysis.

The fact that Beijing identified AVEOX, IMSAR, and Red Cat Holdings — companies barely known to the general public — demonstrates a sophistication in Chinese economic intelligence that should worry Washington more than the counter-sanctions themselves. Beijing knows the American defense supply chain in its details. That knowledge is a strategic advantage.

A highly symbolic signal toward armaments giants

The decision by the Chinese Ministry of Finance, announced on June 22, 2026 and taking effect immediately, concerns government purchases of products from 46 American firms. The list includes several divisions of Lockheed Martin Corporation — the F-35, HIMARS missiles, reconnaissance satellites —, of Raytheon Missiles & Defense (Patriot systems, AMRAAM missiles), and of General Dynamics. It also includes Dedrone, a company specializing in drone detection and neutralization, acquired by Axon/Summit Technologies. The measure is presented by Xinhua as consistent with relevant Chinese laws and regulations, without further explanation on selection criteria — an opacity characteristic of Beijing's retaliatory measures.

The term "government procurement" is crucial for understanding the real scope of this measure. In China, where the state is omnipresent in the economy, government procurement represents a considerable share of the total market. The prohibition covers central agencies and local financial authorities — a broad perimeter. But the exemption clause for "American-funded companies registered in China" preserves foreign direct investments: a Chinese subsidiary of Lockheed Martin — if one existed — would not be affected. In practice, the major American defense firms named on the list generally have little direct presence in China, so the immediate economic impact is limited.

The political significance beyond the economic impact

What matters here is less the immediate impact than the political signal. By explicitly banning Lockheed Martin and Raytheon from Chinese government procurement, Beijing establishes a regulatory precedent usable in the future. These measures can be extended, intensified, or used as bargaining chips in future negotiations. They also create internal political pressure in the United States: the lobbies of the designated defense companies will pressure Congress and the administration to prevent the 1260H list from expanding to the point of further compromising their interests — including their commercial ambitions in third countries where China has influence over procurement decisions.

Lockheed Martin on a Chinese ban list. Ten years ago, that was unthinkable — not because Beijing did not want to, but because it did not dare. Today, it dares. That shift in Beijing's posture is in itself the most important piece of information. Authoritarian China no longer fears scoring political points even when the direct economic impact is limited.

The mechanics of the calibrated retaliation

The Chinese Ministry of Commerce explicitly presented its June 22 sanctions as a response to "the U.S. government's unjust expansion of its so-called list of Chinese military companies." This declaration is important: by formally linking the two measures, Beijing creates an explicit retaliation framework that signals to Washington that any future expansion of the 1260H list will trigger proportionate countermeasures. It is an economic deterrence mechanism — not military, but analogous in its logic: establishing a sufficient cost to discourage escalation.

The timing is also revealing. The 1260H list was published on June 8, 2026. The Chinese countermeasures arrived on June 22 — exactly two weeks later. This two-week response window likely corresponds to the time needed to prepare the lists, coordinate announcements between the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Finance, and obtain approval from higher authorities. This response delay is itself a signal: Beijing is not reacting in panic, but following a deliberative process that reflects a considered strategy.

The market and capital reaction

The announcement of China's June 22 countermeasures triggered measured but significant reactions. Asian financial markets recorded slight volatility, notably on the values of companies exposed to China. In Washington, the Trump administration did not publicly react in the hours following the announcement — a calculated discretion suggesting either no surprise (the countermeasures were anticipated), or an assessment that the direct impact is limited enough not to justify an immediate escalation. The U.S. Department of Commerce and the Office of the United States Trade Representative referred to previously stated positions on the 1260H list, without new declarations.

Washington's silence in the hours following the announcement seems more significant to me than any press release. When a great power does not shout, it is calculating. The real question is: is it calculating to de-escalate, or to find the next step in the escalation? Recent history in Sino-American relations argues for the second hypothesis.

The West's structural dependence laid bare

The inclusion of MP Materials and USA Rare Earth in the Chinese sanctions illuminates what is, by far, the West's most serious strategic vulnerability in this confrontation. Rare earths — a group of 17 chemical elements with unique magnetic and electronic properties — are indispensable for manufacturing virtually all modern weapons systems. Neodymium-iron-boron permanent magnets, which use 2 of these elements, equip the servomotors of guided missiles, the rotors of military drones, and the control surface actuators of fighter aircraft. Without rare-earth magnets, there is no F-35, no HIMARS missile, no Reaper drone.

