OPEN LETTER: To the European Commission — WhatsApp does not belong to Meta alone

June 9, 2026: a courageous and necessary decision

Commissioner, on June 9, 2026, you made a decision that few institutions in the world would have dared to make. You ordered Meta Platforms to restore free access to WhatsApp for competing AI chatbots — ChatGPT, Perplexity, and smaller assistants such as Lucia and Polk — within five business days, under threat of a fine reaching up to 10% of Meta's annual global revenues. You described this as an urgent necessity to prevent "serious and irreparable harm to competition" in a rapidly growing market. I want to tell you, publicly and without reservation: you were right to act. But the work is only beginning.

This open letter is not a critique of your decision — it is an invitation to go further. Because what you did on June 9 is necessary but not sufficient. You stopped a hemorrhage. You have not yet treated the underlying illness: the structural dependency of 2 billion users worldwide on a private American communications infrastructure whose policy can change overnight according to the interests of Mark Zuckerberg.

What Meta did — and what it actually means

Let me summarize the facts for those who have not followed closely. Until January 15, 2026, third-party AI assistants could access WhatsApp and interact with its users in the same way as other companies using the platform. A European user could choose to use ChatGPT, Perplexity, or any other AI assistant through the WhatsApp application. It was open, competitive, favorable to the 6,700 European AI startups that could have positioned themselves on that distribution channel.

Then, on January 15, 2026, Meta unilaterally expelled all competitors from its platform, leaving only its own Meta AI. The Commission opened an investigation in December 2025, issued preliminary objections on March 6, 2026, and offered Meta the opportunity to propose remedies. Meta proposed access fees. The Commission judged those fees "so high that they are not economically viable for competitors" — in other words, the same thing as a prohibition, dressed up as commercial policy. Your decision of June 9 cut through this: back to the status quo ante.

I will say something that may seem counterintuitive: I understand why Meta did this. Not to approve it — to explain it. WhatsApp is the most valuable distribution asset in the digital world. Allowing competitors to access it for free is like opening your store's shelves to rivals who haven't paid the rent. Meta is not a charity. But "not a charity" is not a sufficient defense against competition law obligations for dominant actors.

The Menlo Park defense

Meta's response to your decision was swift and articulate. The company declared its intention to appeal the decision and described the measure as "regulatory overreach." In a statement, Meta declared: "The European Commission has ruled that OpenAI and some of the world's biggest companies can access WhatsApp's paid Business service for free. This is regulatory overreach, funded by many European businesses who pay for this service." This is a clever argument that deserves serious examination — and dismantling.

Meta's argument rests on a confusion between two types of entities: businesses that pay for the WhatsApp Business API to communicate with their customers, and AI assistants seeking access to the platform to position themselves as alternatives to Meta AI. These two situations are legally and economically distinct. The Commission is not asking Meta to open its doors to everyone — it is asking Meta not to use its dominant position in instant messaging to close the AI assistant market to all competitors.

The ownership argument and its limits

Meta's defense also rests on an ownership argument: it is our platform, we can decide who has access. This argument is perfectly valid for an actor without a dominant position. It becomes legally problematic when that actor controls the primary means of communication for 2 billion people worldwide and where restricting access to its platform amounts to market exclusion for competitors who have no viable alternative to reach the same audience.

This is precisely the logic underlying the "bottleneck" doctrine in competition law — when an infrastructure is so essential to competition in a market that denying access amounts to an anticompetitive practice. WhatsApp, with its 2 billion active users and near-universal penetration in many European markets, clearly fits this definition. Commissioner Ribera is right to act.

Let me be clear with Meta: if you had built an infrastructure with two billion users within a purely private business model, having never benefited from network effects that are collective goods rather than individual ones, you might have a moral argument for exclusive ownership. But social networks and messaging platforms don't work that way. Their value comes precisely from the fact that everyone is there. That collective value does not belong to you entirely.

6,700 startups that depend on fair distribution channels

Commissioner Ribera stated this clearly when announcing the interim measures: the Commission's goal is to "preserve the choice for citizens across Europe over the AI assistants they want to use with WhatsApp, without that decision being made for them." And to protect the 6,700 European AI startups that need fair access to distribution channels to remain competitive against American giants.

