NARRATIVE: From the Strait of Hormuz to Bahrain — Four Days That Almost Blew Everything Up

Introduction: A week when the Middle East flirted with catastrophe

Thursday, June 26: when an Iranian drone changes everything

It begins on a Thursday, toward the end of June 2026. An Iranian drone strikes the container ship Ever Lovely, flying the flag of Singapore, as it navigates the Strait of Hormuz. No one aboard is injured. But the attack forces the International Maritime Organization to suspend its evacuation plan for vessels stranded in the strait. The international response is immediate: the IRGC, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, has just fired the first shot in an escalation sequence that will, over four days, bring Iranian ballistic missiles over Bahrain and Kuwait.

This narrative covers those four days — from June 26 to 28, 2026 — and what they mean for the fragile framework agreement that the United States and Iran had painstakingly signed on June 17. An agreement that had promised, for the first time in years, a possible path toward de-escalation. An agreement that the IRGC nearly reduced to nothing in less than a week.

The June 17 agreement: a fragile hope against a backdrop of defiance

A memorandum signed in Switzerland

On June 17, 2026, the United States and Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Switzerland, after months of painstaking negotiations with Pakistan as a key mediator. The text provided for a halt to strikes on "all fronts" — wording vague enough to include American operations against Iranian proxies in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon, as well as IRGC activities in the Persian Gulf. Both parties had 60 days to negotiate the details of full implementation.

The subjects on the table were considerable: arrangements around the Strait of Hormuz, lifting an American blockade of Iranian ports, sanctions, and the future of Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile. On paper, this was the most serious normalization attempt between Washington and Tehran since the 2015 nuclear agreement. And as in 2015, forces on both sides were working to torpedo it before it could take root.

The terms of the agreement and its ambiguities

The MoU text contained a critical clause: fighting had to cease on "all fronts" before certain sensitive issues could be addressed. But at the time of signing, fighting was continuing in Lebanon — a front that Iran considered linked to operations backed by Israel with American approval. This ambiguity would give the IRGC its pretext for justifying its subsequent actions: if the United States had not halted strikes in all areas, the agreement was void on their side.

Pakistan, the key mediator, had committed to facilitating the resumption of technical discussions scheduled for Tuesday, June 30. The Trump administration had publicly declared that nothing had been canceled and that technical talks remained on track. But between the June 17 announcement and June 26, ten days had passed — and the Strait of Hormuz was becoming a zone of direct confrontation.

Thursday, June 26: the first drone

The Ever Lovely and the beginning of the sequence

The container ship Ever Lovely, flying the Singaporean flag, was navigating the Strait of Hormuz when an IRGC explosive drone struck it. No casualties reported. But the incident triggered a chain reaction: the International Maritime Organization suspended its evacuation plan for vessels stranded in the strait. Shipping companies began rerouting their vessels.

The IRGC's logic was clear, even if unstated: force ships to use Iranian waters rather than Omani ones, establishing de facto "exclusive management" of maritime traffic by Tehran. A multinational body supervised by the U.S. Navy had announced it would develop a route running along Omani waters for inbound and outbound traffic. Iran interpreted this as a violation of the MoU: any attempt to establish an alternative arrangement without Iranian supervision was unacceptable.

Iran's position on the strait

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was explicit: "Any attempt to establish new arrangements or arrangements separate from those currently in place by the Islamic Republic of Iran will only complicate things, delay the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and increase the level of tension."Iran claims that the Strait of Hormuz — which normally carries one-fifth of the world's oil and natural gas — is under its "total surveillance and management" for the next 30 days.

This is an extraordinary claim that strikes at the foundations of international maritime law. The Strait of Hormuz is an international transit corridor situated in the territorial waters of both Iran and Oman. Iran's assertion of exclusive sovereignty over its traffic is a direct violation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). But in the Persian Gulf of June 2026, international law is not the only arbiter of reality.

Saturday, June 27: U.S. strikes on 10 Iranian targets

CENTCOM's response

On Saturday, June 27, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announces that the U.S. Navy and Air Force"conducted strikes last night on 10 Iranian military targets at multiple locations in and near the Strait of Hormuz." The targets include surveillance infrastructure, communications systems, air defence sites, drone depots, and mine-laying capabilities. Locations struck include Sirik, Bandar-e Lengeh, and Qeshm island.

These strikes are presented by the United States as a direct response to the Iranian drone attack on the tanker Kiku — a Panama-flagged tanker carrying more than two million barrels of crude oil, owned by Qatar's national energy company — another key mediator in the American-Iranian negotiations. The IRGC had struck the Kiku also on Saturday, early in the day, as it transited near the Strait of Hormuz.