China produces approximately 60% of global rare earths, according to U.S. Geological Survey data, but controls more than 80% of the processing and refining capacity — the part of the chain where raw ores become materials usable by the defense industry. Efforts are underway to develop processing capacities outside China — notably in the United States (Mountain Pass, operated by MP Materials), in Australia, and in Canada. But these capacities remain fragmented, expensive, and far from being able to compete with China's integrated infrastructure in the short term. By targeting MP Materials, Beijing strikes precisely one of the few actors attempting to build this independence.

The long-term American response: billions invested, years needed

Facing this vulnerability, the American administration has launched in recent years massive investment programs to diversify the rare-earth supply chain. The CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act include provisions supporting the extraction and processing of critical minerals on American soil. Federal funds have been directed to MP Materials to develop its California processing capabilities. Canada and Australia — two close allies — are also participating in this collective diversification effort. But these investments take time: building a competitive rare-earth processing chain takes between 5 and 10 years under the best conditions.

Dependence on Chinese rare earths is the bill the West pays for having let globalization proceed unconditionally for twenty years. The billions now being invested in MP Materials or in Australia are the correction of a two-decade strategic mistake. Costly. Necessary. But terribly late — and Beijing knows it.

When the war in Europe feeds the commercial war in Asia

The targeting of Teal Drones and Red Cat Holdings in China's June 22 sanctions reveals a geopolitical connection that the general media have underreported. Teal Drones, acquired by Red Cat Holdings, developed its military drones partly through operational lessons from the conflict in Ukraine. The firm supplies tactical drone systems to the American armed forces and has been involved in development programs inspired by the intensive drone use in the Russo-Ukrainian war. By targeting Teal Drones, Beijing indirectly strikes the technological chain connecting Ukraine's lessons to American military modernization — a connection that has not escaped its attention.

This connection illustrates how different theaters of confrontation — Ukraine, the Taiwan Strait, the Sino-American trade war — are increasingly interconnected. Technologies developed to meet the needs of the war in Ukraine find their way into arsenals destined for the Indo-Pacific. Companies participating in this modernization effort end up on Chinese retaliation lists. Geopolitics is no longer compartmentalized into distinct theaters — it forms a continuum where every action on one front produces reactions on the others.

Jaia Robotics and the submarine warfare of tomorrow

Jaia Robotics, based in Bristol, Rhode Island, manufactures autonomous underwater robots for military purposes — devices playing a growing role in seabed surveillance, submarine detection, and distributed undersea warfare. Its designation by Beijing is consistent with the growing concern of the Chinese Navy (PLAN) about American development of autonomous undersea warfare systems in the Indo-Pacific. The inclusion of Jaia Robotics on the list signals that Beijing is watching closely not only current American military capabilities, but also the companies developing next-generation systems — a vigilance reflecting long-term thinking in military competition.

Jaia Robotics. A few dozen employees in a Rhode Island town. On a Chinese government sanctions list. That is the measure of the stakes: tomorrow's war is being prepared today, in garages and workshops on the American East Coast. And Beijing watches those garages with the eyes of a state.

The dominant symbolism thesis

The most widespread analysis in media specializing in Sino-American commercial policy is that China's June 22 countermeasures are more symbolic than substantively damaging to the targeted American companies. Han Shen Lin of The Asia Group was the most direct in CNBC: most of the 10 companies on the export control list "have little or no significant commercial exposure in China," and the 46 firms banned from government procurement generally do not sell their military products there. Lockheed Martin does not sell F-35s to the Chinese military — this ban changes nothing about its revenues.

This analysis is correct in the short term. But it underestimates two longer-term dimensions. First, companies targeted on the export control list (notably AVEOX, which makes drone motors) could have indirect dependencies on Chinese materials through their own subcontractors. Second, the precedent created by these lists can be instrumentalized in future trade negotiations to demand American concessions — each list constitutes a bargaining chip in geopolitical poker.

