PROFILE: Friedrich Merz — The Man Who Wants to Save Germany by Making It Tougher

A man forged in opposition, now in power

Friedrich Merz waited. A long time. After being pushed aside from the leadership of the CDU by Angela Merkel at the turn of the 2000s, he left politics for a career in business law and finance — notably as chairman of the supervisory board of BlackRock Germany. During those years away, he cultivated a reputation as a hard-liner, a committed free-market liberal, a man who does not mince words on economics and immigration. Then he came back, took over the CDU, won the federal elections in early 2025, and became Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany at a time when the country may have needed it more than it could have imagined.

This spring and summer of 2026, Merz is at work. Simultaneously. On everything. The pension reform — the most ambitious in decades, with a target of retirement at 70 by 2092 on the horizon. The cancellation of the F126 frigate program — eleven billion euros squandered on a ship class that will not be delivered. A defense budget that his NATO allies still consider insufficient. A coalition government under strain with the Social Democrats. And an approval rating holding better than his predecessors — for now.

Germany in 2026: a nation at a crossroads

The Germany Merz inherited was in crisis. After the turbulence of the Ampel coalition under Olaf Scholz, the German economy was emerging from two years of recession. The dependence on Russian gas, brutally exposed by the war in Ukraine, had forced a painful energy transition. The automotive industry — the historic pillar of German economic power — was being disrupted by the transition to electric vehicles and aggressive competition from Chinese manufacturers. The Bundeswehr remained structurally under-equipped despite the Zeitenwende promises.

In this context, Merz's election was read as a national choice: Germany wanted a firmer hand, a clearer direction, a reform drive that successive grand coalitions had failed to embody. Six months into office, the track record is mixed, ambitions remain intact, and resistance is multiplying. This is the profile of a chancellor who wants to transform everything at once — and who knows the window for doing so is narrow.

Merz is the type of leader Germany loves to criticize but may have needed. Pragmatic to the point of bluntness, liberal to the point of discomfort, conservative without being nostalgic. I do not share all his policy choices — particularly on social solidarity in the pension reform — but I recognize something rare in politics: a man who says what he intends to do, and who actually tries to do it.

Thirty-three recommendations to save the system

On June 23, 2026, the pension expert commission Merz had mandated in January delivered its report. Thirty-three recommendations, presented in Berlin after months of intensive deliberations. Merz immediately announced his intention to implement them in full. "Failure is not an option," he declared — a phrase that has become his trademark. Social Democrat Labor Minister Bärbel Bas, co-chair of the commission, backed the approach: "Picking and choosing among the measures is not an option."

The core of the reform rests on three pillars. First, the introduction of a new funded pension pillar — on the Swedish model — where workers and employers will each contribute an additional 2 % of their gross salary starting in 2031, invested in financial markets. Second, the indexation of the retirement age to life expectancy starting in 2031, which should bring the legal retirement age to approximately 70 by 2092. Third, the abolition of retirement at 63 without penalty after 45 years of contributions — a measure introduced by the previous Social Democrat government.

The relentless demographic logic

Merz repeats it tirelessly: Germany has no choice. The numbers are unambiguous. Life expectancy in Germany is 78.5 years for men and 83.2 years for women, according to the federal statistics office. The worker-to-retiree ratio deteriorates inexorably as the baby boom generation exits the labor market. Without reform, pension contributions — currently at 18.6 % of gross wages — would need to rise massively, or pension levels would need to be cut. Merz refuses both options and chooses to act upstream.

The Chancellor argues that the new funded pillar, even though it requires additional short-term contributions, will raise overall pension levels in the 2040s and 2050s. "The Scandinavians did it, and we can too," he says, in explicit reference to the Swedish model combining pay-as-you-go and funded systems since the 1990s. This Nordic reference is strategic: it addresses the argument that funded systems are a speculative risk by showing that they can be managed prudently over the long term.

Retirement at 70 by 2092 — for those born now. That is sixty-five years away. That is the longest political horizon any chancellor could set for himself. Merz is betting that Germany is capable of thinking on that scale. I am not certain. But the alternative — doing nothing and watching the system slowly collapse — is even worse. Sometimes, courageous reform deserves to be recognized as such, even when you do not share all its details.