This last point is crucial and deserves elaboration. OpenAI, Google, Anthropic and Meta AI assistants carry enormous structural advantages: massive funding, millions of existing users, established brands. European AI startups — even the most promising — can only compete with these players on equal terms if distribution platforms remain open. Closing WhatsApp to AI competitors effectively condemns an entire generation of European AI innovation to remain marginal relative to American incumbents.

Digital sovereignty at stake

Commissioner, I want to move beyond the commercial argument to address the strategic one. WhatsApp is today, in many European countries, the primary channel of communication between individuals, between businesses, and between citizens and administrations. Entire communities, entire families, entire small businesses organize themselves via WhatsApp. Allowing a single American company — whose decisions are made in Menlo Park, under pressure from American shareholders and American regulation — to control who can access this infrastructure is a question of European digital sovereignty.

This is not an abstract question. We saw with the Anthropic case and American AI export controls — which occurred precisely the same week — how quickly the American government can unilaterally cut access to technologies that millions of Europeans depend on. Dependence on American infrastructure is not only a competitive problem — it is a strategic vulnerability.

Here is the truth that nobody says loudly enough: if tomorrow, a major diplomatic crisis erupted between Europe and the United States, Meta could shut down WhatsApp in Europe with the press of a button. This is not science fiction — it is a real technical and legal possibility. The Europe that learned the hard way what it means to depend on Russian gas must learn the same lesson about its dependency on American digital infrastructure. The Commission's decisions, including yours, are heading in the right direction. But they are not enough on their own.

Who actually pays and how?

Meta's argument that AI assistants should pay to access WhatsApp deserves honest examination. WhatsApp is a free app for consumers — Meta does not draw revenue directly from individual users. Meta's revenue comes from advertising and the WhatsApp Business API, through which businesses pay to communicate with their customers. The argument therefore runs: if companies pay to access the platform, why shouldn't AI competitors pay too?

The Commission's response — and it is a legally and economically sound one — is that the fees proposed by Meta were not genuine access fees but exclusion fees: deliberately set at a level so high that access was unviable for all competitors. This is not reasonable commercial policy — it is an exclusion strategy dressed as pricing policy. The distinction is crucial and the Commission correctly identified it.

Free access and the sustainability of the model

A legitimate question nonetheless remains: is indefinite free access for third-party AI assistants on WhatsApp economically sustainable for Meta in the long run? Commissioner, you implicitly acknowledged this tension by establishing that the interim measures would last "until the conclusion of the investigation, at the latest until June 2029." This gives your investigation three years to establish a fair and durable access framework — one that could include reasonable and non-discriminatory fees if the investigation concludes that a transparent pricing model is acceptable.

This pragmatic approach — neither perpetual free access nor exclusion — is exactly the kind of compromise European competition law is designed to find. The difficulty will lie in the details: how do you define "reasonable" fees in a market where the opportunity costs of accessing 2 billion users are almost impossible to quantify objectively? That will be the work of your investigation. Difficult but essential work.

I don't claim to have the magic formula for pricing WhatsApp access fairly. It is an extraordinarily complex regulatory problem. What I know is that leaving Meta to set those prices unilaterally amounts to letting a monopolist decide the price of its own monopoly. That is not regulation — it is regulatory abdication. The Commission is right to intervene. The difficulty lies in implementation.

The DMA is a good tool — but it has blind spots

The European Digital Markets Act (DMA) — which classifies Meta as a "gatekeeper" in the regulatory sense and imposes specific interoperability and non-discrimination obligations on it — is the primary legal framework within which your June 9 decision sits. Note that this decision was taken under classical antitrust law (Article 102 TFEU on abuse of dominant position), not directly under the DMA — reflecting the flexibility of available tools, but also the limitations of existing DMA procedures for this type of urgency.