The progressive escalation thesis

Other analysts — notably those from economic security think tanks — see in the June 22 measures the beginning of a deliberate progressive escalation. According to them, Beijing uses symbolic measures initially not because it cannot strike harder, but because it is building a staircase: each step warns Washington of the potential consequences of the next escalation. The real threat is not what was announced on June 22 — it is what will be announced if Washington decides to further expand the 1260H list, or impose new semiconductor export restrictions on China. The rare-earth staircase is the most vertiginous: if Beijing ever decides to impose an embargo on all rare-earth exports to the United States, the consequences for the American defense industry would be severe — not immediate, but severe in the medium term.

The rare-earth staircase. I insist on this image. This is not an abstract threat. It is a physical reality: without neodymium, without dysprosium, without praseodymium, the permanent magnets that power American drone motors cannot be made. Washington has ten years to build its own capabilities. Ten years is short. The clock is ticking — and Beijing is watching it.

The compliance puzzle in the supply chain

For American companies not directly appearing on the Chinese lists, the June 22 measures nonetheless create new regulatory complexity. The third-country extension provision in the Chinese Ministry of Commerce's export control list means that a Singaporean, Taiwanese, or European distributor that bought China-processed materials to resell to Teal Drones or AVEOX would find itself in violation. For companies in the global defense supply chain — which is extraordinarily complex and globalized — identifying all suppliers potentially affected by this restriction is a significant compliance challenge.

Companies like L3Harris Maritime Services, whose China presence is limited, will barely be directly affected. But their subcontractors that may use Chinese-origin components for non-specifically-listed materials will need to revise their practices. This phenomenon of regulatory cascades, where each measure generates uncertainties in increasingly wide circles, is one of the most important systemic costs of the Sino-American trade war — often invisible in analyses focused on the directly named companies.

Exempted companies: the subtlety of the subsidiaries clause

The exemption clause for "American-funded companies registered in China" is a considered political decision by Beijing. It preserves foreign direct investments — notably joint ventures and Chinese subsidiaries of American multinationals that produce in China. This preservation is not philanthropic: Beijing needs the investments, technologies, and jobs these companies bring. By exempting them, it signals that it wants to punish Washington without discouraging foreign investors. That is the difficult balance authoritarian China seeks to maintain: assertive enough to defend its strategic interests, open enough to sustain the influx of capital and technology.

This exemption clause reminds me that Beijing is playing a multi-level game simultaneously. It punishes Washington. It protects investors. It shields its own economy. And it does so with growing regulatory precision. This is no longer the "sleeping dragon" of the 1990s — it is a first-class strategic actor that masters the instruments of international trade.

Japan, Australia, and South Korea watch carefully

In the Asia-Pacific, American allies watched the June 22 developments with particular attention. For Japan, Australia, and South Korea — 3 countries with significant commercial relationships with China while being close American defense partners — these measures illustrate the growing difficulty of maintaining both relationships simultaneously. These countries have their own defense companies that could, over time, end up on Chinese lists if they draw too close to the American defense architecture.

Australia, in particular, is in a delicate position: it simultaneously operates within the AUKUS framework (nuclear submarines, long-range missiles), is an explicit target of Beijing's deterrence strategy, and is a major economic actor whose mineral exports (iron, coal, rare earths) to China represent tens of billions of dollars annually. China's June 22 measures remind Australians — who recently began discussing rare earths with Ottawa in a defense cooperation framework — that their economic dependence on China remains a real pressure lever.

Europe between caution and positioning

In Europe, official reactions to China's June 22 measures were discreet — no European capital commented publicly in the first 48 hours. This discretion reflects the EU's uncomfortable position: condemning China's measures risks compromising attempts at dialogue with Beijing on other files (market access, tariffs, semiconductors). Ignoring the measures risks sending a passivity signal on economic sovereignty questions. The European Commission recently adopted its own critical foreign investment screening mechanism — but has not yet developed an equivalent of the 1260H list. The internal debate over the necessity of such a tool will accelerate in light of June 2026 developments.

A silent Europe. It is a pattern I know all too well. Europe's silence in the face of authoritarian provocations has a long history — and a long list of regrets. On China, Europe delays, hesitates, calculates its immediate interests. Meanwhile, the confrontation intensifies without it — and it will need to take a position, sooner or later, prepared or not.