The Kiku and the brutality of the Iranian signal

The fact that Iran chose to strike a tanker belonging to Qatar — the country that hosts its own peace negotiators with the United States and with various regional factions — is a signal of calculated brutality. Either the IRGC was deliberately ignoring the diplomatic implications. Or it was fully aware of them and chose the attack precisely to show that diplomatic relationships will protect no one if Iran decides to strike.

Qatar, which had condemned Iranian attacks against Bahrain and Kuwait while insisting on the need to "spare the region the consequences of unjustified attacks," found itself in the untenable position of being simultaneously mediator and target. This positioning is revealing of the IRGC's strategy: sow confusion, maximize pressure on all regional actors, and demonstrate that no one is out of reach.

Sunday, June 28: missiles and drones over Bahrain and Kuwait

The assault on the Fifth Fleet and Ali Al Salem

On Sunday, June 28, following the American strikes of the previous night, the IRGC moves to direct escalation: ballistic missiles and drones against the Ali Al Salem air base in Kuwait, and against the U.S. Fifth Naval Fleet at Port Salman in Bahrain. This is the first time Iran has directly attacked these American bases in this escalation sequence — a line crossed that changes the nature of the conflict.

The immediate results are, on balance, less catastrophic than the sequence might have suggested. In Kuwait, air defences intercept Iranian drones and two missiles — no casualties, no damage reported. In Bahrain, the Iranian strikes damage a residential building near the international airport — no deaths. The building hit was not adjacent to the Fifth Fleet headquarters. In Qatar, one Qatari national dies after being struck by shrapnel resulting from military operations in the region.

The reaction of Gulf Arab states

The reactions of the Gulf Arab states are unanimously severe. Bahrain denounces "a dangerous escalation that reveals what Tehran is doing is not an isolated or passing act, but a deliberate approach and a systematic pattern of repeated aggression."Kuwait calls the attacks a "flagrant violation of its sovereignty." The United Arab Emirates speak of a "manifest violation of sovereignty" and a "threat to their security and stability."Jordan refers to a "dangerous escalation and a flagrant violation of international law and the United Nations Charter."

Oman — which shares the Strait of Hormuz waters with Iran and is traditionally the secret communication channel between Tehran and Washington — calls for restraint and favours dialogue. It is Oman that, in the weeks ahead, would likely be the first country to attempt to repair what the IRGC had torn.

Trump, the threat, and crisis management

"Iran will no longer exist"

The public reaction of Donald Trump is, in its own way, characteristic. He accuses Iran of violating the agreement and warns that there is a point at which the United States could be "forced to militarily finish the job." He posts on social media: "If that happens, the Islamic Republic of Iran will no longer exist!" This is a threat of total annihilation formulated in absolute terms — the kind of declaration that, coming from an American president, should logically send oil prices upward and Gulf stability several levels downward.

But the Trump administration simultaneously sends a more measured signal: nothing has been canceled, technical discussions remain scheduled for the following days. This double message — apocalyptic rhetoric and diplomatic continuity — is the characteristic operational mode of the Trump administration toward Iran. It produces maximum uncertainty that may be calculated, or may simply reflect a constitutive unpredictability.

Sixty days that begin to feel like fewer

The June 17 agreement allowed 60 days to negotiate the details. Within ten days, the IRGC had attacked three merchant vessels and two American military bases. Pakistan was still mediating. Technical talks were still "on track" according to Washington. But the countdown had accelerated dramatically.

The Tehran Stock Exchange, reacting to the escalation, had lost more than 100,000 points, falling to approximately 5 million points. Ordinary Iranians — those with nothing to do with the IRGC's calculations — were paying the price of the volatility triggered by their own military. This is not the first time this equation has presented itself in Iran. It will not be the last.

Iran against itself: the divide between negotiators and military

Araghchi against the IRGC

The crisis of June 2026 exposes a tension that observers of Iranian politics know well: the fracture between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — represented by Araghchi, who had negotiated the MoU with the United States — and the IRGC, which answers ultimately to the Supreme Leader and not to the president. The IRGC did not ask Araghchi for permission to strike the Kiku or the American bases. It acted — and then forced the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to publicly defend its actions.

Araghchi complied, repeating that the Strait of Hormuz remained under Iran's "total surveillance and management" for the next 30 days. But he also held to the line on the Qatar talks scheduled to resume — signaling that the diplomatic door was not closed. This double language — aggressive on substance, open on form — is what makes Iranian policy so difficult to analyze from the outside.