The DMA is a good framework. It forced Apple to open its App Store to third-party stores, compelled Google to offer alternative choices on Android devices, and imposed various interoperability obligations on Meta. But it has significant blind spots in the AI domain: it was not designed to specifically regulate AI assistant markets, and its interoperability provisions do not necessarily cover every scenario that AI's rapid development generates.

What the DMA must be amended to include

Commissioner, here is my concrete request: the current investigation must serve as the basis for a revision or clarification of the DMA that explicitly establishes that dominant-position communications platforms cannot use their control of messaging infrastructure to favor their own AI assistant at the expense of competitors. This rule does not currently exist in explicit form in the DMA — which is why you had to resort to urgent interim measures rather than a standard DMA procedure.

A legislative clarification would establish a preventive rather than a corrective rule: instead of waiting for Meta to close access again — or for Apple to do the same with iMessage, or for Google to do it with Gmail — open access obligations for AI assistants would be established in advance for all operators of dominant messaging infrastructures. This is more effective, more predictable, and less costly in regulatory resources.

The problem with reactive regulation — waiting for the abuse to occur, investigating, sanctioning — is that the market has often already been distorted in ways that are difficult to reverse between the moment abuse begins and the moment a sanction is imposed. In the AI space, where consumer habits and market positions consolidate at blinding speed, three years of investigation can mean an entire generation of competitiveness losses for European startups. Preventive regulation is the only approach that keeps pace with tech.

When network effects become a cage

We must name the reality: WhatsApp achieved its mass adoption through network effects — the more users, the more valuable the platform becomes for each individual user. These network effects are a common good produced by all users collectively, not an asset created by Meta alone. The value of WhatsApp to the company is a direct function of user numbers — each of whom contributed to that value simply by joining the platform and inviting their contacts.

This economic reality — which economists call network externalities — justifies a different regulatory approach than one would apply to a company whose value is created purely through its own investments. Meta's market position on WhatsApp is not simply the result of its technological superiority or investment — it is the result of a network dynamic that the company captured but did not create. This fundamentally changes the legitimacy of its claim to exclusivity over that infrastructure.

Messaging as critical infrastructure

In many European countries, WhatsApp is de facto a critical communications infrastructure. Health services communicate via WhatsApp. Businesses manage their operations via WhatsApp Business. Local communities organize via WhatsApp groups. Families maintain transnational ties via WhatsApp. This pervasiveness transforms WhatsApp into something that more closely resembles a public infrastructure than a simple private product.

This reflection on the infrastructure status of dominant platforms is one of the most important regulatory discussions of our era — and it extends well beyond the single case of Meta/WhatsApp. It also concerns operating systems (Windows, iOS, Android), search engines (Google), marketplaces (Amazon), and now AI platforms. The European Commission is at the forefront of this global conversation. Your June 9 decision is a concrete illustration of it.

Here is what Europeans don't always realize: their dependency on WhatsApp is not a rational individual choice — it is the result of a network dynamic that has progressively locked them into an infrastructure whose rules they don't control. People didn't "choose" WhatsApp in the sense of an informed preference among equivalent alternatives — they are there because everyone else is. That is precisely the kind of lock-in that regulation must address.

The American narrative against European regulation

Commissioner, Meta's reaction — calling your decision "regulatory overreach" — is part of a broader narrative campaign by major American tech companies to portray European regulation as a protectionist obstacle to innovation. This narrative is clever because it contains a grain of truth: some European regulations have indeed created excessive administrative burdens for startups that had no intention of creating the problems the regulation sought to prevent.

But this narrative is fundamentally dishonest when applied to antitrust decisions against dominant platforms. Requiring Meta not to unilaterally close its 2 billion user platform to AI competitors is not protectionism — it is the application of fundamental competition law principles that exist in all major market economies, including the United States. The difference is that Europe has had the courage to apply these principles to Big Tech, where the United States has long hesitated.

Europe as a model — and its responsibilities

The fact that your decision is cited in global policy discussions on AI regulation, that it is scrutinized in Washington, Tokyo, New Delhi and Seoul by regulators seeking models, illustrates Europe's unique position in global digital governance. Europe may not be the largest AI market — it is the most influential regulatory power. That is a power that carries responsibilities.