How we got here: chronology of an escalation

To understand the June 22, 2026 measures, they must be placed in a chronology of reciprocal escalations. In January 2025, the Chinese government had already added 28 American companies — including Lockheed Martin, Boeing Defense, Raytheon, and General Dynamics — to its export control list, prohibiting exports of dual-use items. That was a significant first salvo. The June 22, 2026 measures constitute the second wave: 10 new companies on the export control list + 46 government procurement bans. The progression is measured but constant.

If one projects this trend, the third wave — if it comes — could include more substantive measures: large-scale rare-earth restrictions, specialized semiconductor export bans toward the United States, restrictions on components used in specific weapons systems. This scenario is not inevitable — both parties have economic reasons not to escalate indefinitely. But the logic of sanctions staircases, once set in motion, is difficult to stop. The history of American sanctions against Iran or Russia illustrates this abundantly: staircases are not easy to descend.

The role of the U.S. Congress in the coming escalation

In Washington, Congress plays an active role in intensifying pressure on Chinese companies. Members of both parties — notably the anti-China hawks within Congress — had sharply criticized the withdrawal of the 1260H list in February 2026, seeing it as an unacceptable concession to Beijing. Their pressure contributed to the list's republication in June. If China's June 22 countermeasures are perceived in Washington as a sign of weakness or empty symbolism, they risk reinforcing the voices advocating for further escalation. In this context, moderation must come from the executive branch — an executive that has not always managed to resist Congressional pressure on China files.

The U.S. Congress as an escalation factor. It is an institutional reality often underestimated in geopolitical analyses. The administration may want to moderate — Congress can force its hand. In the Sino-American confrontation, 535 Congressional members are that many influence centers that complicate any coherent long-term strategy. Beijing does not have that problem.

Third-party companies caught in a vise

China's June 22 measures, particularly the third-country extension of the export control list, create a delicate situation for hundreds of non-American and non-Chinese companies. A Taiwanese electronics component maker that sells to both Teal Drones subcontractors and Chinese clients theoretically finds itself caught between two incompatible restriction lists. An Australian company that extracts rare earths and sells both to MP Materials and to Chinese refiners faces potentially contradictory obligations. This growing regulatory fragmentation of the global economy is one of the diffuse but real costs of the Sino-American trade war — invisible in macroeconomic statistics, but very present in the daily reality of global company executives.

Countries like Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, which play a growing role as intermediary platforms in the Southeast Asian technology supply chain, are particularly exposed. Several companies have begun restructuring their operations to create distinct entities depending on whether they work for American or Chinese clients — a costly operational decoupling reflecting geopolitical decoupling at the scale of an individual company.

The relative resilience of America's Asian allies

Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea maintain delicate positions in this commercial conflict. Their semiconductor companies — TSMC, Samsung, SK Hynix — are simultaneously critical suppliers to the American defense economy and important commercial revenue sources from China. The June 22 measures do not directly affect them, but they reinforce pressure toward a decoupling that none of these countries truly wants. For Taiwan in particular, which lives under China's direct military threat, the Sino-American commercial confrontation is an additional element of an already extremely complex strategic equation.

Taiwan is simultaneously the target of China's military deterrence, the heart of semiconductor production that America desperately needs, and an economic actor that cannot do without its relationships with mainland China. This impossible triangulation is the most explosive geopolitical situation of our era. And the June 22 sanctions are one more reminder of that.

Possible scenarios for what comes next

Several scenarios emerge for the months following the June 22, 2026 measures. The de-escalation scenario assumes that both parties, having made their political points, choose not to escalate further — using the respective lists as bargaining chips in broader trade negotiations on tariffs or market access. This scenario is possible but requires political will on both sides of the West. The controlled escalation scenario assumes both parties continue to test each other with incremental measures — new entries on lists, extensions of sectoral restrictions — without crossing a catastrophic threshold. That is the most likely scenario in the short term.

The crisis scenario would involve a sudden escalation triggered by an unforeseen event — a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, the discovery of large-scale cyberespionage, or a radical White House decision on rare earths. In this scenario, the lists of sanctions and counter-sanctions would become the instruments of total economic confrontation, the consequences of which for the global economy — still heavily interdependent despite the ongoing decoupling — would be severe. That is the scenario both parties are trying to avoid, but which their internal competitive logics are progressively making less improbable.