The threat of a complete halt to negotiations

The IRGC — through its declarations, not through diplomatic acts — threatened a "complete halt" to negotiations if the United States continued its strikes. This threat is simultaneously credible and strategically improbable: credible because the IRGC has the capacity to sabotage any diplomatic opening, improbable because Iran has a direct interest in the lifting of sanctions for its crisis-ridden economy.

The question that hung at the end of that week was: was the IRGC's halt threat a bluff to obtain American concessions on the strait? Or was it a serious statement of intent from those within the Iranian regime who prefer confrontation to normalization? The answer to that question determined whether the June 17 agreement could survive the week of June 26-28.

The impact on global maritime traffic

One-fifth of the world's oil in question

The Strait of Hormuz is, in normal times, the transit corridor for approximately one-fifth of the world's oil and natural gas. When it is disrupted, the effects propagate through every industrial economy that depends on hydrocarbon imports — from Europe to Asia to emerging countries whose economies are still heavily anchored in fossil fuels. The week of June 26-28 disrupted this artery without closing it completely.

The multinational body supervised by the U.S. Navy reported that 89 vessels had transited with its assistance — below the historical average of 138 ships per day. Traffic had increased in the 72 hours preceding the report, but remained reduced. Marine insurance companies had raised their premiums. Commodity traders were watching crude oil prices nervously. Russia — whose oil revenues benefited indirectly from price increases linked to Gulf instability — was observing the escalation with the quiet satisfaction of someone who profits from others' chaos.

Russia as indirect beneficiary

An analysis by CIMSEC (Center for International Maritime Security) documented how the partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz benefited Russian oil revenues: the disruption of supply from the Persian Gulf drove up oil prices, partially offsetting the impact of Western sanctions on Russian exports. This is not strategic coincidence: Russia has documented interests in keeping Iran in a confrontational posture toward the West, and it has the means — arms sales, technology transfers, diplomatic support at the UN Security Council — to maintain that relationship.

The convergence of Russia-Iran-China-North Korea as a bloc destabilizing the Western order is not a conspiracy theory. It is a reality documented in Western intelligence reports for several years. The Strait of Hormuz crisis is one illustration among many.

What this crisis says about the Middle East of 2026

An arc of crisis stretching from Lebanon to the Gulf

The sequence of June 26-28, 2026 is not an anomaly — it is the latest episode in a series that has been running for months, if not years. American and Israeli operations against Iran had begun on February 28, 2026, according to the timeline documented in available sources. Exchanges of strikes had intensified on several occasions. The June 17 agreement was an attempt at a pause — a pause that the IRGC made very difficult to sustain from the following week onward.

Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and now directly Kuwait and Bahrain: the geography of the confrontation between Iran and its adversaries had expanded. Each extension of the battlefield complicates the map of possible agreements: a ceasefire on one front does not necessarily halt fighting on another. And Iran — or rather the IRGC — uses this geographic complexity as a negotiating lever: demand concessions on all fronts simultaneously, knowing that the West cannot coordinate coherent responses across so many theatres.

Regional stability as an abstract notion

The Gulf Arab states — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait — have divergent interests but a shared fear: being caught in a direct conflict between the United States and Iran on their own territory. The fact that Iranian ballistic missiles flew over Bahrain and Kuwait on June 28 — even without causing casualties — is a political trauma for governments that had invested decades in building balanced relations with both of their major neighbours.

The destabilization of the Persian Gulf has direct consequences for Ukraine as well: a West mired in a crisis with Iran devotes less attention and resources to the war in Europe. Moscow calculated this. Beijing calculated this. And the IRGC — whatever the true degree of autonomy in its decisions — objectively contributes to that calculation.

Negotiations still on track: despite everything

Pakistan and the resumption of discussions

Despite the escalation of June 26-28, the American-Iranian technical discussions scheduled for Tuesday, June 30 — with Pakistan as mediator — had not yet been officially canceled at the time of these events. The Trump administration had held its position: talks were continuing. Pakistan had said discussions would resume. Iran — through the voice of Araghchi, not the IRGC — had not formally slammed the door.

This maintenance of the diplomatic facade, despite Iranian ballistic missiles over Bahrain and Kuwait, testifies to the extraordinary pressure both parties feel to preserve a path toward de-escalation. Iran needs sanctions relief for its economy in crisis. The United States needs stability in the Gulf. These mutual needs are stronger than the IRGC's provocations — at least for now.

Talks in Qatar

Resumption talks were scheduled in Qatar in the days following the crisis. Qatar — despite the fact that its own tanker Kiku had been attacked — maintained its position as facilitator. This is a remarkable demonstration of geopolitical pragmatism: Doha understands that its mediating role confers security and influence that outweighs the price of the humiliation of an attack on its oil infrastructure. Gulf states play at the levels of power their geographies impose on them.

