PROFILE: The F-35 depends on China — Beijing's rare earths time bomb

One F-35, more than 400 kilograms of rare earths

Every F-35 Joint Strike Fighter contains more than 400 kilograms of rare earth elements. Dysprosium, terbium, neodymium — chemical elements whose names evoke science fiction but whose reality is entirely concrete: without them, the actuators, the electronic warfare systems, the missiles, and the permanent magnets that give this aircraft its lethal precision would simply not function. And China controls roughly 85% of global rare earth processing and more than 90% of global magnet production. This reality, documented by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, represents one of the deepest strategic vulnerabilities of the United States and its allies.

In June 2026, this vulnerability entered a new critical phase. Chinese rare earth exports to Japan fell by 34% year over year between January and April 2026. Exports of dysprosium and terbium to Japan dropped to zero starting January 2026. The NDAA 2026 requires the United States to ban Chinese-origin rare earths from its defense systems by 2027 — a deadline industry experts consider nearly impossible to meet.

What the numbers reveal

In 2024, the United States still imported 80% of its rare earths, according to the US Geological Survey. For certain elements — dysprosium, critical for magnets, samarium, vital for military applications — China's dominance in processing reaches 99%. Not 85%, not 90%: 99%. China does not merely produce rare earths — it controls the chemical processing that makes them usable for the Western defense industry.

For Japan, the data are even more stark. In March 2026, Chinese rare earth exports to Japan had fallen by 88%. In April 2026, still 82%. Yttrium, used in anti-corrosion coatings on many military systems, dropped by more than 90%. These reductions are not accidental — they are part of a deliberate strategy by Beijing to use its dominance as a geopolitical lever.

The United States spent trillions building the F-35, the most sophisticated combat aircraft in history. And a magnet — the size of a palm — could render it useless if Beijing decides to turn off the tap. That is the paradox of the technological superpower dependent on another superpower for its critical raw materials.

The 2025 trade war as a dress rehearsal

In April 2025, in response to the trade war launched by the Trump administration, China imposed export restrictions on seven types of rare earths and magnets used in the defense, energy, and automotive sectors. The American response? A partial capitulation. According to Foreign Policy, "the absolute dependence of the United States" on raw and processed rare earths from China led them to "back down completely to the status quo ante." In June 2025, during negotiations in London, both sides reached a truce: China would approve rare earth exports in exchange for American trade concessions.

That truce remains fragile. Chinese customs data show that exports of several critical resources to the United States remain roughly 50% below pre-April 2025 export-control levels. Beijing has reduced the flow without cutting it entirely — a sustained, calculated pressure that maintains American dependence while avoiding a complete rupture that might accelerate Washington's diversification efforts.

The NDAA 2026: an unrealistic deadline?

The NDAA 2026 states clearly: starting in 2027, American defense systems may no longer contain rare earths of Chinese origin. On paper, it is a firm decision. In industrial reality, it is near-impossible within the timeframe. Opening a mine, building chemical processing infrastructure, training a skilled workforce — that takes ten to fifteen years, not twelve months.

The Pentagon became the principal shareholder of MP Materials, the operator of the Mountain Pass mine in California, with the ambition of creating an American "mine-to-magnet" supply chain capable of producing the magnets needed for F-35s, drones, and submarines. But even with that massive investment, the United States cannot, in the short term, do without China for heavy rare earths. As Tom Moerenhout of Columbia University put it: "Reconstituting American ammunition stockpiles will require heavy rare earths — exactly where China holds a near-monopoly."

The NDAA 2026 sets a deadline that industry leaders themselves consider impossible. Is this real policy or political posturing? I think it is both — a sincere declaration of intent, but unrealistic in its timeline. The intention is good. The execution will be painful.

