TESTIMONY: Netanyahu "As Long as Necessary" — A Formula That Blocks All Mediation

Introduction: when a four-word phrase becomes an occupation doctrine

The words spoken and their actual weight

On June 25, 2026, at a graduation ceremony for combat officers in southern Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu uttered a sentence worth more than any foreign policy speech: Israeli forces would remain in southern Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza "as long as necessary." His Defence Minister Israel Katz, at the same event, was even more explicit: the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) would stay in the security zones "without a time limit." Two men, two formulations, one message: there is no withdrawal date.

These words are not spoken in a vacuum. They come in a context where the American-Iranian memorandum of understanding — negotiated by Vice President JD Vance in Switzerland — explicitly provides for "immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon." Netanyahu's formula directly contradicts the terms of an agreement Washington is presenting as a major success. And Netanyahu knows this. And he says it anyway. The signal is clear: Israel is not a party to that agreement and does not consider itself bound by its terms.

The geographical scope being claimed

Before commenting on the formula, the facts must be measured. An investigation by Al Jazeera published on June 14, 2026 documented, via satellite imagery, that Israel effectively controls roughly 1,000 square kilometres of territory outside its recognized borders — more than its own surface area added to the Palestinian territories and the annexed Golan. This territory includes approximately 570 square kilometres in southern Lebanon, 235 square kilometres in Syria, and the remainder in Gaza. According to Middle East Eye, on June 26, 2026, Israeli soldiers were still razing houses in the village of Markaba in Lebanon. Daily Israeli strikes were killing people in southern Lebanon despite a ceasefire announced just one week earlier.

The geography of "security zones" and their internal logic

What Israel calls a "security zone"

The term "security zone" is borrowed from the language of defensive legitimacy. It presupposes a porous border to protect, a persistent threat to neutralize, and a conditional withdrawal once that threat has been neutralized. The terminology is rhetorically effective because it positions the Israeli military presence as defensive and temporary — without either of those two characteristics, which Netanyahu and Katz's declarations of June 25–26 explicitly contradict.

In Lebanon, Israel's "security zone" extends beyond the Litani River — the official limit that the United Nations had defined as the buffer zone boundary under UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of 2006. That resolution had ended the 2006 war by requiring IDF withdrawal and the deployment of UNIFIL (the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon). By extending its areas of control beyond the Litani, Israel is in violation of that resolution's terms. Katz explicitly said that the IDF would oppose withdrawal "despite all existing and forthcoming pressure."

In Syria: Mount Hermon and the post-Assad vacuum

The Syrian dimension is perhaps the most strategically revealing. Since the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024, Israel has occupied the heights of Mount Hermon — a former UN buffer zone — and has carried out, according to Syrian authorities, more than 1,000 airstrikes and 400 ground incursions on Syrian territory. These operations are not targeting only Hezbollah — they are systematically destroying the military infrastructure of the Syrian regular army, that of both Assad and his successors.

On Mount Hermon, which "overlooks Israel, Lebanon, and Syria" according to Middle East Eye, the IDF has maintained a permanent presence since December 2024. This position provides considerable intelligence and surveillance value, and likely firing capabilities on targets deep inside Syria and Lebanon. Not holding it would be a strategically difficult decision for any Israeli government — but holding it "without a time limit" amounts to annexing a military position inside a third-party state.

What "as long as necessary" means for international mediation

A formula without end criteria — intentionally

The power and the danger of the formula "as long as necessary" lie precisely in its absence of operational criteria. What condition would need to be met for the presence to become "no longer necessary"? Netanyahu names none. The absence of end criteria is not an oversight — it is a deliberate decision. If criteria were formulated — "we will stay until the complete demilitarization of Hezbollah," "until the reconstruction of a viable Palestinian state," "until Syria establishes a stable government" — then those criteria would become objects of international negotiation. Mediators could work to meet them and demand withdrawal once the objective was achieved.

By refusing to formulate criteria, Netanyahu removes all potential mediators from the diplomatic game. France, which has been attempting since 2024 to reach an agreement on Lebanon, no longer has a parameter to negotiate. The UN, whose UNIFIL has been present in Lebanon since 1978 and whose authority is reinforced by Resolution 1701, cannot demand withdrawal if Israel simply states that necessity has not yet been met. The European Union, which has condemned the continuation of military operations, lacks sufficient leverage to force Tel Aviv's hand.

