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The ColumnOp-Ed· No. 1833

OPEN LETTER: Erdogan, Turkey and peace in Ukraine — three truths that must be told

On June 27, 2026, your Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced, during a joint press conference with his Canadian counterpart Anita Anand in

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Key takeaways
  1. On June 27, 2026, your Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced, during a joint press conference with his Canadian counterpart Anita Anand in
  2. Introduction: A letter that must be written
  3. Erdogan, allow me to be direct
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Facts, quotes, and cited links remain in the body. Interpretations are framed as analysis or opinion according to the format.

Introduction: A letter that must be written

Mr. Erdogan, allow me to be direct

On June 27, 2026, your Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced, during a joint press conference with his Canadian counterpart Anita Anand in Ottawa, that Ankara was ready to bring Ukrainian and Russian delegations back to the negotiating table. "The diplomatic process has reached an impasse, hostilities have intensified," he declared. Two days later, on June 29, you repeated that call before NATO allies at the Parliamentary Summit, declaring your wish for the war to be resolved "through dialogue." This initiative deserves a direct response — not diplomatic, not polite for form's sake, but honest.

I write to you not as a representative of anyone, but as an observer of this war that drags on, bleeds, and destroys cities and lives every night. You say that Turkey has earned the trust of both parties. That may be true. But earning Putin's trust and earning Zelensky's trust are not equivalent — and the difference between those two trusts says everything about the nature of the mediation you are proposing.

Context: a deadlock created by Moscow, not a symmetric one

This deadlock is not the result of any lack of will on Ukraine's part. It is the direct result of conditions imposed by Russia that are unacceptable. Vladimir Putin has said he is ready to negotiate "on the basis of the Istanbul agreements" — meaning from massive territorial concessions that Zelensky rightly rejected, because they consecrate an act of aggression. Presenting this as a symmetric deadlock is a rhetorical concession to Moscow before the delegations have even sat down.

Istanbul 2022: a precedent that warns rather than inspires

What happened — and why it failed

Turkey regularly recalls that it hosted the Istanbul talks in 2022. Those talks produced a draft memorandum whose details remain disputed. Russia today claims a framework had been reached — an assertion that Ukraine and Western witnesses formally contest. What is undeniable is that Putin continued the offensive — notably after the discovery of the atrocities in Bucha in April 2022.

Invoking Istanbul as a positive precedent without analyzing why that process failed risks repeating the mistake. Worse: it gives Russia the argument it seeks — that Ukraine had accepted a territorial framework and withdrew from it under Western pressure. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio was explicit in his exchange with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov: "There was no agreement in Anchorage." The same clarity is required on Istanbul.

What Zelensky is doing in the meantime

On June 26, 2026, President Zelensky declared that he had presented proposals to key partners and allies of Putin for a possible end to the war. At the same time, he approved a 40-day operation by the SBU aimed at pressuring Russia into halting combat. These two approaches — diplomatic and pressure-based — do not contradict each other. They are consistent with the position of a country that wants peace but refuses capitulation. This fundamental distinction must guide any serious mediation.

The NATO summit in Ankara: an opportunity and a trap

July 7 and 8: the moment of truth

The 32 heads of state of NATO member countries will meet in Ankara on July 7 and 8, 2026. Trump, Zelensky and European leaders will be in your capital. Secretary General Mark Rutte has described this summit as a transition toward "NATO 3.0," with Europe assuming greater responsibilities in conventional defense. A commitment of 70 billion euros in military aid to Ukraine is expected in the joint declaration, plus a similar pledge for 2027.

Hosting the NATO summit while simultaneously proposing to bring Kyiv and Moscow to the same table is a difficult position to hold. Will the NATO allies preparing to announce massive support for Ukraine see your mediation as a complement — or as an attempt to temper their solidarity? The answer depends on the guarantees you offer Ukraine — and not just to Russia.

