REPORT: Bill Pulte at the DNI — lightning purge and chaos in American intelligence

June 19, 2026: an unknown figure takes the reins of intelligence

On June 19, 2026, Donald Trump names Bill Pulte acting director of the DNI — the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the body coordinating all 18 American spy agencies. Pulte, a billionaire heir and entrepreneur known to the general public for his viral cash giveaways on Twitter/X, has no formal intelligence experience. His appointment comes the day after the late-May 2026 resignation of Tulsi Gabbard, who had herself arrived at the post without a traditional intelligence background.

Within less than a week, Pulte will transform the DNI into a testing ground for the DOGE doctrine applied to national intelligence. From day one, layoffs begin. Revelations cascade. Republican senators rage. And Washington discovers, in stunned disbelief, that the American national security apparatus can be shaken the same way as an ordinary ministry.

Gabbard's resignation: a cascading departure

The resignation of Tulsi Gabbard in late May 2026 is not a minor detail. Appointed by Trump 47 for her profile as a sharp critic of the American security establishment, Gabbard had herself clashed with the DNI's institutional cultures. Her precipitous departure — whose exact reasons remain disputed — left a void that Trump filled with Pulte, a man who has never spent a day working in an intelligence agency in his life.

For the 17,000 DNI employees and the directors of affiliated agencies — CIA, NSA, DIA, and the rest — this succession of two atypical profiles sends a troubling message: institutional continuity is no longer a protected value at the White House. Intelligence professionals who have spent their careers building relationships, sources, and methods watch with a mixture of stupefaction and alarm.

Bill Pulte at the DNI — I had to read it twice. A man known for giving away money on Twitter will oversee intelligence operations against China, Russia, and Iran? I understand the DOGE logic: break silos, eliminate bureaucracies. But intelligence is not a bureaucracy like any other. Its mistakes are not measured in budget waste — they are measured in human lives lost.

Six direct terminations, 45 reassigned

On his very first day leading the DNI, Bill Pulte fires more than 50 employees: 6 direct terminations and 45 forced reassignments to other federal agencies. These figures, revealed by The Guardian on June 23, 2026, illustrate the brutality of the method. No consultation process, no individual performance evaluation — an ideological purge, wielded bureaucratically but swift as lightning.

According to CNN sources cited in the Guardian investigation, Pulte is considering eliminating "hundreds" of positions across the entire DNI. This information, unconfirmed officially at the time of writing, potentially represents the most significant disruption to the American intelligence apparatus since the post-September 11 reforms of 2001. The difference: in 2001, the disruption responded to a proven tragic failure. In 2026, it precedes any serious diagnosis.

Who are the 50? A question without a public answer

One of the most troubling questions raised by this purge is the complete absence of transparency on the selection criteria. Why these 6 terminated rather than others? What functions did the 45 reassigned perform? Were they China analysts, counterterrorism officials, cybersecurity experts? No official answer is available — and that is precisely where the problem becomes serious for national security.

Intelligence operates on trust networks and accumulated institutional knowledge. An analyst who has worked on a subject for ten years is not replaceable overnight. Firing experts without ensuring knowledge transfer is potentially creating blind spots in American strategic monitoring. Blind spots that adversaries like China, Russia, or Iran could exploit.

Fifty employees fired in a single day at the DNI — without public criteria, without individual evaluation, without process. In any other organization, we would call that wrongful dismissal. In national intelligence, it is a potential security breach. I am not saying the DNI cannot be reformed — I am saying the speed of this purge is itself a risk.

The Republican reaction: between adherence and revolt

The response within the Republican Party is revealing of internal GOP tensions. Senator Lindsey Graham quickly moved to accelerate the confirmation of Jay Clayton — former SEC chairman — as permanent DNI director. This effort, documented by Politico on June 21, 2026, aims to quickly end the Pulte interim period and stabilize a shaken institution.

But it is the reaction of Senator Thom Tillis (Republican, North Carolina) that captured media attention. In a video posted to YouTube on June 23, 2026, Tillis calls the DNI layoffs a "hot steaming pile of DOGE S—T" — as colorful a formulation as it is improbable from a Republican senator directed at DOGE. The political signal is strong: even within GOP ranks, the Pulte method is shocking.

Jay Clayton: a reassuring profile for markets, but not for intelligence

Jay Clayton, whom Graham is pushing as permanent director, is a respected lawyer and former financial regulator. His management of the SEC under Trump 45 earned him a reputation for competence and relative independence. But the DNI is not the SEC. Coordinating 18 intelligence agencies, managing sensitive human sources, overseeing clandestine operations — these tasks have nothing to do with regulating financial markets.

The pattern taking shape is troubling: Trump appears to select his intelligence directors based on criteria of personal loyalty and absence of institutional experience — as though experience itself were suspect. Gabbard, Pulte, possibly Clayton — none has spent a day at Langley or Fort Meade. Competence appears to be a secondary criterion in selecting the keepers of American secrets.

