PROFILE: Witkoff and Kushner, the Envoys Returning to Moscow After the Islamabad Deal

PROFILE: Witkoff and Kushner, the Envoys Returning to Moscow After the Islamabad Deal

Introduction: two men on standby, a world suspended

The Ukrainian dossier put on hold by Tehran

On June 17, 2026, in Versailles, Donald Trump signed the Islamabad Memorandum over dinner with Emmanuel Macron — a 14-point agreement formally ending the war between the United States and Iran. That evening in Tehran, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian applied his digital signature. One major conflict was formally halted. Another, in Ukraine, might soon resume negotiations that the Iranian war had frozen for months.

For the two men tasked by Trump with negotiating peace in Ukraine — special envoy Steve Witkoff and presidential son-in-law Jared Kushner — had been entirely consumed by the Iranian crisis. The tripartite US–Ukraine–Russia talks had been essentially stalled since February 2026, according to the Kyiv Independent. With the signing of the memorandum, that diplomatic deadlock had found its natural end. At least in theory.

Witkoff and Kushner: portraits of the negotiators

Steve Witkoff, the businessman turned diplomat

Steve Witkoff, a New York real estate developer turned Trump special envoy, perfectly embodies the Trumpian era of diplomacy: no career in foreign affairs, no background in international law, but a personal network of relationships with world leaders cultivated through luxury real estate deals. Witkoff had already met Putin in Moscow in December 2025, alongside Kushner, in a five-hour session that produced no concrete agreement.

His profile is both his strength and his weakness: he can speak directly to Putin without the usual protocol filters, but he does not command the subtleties of international humanitarian law, armistice treaties, or verification mechanisms. He negotiates the way one buys a building — seeking the price both parties can live with, without dwelling too long on the fine print. For Ukraine, that fine print is often a matter of national survival.

Jared Kushner, the president's son-in-law in the shadows

Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and former advisor at the White House during the first term, resurfaced as a diplomatic actor with his father-in-law's reelection. His experience in Middle East negotiations — notably the Abraham Accords of 2020 — lends him genuine credibility in Arab chancellery corridors. In Moscow, his role is less obvious: the Russians see him as the most direct channel to Trump, making him a valued interlocutor for the Kremlin.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declared on June 24, 2026 that the two envoys were "occupied with other files" but that discussions would resume "as soon as they became available." This patiently bureaucratic formulation masks Moscow's real impatience: the Kremlin wants to negotiate directly with Trump, and Witkoff–Kushner are the only cables connecting both presidents on Ukraine.

The Islamabad Memorandum: what freed the negotiators

Fourteen points for an Iranian peace

The Islamabad Memorandum, digitally signed on June 14, 2026 and confirmed by the presidents on June 17, is a 14-point agreement negotiated under Pakistani mediation with support from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt. It provides notably for the end of hostilities, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the lifting of the American naval blockade of Iranian ports, immediate exemptions on Iranian oil exports, and a reconstruction fund of at least $300 billion.

For the negotiations on Ukraine, this memorandum has an indirect but immediate effect: it frees Witkoff and Kushner from their priority commitment in Tehran and allows them to turn back toward Moscow. Putin said it explicitly during a televised interview on June 28: "We expect that after events are over, after the active phase of the Iranian track has passed, we will see the representatives of the American administration with whom we have already met repeatedly in Moscow."

The Iranian deal and Russian economic relief

The resolution of the Iranian crisis carries significant economic implications for Russia — and not all of them positive. According to analysis by Carnegie Endowment, the war between the United States and Iran had triggered an oil price surge that represented a financial windfall for Moscow. In May 2026 alone, Russia took in 175 billion rubles ($2.3 billion) in additional oil and gas revenues from that price spike.