Zero dysprosium, zero terbium: the strongest signal yet

Japan is the world's largest rare earth importer — and also the ally most exposed to Chinese pressure in this domain. The January-to-April 2026 data are unambiguous: Chinese exports of dysprosium and terbium to Japan fell to zero. Both elements are indispensable for high-performance magnets used in Japanese weapons systems and components supplied to the American defense industry. Without them, industrial production halts — not immediately if stockpiles exist, but inevitably if the blockade persists.

Japan had already lived through this scenario in 2010, when China reduced its rare earth exports following the Senkaku islands dispute, sending global prices soaring. The US-Japan bilateral deal worth 36 billion dollars for critical mineral projects signed in February 2026 reflects exactly that urgency: both countries understand they must act quickly before their maneuvering room disappears.

Japan's F-35 fleet in Beijing's crosshairs

Japan is one of the largest F-35 operators outside the United States — Tokyo has ordered more than 100 F-35s of various variants. If deliveries of Chinese heavy rare earths remain at zero, the production and maintenance of these aircraft would eventually be compromised. That is precisely what Beijing wants Tokyo to understand: China can affect the defense capability of a key American ally without firing a single shot.

The Quad grouping — the United States, Japan, Australia, and India — has begun working on alternative critical mineral supply solutions. Australia, which holds significant rare earth reserves, is central to this strategy. But Australia's chemical processing capacity remains limited, and building a full supply chain takes time. In the meantime, the dependency persists.

I understand Beijing's logic. By blocking rare earths to Japan, China sends a clear message: your defense capability depends on our goodwill. That is unprecedented geopolitical coercion — with no obvious short-term response. What do you do when your supplier is also your strategic adversary? You diversify, slowly, painfully, insufficiently.

Alternatives exist but are not yet sufficient

It would be inaccurate to say that the West is not responding. The United States, Australia, Canada, and several countries in Africa are exploring and developing their rare earth resources. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent presented in November 2025 the first rare earth magnet produced in the United States in 25 years, manufactured by the South Carolina company eVAC. Symbolically, that matters. But one magnet does not make an industrial supply chain.

Brazil, which holds the world's second-largest known rare earth reserves, is a target of interest for American and Japanese investors. But even alternative extraction sources often still need to pass through Chinese processing infrastructure. The chemical processing of rare earths remains the hardest control point to replicate outside China. China controls 90% of global processing — that is not a figure you reverse in a few years.

The Ukrainian lesson for Asian security

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 showed what it costs to depend on an autocratic power's goodwill for your security. Dependence on Chinese rare earths creates a structurally similar risk for Asian democracies: a single control point, held by a strategically adversarial actor. Beijing can act without firing a shot, without a formal declaration of war, without violating a treaty. It simply withholds export licenses.

President Zelensky has actively positioned Ukraine as an alternative supplier of critical materials to the West — one dimension of the minerals deal with the United States concluded in early 2025. Ukraine holds significant reserves of rare earths and critical minerals. If the agreement holds and investment follows, Ukraine could become a player in the West's supply chain diversification — benefiting its own reconstruction and the strategic resilience of its allies.

The West has known since 2010 that this dependency is a major strategic risk. Sixteen years later, that risk is sharper, not less so. We have reports, analyses, laws like the NDAA 2026. What is missing is the sustained will and funding commensurate with what is at stake. Bureaucracy and political immediacy continue to take precedence over long-term strategic resilience.

A strategy planned over decades

In 2020, President Xi Jinping publicly declared the need to "strengthen the dependence of international production chains on China," thereby creating "a powerful countermeasure" against adversary nations. China's dominance over rare earths is the textbook case of that doctrine. China's massive investments in rare earth extraction and processing since the 1980s were not driven by purely economic logic — they responded to a long-term strategic vision: to transform processing leadership into an instrument of geopolitical coercion.

In 2010, China cut its exports to Japan in response to a minor diplomatic incident over the Senkaku islands, sending global prices through the roof. In 2025, it imposed global restrictions in response to Trump's tariffs. In 2026, it maintains targeted pressure on Japan. Each episode refines the technique. Each Western capitulation confirms the weapon works.