Tillis saying "hot steaming pile of DOGE S—T" — the Republican senator saying out loud what many think privately. That moment will remain in the annals of the American Congress. And it illustrates something important: the DOGE doctrine is meeting real resistance, even in Republican ranks, when it touches national security institutions. There are lines that even Trumpists do not want to cross.

A GAO report that documents the scale of the cuts

The DNI purge fits within a broader movement documented by a GAO — Government Accountability Office — report published on June 23, 2026. According to this report, DOGE has eliminated 82,940 civilian Pentagon positions since January 2025, reducing the military civilian workforce from 778,188 to 695,248 employees. A reduction of more than 10% in 18 months.

These figures are significant. Pentagon civilians are not ordinary bureaucrats — they are engineers maintaining weapons systems, analysts assessing threats, contracts managers overseeing billions of dollars in military acquisitions. Their mass elimination creates real operational risks in the American military chain of command.

CISA: 40% of cybersecurity staff eliminated

Among the agencies hit hardest by DOGE, the CISA — Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency — is among the most severely affected. According to Broadband Breakfast on June 25, 2026, DOGE cut 40% of CISA's staff. This agency is responsible for protecting America's critical infrastructure — power grids, water systems, finance, communications — against cyberattacks.

Cutting 40% of a cybersecurity agency's workforce in the middle of a digital Cold War with China, Russia, and Iran — the logic escapes most security experts. China and Russia are investing massively in offensive cyber capabilities. Reducing defenses at the very moment the threat is growing resembles a suicidal strategy. The defense of American networks now rests on skeleton crews.

Cutting 40% of CISA while China tests its cyber capabilities and Russia continues its influence operations — I look for the logic, I cannot find it. Maybe DOGE has arguments I am not aware of. But in the meantime, every hacker in Beijing or Moscow who learns this news is probably ordering a round of drinks. It is a free gift to America's adversaries.

A coherent but dangerous doctrine in intelligence

The DOGE doctrine — eliminating federal bureaucracy deemed inefficient, disloyal, or unnecessary — has a certain coherence in civilian ministries. Eliminating redundant administrative positions, reducing regulatory spending, accelerating decision-making — these objectives are legitimate in certain contexts. But applied to intelligence and cybersecurity, the DOGE doctrine potentially becomes a doctrine of self-sabotage.

Intelligence is not an ordinary bureaucracy. Apparent "inefficiencies" are often security redundancies — double-verification systems, parallel teams to avoid blind spots. Eliminating these "inefficiencies" can create lethal vulnerabilities. This is a logic the Trump administration seems determined to ignore, in the name of a cost-reduction imperative that fails to account for the specificities of intelligence missions.

DOGE advocates respond

Defenders of the DOGE approach at the DNI advance several arguments. First, that the DNI expanded uncontrollably since 2004 and that a significant portion of its workforce represents parasitic bureaucracy rather than real operational capacity. Second, that institutional loyalties within intelligence agencies have sometimes protected actors who worked against the priorities of the democratically elected executive.

These arguments are not without merit. The history of American intelligence agencies is dotted with examples of excessive bureaucratization and institutional resistance to legitimate political directives. But the answer to these real problems is not a rapid ideological purge — it is a structured, evaluated, progressive reform. What Pulte is doing is neither structured nor evaluated.

I acknowledge that the DNI is not perfect — no human institution is. And I acknowledge that reforms are necessary in intelligence agencies. But there is a fundamental difference between reforming and purging. Reform is methodical, documented, progressive. A purge is rapid, ideological, and often irreversible in its institutional damage.

Blind spots accumulating

Let us take a moment to measure the accumulating fragilities: 50 employees fired at the DNI, 82,940 civilians eliminated at the Pentagon, 40% of CISA personnel gone. Each of these measures taken in isolation might be explainable. Their cumulative effect outlines a systemic weakening of the American national security apparatus at a moment of maximum geopolitical tensions — Iran, Ukraine, China, North Korea.

America's adversaries are watching, analyzing, and adapting their strategies accordingly. A CISA at 60% of its staffing is a vulnerable CISA. A DNI undergoing a purge is a DNI whose analytical capacity is temporarily reduced. An army whose civilian workforce shrank by 10% must do more with less. The sum of these vulnerabilities exceeds their arithmetic total.

The signal sent to allies

These cuts also send a troubling signal to American intelligence partners — notably the Five Eyes members (United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and NATO allies. Allied intelligence rests on a principle of reciprocity and institutional trust. When American institutions are destabilized, the entire Western intelligence-sharing system suffers.

Sources within allied agencies, reported by British media, describe growing concern over the reliability of the American intelligence partnership in the context of DOGE purges. This concern is legitimate — and it is precisely the type of collateral effect that DOGE advocates evidently did not calculate in their bureaucratic efficiency model.

The Five Eyes — that intelligence partnership that survived the Cold War, September 11, nuclear proliferation, terrorism — concerned about American reliability. It would be comical if it were not so grave. The United States is in the process of destroying in a few months what generations of intelligence professionals built since 1945. The vertigo is real.