Workers in physically demanding trades: the declared losers

The most vigorous criticism of the reform targets the abolition of retirement at 63. This measure will fall particularly hard on workers in physically demanding trades: construction workers, care workers, sanitation workers, warehouse staff. These professions, whose bodies wear out prematurely, cannot work until 67 or 70 with the same ease as an office worker. German unions, notably the DGB and IG Metall, immediately denounced the social injustice of the measure.

Merz anticipated this criticism. He assures that the mechanisms for disability retirement will be maintained and improved to protect those who physically cannot extend their careers. He insists there will be "no reduction in pensions" and that pensions will continue to increase, simply somewhat more slowly than wages. But for many manual workers, the distinction between "reducing pensions" and "pensions increasing more slowly than wages" remains difficult to feel in their daily lives.

The coalition under strain: Social Democrats caught between two chairs

Merz's governing coalition with the SPD holds only a slim majority in the Bundestag. The pension reform exposes this fragility. While Social Democrat leaders officially backed the approach — Labor Minister Bas co-presented it — the SPD's electoral base is precisely the workers who will lose early retirement at 63. This internal SPD tension could translate into defections when the parliamentary vote scheduled before the summer recess on July 10, 2026 arrives.

Merz has set an ambition of a vote before the Bundestag summer recess. This tight timeline is itself a strategic choice: by forcing a vote before the opposition has time to mobilize union and popular resistance, he hopes to lock the reform into the legislative record before it becomes a midterm campaign issue. The tactic is transparent — and potentially effective.

Merz wants to vote before the summer break. His Social Democrat partners are squirming in every direction. This image says a great deal about democratic governance: necessary reforms are often those that produce the most visible short-term losers. Political courage means carrying them through anyway. The question is whether the coalition's Social Democrats have that courage — or whether their electoral calculations will override the demographic analysis.

The F126 program: an outsized ambition that ran into reality

The F126 frigate program was supposed to be the symbol of German naval renewal. Ordered from Damen Shipyards for a total of four vessels, it was meant to produce the largest frigates built in Europe since the Second World War — ships of 171 meters, equipped with the most modern anti-missile defense systems. The initial program cost: approximately 5.4 billion euros for four units. The actual estimated cost at the time of cancellation: double that, or more. And the first vessel, awaited for years, had still not been delivered.

On June 24, 2026, the German Defense Minister formalized the cancellation of the F126 program and announced its replacement with an order for eight MEKO A-200 frigates from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS). The decision landed like a bombshell in the European naval industry. Rheinmetall shares, a program partner, dropped sharply. Relations with the Netherlands — a program partner — were tested. Roughly 2 billion euros had been spent without delivering a single ship. A programmatic catastrophe.

The logic of the pivot to MEKO: pragmatism at the expense of prestige

The decision to switch to MEKO A-200 frigates is a choice of brutal pragmatism. These vessels are less technologically ambitious than the F126, but they are proven, deliverable within reasonable timelines, and manufactured by a German shipyard — which addresses both supply security requirements and national industrial policy imperatives. By ordering eight units instead of four, Germany actually doubles its quantitative ambition while reducing its qualitative ambition.

For the Bundeswehr, the urgency was real. The German navy suffers from pronounced fleet aging and capability gaps in critical areas — missile defense, submarine warfare, power projection in the Baltic. The war in Ukraine made these gaps politically unacceptable. The decision to cancel the F126 is painful in the short term, but it allows Germany to start receiving capable frigates within reasonable timelines rather than waiting indefinitely for pharaonic ships that were not coming.

Two billion euros squandered in a frigate program that delivered not a single ship. This is the type of military procurement scandal that should trigger a major political crisis. In Germany, it produced a serious debate and a pragmatic decision. Merz made the call — in favor of the possible over the ideal. It is not heroic, but it is often what governing requires.

The Zeitenwende: a promise whose implementation remains insufficient

In February 2022, his predecessor Olaf Scholz had pronounced the word "Zeitenwende" — turning point — to describe the strategic revolution imposed on Germany by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. A special fund of 100 billion euros was created to modernize the Bundeswehr. Four years later, some of that money has been spent, but the German army remains structurally under-resourced in ammunition, modern armored vehicles, trained personnel, and air defense systems.