This power is only legitimate — and only effective — if European regulatory decisions are rigorous in their analysis, transparent in their motivations, and consistent in their application. Your June 9 decision appears to pass these tests. The investigation that follows must also pass them — with solid economic analysis, inclusive stakeholder consultation including European AI startups, and a conclusion that establishes a fair and durable access framework.

Europe regulates where America hesitates. That is not always a comfortable position — for the companies that must comply, or for the regulators who absorb criticism from American lobbyists. But it is often the right position. The problem is not that Europe over-regulates — it sometimes regulates poorly or too slowly. The June 9 decision was fast and well-targeted. Let the investigation that follows be equally rigorous.

Lucia, Polk and the others: alternatives that deserve to exist

In her announcement of the interim measures, Commissioner Ribera cited not only the major players like ChatGPT and Perplexity, but also smaller European AI assistants like Lucia and Polk. These names, largely unknown to the general public, represent precisely the kind of innovation Europe seeks to protect and encourage — AI startups that have developed competitive products and need access to distribution channels to reach users.

For Lucia or Polk, exclusion from WhatsApp is not merely a commercial inconvenience — it is an existential threat. These companies lack the resources to build their own user base at the pace at which major American players are consolidating their positions. Access to distribution through an existing platform like WhatsApp is often the only viable way for small startups to compete with giants that have billions in capital and global marketing teams.

European AI sovereignty depends on distribution

Commissioner, here is the structural link I want to establish: European digital sovereignty policy — of which you are one of the architects — can only succeed if distribution layers remain open to European actors. Billions can be invested in AI research, engineers trained, startups funded — but if the channels through which users access AI products are controlled by American actors who exclude European competitors, the digital sovereignty strategy remains incomplete.

This is the deeper meaning of your June 9 decision: it does not concern only competition in the AI assistant market — it touches the fundamental architecture of the European digital economy and the ability of European actors to participate in it on an equal footing. This is a strategic as much as a competitive challenge.

I want to say to the developers of European AI startups reading these lines, who look at Meta with a mixture of admiration and frustration: just because Meta has 2 billion users on WhatsApp doesn't mean it has the right to decide who can reach them. You have a regulation that supports you. Use it. And keep building the alternatives that Europe needs to have — because regulation alone is not enough if there are no technology champions to defend.

iMessage, Gmail, LinkedIn: the coming battles

The decision on WhatsApp is only the first of a series of coming battles over access to dominant messaging and communications platforms. Apple's iMessage, with its dominance in certain markets — particularly the United States and the United Kingdom — raises similar questions about third-party AI access. Google's Gmail, used by more than 1.8 billion people, could become a privileged channel for the Gemini assistant at the expense of competitors. Microsoft's LinkedIn and its growing integration with Copilot raise the same issues in a professional context.

Commissioner, the decision you made on WhatsApp sets a precedent — for the better. But that precedent will only be effective if it is applied consistently to all dominant platform operators. Selective treatment — or treatment perceived as selective — would undermine the legitimacy of the European regulatory framework and fuel the American protectionism narrative. Consistency is not only a legal virtue — it is a political necessity.

Mandatory interoperability as a structural solution

The long-term structural solution to the problem of dominant platform closures is mandatory interoperability — the obligation for dominant messaging platforms to allow users of other platforms to communicate with their users. The DMA already imposes a form of interoperability on Meta — but the implementation details remain complex and contested. Full and effective interoperability would fundamentally transform market dynamics: instead of having to "choose" WhatsApp because everyone is on it, users could use their application of choice and communicate with everyone.

This is an ambitious structural transformation — more difficult technically and politically than the June 9 interim measures. But it is the only solution that addresses the fundamental problem rather than managing its symptoms. I encourage you to pursue this direction with the same determination you showed on June 9.

Mandatory interoperability is the dream of the internet's pioneers — a network where anyone can communicate with anyone, without the platform being a discriminating factor. That dream was killed by network effects and the commercial decisions of major platforms. The DMA attempts to revive it. It is an ambitious, difficult, and absolutely necessary project. I hope the Commission sees it through.