What Russia cannot replicate, but China can

Russia used natural gas as a coercion instrument against Europe — with mixed results, ultimately overcome at considerable economic cost. But Russia does not hold a global monopoly on gas. Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Qatar were able to substitute, at the price of a painful transition. For heavy rare earths and their processing, China holds a near-monopoly with no equivalent. There is no Saudi Arabia of rare earths ready to compensate.

Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun, during a video call with his Russian counterpart Andrei Belousov in January 2026, called for "strengthening strategic coordination" between Beijing and Moscow. Both powers understand that by combining Russian energy dependency with Chinese rare earth dependency, they create a pressure system on the West that is harder to circumvent than either threat taken separately.

Russia and China play on two different but complementary fronts. Moscow kills Ukrainians and depletes Western weapons stocks. Beijing is gradually strangling the raw material supply chain that would allow the West to rearm. It is an asymmetric coordination that NATO has not yet fully integrated into its strategic planning.

The necessary investments are known

The answer to dependence on Chinese rare earths is not mysterious — it is simply long and costly. The United States needs a full "mine-to-magnet" supply chain: active rare earth mines, chemical separation and processing capacity, magnet factories, strategic security stockpiles. The Pentagon is investing in this direction with MP Materials and other initiatives. Europe is working on its own critical mineral projects. Japan is diversifying its supply sources toward Australia, Canada, and other countries.

But the pace of these investments remains insufficient given the urgency. Analysts estimate it will take between ten and fifteen years to build alternative supply chains capable of replacing China for heavy rare earths. In the best case, a complete supply chain will not be operational before 2035. Until then, the F-35, missiles, drones, and all the defense systems that depend on those magnets remain vulnerable to Beijing's goodwill.

The role of allies and multilateralism

No country can solve this problem alone. The G7, NATO, and Indo-Pacific partners must coordinate their investments, share the development costs of mining and processing infrastructure, and create collective strategic stockpiles. Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen argued in June 2026 that democracies must act collectively against emerging threats — including strategic economic dependencies. Dependence on Chinese rare earths should be at the top of that collective agenda.

G7 deliveries to Ukraine are an example of what multilateral coordination can achieve quickly when the political will is there. The same will is needed for rare earths. The problem is less visible than burning tanks — but it is potentially just as decisive for the outcome of future conflicts. An F-35 without a dysprosium magnet does not fly. It is that simple.

There is a remarkable irony in the fact that Ukraine, a country at war, could become a supplier of critical minerals to the armies helping it defend itself. The geopolitics of raw materials is rarely this circular. If Ukraine survives and prospers, everyone wins — including the West's defense industrial security.

Mountain Pass and the American mining renaissance

The Mountain Pass mine in California is the only active rare earth mine in the United States. Its operator, MP Materials, in which the Pentagon became the principal shareholder, aims to build a complete magnet production supply chain on American soil. The project, called 10X, targets the production of magnets for F-35s, drones, and submarines. It is a serious ambition, funded by the American taxpayer, driven by a national security rationale.

But Mountain Pass is primarily productive in light rare earths — neodymium, praseodymium. Heavy rare earths — dysprosium, terbium — are far rarer on American territory. Measured US reserves are estimated at 3.6 million tonnes by the US Geological Survey — versus 44 million tonnes in China. This geological asymmetry is fundamental: even with the best investments, the United States will not become self-sufficient in heavy rare earths without access to resources from partners like Australia, Canada, or India.

China has decades of head start

Since the 1980s, China has systematically and massively invested in rare earth extraction, processing, and magnet production. It has developed unique industrial expertise, a skilled workforce, and complex chemical infrastructure. Replicating that ecosystem takes time — not because the technology is secret, but because large-scale industrial mastery is difficult to transfer and requires years of learning.