Merz inherited this situation and committed to bringing the defense budget above 2 % of GDP — NATO's target. In 2026, Germany is set to reach that target, but Poland, Estonia, Finland, and other neighbors alarmed by Russia are spending 3 to 4 % of their GDP on defense. For these front-line countries, Germany's 2 % commitment remains a symbolic minimum insufficient for someone who would be their first line of defense in a major conflict.

Allied criticism: Germany is not doing enough, fast enough

NATO allies, starting with Trump's United States and the Baltic states, continue to express justified impatience at the pace of German military buildup. Arms deliveries to Ukraine have regularly fallen short of stated commitments. New orders for Leopard 2A8 tanks, artillery, and advanced air defense systems are moving forward, but delivery timelines from the German defense industry remain long. Defense production capacity, after decades of disarmament, does not rebuild in a few quarters.

Merz is fully aware of these criticisms. He reframes them in terms of objective constraints: rebuilding serious defense capacity takes time, investment, and a reform of the military procurement culture that has always been one of the Bundeswehr's chronic weak points. The cancellation of the F126 program — whatever the short-term pain — illustrates precisely his willingness to break with the large symbolic ambitions that absorbed billions without producing real capability.

Germany is Europe's largest economy and bears the largest share of responsibility for continental security. Its historic under-investment in defense has been a structural problem for decades. Merz knows it. But rebuilding serious military capacity in two years after thirty years of peace dividend — that is like asking someone to regain their teenage fitness in two weeks of exercise. It takes the time it takes. Which does not mean accepting the slowness complacently.

The creeping deindustrialization and Merz's responses

Germany has been experiencing a worrying phenomenon of relative deindustrialization for several years. Factories are closing or relocating due to more expensive energy since the Russian gas crisis, high labor costs, rigid employment law, and aggressive competition from Asian producers — particularly in automotive and chemicals. BASF, Volkswagen, ThyssenKrupp: iconic names of German industry that have announced job cuts and restructuring.

Merz's response is two-pronged: on one side, he advocates labor market liberalization and reducing the bureaucracy that stifles investment. On the other, he supports strategic investments in future sectors — hydrogen, semiconductors, defense — through targeted public funds. This combination of economic liberalism and strategic interventionism is coherent with his intellectual formation, but runs into resistance from his Social Democrat coalition partners, traditionally more protective of social entitlements.

The pension fund as an economic investment tool

One frequently underestimated aspect of Merz's pension reform is its macroeconomic ambition. The new funded pillar, once established, will inject a minimum of 30 billion euros per year into financial markets. Merz sees in this mechanism a way to mobilize massive capital for productive investment in Germany and Europe. That is the most compelling economic argument for the reform: transforming pension savings into an investment engine, as the Swedish model and Scandinavian pension funds have demonstrated.

"The integration of capital markets into statutory retirement provision is probably the crucial element for the long-term sustainability and stability of our pension system," Merz said. This is not only the rhetoric of a former BlackRock chairman — it is an analysis widely shared by European economists. The challenge is political: convincing a population that still associates stock market capitalism with the 2008 financial crises that its pension contributions will be well managed in financial markets.

The former chairman of BlackRock Germany's supervisory board proposing to have part of German pensions managed by financial markets. Critics see cynicism. Merz sees consistency. The truth is probably somewhere between the two. The Swedish model works — with rigorous safeguards, transparent governance, and long investment horizons. Those are precisely the conditions that policy must create, not simply presuppose.

A stricter immigration policy: the controversial measures

On immigration, Merz did not wait to act. From the outset of his term, he put in place tightened border controls, extended the policy of deporting rejected asylum seekers, and strengthened readmission agreements with third countries. These measures were criticized by human rights organizations and by European partners — notably the European Commission, which monitors the consistency of migration policies within the Schengen area.