Turkey deploys 70,000 police to secure Ankara

Turkey has deployed 70,000 police officers and placed Ankara under a security lockdown, banning demonstrations for 13 days around the summit. This shows you are taking the event seriously — as you should. But the physical security of the summit is not enough. What the allies expect from Turkey is political clarity: is Ankara with them in their support for Ukraine, or is Ankara negotiating in parallel terms that Moscow would approve?

What Ukraine needs to hear from Turkey

Concrete guarantees, not general declarations

Zelensky will not refuse dialogue if the conditions respect Ukrainian sovereignty. What he refuses is a negotiation whose starting point would consecrate Russia's illegal territorial seizures. Any Turkish mediation that made those seizures a fait accompli would run contrary to the international law you invoke. To have value, your mediation must offer Ukraine guarantees: on troop withdrawal, on verification mechanisms, on future security.

This is not an extravagant demand. It is the minimum that a serious mediator must put on the table so that the aggrieved party — Ukraine — can sit down without fearing the table is a trap. Fidan said Ankara wants peace achieved "on the basis of international law." Very well. International law prohibits the acquisition of territory by force. Let us start there.

The positive precedent: the grain deal

Turkey demonstrated with the Black Sea grain agreement that it was capable of a constructive and effective role. That agreement enabled the export of millions of tons of Ukrainian grain despite the war — a concrete, measurable, humanitarily significant achievement. But when Russia unilaterally withdrew from it and Turkey could not or would not impose consequences, the lesson was painful. What you propose today must learn from that failure: without coercive mechanisms, a mediation is worth only the goodwill of the parties — and the goodwill of Moscow is, forgive my frankness, a particularly fragile hypothesis.

Third truth: choose your side without saying it out loud

Turkey's strategic position is both an asset and a risk

Your geostrategic position is exceptional: you control the Bosphorus, you are a NATO member, you maintain relations with Moscow despite the war, you sell Bayraktar drones to Ukraine while maintaining dialogue with Russia. This position gives you real influence. It also imposes proportional responsibility.

China, Iran, North Korea — these revisionist powers that directly or indirectly support Russia's war machine — are watching closely what you do. If your mediation produces a framework that even partially validates Moscow's territorial acquisitions, you send a signal to all these powers: aggression pays, provided you hold out long enough. That is the opposite of the message the world needs to hear.

NATO needs a Turkey that chooses

NATO allies are not asking you to abandon your relations with Russia overnight. They are asking you not to use those relations to weaken their support for Ukraine. Minister Fidan himself acknowledged it: it is time to show "practical implementation" of defense commitments. That implementation also requires a clear alignment on a fundamental principle: one country cannot seize by force the territory of another, and a peace that consecrates that violation is not a peace — it is deferred capitulation.

What Turkey must do concretely

Three conditions for a credible mediation

Concretely, your mediation must rest on three non-negotiable conditions. First: publicly demand that Russia commit to withdrawing its troops as a prerequisite for any substantive negotiation — not the current front lines as a starting point, but Ukraine's internationally recognized borders as the final objective. Second: propose a framework with international verification mechanisms, not just a discussion table. Third: publicly align Turkey's position with the United Nations Charter and not the vague "spirit of Istanbul" that Moscow instrumentalizes.

If Turkey does this, it deserves to be heard and respected as a mediator. It places itself clearly on the side of international law — which does not prevent it from speaking with Russia, but defines the terms in which that conversation takes place. A mediation without principles is not a mediation. It is a facilitation of impunity.

Ankara can become a name associated with just peace

You have a historic opportunity. The NATO summit in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026 can be the moment when Turkey clearly affirms that it stands on the side of the law, of sovereignty, and of the right of peoples to decide their future without foreign armed intervention. Ankara can become the name associated not with a compromise agreement that leaves an open wound, but with a just peace that holds because it is founded on unassailable principles. That would be your most lasting diplomatic legacy.