With the signing of the memorandum and the gradual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, oil prices fell immediately — a painful blow to Kremlin finances. The price drop comes at the worst possible moment: Russia's military budget is under pressure, and the deficits carved out by the war in Ukraine require high oil revenues to be covered. In this context, Putin has an objective interest in negotiating quickly on Ukraine — not out of any desire for peace, but to reduce budgetary pressure.

Anchorage, Moscow, and the story of a suspended diplomacy

The prior meetings that laid the groundwork

The discussions between Witkoff–Kushner and the Kremlin have a history. The first Moscow meeting in December 2025 lasted five hours without producing an agreement. American proposals in 28 points, some of which leaked, provoked consternation among European leaders who felt they accommodated Moscow's demands too much — particularly on the question of NATO and Russian control over roughly one fifth of Ukrainian territory.

Putin referenced, on June 28, the discussions at Anchorage with Trump himself, indicating that the resumption of talks in Moscow would build on what had been discussed during that direct meeting between the two presidents. This framing by Putin reveals his strategy: use the Trump channel to bypass Ukrainian and European intermediaries, and anchor future negotiations in the concessions already on the table.

Zelensky and the "positive" conversation with the American envoys

On June 8, 2026, before the signing of the Islamabad memorandum, Zelensky described his conversation with Witkoff and Kushner as "positive" and highlighted their "willingness to engage." He noted that the two men had "positively assessed Ukraine's position" — an ambiguous formulation suggesting the American envoys recognized the solidity of the Ukrainian position without necessarily committing to fully backing it.

Zelensky also raised the possibility of discussions during the G7 in France — discussions that did indeed take place within that framework, with Trump declaring on June 28 that Russia should "make a deal with Ukraine" and that Zelensky was "doing pretty well" on the front. That rhetorical shift in Trump's language — from "Zelensky doesn't have the cards to win" to "he's doing pretty well" — is a subtle but real indicator of a rebalancing in the American perception.

Moscow plays the game of conditional availability

Peskov and the art of promising without committing

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov's declaration of June 24, 2026 — that talks will resume when Witkoff and Kushner "become available" — is a textbook example of Kremlin diplomatic communication: assert openness without setting any precise conditions, timeline, or substance. This facade of openness is calibrated to signal goodwill to Washington while conceding nothing on the fundamentals.

The Kremlin has every interest in maintaining the illusion of willingness to negotiate as long as battlefield conditions are not unfavorable. Russia's advances — modest but continuous — in sectors like Kupyansk, Kostyantynivka, and Huliaipole allow Putin to enter negotiations from a position of relative territorial advantage. Negotiating now may mean locking in gains that fresh Ukrainian counterattacks could erode.

The oil price factor in the diplomatic equation

The Carnegie Endowment analysis is clear-eyed about Moscow's real interests: the "muddy status quo" between war and peace with Iran was ideal for Russia — high oil prices, global attention diverted from Ukraine, and Western weapons flows to Kyiv disrupted. With the memorandum signed and the prospect of resumed Iranian oil exports, that windfall evaporates.

In May 2026, Russian agricultural exports to Iran had risen by 81% via the Caspian Sea, and traffic at Russian Caspian ports had doubled in some cases. This commercial dynamic between Moscow and Tehran, born of the Iranian war, risks contracting with normalization. Russia therefore has an objective interest in offsetting these commercial and financial losses through a rapid diplomatic resolution on Ukraine — but on its own terms.

Ukraine facing the resumption of talks

Zelensky between mistrust and pragmatism

Zelensky has navigated the period of diplomatic paralysis induced by the Iranian crisis with remarkable skill. He maintained European support, reinforced bilateral partnerships with the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Nordic countries, and used the window of relative American inattention to push his own offensives — notably the deep strikes on Russian military infrastructure that characterized June 2026.

Facing the likely resumption of Witkoff–Kushner–Moscow discussions, Ukraine's position is stronger than it was in December 2025: strikes on the Kapotnya refinery in Moscow, attacks on air defenses in Crimea, and the saturation campaign documented by Meduza have demonstrated that Ukraine can strike far and hurt hard. That is not negligible at the negotiating table.