Merz defends these choices in the name of controlling migration flows, preserving the country's integration capacity, and responding to an electoral demand clearly expressed by a large segment of German public opinion. He walks a fine line: the measures must be firm enough to satisfy his conservative electorate and to contest the AfD's political terrain, without crossing lines that would put him at odds with Germany's democratic values and European obligations.

The AfD in ambush: the challenge of demarcating on the right

The rise of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) remains the most serious medium-term political challenge Merz faces. The AfD achieved historically high results in the last federal and regional elections, positioning itself as a radical alternative to the conservative right Merz represents. The temptation for Merz is to adopt the AfD's themes to drain its electoral reservoir — a risky strategy that can increase the legitimacy of those themes without actually winning over AfD voters.

This tension is constitutive of Merz's political position. He must simultaneously govern the center-right, reassure the Social Democrats in his coalition, and prevent the hemorrhage toward the far right. This is not a novel position in the history of European democracies — it is the structural pressure that all center-right governing parties face in an era of growing polarization.

Merz and the AfD: a relationship of repulsion and involuntary attraction. The more Merz hardens his immigration position, the more he validates AfD themes as legitimate subjects of democratic debate. That is the paradox of all "terrain defense" strategies. But the alternative — ignoring the real concerns of a significant segment of the electorate — is not a viable long-term political strategy either. This is one of the most difficult questions in contemporary European democracy.

A clear commitment in favor of Kyiv

On Ukraine, Merz has taken a clearer and firmer position than his predecessor Scholz. Where Scholz hesitated until the last moment to deliver Leopard tanks, Merz unequivocally supports Ukraine's right to defend itself with all necessary means. This position is consistent with his broader geopolitical vision: Putin's Russia represents an existential threat to the European security order, and the weakness of the Western response is an invitation to further escalation.

Arms deliveries to Ukraine have been accelerated under his chancellorship — tanks, artillery, air defense systems, ammunition. Germany contributes more meaningfully than under Scholz, even if delays and shortfalls persist. Merz has also supported the expansion of sanctions against Russia and has spoken in favor of a reinforced European security architecture that does not depend solely on American goodwill — a lesson that Trump's foreign policy has made urgent.

The Merz-Macron-European defense triangle

The relationship between Merz and Emmanuel Macron is fundamental to the future of European defense. Both leaders share a vision of European strategic autonomy, even if their approaches and priority files differ. Franco-German cooperation on weapons programs — the MGCS future battle tank, the SCAF combat aviation system — remains essential but difficult. The cancellation of the F126 and the pivot to MEKO illustrate the limits of large programmatic ambitions in armaments.

Merz knows that European defense cannot be built without Germany, but also that Germany cannot claim European security leadership without equipping itself with military capacity commensurate with its ambitions. This is a complex equation that requires both massive industrial investment, a cultural reform of the Bundeswehr, and a durable political will that democracies, with their short electoral cycles, struggle to sustain.

Merz on Ukraine: a clear alignment, a welcome consistency after his predecessor's dithering. Germany is a central European power — its unambiguous commitment to Ukraine is fundamental to the credibility of Western solidarity. Putin bet on Western fatigue and division. Merz refuses to prove him right. For that, he deserves credit that his domestic critics do not always grant him.

The Merz method: decide fast, own the consequences

Merz governs fast. Perhaps too fast according to his critics, not fast enough according to his most impatient supporters. His method is characteristic of a business executive accustomed to boardrooms rather than laborious legislative compromises: he frames the terms of a reform, appoints an expert commission, receives their recommendations, and immediately announces full implementation. The political consultation phase is compressed to the minimum compatible with coalition requirements.

This method has brought him successes and frictions. On the pension reform, he managed to impose an ambitious timeline and keep his coalition in line. On other files, particularly immigration and budget cuts, he absorbed setbacks or compromises that softened the reach of his initial ambitions. German democracy, with its multiple checks and balances, powerful unions, regional parties, and its Bundesrat, is not easy terrain for impatient reformers.

Popularity: more resilient than expected, but fragile

Six months after his election, Merz's approval has held at respectable levels despite the demanding reform agenda he has pursued. Recent polls show moderate but real satisfaction with his governance style, even among voters who oppose certain specific policies. Germans appear to value clarity and determination, even when they do not share all the directions taken.