The next 1260H cycle: December 2026 or June 2027?

The next mandatory annual update to the 1260H list must occur by June 2027 at the latest. But nothing prevents the American administration from accelerating an intermediate update if Congress demands it — a pressure that the anti-China hawks will not fail to apply. If that next update further expands the list, it will automatically trigger a new cycle of Beijing countermeasures, following the staircase logic established in 2025 and 2026. The challenge for Sino-American bilateral diplomacy is to find the equivalent of nuclear deterrence doctrine — but for trade wars: a stabilization mechanism that prevents indefinite escalation without requiring either side to abandon its fundamental red lines.

We developed stabilization mechanisms for nuclear war — the hotline, alert protocols, de-escalation channels. For commercial and technological war, we have none yet. That is a dangerous institutional void. And the events of June 22, 2026 show that this void is beginning to weigh heavily.

What June 22, 2026 says about our era

China's June 22, 2026 measures — 10 companies on the export control list, 46 firms banned from government procurement — are not isolated events. They are the documented steps of a structural commercial and technological escalation between the world's first and second powers. They reveal the growing sophistication of Beijing's regulatory arsenal, its capacity to precisely target American defense supply chains, and its willingness to establish precedents usable in future confrontations. They also reveal the limits of this strategy: without significant direct economic impact on the targeted companies in the short term, they risk appearing as strategic bluffing — thereby encouraging Washington to continue expanding its own list.

The real threat behind the symbolism

The real threat of the June 22 measures is not in what they do today — it is in what they prefigure for tomorrow. The designation of rare earths as an explicit retaliation instrument. The extension to third countries of Chinese restrictions' reach. The coordination between two ministries for a simultaneous announcement. These architectural signals say something important about the direction of Beijing's economic policy: toward an increasingly assertive and precise use of its monopoly positions in critical sectors as a power lever in the confrontation with the West. June 22, 2026 is a step. The question is: which one?

Two ministries, two lists, one single message. Beijing has found its rhythm in this confrontation. It is slow, deliberate, calculated. It is not seeking the grand finale — it is patiently building its positions. Facing that, the impatience and impulsiveness of American commercial policy sometimes look like an advantage for Beijing. Patience is also an instrument of power.

The choice of the two capitals

Washington and Beijing both face a choice, in the months ahead, of going up or down the sanctions and counter-sanctions staircase. Going up means longer lists, broader restrictions, rare earths as an explicit weapon, an economic confrontation that would affect millions of consumers and workers in both countries and beyond. Going down means finding a stabilization mechanism — doubtless within bilateral trade negotiations on tariffs and market access, where the lists would be used as bargaining chips for concrete concessions. Neither trajectory is inevitable. Both are possible. And in the uncertainty of this fork, thousands of companies, allied governments, and global economic actors are waiting, holding their breath, for the next decision that will determine which direction is taken.

The West as a whole must have a common strategy

This report confirms what every serious observer of the Sino-American confrontation has long known: a fragmented Western response — Washington draws up its list, Europe hesitates, Canada recalibrates — plays directly into Beijing's strategy. Authoritarian China faces a potentially powerful coalition that struggles to speak with one voice. NATO has defined China as a systemic challenge. The EU has adopted investment screening mechanisms. Canada is engaged in recalibrating its relationship with China. But none of these efforts is yet coordinated within a common strategic framework. It is this framework — a Western equivalent of the 1260H list but shared among allies, precise in its criteria, fair in its procedure — that is missing. And as long as it is missing, Beijing will continue to advance, list after list, mechanism after mechanism, on the path to global techno-economic power.

I will end on this image: two Chinese state secretariats coordinating their announcements on the same Monday. And on the other side, a Western alliance still struggling to get its act together. Coordination is a form of power. And on that front — not the front of weapons or the economy, but the front of strategic coherence — the West still has much to do to be worthy of the challenge it faces.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between verified facts and interpretive analysis. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under Sources, never here.

Primary source families used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

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When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under Sources.

Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a critical, contextual synthesis based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.