Ukraine's red lines and Kyiv's resilience

Ukraine's red lines are known and documented: no territorial concessions without a referendum, no exclusion from NATO membership, binding security guarantees for any agreement. These positions have not changed despite American pressure and Witkoff–Kushner proposals that allegedly, per leaked reports, accommodated some Russian demands.

The Trump of today — who says Russia must "make a deal" and that Zelensky is doing well — is potentially more useful to Ukraine than the Trump of December 2025. If this posture shift is real and not purely cosmetic, it could alter the parameters of future discussions in Moscow. Ukraine has always known how to play on the variability of Trump's moods — that is a diplomatic art form in itself.

Witkoff in Moscow: scenarios for the resumption of talks

What can we expect from a third visit?

The third visit of Witkoff and Kushner to Moscow — if it materializes in the weeks following the Islamabad memorandum — will unfold in a substantially different military and diplomatic context from December 2025. Ukraine is now striking at medium depths of several dozen kilometers behind Russian lines; Crimea is under growing logistical pressure; and ISW reports confirm that Ukraine has degraded numerous Russian air defense systems.

In this context, the American envoys will have to choose: present Putin with the same accommodating package that shocked Europeans in December, or arrive with a revised mandate that accounts for the evolving balance of power. The first scenario benefits Moscow; the second could lay the groundwork for an agreement that Ukraine could accept without political self-destruction.

The role of Europeans in this equation

Europe is structurally ill-positioned in this process: absent from the direct Washington–Moscow discussions, yet indispensable to any credible post-conflict security guarantee. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany have each expressed concerns about an agreement that would bypass European and Ukrainian interests.

Zelensky's upcoming visit to Bratislava, the bilateral intergovernmental consultations Ukraine–Slovakia in Lviv, and the Ukraine–UK strategic dialogue of June 2026 are all part of this logic: Kyiv is multiplying its European diplomatic anchors so that no one can negotiate over its head. That is preemptive diplomacy — and it is indispensable.

Iran and Ukraine: two crises, one American foreign policy

The Trump doctrine of sequential "deals"

The foreign policy of the Trump administration in its second term has structured itself around a logic of successive "deals": close the Iranian file first, then turn to Ukraine. This serial approach reflects both the constraints on presidential attention and a negotiating philosophy that prefers bilateral agreements to complex multilateral architectures.

The Islamabad memorandum cost Washington significant concessions: $300 billion in reconstruction funds, the unblocking of frozen Iranian assets, immediate oil exemptions. If Trump applies the same logic to Ukraine — finding the deal both parties can live with — the Ukrainian concessions could be considerable. That is the scenario that terrifies both Kyiv and Brussels.

The Iranian precedent as a warning for Ukraine

The Islamabad memorandum is not a peace treaty — it is a ceasefire framework that leaves the most difficult questions (Iranian nuclear program, ballistic missiles, proxy networks) to future negotiations. The analogy with a future agreement on Ukraine is troubling: a "frozen positions" ceasefire that would push the fundamental questions of territorial sovereignty and security guarantees further down the road.

For Ukraine, that scenario would amount to freezing a partial defeat while maintaining the illusion of negotiations. That is precisely why Zelensky refuses any formula unaccompanied by binding security guarantees comparable to NATO's Article 5. The Iranian lesson, seen from Kyiv, is that framework agreements can become traps — if the details are never finalized.

Putin speaks, and his words reveal a strategy

The June 28 declarations and their dual reading

Putin's words on June 28, 2026 deserve precise analysis. "We are ready to continue negotiations and discuss all details and modalities — if not agreements, then at least the subjects discussed at Anchorage." This formulation is revealing: it signals that Putin considers the Anchorage discussions the starting point for future negotiations — not Ukrainian or European positions.