But the political window is narrow. A severe economic recession, a misstep on the Ukraine file, or a social crisis linked to the pension reform could rapidly erode this political capital. The grand coalition with the SPD is not natural: it holds because the two parties have no arithmetical alternative, not because they share a common vision. This structural fragility is the limit of Merz's action — and the reason he is in a hurry to engage reforms before the coalition shows its first deep fractures.

Merz is attempting something his predecessors avoided for decades: transforming Germany while it still has the means to do so. Pensions, defense, immigration, the economy — all at once, with a fragile coalition and a packed agenda. I do not know if he will succeed. But audacity, in European politics, deserves to be named for what it is — even when you do not share all its ideological directions.

Germany as the engine of a more sovereign Europe

Merz's European vision is ambitious but pragmatic. He wants a more sovereign Europe — capable of defending itself, controlling its borders, competing with the United States and China in strategic technology sectors. But he rejects the federalist rhetoric that has sometimes animated the European debate: for him, European sovereignty runs through cooperation between sovereign nations, not through the transfer of competencies to supranational institutions.

This vision is consistent with Adenauer's modified Gaullist French tradition: a strong Europe because its member states are. The Franco-German relationship, the historic pillar of European construction, enjoys under Merz and Macron a moment of real strategic convergence on defense and technological autonomy. Divergences persist on budgetary policies and capital markets union, but the common foundation is more solid than under previous governments.

The relationship with Merkel's legacy: an assumed break, a real continuity

It is often said that Merz is the anti-Merkel. That is true in style — more direct, less consensual, more ideologically assertive. But on the fundamentals of German foreign policy — NATO anchor, Franco-German cooperation, European commitment — the continuity is stronger than the break. Where Merz truly distinguishes himself from Merkel is in his willingness to take difficult decisions and defend them publicly instead of deferring the decision until consensus emerges naturally.

Angela Merkel was a champion of longevity, stabilization, "not acting as an excuse for action." Merz is a man of urgency, of "now or never." These two political temperaments correspond to two different moments in German and European history. It is too early to say which will be judged by history as better suited to its era. But the era itself — the war in Ukraine, Sino-American competition, the climate emergency — seems to demand more of Merz than of Merkel.

Merkel governed Germany for sixteen years while carefully avoiding making waves. The result: a stable Germany, but an atrophied Bundeswehr, energy dependence on Russia, and structural reforms deferred for an entire generation. Cautious immobility has its costs. Merz knows it. And perhaps Germany, finally, is ready to hear it.

Social vulnerability: a conservative blind spot

The weakest point in Merz's political vision is his understanding of social vulnerability. His career — a prosperous business lawyer, law graduate, experience in the boardrooms of major international companies — predisposes him to view structural problems through a lens of economic efficiency rather than social equity. The pension reform illustrates this: it is economically coherent for someone with regular contributions in a stable sector, and very painful for workers in physically demanding, precarious trades.

This limit is not invisible to Merz himself — he faces it in every parliamentary question, every union demonstration, every criticism from his Social Democrat coalition partners. The question is whether his safeguards and exemptions for workers with physical disabilities are sufficient to render the reform politically and socially acceptable. The test will come when the first generations reach 68, then 70, and discover in their own experience the limits of today's promises.

Communication: a style that alienates as much as it convinces

Merz is an excellent debater, a sharp communicator in conferences and in-depth interviews. But his style — sometimes perceived as arrogant, overconfident, lacking empathy — does not suit all audiences. In a country where the tradition of co-determination and social dialogue runs deep, a chancellor who presents his reforms as unassailable self-evident truths without sufficiently negotiating their contours risks provoking resistance that could have been avoided.

Close advisers acknowledge this blind spot in Merz's communication. Efforts have been made to improve outreach — multiplying appearances in mass media, adapting the message to the daily concerns of retirees, workers, families. But the instinct returns: under pressure, Merz reverts to being the man who spent years in the boardrooms of multinationals, not the politician on the campaign trail in a Hessian village hall.