A regulatory model the world is watching

Commissioner Ribera, your decision of June 9, 2026 is not only an act of European competition law. It is a political act that will be studied in Washington, Tokyo, Ottawa and Seoul by regulators seeking precedents for regulating American digital giants in their own territories. The OECD published in May 2026 a report on digital gatekeeping practices that explicitly cites the Digital Markets Act as the most advanced regulatory framework in the world in this domain. This is not a coincidence of timing.

International pressure to regulate dominant platforms is intensifying. Canada with its Online News Act, Australia with its mandatory bargaining regime, the post-Brexit United Kingdom with its own Digital Markets Unit: all these countries look to Europe as the most advanced regulatory laboratory. Your decisions create precedents that extend well beyond the Union's borders. With that power comes additional responsibility: to be rigorous, fair, and measurable in your outcomes.

The American administration's reaction and trade tensions

Let us be honest about the geopolitical context: the June 9 decision provoked strong reactions in Washington. Members of the US Congress called the measure a "disguised trade barrier" and asked the administration to bring the matter before the World Trade Organization. This is not the first time — and it will not be the last. The tension between European regulatory sovereignty and American commercial interests is structural and will not disappear with a statement of principle.

Europe's response to this pressure must be firm but nuanced. Firm because the Union's right to regulate its internal market is non-negotiable. Nuanced because Europe needs the United States as a strategic partner in a context of competition with China, and unnecessary trade tensions weaken that alliance. It is possible to defend European regulation without turning it into a civilizational confrontation. Good lawyers and good diplomats know how to make that distinction.

I will say something unpopular: European regulation of digital giants is correct in principle and sometimes clumsy in communication. When Eurocrats describe the DMA as a "victory against American digital imperialism," they transform a competition law question into a geopolitical conflict — which is exactly what Meta and its lobbyists want, because it repositions them as victims rather than dominant actors. Solve the legal problem. Avoid the war rhetoric. Europe will be more credible, and more effective.

Signal, Telegram, Wire: why substitution isn't happening

Commissioner Ribera, it is time to address the question that your colleagues prefer to avoid: despite years of regulatory decisions against Meta, despite the Cambridge Analytica scandals, despite repeated warnings from privacy experts, WhatsApp continues to dominate the European messaging market. Signal has gained privacy-conscious educated users. Telegram has captured certain communities. Wire has attracted businesses. But none of these alternatives has managed to break WhatsApp's network effect at mass scale.

The reason is simple and brutal: your parents, your doctor, your pharmacist, your baker, your neighborhood association are on WhatsApp. Not on Signal. Switching is not a rational individual choice — it is a collective coordination problem that requires either a critical mass of simultaneous migrations or a regulatory obligation. Privacy awareness campaigns are not enough. Commission decisions alone are not enough. An active, funded, and coordinated migration strategy is needed.

The role of member states in promoting alternatives

Some European governments are leading the way. Germany has banned WhatsApp in federal administrations and adopted open-source solutions. France has deployed Tchap for its civil servants. The Netherlands is migrating toward sovereign messaging solutions. But these initiatives remain islands in an ocean of WhatsApp dependency for ordinary citizen communications. The real breakthrough will come when states require businesses of significant size to offer alternative contact channels, or when forced interoperability makes substitution technically transparent for the end user.

Your role, Commissioner, is to create the conditions in which this migration becomes possible without an unbearable cost for individuals and small businesses. This is not about punishing Meta — it is about freeing the two billion users who might actually want a choice but don't have one in practice. Mandatory interoperability is the key. It would allow a Signal user to communicate with a WhatsApp user without anyone having to migrate. It is technically feasible. It is politically difficult. It is exactly the kind of fight the Commission must wage.

Let me be honest about my own contradictions: I use WhatsApp. I know that is a problem. I tried Signal, and half my contacts aren't there. I tried to coordinate a migration in my professional circle, and after three weeks of effort, I gave up. I don't say this to justify my laziness — I say it to illustrate the scale of the structural challenge. If someone like me, who knows exactly why WhatsApp dependency is problematic, can't get out of it alone, that is proof that the individual solution doesn't work. The solution must be systemic. That is your job, not mine.