By referencing Anchorage rather than previous rounds of discussion with the envoys, Putin seeks to anchor future negotiations in the frame most favorable to Russia — that of a direct dialogue between the two great powers, with no imposing Ukrainian or European intermediaries. It is a classic Kremlin diplomatic maneuver: asserting the primacy of the bilateral Russia–US channel over any other format.

Moscow's silence on substantive conditions

Neither Putin nor Peskov publicly raised precise conditions for a formal resumption of discussions on Ukraine. No prior ceasefire demand, no explicitly stated territorial conditions, no demand for Ukrainian withdrawal from friction zones. This calculated silence preserves a useful ambiguity: it allows Moscow to keep every door open while committing to nothing.

For observers of Russian diplomacy, this silence is itself a signal: Putin is open to discussion but feels no urgent pressure to conclude. The losses in territory, the budgetary pressure induced by falling oil prices, and the prospect of reinforced Western support for Ukraine could accelerate the timetable. But for now, the Kremlin is running out the clock.

The post-Islamabad diplomatic space: opportunity or trap?

A narrow window of opportunity

The signing of the Islamabad memorandum creates a diplomatic window that some analysts describe as an opportunity to revive discussions on Ukraine. Witkoff and Kushner have their attention available; falling oil prices are creating economic pressure on Moscow; and Trump seems disposed to push for a deal. These three converging factors could theoretically accelerate serious discussions.

But this window is narrow and fragile. The Iranian memorandum itself is a framework agreement full of uncertainties — the possibility of a resumption of hostilities between Washington and Tehran exists. If the Iranian crisis reignites, the American envoys return to Saudi Arabia or Qatar, and Ukraine falls back into the queue. Kyiv must therefore act quickly to solidify its diplomatic gains while American attention is momentarily available.

The threat of an imposed agreement

The scenario most feared in Kyiv remains that of an imposed deal — where Washington and Moscow agree on a framework that constrains Ukraine into accepting conditions it would have freely refused. Leaks about the American proposals from December 2025 triggered legitimate alarm among European allies who saw in those 28 points a dangerous accommodation of Russian demands.

Ukraine's ability to resist such a scenario depends on two factors: its military performance on the ground, which maintains a balance of power not unfavorable to it, and the solidity of its European support, which can counterbalance excessive American pressure. Both are in better shape today than they were six months ago — which is good news for Kyiv.

Russia, Iran, and the new trade routes

Caspian commerce and its implications

The war between the United States and Iran had an unexpected effect: it forced Iran to intensify its trade with Russia via the Caspian Sea. 2 million tonnes of Russian wheat — normally routed via the Black Sea — were redirected to Iran via the Caspian. Russian agricultural exports to Iran rose by 81% in 2026. Russian Caspian ports saw their traffic double.

With the end of the Iranian crisis, some of these trade flows may reorient. Iran will regain access to its Gulf ports and usual trade routes. Russia will lose part of its commercial monopoly with Tehran. This is a side effect of the Islamabad memorandum that few analyses mention: regional normalization reduces Iranian dependence on Russia, weakening the Moscow–Tehran axis over the medium term.

The Moscow–Tehran axis after Islamabad

Russia supplied drone components to Iran, notably for the Geran-2 drones developed from Iranian Shahed-136 models. These deliveries traveled via the Caspian. Iran was attempting to turn the Caspian into a "lifeline" for its food and military imports. This military-commercial symbiosis — Russia supplying technology, Iran supplying drone models — is one of the foundations of the Russian–Iranian military cooperation that has fueled the war in Ukraine.

The resolution of the Iranian crisis may reduce Tehran's urgency for this cooperation — but it is unlikely to eliminate it in the short term. Ongoing contracts, established dependencies, and shared strategic interests between Moscow and Tehran are too deep to be erased by a sixty-day framework agreement. For Ukraine, that means the Iranian drones used by the Russian army will not vanish overnight.