Merz can make a mistake that men of his caliber often make in politics: confusing being right with having the legitimacy to impose his rightness. In a democracy, even good reforms need consent that is built patiently. Economic intelligence without political and social intelligence does not make a great chancellorship. That may be the harshest judgment history eventually delivers on him.

A legacy difficult to place

It is too early to place Merz in the gallery of great German chancellors. But comparisons arise naturally. With Konrad Adenauer, he shares the Western anchor and the conviction that Germany can only prosper grounded in the Atlantic alliance. With Helmut Schmidt, he shares economic pragmatism and a reputation as a man who tells uncomfortable truths without sugarcoating. With Gerhard Schröder, he shares the will for deep structural reforms despite resistance — but Schröder remade Germany from the bottom of the labor market, while Merz attacks the top of the social protection system.

The difference from all his predecessors: he governs in an infinitely more dangerous geopolitical context. Adenauer governed a divided Germany but within a reassuring American security framework. Merz governs in a Europe whose security is being challenged to the east by Russia and to the west by American hesitations. This external pressure is both the primary constraint on his action and the primary justification for his reformist urgency.

Can he succeed where his predecessors failed?

The question posed in this profile's title deserves an honest, nuanced answer. Merz can succeed with the pension reform if the coalition holds, if financial markets behave reasonably in the 2030s, and if the most exposed workers are genuinely protected by the promised exception mechanisms. He can succeed in the transformation of German defense if industry ramps up and MEKO deliveries arrive on schedule. He can succeed in stabilizing the economy if the competitiveness reforms produce their effects without triggering a major social fracture.

But he can also fail — if the coalition implodes on a major disagreement, if an external economic crisis neutralizes his reforms, or if his insufficient communication alienates the working-class voters he needs to maintain a majority. In the history of German democracy, ambitious reformers have sometimes succeeded (Schröder with Agenda 2010), sometimes left their legacy for others. Merz has the context on his side — a geopolitical and social urgency that makes inaction more costly than ever.

I do not know if Friedrich Merz will succeed. Nobody does. What I know is that the problems he is trying to solve — unsustainable pensions, insufficient defense, an economy in mutation — are real and urgent. Sometimes, in politics, that is all you can ask: that the right person in the right place genuinely tries to solve the real problems. The rest, history decides.

An Atlanticist facing an unpredictable America First

Friedrich Merz is, in the DNA of his political formation and his worldview, a committed Atlanticist. He believes in the fundamental value of the alliance with the United States, in the NATO framework as the guarantor of European security, and in the complementarity of liberal democracies against autocracies. But Donald Trump's America is not Reagan's America or Obama's America. It is a power that questions its own reliability as an ally, that treats transatlantic relations as a commercial balance of power, and that can, with a tweet or a press conference, destabilize a decade of cooperation.

Merz navigates this political space with calculated prudence. He does not publicly break with Washington — Germany needs it too much for immediate security against Russia. But he simultaneously accelerates all projects of European strategic autonomy, industrial sovereignty, and independent defense capacity. This is the comprehensive insurance policy: maintain the American alliance while building the alternative, for the day when America proves truly unreliable.

Diplomacy between Berlin, Paris, and Brussels

The backbone of European autonomy runs necessarily through the Franco-German axis. Merz has multiplied signals of rapprochement with Paris — on defense, on joint investment, on industrial policy. This Franco-German convergence is all the more necessary as Europe faces geopolitical pressures that demand a cohesion the recent past has not always produced. The Merz-Macron tandem, though different in style and political culture, shares a common diagnosis: Europe must do more on its own, now.

In Brussels, Merz is perceived as a serious, pro-European interlocutor on the broad balances but critical of bureaucratic excess and regulatory rigidities slowing competitiveness. His position is not that of a Eurosceptic — it is that of a pragmatic federalist who wants the Union to be more effective to remain legitimate. This is an uncomfortable position but probably necessary at a moment when Europe needs both solidarity and concrete results.

The worst scenario for Europe would be a Merz paralyzed by his domestic battles at the very moment Trump forces a binary choice on Ukraine support or defense spending. A German chancellor weakened in his own country cannot weigh as he should in Brussels or Washington. That is why his domestic reforms are not just German matters — they condition the capacity of all of Europe to respond to its existential challenges.