Putin's Russia: an unreliable negotiating partner

What Lavrov says and what Lavrov does

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently declared that Moscow was ready to resume talks with Kyiv"where they left off." This formulation sounds conciliatory. It is in reality a disguised demand: resuming talks "where they left off" means starting from the territorial concessions discussed in the draft of Istanbul 2022 — a draft that Ukraine never officially validated and that Putin himself torpedoed by continuing the offensive after Bucha.

Putin has also declared having no "preconditions" for negotiations. But the actual content of his real demands — recognition of the annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts, permanent Ukrainian neutrality, an end to any NATO membership bid — constitutes precisely the heaviest set of preconditions imaginable. The language of Russian negotiation is a coded language: every word must be read against its apparent meaning.

What Turkey knows about Moscow

Turkey knows Russia better than most Western capitals. It has negotiated with it in Syria, in Libya, in Nagorno-Karabakh. It knows how Moscow uses peace processes to freeze situations that favor it rather than to resolve conflicts. This knowledge is precious. It must be put at Ukraine's service, not used as an argument to convince Kyiv to accept a deal that Moscow could tolerate.

What the West was already expecting from Ankara

NATO needs an aligned Turkey

NATO allies are not asking you to abandon your relations with Russia overnight. They are asking you not to use those relations to weaken their support for Ukraine. Minister Fidan himself acknowledged it: it is time to show "practical implementation" of defense commitments. That implementation also requires a clear alignment on a principle: one country cannot seize by force the territory of another, and a peace that consecrates that violation is not a peace.

The allies have announced 70 billion euros in support for Ukraine at the Ankara summit. If at the same time Turkey facilitates a negotiation that would lead Ukraine to cede territory, the signal sent to the world is contradictory. A choice must be made. Not between NATO and Russia — you have already chosen NATO. But between a mediation that serves the law and one that serves the immediate interest of ending the fighting at any price.

Defense spending as proof of commitment

Turkey has significantly increased its defense spending in recent years. Its defense industry — the Bayraktar drones, naval systems, Roketsan missiles — has become a global player. These capabilities give Turkey a military credibility that few mediators possess. They must support a mediation with real weight — not just well-equipped meeting rooms.

Conclusion: History is watching you

Turkey at a crossroads

You hosted the Istanbul talks in 2022. You are proposing new mediation today. Between those two moments, Turkey sold drones to Ukraine, maintained commercial relations with Russia, and played an ambiguous role in controlling the Bosphorus. This ambiguity has had tactical advantages for Ankara. But in history, powers that chose ambiguity over clarity at decisive moments have not always aged well.

One final question

I put a simple question to you, Mr. Erdogan. If the Turkish mediation succeeds — if Ukraine and Russia sit down in Ankara and sign a document — what will it contain? Will it consecrate Ukraine's sovereignty over its entire internationally recognized territory? Or will it foresee spheres of influence, frozen front lines, arrangements that leave Moscow what it took by force? The answer to that question is the difference between a mediator and an accomplice. I credit you with wanting to be the former. Prove it.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

My position and my acknowledged biases

I am Maxime Marquette, columnist and analyst. I am pro-Ukraine and consider Ukrainian sovereignty non-negotiable. This editorial bias is openly held. It does not prevent me from acknowledging that diplomatic initiatives like Turkey's can, in the right framework, be useful. This letter is a call for that right framework — not a rejection of diplomacy.

What I don't know

I do not have access to private conversations between the Turkish, Ukrainian and Russian governments. I cannot prejudge Erdogan's real intentions. This article rests on public statements by Hakan Fidan and Erdogan, reported by verified sources, and on analysis of the diplomatic context. No testimony was invented. No fact was fabricated.

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Cite this article

Maxime Marquette (2026). OPEN LETTER: Erdogan, Turkey and peace in Ukraine — three truths that must be told. MadMax. https://mad-max.co/en/article/lettre-ouverte-erdogan-la-turquie-et-la-paix-en-ukraine-trois-verites-qu-il-faut

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Maxime Marquette
Independent columnist

Maxime Marquette writes most of the analyses and columns published on MadMax — geopolitics, technology, and current events, no filler.

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