Cross-portrait: Witkoff–Kushner versus Peskov–Ushakov

Negotiators with radically different styles

The contrast between the two pairs of negotiators is striking. On one side, Witkoff and Kushner — two businessmen of direct manner, accustomed to protocol-free negotiations and fast deals. On the other, Dmitry Peskov and presidential aide Yuri Ushakov — Kremlin bureaucrats forged in decades of Soviet and post-Soviet diplomacy, masters of the art of saying much while committing to nothing.

This stylistic asymmetry is itself a diplomatic factor. The Americans seek rapid closure; the Russians play the long game. The Americans are willing to concede on details to secure the principle; the Russians negotiate details with the same ferocity as principles, knowing that the devil lives in the fine print. For Ukraine, hoping that Witkoff and Kushner will secure the best possible deal against such seasoned negotiators may be optimistic.

The Ukrainian team and its position in the process

Ukraine's position in this triangular process is structurally awkward: it is the primary party concerned, yet not at the Washington–Moscow table. Zelensky maintains direct contacts with the American envoys, but his ability to influence what Witkoff and Kushner will say to Putin is limited to what Trump will choose to take into account.

That is why Ukraine's strategy consists of multiplying anchoring lines: consolidated European support, mobilized Western public opinion, military results on the ground, and multilateral diplomatic advances like access to the EU Cybersecurity Reserve or Ukrainian sanctions against the Russian military-industrial complex. Every additional anchor makes it a little harder to reach an agreement that would marginalize Kyiv.

Toward Moscow: what diplomacy can hope for

The conditions for an acceptable agreement for Ukraine

An agreement on Ukraine that would be acceptable to Kyiv should include at minimum: a ceasefire along current lines, legally binding security guarantees for Ukraine involving nuclear-armed countries, a credible path toward NATO membership or an equivalent mechanism, and the question of reparations — tied to the frozen Russian assets the EU has begun mobilizing via the mechanism of the International Claims Commission.

None of those elements figured in the leaked American proposals from December 2025. That does not mean they cannot appear in a future version — but it means that Zelensky will need to exert maximum pressure on Trump before Witkoff and Kushner fly to Moscow. Diplomacy is played before the departure, not during the meeting.

What Russia can concede — and what it will not

Putin can accept a freeze on current positions if it allows him to maintain control over occupied territories and obtain guarantees of neutrality for Ukraine. He will not yield on Ukrainian NATO membership — that has been his absolute red line since 2022. He will not yield on Crimea, which he considers definitively Russian since its illegal annexation in 2014. These two points define the space within which any negotiation must operate.

What remains in the zone of possible negotiation: the precise borders in the four oblasts annexed in 2022 (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson), which Russian forces do not fully control, the modalities of a Ukrainian neutrality status, the partial or total lifting of sanctions, and the question of prisoners of war. It is in these zones that negotiation could actually produce something — if the actors want it to.

The Ukrainian negotiating doctrine — what Kyiv demands in exchange for peace

Zelensky's minimum conditions — a red line that holds

While Witkoff and Kushner multiply their diplomatic shuttles, Zelensky's position on the conditions for a settlement remains documented and consistent. Ukraine demands the full withdrawal of Russian forces from occupied territories, legally binding security guarantees — not mere declarations — preferably including NATO membership, and accountability for war crimes. These conditions are non-negotiable in substance, even if their sequencing and implementation might be.

This Ukrainian red line creates a fundamental tension with the mediation ambitions of the Trump administration, which appears to prefer a rapid ceasefire along current lines to a full restoration of Ukrainian territorial sovereignty. The distance between the two positions is immense — and both Witkoff and Kushner know it. That is why their missions to Moscow and Islamabad seem aimed at building an architecture of progressive trust, hoping that small successive steps create an irreversible dynamic toward a broader settlement.