A country aging faster than its reforms

Behind all of Friedrich Merz's immediate political battles looms an implacable demographic reality: Germany is aging. The country today counts approximately 84 million inhabitants, but with a fertility rate of around 1.46 children per woman — well below the replacement threshold of 2.1 — and a postwar baby boom generation on the verge of exiting the labor market, Germany's age pyramid creates structural pressure on the entire social system. Merz's pension reform is directly dictated by this reality: with fewer contributors for more retirees, the current model is mathematically not viable.

Projections from the Federal Statistics Office (Destatis) are unambiguous: Germany's working-age population will shrink significantly by 2035, absent massive compensatory immigration. Merz is caught between two contradictory imperatives: the need for labor immigration to sustain the economy and fund pensions, and the political pressures from a segment of his electorate and his coalition partners demanding a restrictive immigration policy. He cannot have both — and that may be the fundamental contradiction of his mandate.

Immigration, labor, and social cohesion: the impossible equation

Germany needs, according to estimates from the federal government's economists, 300,000 to 400,000 qualified immigrants per year to sustain its economic base in the decades ahead. Merz has put in place more flexible labor immigration arrangements — accelerated recognition of foreign qualifications, simplified work visas — while simultaneously tightening border controls and deportation procedures. This two-speed policy is politically coherent but economically risky: skilled workers choose their destinations, and a reputation as an unwelcoming country can deter exactly the profiles Germany needs.

German social cohesion is the most precious asset Merz manages. A society that feels economically secure can accept transformation. A society fragmented by economic anxiety and distrust of institutions can tip toward far less constructive forms of politics — as the rise of the AfD has illustrated for several years. Merz governs on a tightrope: every reform must produce visible results quickly enough for trust to hold before the next elections.

Demographics is the slowest and most inexorable politics. Children not born today will not be there to fund pensions in thirty years. Skilled workers who choose Canada or Switzerland over Germany will not come back. Merz has understood the urgency — the question is whether his policies will produce the necessary effects at the required speed. In a democracy, political time and economic time are not the same. That may be the fundamental challenge of any reformer.

A man at the right moment, or too far ahead of his time?

Friedrich Merz took charge of Germany at a moment when long-deferred reforms can no longer be postponed. His determination to transform everything at once — pensions, defense, the economy — is either the mark of genuine historic leadership or the symptom of an impatience that risks compromising every project through excess of simultaneous ambition. The history of political reforms shows that durable successes are often the product of progressive, pedagogical, negotiated reforms — not grand projects imposed within months.

But history also shows that some eras do not have the luxury of long timelines. The war in Ukraine, Sino-American competition, the climate crisis, German demographics: all these challenges have time horizons that do not accommodate procrastination. If Merz manages to embed in law and institutional practice the reforms he has announced, Germany will be better equipped for the decades ahead. If resistance prevails, the problems will be even more severe for his successor.

What Europe expects from Germany

Europe needs a Germany that is strong, engaged, and reformed. Not dominant — history has shown the dangers of a hegemonic Germany — but a leader by example, by economic solidarity, by assumed military power. Merz understands this. His foreign policy — support for Ukraine, NATO commitment, Franco-German cooperation — illustrates this vision. What remains to be proven is that Germany's internal transformation can be accomplished without shattering the social cohesion that makes it a stable democracy in a continent under pressure.

Friedrich Merz wants to save Germany by making it tougher. The word "tough" in politics can mean two very different things: the toughness that strengthens, that demands more of everyone for a higher common good — or the toughness that fractures, that breaks solidarity in favor of cold efficiency. The challenge of his chancellorship is precisely to navigate between these two definitions. Germany, Europe, and Ukraine hope he finds the right path.

Friedrich Merz is not a man of soft consensus. In a world that demands leaders capable of difficult decisions, that may be a quality. But democracies function well only when the people living in them believe that sacrifices are shared equitably. If Merz fails to convince working-class Germans that his reforms are just — not only efficient, but just — he risks winning parliamentary battles while losing the political war. Germany deserves better than that, and so does Europe.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. I claim analytical clarity, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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