The first magnet produced in the United States in 25 years by eVAC, presented by Secretary Bessent in November 2025, is an important symbolic milestone. But it is a milestone — not a solution. Between the first demonstration magnet and the millions of magnets needed for American defense systems lies an industrial gulf that neither political enthusiasm nor current budgets will bridge within the deadlines imposed by the NDAA 2026.

I keep returning to that 2027 date imposed by the NDAA. It will pass. And F-35s will continue to carry magnets with Chinese rare earths inside, or they will be grounded for lack of alternative magnets. Both options are unacceptable. Either we need a real plan with massive accelerated funding, or an honest revision of the deadlines. Policy cannot change the laws of industrial geology.

Ukraine's reserves and the minerals deal with the United States

In 2025, the United States and Ukraine concluded an agreement on critical minerals, recognizing that Ukraine holds significant reserves of rare earths and strategic minerals. This agreement is more than a commercial arrangement — it is a strategic recognition that Western security also depends on diversifying critical raw material supply chains. A sovereign Ukraine integrated into the Western economy could, over the long term, play a role in reducing dependence on Chinese rare earths.

That is one of the reasons why supporting Ukraine is not merely a matter of democratic values — it is also an investment in the industrial and strategic resilience of the West. Every Ukrainian resource that remains under Ukrainian rather than Russian or Chinese control is one less resource in the autocracies' coercion arsenal. And every joint production agreement between Ukraine and its allies strengthens the collective capacity to respond to Beijing's geopolitical pressure.

The convergence of threats and the urgency of acting together

The threat of Chinese rare earths cannot be separated from the Russian threat in Ukraine, nor from the North Korean threat in the Pacific. These pressures are linked in a coherent strategy to weaken the West: Moscow consumes Western weapons stocks in Ukraine, Beijing strangles the raw material supply chain that would allow their reconstitution, and Pyongyang threatens stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The West's response must be commensurate with this convergence.

The agenda of the next NATO summit should include, prominently, a collective strategy on critical minerals — with measurable objectives, coordinated investments, and a realistic timeline. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that the Atlantic Alliance can act collectively under pressure. The rare earths pressure is less visible, but it is real. Are we waiting for an F-35 to be grounded for lack of a magnet before acting?

I end with this image: the F-35 covering Ukraine from Poland or Romania, its magnets manufactured in China, on a production line that Beijing can shut down by administrative decision. That is the fundamental contradiction of Western security today. It is surmountable. But it demands a political will I do not yet see at the required level.

A dependency that conditions military sovereignty

Dependence on Chinese dysprosium and terbium is not a technical problem — it is a sovereignty problem. As long as the United States, Japan, and their allies do not control the supply chains of the materials that power their fighter jets, missiles, and air defense systems, their military posture remains conditional on Beijing's goodwill. This is not a hypothetical future vulnerability. It is a 2026 reality, documented in Chinese customs data, in CSIS analyses, in Tom Moerenhout's statements at Columbia.

The NDAA 2026 states clearly that this dependence must end by 2027. Industry leaders state clearly that this is impossible within that timeframe. What Beijing's rare earth policy reveals is that China has planned this situation over decades. It succeeded. The question now is not whether the West should diversify — that is obvious. The question is whether the West will find the political will and sustained funding to do so before the next crisis reveals the full extent of the accumulated vulnerability.

The priority the West must set

A coordinated, ambitious plan, sustainably funded over twenty years, is necessary — not political declarations whose horizon ends with the current mandate. The war in Ukraine proved that democracies can act quickly and collectively when they perceive the threat. The threat of Chinese rare earths is real. It is documented. It has already produced its effects in 2025 and 2026. The urgency that is called for is needed now — before dependence becomes capitulation.

I end with an uncomfortable thought: Beijing does not need military invasion to constrain Western democracies. It just needs to control the magnets inside their fighter jets. That is twenty-first century warfare: invisible, silent, difficult to explain to voters, but potentially more decisive than any land battle.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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