The resolution of the crisis — if resolution came — would pass through these discreet channels and mediating states. Not through Trump's declarations about the end of Iran. Not through the IRGC's threats of a complete halt to negotiations. But through anonymous diplomats in meeting rooms in Doha, Islamabad, or Muscat. That is how regional crises are managed — or are not.

Ukraine in the shadow of the Gulf

The resources of Western attention in question

When the Persian Gulf is on fire, Ukraine is not the front-page priority. Crisis meetings at the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department are occupied with maps of the Strait of Hormuz and trajectories of Iranian missiles. Political and diplomatic time is a scarce resource. And in late June 2026, a considerable portion of that resource was absorbed by a Gulf crisis that the IRGC had — deliberately or not — chosen to provoke.

The connection is not abstract: the Patriot systems defending American bases in Kuwait and Bahrain are the same systems that Ukraine needs to defend Kyiv and Kharkiv. The ammunition consumed in the June 28 interceptions is drawn from global stocks that include allocations for Ukraine. War across two theatres — even at very different levels of intensity — creates pressure on supply chains that were not designed for two simultaneous conflicts.

Ukraine's resilience despite the distractions

Zelensky and his team have developed expertise in managing global attention. They know their country is not always at the top of the agenda. They have learned to maintain diplomatic and communications pressure in any circumstances. The week of June 26-28 did not change the Ukrainian position on the ground — fighting continued, arms deliveries continued to be negotiated, the NATO summit at Ankara remained on the schedule.

But Ukraine is a country at war that depends on the continued support of partners whose attention is being solicited simultaneously by multiple crises. This reality is a structural vulnerability that its enemies — Russia, Iran, and to a lesser extent North Korea — consciously exploit. The multiplication of regional crises is a strategy, not a coincidence.

The role of Russia and its allies

The Moscow-Tehran-Pyongyang axis

The relationship between Russia and Iran is not a formal alliance. But it is functional: Russia has supplied Iran with military equipment, missile technologies, and diplomatic support at the UN Security Council. In return, Iran has supplied Russia with Shahed drones that terrorized Ukrainian cities for months. North Korea has supplied ammunition and shells that stocked Russian artillery batteries on the front line. These arms flows have been documented, sanctioned, and continue despite everything.

The CIMSEC analysis documenting Russian benefits from the partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz adds an additional dimension to this convergence: Russia benefits economically from every Gulf crisis. This benefit does not need to be coordinated to be real. It is enough that each actor acts in its own interest for the ensemble to produce a coordinated destabilizing effect against the West.

The cumulative effects of planned or accidental destabilization

Whether one believes in explicit coordination between Moscow, Tehran, Beijing, and Pyongyang, or explains it by a convergence of interests without formal coordination, the result is identical: the West faces simultaneously a war in Europe, a crisis in the Persian Gulf, a Chinese military buildup, and North Korean provocations. Each crisis absorbed is one less resource for the others. And the West's resources — in political attention, in ammunition, in defence systems — are not infinite.

The response to this reality cannot be retreat. That would hand a free victory to those seeking to exhaust Western resistance. The response must be an increase in capacity — industrial, diplomatic, institutional — to simultaneously manage multiple crises without losing the thread of any one of them. That is easier said than done. But it is the only response with strategic sense.

Conclusions of the narrative: four days, many questions

What saved the June 17 agreement

At the end of the week of June 26-28, 2026, the June 17 agreement was under severe strain but not dead. Pakistan continued to mediate. Qatar maintained its open channels despite the attack on the Kiku. The Trump administration declared that technical discussions were continuing. Iran — through the voice of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs — had not formally broken off.

What saved the agreement — if it was saved — is the asymmetry of costs. Iran cannot afford economically a return to the pre-agreement situation: the sanctions, the American and Israeli military pressure, the collapse of the rial. The United States cannot afford politically a direct military conflict with Iran in the middle of a campaign of support for Ukraine and rising tensions with China. This mutual asymmetry is the fragile glue that held the agreement together despite everything.

What this narrative cannot yet tell

This narrative stops at June 28, 2026. It cannot tell what happened next — whether the technical Qatar discussions took place, whether the agreement held, whether the IRGC struck again, whether Hormuz was reopened on Iranian or international terms. This narrative is a snapshot of an ongoing crisis, not a story with an ending. And in Middle East crises, stories without endings are the rule, not the exception.

What I can say is that four days of missiles, drones, attacked tankers, and bombed American bases reminded us of an uncomfortable truth: the Middle East of 2026 is a powder keg that multiple actors, with multiple agendas, are simultaneously blowing on. And in this context, maintaining functional diplomacy requires nerves of steel, courageous mediators, and a degree of luck that no one can guarantee.