The contradiction with the American-Iranian agreement

The Trump administration finds itself in a diplomatically awkward situation. It has just announced a historic agreement with Iran providing for an end to hostilities "on all fronts" — and its Israeli ally has just publicly declared it will not honour that commitment on the Lebanese and Syrian fronts. According to Middle East Eye reporting from June 26, Katz specifically said that Israel was opposed to withdrawal from Lebanon "despite existing and forthcoming pressure" — a formulation that manifestly includes pressure from Washington.

Trump told reporters he could "solve problems quickly" with Netanyahu. But the facts on the ground — the demolitions in Markaba on June 26, the daily strikes despite the announced ceasefire — tell a different story. The American-Iranian agreement risks being compromised if one party can invoke Israeli actions as a violation of the commitments. Iran has already conditioned its respect for the ceasefire on Israel's compliance — a condition that Netanyahu has just made impossible to satisfy.

Gaza: the relentless expansion despite the agreements

From 53% to 70% of control: the endless advance

In Gaza, Netanyahu has ordered the army to occupy 70% of the enclave — an expansion from the 53% controlled at the time of the October 2025 ceasefire. By June 26, 2026, the IDF already controlled approximately 60% of the territory. If the 70% objective is reached, the 2.2 million Palestinians of Gaza would be confined to 109 square kilometres — less than the surface area of an average-sized city. The human density in this residual zone would be without precedent on the planet.

According to Middle East Eye, airstrikes have killed nearly 1,000 Palestinians since the October 2025 ceasefire — meaning the ceasefire was never fully honoured. This ground reality makes the formula "as long as necessary" more than a diplomatic abstraction: it carries immediate and documented human consequences that I cannot ignore in this commentary.

Israel's definition of "necessary" and international law

International humanitarian law — notably the Geneva Conventions and their First Additional Protocol — defines the conditions of military occupation, the rights of civilian populations, and the obligations of occupying forces. These norms contain no "as long as necessary" clause that would allow an occupying force to unilaterally redefine the conditions for ending an occupation. Prolonged military occupation without a credible political process toward resolution is itself problematic under international law.

Western allies confronting the Netanyahu formula

Europe and the credibility of its Middle East policy

The European Union has condemned the continuation of Israeli military operations in Lebanon and called for withdrawal in conformity with Resolution 1701. These condemnations are not accompanied by effective pressure mechanisms. European sanctions against Israel — imposed on products from West Bank settlements — have not been extended to operations in Lebanon or Syria. The EU-Israel Association Agreement has not been suspended. The credibility of European positions suffers from this disconnect between statements and action.

France finds itself in a particularly delicate position: it is one of the main supporters of UNIFIL and has troops on the ground in Lebanon. UN forces have been caught up in incidents with the IDF during the Israeli advance. The French government has protested energetically — but stopped short of withdrawing UNIFIL or taking coercive measures against Tel Aviv.

Washington between support for Israel and the credibility of its Iranian deal

Secretary of State Rubio had declared, at his initial announcement of the US-Iran framework, that the memorandum of understanding would include "the immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts." This formulation was intended to include Lebanon. Netanyahu destroyed that coherence in a few words. American officials then moved to "reassure" Israel that withdrawal from Lebanon was not a condition of the US-Iran agreement — which concretely means they capitulated before Netanyahu's position rather than maintaining the terms of their own agreement.

What the formula reveals about the region's future

A Middle East without a road map

"As long as necessary" is not only a formula — it is a declaration of intent that there is no political process that follows. The Netanyahu government, together with its far-right partners such as National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir (who declared the American-Iranian agreement "does not guarantee our security" and that Israel "is not party to that deal"), offers no political horizon for Gaza, Lebanon, or Syria. The apparent objective is a situation of indefinite military control — permanent buffer zones that reduce enemy offensive capabilities but lead to no lasting political arrangement.

This absence of a political horizon is the most troubling aspect of this article's analysis. Wars, occupations, humanitarian crises can persist for years without political resolution — the examples of Kashmir, the Cyprus conflict, and the West Bank since 1967 all bear witness. "As long as necessary" without end criteria is the recipe for a conflict that lasts generations.