The architecture of guarantees — what history teaches

The most painful precedent for Ukraine in the question of security guarantees is the 1994 Budapest Memorandum: in exchange for surrendering the Soviet nuclear arsenal on its territory, Ukraine received guarantees of sovereignty and territorial integrity from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia. Those guarantees proved worthless in practice when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and then launched the full-scale invasion in 2022.

Any architecture of security guarantees in a possible settlement must therefore be radically different from the Budapest Memorandum — with automatic trigger mechanisms, pre-positioned forces, and concrete military commitments rather than mere political declarations. Ukraine, taught by the betrayal of 1994, insists on this point with absolute clarity. And that insistence is entirely justified.

Conclusion: diplomacy resumes, Ukraine must not lower its guard

A pivot moment in the diplomatic war

The signing of the Islamabad memorandum and Putin's declarations of June 28, 2026 mark a pivot: the conditions for a resumption of Washington–Moscow talks on Ukraine are in place for the first time in months. Witkoff and Kushner will soon be in Moscow. Putin is waiting for them. Trump is pushing for a deal. The window is open.

But an open window is no guarantee of a favorable outcome. Ukraine must use the coming weeks to consolidate its military positions, strengthen its European diplomatic anchors, and ensure that the American mandate genuinely carries its interests. Zelensky understands this — which is why he multiplies visits, bilateral agreements, and demonstrations of military capability.

The final stakes: a just peace or a fragile armistice

The world hopes for peace. Ukraine wants a just peace. The difference between the two is immense — and it is in that space that Witkoff, Kushner, Putin, and Zelensky will negotiate the next chapters of this war. Radkivka has fallen. Soldiers die every day. History cannot wait for a perfect deal — but it must not accept a deal that sets up the next war.

Ukraine has resisted. It is still resisting. The American envoys are returning to Moscow. That is neither a victory nor a defeat — it is the beginning of the next chapter. And in that next chapter, Zelensky deserves allies who negotiate from his strength, not in spite of it.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My sources and their nature

This article is built from documented primary sources: Putin's public statements as reported by The Guardian and Bloomberg, the Carnegie Endowment analysis of the Russian reaction to the Iranian deal, Peskov's declarations as reported by RBC Ukraine, the text of the Islamabad Memorandum as made public by American and Iranian official sources, and reporting from the Kyiv Independent on the Zelensky–Witkoff–Kushner exchanges. I have no privileged access to confidential diplomatic documents or to transcripts of closed-door meetings.

I acknowledge that my analysis of Putin's intentions is based on the interpretation of public statements rather than internal Kremlin documents. This epistemic limitation is inherent to all journalism about Russia in wartime. I do my best to distinguish what is established from what is plausible.

My acknowledged biases

I hold a pro-Ukrainian editorial orientation, which does not mean I am blind to the legitimate interests of other actors or to the real diplomatic complexities. I believe Ukraine has the right to defend its sovereignty, that security guarantees must be binding, and that any agreement that sets up a future Russian aggression would be a strategic error for the entire West. These convictions inform my analysis — the reader should factor that in.

I also acknowledge the fundamental uncertainty of any diplomatic forecast. The most rigorous analyses have been contradicted by events in this conflict since 2022. I formulate plausible scenarios, not certainties.

Sources

Primary sources

The Guardian — Ukraine war briefing: Putin expects US negotiators in Moscow — June 28, 2026

Carnegie Endowment — Simmering U.S.-Iran Conflict Is Moscow's Ideal Outcome — June 24, 2026

The Soufan Center — Great Power Implications of the War in Iran — June 26, 2026

Secondary sources

US News/Reuters — Kremlin says contacts with US over Ukraine will resume when Witkoff and Kushner become available — June 24, 2026

RBC Ukraine — Kremlin says when it expects Trump's envoys to visit Russia — June 16, 2026

Kyiv Independent — Zelensky discusses Moscow's intentions, peace efforts in 'positive' call with US envoys — June 8, 2026

Bloomberg — Russia Ready to Continue Discussing Ukraine With US, Putin Says — June 28, 2026