Why WhatsApp is the gateway for mass AI adoption

Commissioner Ribera, the June 9 decision appears on the surface to be about messaging. It is actually about generative artificial intelligence. Meta AI is deployed on WhatsApp, Messenger and Instagram simultaneously — three platforms totaling more than 4 billion active users. When Meta decides to integrate its AI into WhatsApp and refuse access to competing AI assistants, it positions itself as the indispensable gatekeeper of AI distribution to the general public. This is not a technical decision — it is a first-order market control strategic decision.

The 6,700 European AI startups you want to protect are not facing Meta on a technological playing field — they face a distribution problem. Their models are sometimes better than Meta AI on certain tasks. Their interfaces are often more sophisticated. But they don't have access to WhatsApp's two billion users. The result: European AI remains confined to niche audiences while Meta conditions an entire generation to interact with AI through its own products. The competitive gap that is opening up today in terms of distribution will be extremely difficult to close in ten years.

AI as the forgotten dimension of the DMA

The Digital Markets Act was designed before the explosion of generative AI. It applies to digital gatekeepers as they existed in 2020–2022. But the landscape has radically changed: messaging platforms are no longer simply communication channels — they have become entry points for AI services that can potentially replace search engines, virtual assistants, recommendation services and commerce interfaces. Updating the DMA to explicitly include constraints on the vertical integration of AI into gatekeeper platforms is urgent. It is a gap that your legal teams must close quickly.

Companies like Anthropic, Mistral, Aleph Alpha and dozens of European AI startups are trying to reach consumers. They have the technologies. They don't have the distribution channels. Requiring WhatsApp to offer fair access to third-party AI assistants — through an open API, transparent and non-discriminatory fees — is the most important regulatory decision you could make for the future of European AI. It does not yet feature in your current mandate. It should.

I observe with mild frustration that public debate on the DMA and Meta focuses almost exclusively on messaging and privacy, while the central strategic issue is AI. In five years, the battle for the distribution of generative AI to the general public will probably be more decisive for European technological competitiveness than any decision on cookies or data protection. The Commission has a window of action. It may last two years. After that, positions will be too consolidated to be changed by regulation alone. Act now.

Regulating without educating: the limits of a purely legal approach

Commissioner Ribera, allow me an observation in the form of a friendly challenge: regulation alone cannot solve the problem of dependency on dominant digital platforms, if it is not accompanied by a massive policy of digital literacy. Two billion WhatsApp users who don't understand what network effects mean, who have never heard of the Digital Markets Act, and who don't know what interoperability could change in their daily lives — these two billion users will not make informed choices even if you legally give them the option.

The European Union invests billions in digital skills programs. A fraction of these investments should be directly devoted to explaining to ordinary citizens — not experts — why the concentration of digital platforms affects them personally. Why paying Meta with their data when alternatives exist. How to exercise their rights under GDPR and the DMA. This is not activism — it is digital citizenship.

Education models that work: lessons from Finland and Estonia

Finland is regularly cited as the most advanced country in digital media literacy. Its national program includes teaching critical thinking toward algorithms, online privacy management, and understanding platform business models from primary school. Estonia, Europe's most digital nation, has integrated data sovereignty and critical digital infrastructure concepts into its school curriculum. These models are exportable. They should be the shared European ambition.

At the Union level, a harmonized digital literacy program that prepares citizens to understand their rights in the digital ecosystem would be a powerful complement to regulatory decisions. Because regulation changes the rules of the game — but it is only when players understand the rules that they can fully benefit from them. Regulation and education are two sides of the same coin. Your mandate covers the first. Your colleagues in education must take care of the second.

There is something slightly absurd about the fact that Europe spends billions to regulate American digital platforms, but does not invest proportionally in educating citizens to understand why that regulation is necessary and how to benefit from it. Legal victories against Meta, Google or Amazon change little if users continue to use these services without understanding the alternatives that exist. Regulatory pedagogy — explaining to citizens what regulators are doing in their name — is an essential democratic function that the European Union must develop seriously.