International mediation blocked

France, the UN, Qatar, Egypt — all have at various points attempted to structure negotiation processes for Lebanon or for Gaza. These attempts all run into the same obstacle: Netanyahu refuses any political finality that would entail military withdrawal without guarantees that no third party can provide to his satisfaction. The formula "as long as necessary" is not a refusal to negotiate — it is a refusal to set conditions for the end of a military presence. In doing so, it strips international mediation of its very object.

Washington's silence and the implicit guarantees

The Trump administration facing Israel's permanent deployment

The absence of a public American reaction to the formula "as long as necessary" constitutes in itself a position. The Trump administration chose strategic silence — neither explicit approval nor condemnation. This silence has a precise diplomatic value: it signals to Arab allies that Washington will not restrain Israel, and it signals to Israel that it has considerable latitude as long as operations remain below the threshold of American Congressional reaction. This is the variable geometry of the American-Israeli relationship under an administration that measures allies by their immediate utility.

The Qatari and Egyptian mediators who worked to extract a Gaza agreement find themselves in an impossible position: how do you negotiate a withdrawal when the head of the Israeli government has publicly declared there will not be one? Netanyahu's formula preceded the negotiations in the media — before mediators could even table their proposals. It is a diplomatic pre-emption manoeuvre that reduces the room for manoeuvre of all actors, including Israel's own allies.

Civilian populations caught between two timelines

What "as long as necessary" means for Gazans, Lebanese, and Syrians

Behind the diplomatic formula, there are concrete human realities. In Gaza, the Israeli military presence in the Philadelphi Corridor and the buffer zones continues to fragment the territory into non-viable enclaves. Humanitarian organizations — UNRWA, Médecins sans frontières, the ICRC — are documenting the growing difficulty of delivering aid to areas under Israeli military control. A military occupation "as long as necessary" without a time horizon makes any reconstruction planning impossible.

In Lebanon, villages in the south remain under Israeli military control despite the ceasefire agreement of November 2024. Displaced residents cannot return home. Lebanese authorities cannot administer these zones. Netanyahu's formula — "we will stay in Lebanon" — directly contradicts the commitments made at the time of that agreement and undermines the credibility of the United States as guarantor. This accumulation of precedents is permanently reshaping the grammar of future negotiations.

Conclusion: four words to close every door

The diplomatic reach of a formula without criteria

"As long as necessary" is, in the context of June 2026, the diplomatically weightiest formula uttered in the region since the Oslo Accords of 1993 — but in the opposite direction. Where Oslo opened a horizon, this formula closes it. It publicly declares, from the podium of a military ceremony, that Israeli forces consider themselves entitled by permanent right to maintain military positions on the territory of three states — with no legal, political, or temporal condition attached.

The responsibility to name what we see

A columnist's role is not to validate or invalidate the foreign policy decisions of sovereign states. It is to name them clearly, to analyze their implications, and to signal when a formulation conceals a reality that official diplomacy refuses to articulate. The formula "as long as necessary" conceals a simple reality: Israel has decided not to withdraw. Saying that clearly is not hostility toward Israel — it is analytical honesty that, in the long run, serves the search for lasting peace better than comfortable euphemisms.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

My position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

I firmly believe in Israel's right to exist and to defend itself against actors like Hamas and Hezbollah. I do not conflate the state of Israel and its legitimate rights with the policy decisions of the Netanyahu government, which represents one particular tendency within Israeli politics. I believe Israel's lasting security requires a political agreement, not permanent military occupation — and that conviction colours my analysis. It seems to me consistent with a pro-democratic and pro-rules-based-order position.

What I do not know

I do not know the precise terms of the military arrangements currently being made between the Trump administration and the Netanyahu government. I have no information on any private security guarantees given to Israel in exchange for restraint on public operations. My reading is based on the public declarations of both parties and the ground reporting by Middle East Eye, Al Jazeera, The Guardian, and Daily Sabah.

Sources

Primary sources

Al Jazeera — Netanyahu: "We will remain in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza as long as necessary" — June 25, 2026

Middle East Eye — Netanyahu and Katz say Israel will remain in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza without a time limit — June 26, 2026

Al Jazeera — Israel expands military control in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria by 1,000 sq km — June 14, 2026

Secondary sources

The Guardian — Netanyahu declares victory over Iran and rules out Lebanon withdrawal — June 15, 2026

Al Jazeera — Netanyahu says Israel will not leave occupied territory in Lebanon — June 15, 2026

Daily Sabah — Netanyahu vows to stay in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza after US-Iran deal — June 15, 2026