Jay Clayton as a compromise solution

The most likely short-term outcome is the confirmation of Jay Clayton as permanent DNI director, under pressure from Republican senators like Graham who want to end the Pulte interim. Clayton would bring a degree of institutional stability and Washington-circle credibility. But he inherits a weakened institution, demoralized employees, and a deeply shaken internal culture.

The real question is whether Clayton will have the will and political latitude to halt the planned position eliminations, rebuild critical teams, and restore trust with allied partners. Or whether he will simply be the presentable face of a DOGE doctrine that continues to apply remorselessly, away from the media spotlight.

A dangerous precedent

Beyond the Pulte case and the DNI, this report illustrates a dangerous precedent: American national security agencies are no longer considered protected institutions from short-term budgetary efficiency imperatives. If this doctrine extends to the CIA, the NSA, or military intelligence commands, the consequences for collective Western security could be lasting and grave.

History teaches that powers that weaken their own intelligence capabilities during periods of intense geopolitical competition pay this choice disproportionately. Not always immediately, but inevitably. Time will tell whether Washington learned this lesson in time.

Bureaucratic efficiency applied to state secrets

The DOGE doctrine — reduce, simplify, cut — makes sense in managing standard administrative services. It makes far less sense when applied to organizations whose value cannot be measured in direct budget costs, but in discreet capabilities, trust networks, and years of accumulated training and experience. Intelligence is precisely this type of organization. A DNI analyst who spent ten years studying the movements of Chinese capital has no visible value in a cost-per-employee Excel spreadsheet — but his operational value is immeasurable.

The fundamental error of Pulte and DOGE at the DNI may lie exactly here: treating intelligence as an ordinary bureaucracy. The methods that work for reducing spending in regulatory agencies or civilian ministries become national security risks when applied to agencies that collect and analyze the information on which the security of 330 million Americans and their allies depends.

Historical experience: purges that cost dearly

American intelligence history offers several examples of institutional purges whose consequences were grave. The sidelining of Arab-language specialists in the 1970s contributed to blind spots in the 1980s Middle East. The reduction of CIA human intelligence capabilities in the 1990s, in favor of electronic surveillance, was identified as one of the intelligence failure factors before September 11, 2001. These historical lessons are known to every intelligence professional — and appear to be ignored by the architects of the Pulte purge.

This is not an ideological critique of the Trump government. It is an empirical observation: intelligence organizations that underwent rapid purges systematically experienced performance degradation in the following years. Rebuilding takes time, money, and political will that subsequent administrations do not always possess. What Pulte dismantles in a few weeks can take a decade to rebuild.

Purges in American intelligence history — I know them well. And I am struck by how regularly the same mistakes repeat themselves. Every political generation that arrives in power with distrust of the "inherited" intelligence professionals makes the same impulsive cuts. And every time, the operational consequences make themselves felt at the worst possible moment. Pulte is not the first — he is simply the fastest.The institutional intelligence of the intelligence community — that tacit knowledge accumulated over years, those source networks cultivated over decades, those regional expertises developed in languages and cultures that few Americans master. None of that can be bought with a $350 billion defense budget. It is built patiently, maintained meticulously, and lost irremediably when treated as a budget line to be cut.Pulte, DOGE, the DNI — I close this report with a reinforced conviction: national security institutions cannot be treated like ordinary government agencies. Their value is discreet, their fragility real, and rebuilding after a purge is slow and costly. America is playing with fire by subjecting them to a doctrine of budgetary efficiency that deliberately ignores these realities.

When bureaucratic doctrine meets national security

The appointment of Bill Pulte to the DNI and the lightning purge of his first hours are not simply another episode of Washington chaos. They represent the application of a coherent — but profoundly ill-suited — doctrine to a domain where mistakes are not measured in budget but in lives. The elimination of 50 employees in a single day, the plans for massive future cuts, the 82,940 Pentagon civilians already eliminated — all of this outlines a systemic weakening of the American national security apparatus.

America's adversaries — China, Russia, Iran, North Korea — are watching and adapting. Allies are worried. Intelligence professionals are resigning or staying silent. And Washington continues, undeterred, to apply DOGE logic to institutions whose value cannot be measured in budget lines but in discreet capabilities, trust networks, and accumulated years of competence.

A democracy experimenting on its own defenses

There is something deeply troubling in this sequence — not because intelligence reform would be illegitimate, but because the way it is being conducted resembles irresponsible experimentation on the very foundations of American democratic security. Democracies need competent, reliable intelligence, independent of partisan loyalties, to function. What Pulte is building looks like the exact opposite of that ideal.

Zelensky, who depends in part on American intelligence to defend his country, has reason to hope this chaos is temporary. NATO has reason to hope that allied partners maintain their confidence in the shared intelligence system. And American citizens have reason to demand that their elected officials hold the DNI leadership accountable for what is happening.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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