What the WhatsApp case says about the Europe we want to build

Commissioner Ribera, in closing this letter, I want to broaden the perspective. The Meta/WhatsApp case is one among many to come. There will be Google and the vertical integration of AI into search. There will be Apple and App Store restrictions. There will be Amazon and the priority given to its own products on its marketplace. There will be Chinese companies — TikTok, Shein, Temu — with their own data collection practices and their own network effects. Each case will be different in its details. Each will be identical in its fundamental structure: a dominant platform using its position to exclude competitors and lock in users.

The central question is not technical — it is political: what kind of digital economy do we want to build in Europe? An economy where citizens' data belongs to citizens, where digital markets are contestable, where European startups can compete with American and Chinese giants on a level playing field? Or an economy where Europe is a consumption market for platforms that don't pay their taxes here, don't respect our values, and don't answer to our democratic institutions? It is your decisions — and those of your colleagues — that will answer that question. Choose wisely.

The next regulatory priorities: a roadmap for the Commission

To close this letter, here is what I concretely ask of you, Commissioner. First, finalize and strengthen the procedure opened against Meta on June 9 with clear, measurable interoperability requirements with strict deadlines. Second, update the DMA to explicitly include generative AI within the definition of core platform services subject to gatekeeper obligations. Third, coordinate with American and British regulatory authorities to prevent companies from playing regulators against each other. Fourth, invest in digital literacy for European citizens in partnership with member states and educational institutions.

These four priorities do not solve all problems of European digital sovereignty. They create the conditions for solutions to emerge. Europe has the institutions, the democratic legitimacy, and — since June 9, 2026 — the legal precedent to act. All that is missing is the political will to hold firm over time, even under pressure from lobbyists, commercial allies and electoral cycles. I trust you, Commissioner. Do it.

I address Teresa Ribera with respect, because I sincerely believe that she and her teams are doing extraordinarily difficult work in a political and legal context that is not always favorable. Regulating companies whose market capitalization exceeds the GDP of many member states, within a complex legal framework, with political pressures from all sides — that is thankless and crucial work. What I ask of them is persistence. Because regulatory victories against dominant platforms are measured in decades, not quarters. Europe has the right doctrine. It must have the staying power.

What June 9, 2026 says about Europe

Commissioner, your decision of June 9, 2026 says something important about Europe in 2026: it is capable of acting quickly, with resolve, to defend a principle of fair competition against one of the most powerful private actors in the world. That deserves recognition and acknowledgment — not because it is extraordinary, but because it is what regulation should do, and too often does not.

Meta's argument — that opening WhatsApp to AI competitors is "regulatory overreach" — reveals a mentality that confuses property rights with the right to a monopoly. Allowing a single American actor to control the messaging of 2 billion people and to unilaterally decide who can reach them with what services would be far more dangerous for the European economy and for European citizens' digital freedoms than any Commission decision.

The work ahead

But the work does not stop there. The investigation following your interim decision must establish a permanent, fair and economically viable access framework. The DMA must be clarified to explicitly integrate AI assistant markets. Interoperability must be pushed as far as possible. And the treatment of dominant platforms must be consistent — Meta, Apple, Google, Microsoft must face the same obligations, without favoritism or perceived discrimination.

Europe has a historic opportunity to establish global standards for AI and digital platform governance. That opportunity will not come twice. The decisions made in the next three years — on WhatsApp, on AI assistants, on interoperability, on data transparency — will define the rules of the digital game for a generation. I trust you to make these decisions with the courage and rigor you showed on June 9. Europe needs it.

Commissioner Ribera, this letter is a declaration of support and of expectation. Support because the June 9, 2026 decision was just, courageous and necessary. Expectation because it is only a beginning, and the pressure to retreat will be immense. The Europe that invented democracy, human rights and the rule of law can also invent digital sovereignty. That is not idealism — it is sound economic policy. The two billion WhatsApp users deserve better than having no choice. It is up to you to give them one.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a columnist and analyst. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

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