Conclusion: An unfinished narrative in a world that is no less so

The meaning of four days in the long run

These four days from June 26 to 28, 2026 may be only a footnote in the history of the American-Iranian crisis. Or they will be the moment when an escalation nearly became irreversible — and did not, thanks to anonymous diplomats who worked in the shadows while generals brandished their missiles. History will tell which of these two narratives is the true one.

What is certain is that the June 17 agreement survived a severe test. That the IRGC demonstrated its ability to torpedo the diplomacy of its own government. That the Gulf Arab states were reminded of the brutality of their geopolitical neighbourhood. And that the West had to, once again, manage two simultaneous crises — in Europe and in the Middle East — with resources that are not infinite.

What the narrative must retain

Narratives of military crises run the risk of focusing on the drama — the missiles in flight, the burning bases, Trump's apocalyptic declarations. They sometimes forget the invisible actors: the Pakistani and Qatari diplomats who maintain open channels, the sailors of the American coast guard who escort merchant vessels under the radar, the Iranian negotiators who try to contain their own military. These actors matter as much as the generals. Often more.

The Strait of Hormuz was not completely closed. The June 17 agreement did not collapse, at least not in the week of June 26-28. These non-events may be the most important in the narrative. They say that despite the IRGC, despite the ballistic missiles, despite Trump and his declarations of total annihilation, de-escalation mechanisms held. Fragile, imperfect, threatened — but they held.

Epilogue: What the sea always says

Hormuz as a geopolitical mirror

The Strait of Hormuz is a geography that concentrates the world's tensions. It measures 33 kilometres at its narrowest point. Through this bottleneck pass the economies of dozens of countries. An Iranian hand on this tap, and the world trembles. This is not a metaphor. It is geopolitical physics.

Iran knows what it controls. The United States knows what it cannot allow to be controlled. And between these two incompatible logics, diplomats, mediators, and naval officers are trying to find a path that preserves at once Iranian sovereignty, international freedom of navigation, and the stability of an oil market on which the entire world still depends. It is the impossible task. And despite everything, it gets done.

For Ukraine, for Europe, for us

The Gulf crisis of June 2026 is a brutal reminder that modern wars are no longer contained in isolated theatres. They answer each other, feed each other, extend. Ukraine is fighting Russia with shells that come from North Korea. Iran attacks with drones that resemble the Shaheds sent to Kyiv. China controls the rare earths that manufacture the defences against those drones. Everything is connected.

Understanding these connections is the duty of anyone who wants to understand the world of 2026. This narrative is just one fragment of that picture. A fragment from June 26 to 28, in the Persian Gulf, in the space of four days that could have changed everything — and may have changed nothing at all. That is how crises work. And that is how the world keeps turning, despite everything.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My method and my limits

This narrative is built from public journalistic sources available as of June 28-30, 2026. I have no direct diplomatic source in the Middle East. I do not have access to classified information from American or European intelligence services about the IRGC. Everything I report as fact is attributed to cited sources. Everything I formulate as analysis is clearly identified as such — opinion or inference, never presented as certainty.

I am openly in favour of stability in the Persian Gulf, the maintenance of international maritime law, and the preservation of an agreement that, however imperfect, represents a path toward reduced tensions. I am sceptical — but not hostile by principle — toward authoritarian regimes that seek to use economic and military weapons against democracies and their allies.

What I do not know

I do not know whether the Qatar discussions planned for late June actually took place. I do not know whether the June 17 agreement survived the following weeks. I do not know what portion of the IRGC's actions was coordinated with the Iranian political leadership, and what portion reflected military autonomy. These questions remain open and limit the scope of my analysis. I acknowledge that.

I have not attributed to actors intentions that do not correspond to their public statements, nor invented scenes or dialogues. This narrative is grounded in documented facts, even when the narrative inferences drawn from them are my own.

Sources

Primary sources

Al Jazeera — IRGC doubles down as Iran-US MoU jeopardised by Hormuz strikes — June 28, 2026

Al Jazeera — Iran attacks Kuwait and Bahrain in response to US strikes — June 28, 2026

PBS NewsHour — Iran attacks Bahrain and Kuwait following US strikes and threatens to halt talks — June 28, 2026

Secondary sources

Reuters — US conducts further strikes on Iran — June 27, 2026

Institute for the Study of War — Iran Update Special Report June 28, 2026

CIMSEC — The Hormuz Closure and the Limits of Sanctions: How Russia Benefited from Iran's Chokepoint Weapon