All 32 NATO members finally clear the 2% of GDP defense threshold

Introduction: a milestone that looked impossible a decade ago

A figure that would have made any diplomat laugh in 2014

A number just landed that deserves a pause: for the first time in its history, all 32 NATO member states cleared the 2% of GDP defense-spending threshold in 2025, according to a factbox published by the Anadolu news agency ahead of the Ankara summit. That threshold, set at the 2014 Wales summit, looked at the time like a theoretical target few allies actually took seriously.

Twelve years later, the landscape has changed radically. Combined allied defense spending now tops $1.4 trillion, a figure that reflects a Western rearmament on a scale unseen since the end of the Cold War.

Why this milestone is arriving now

This collective surge owes nothing to chance. Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine acted as an electric shock for European governments that had, for decades, treated continental peace as a given. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, all direct neighbors of Russia or its Kaliningrad exclave, led this transformation with an urgency Western European countries are only now discovering.

The NATO summit in Ankara, set for July 7 and 8, 2026, must now assess progress toward an even more ambitious target: 5% of GDP by 2035, set at the June 2025 Hague summit.

Poland and the Baltic states lead the pack

Warsaw spends like it's the height of the Cold War

Poland tops the list at 4.48% of GDP spent on defense, a proportional level comparable to the United States at the peak of the Cold War. Warsaw has acquired, in three years, F-35 jets, South Korean K2 tanks, HIMARS artillery systems, and Patriot air-defense batteries. A national law now mandates a minimum floor of 4% of GDP for the Polish military budget.

This acceleration is explained by geography: Poland shares a 434-kilometer border with the Russian Kaliningrad exclave and a 210-kilometer border with Belarus, two neighbors directly involved in supporting Russia's war against Ukraine.

Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are not far behind

Lithuania has seen its defense budget multiply more than fivefold since 2014, now reaching 4% of GDP, the most dramatic proportional increase in the entire alliance. Latvia, at 3.73%, has already surpassed the new 3.5% benchmark set for 2035, a full decade ahead of schedule. Estonia, at 3.38%, shares roughly 340 kilometers of border with Russia and remains one of the most committed allies on a per-capita basis.

These three countries host NATO multinational battlegroups under the enhanced forward presence framework, a deterrent posture directly tied to the perceived threat from Kaliningrad and the Russian border.

The Norwegian case: a historic symbol

A European ally outspends the United States per capita

In 2025, for the first time in NATO's recorded history, a European ally outspent the United States on defense per capita: Norway, at 3.35% of its GDP. This country, which shares a 196-kilometer border with Russia in the Arctic, has invested heavily in Arctic surveillance, naval capabilities, and land forces.

This symbolic shift shows just how much the internal balance of power within the alliance is evolving: high-income countries, when they commit fully, can now outweigh the American superpower on a per-capita basis.

The Arctic, a quiet new front in the rivalry with Moscow

Norway is not acting alone in this strategic region. Russia's growing militarization of the Arctic, combined with China's rising interest in polar shipping routes, is pushing Nordic countries to build up capabilities well beyond what Western public opinion typically notices.

This quiet vigilance in the High North deserves more media attention, since it illustrates the multidimensional nature of today's strategic competition between the West and its rivals.

The United States, still first in absolute terms but overtaken proportionally

Washington remains the alliance's budgetary heavyweight

The United States spent roughly $838 billion on national defense in 2025, nearly 60% of NATO's combined spending, even though the country accounts for only about 43% of the alliance's combined GDP. As a share of American GDP, that amounts to 3.22%, a figure now surpassed by Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Norway.

The American share of the alliance's total spending has, in fact, declined, from roughly 72% in 2016 to 60% in 2025, a drop entirely attributable to rising European budgets rather than any American cutback.

Washington's direct contribution to the common budget stays marginal

One figure deserves wider public attention: the United States' direct contribution to NATO's common operating budget for 2026 represents only 14.9% of a total budget of €5.3 billion, roughly $750 to 800 million a year, an amount below 0.1% of the U.S. national defense budget. That share is identical to Germany's, a fact that seriously complicates the narrative that Washington single-handedly funds the alliance.

This figure puts into perspective certain statements by Donald Trump, who in March called NATO a paper tiger and labeled some allies cowards for refusing to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz during the Israel-Iran conflict.

The historic laggards finally catch up

Italy, Belgium, and Canada finally cross the line

Several allies long criticized for their lack of commitment finally hit the 2% threshold in 2025. Italy, the alliance's fourth-largest economy, crossed that line for the first time since the 2014 Wales summit. Belgium, home to NATO's Brussels headquarters, boosted its defense budget by 59% in a single year to cross the threshold.

Canada, long seen as the alliance's most visible laggard on burden-sharing, reached roughly $43.9 billion and crossed the 2% threshold in 2025, under political pressure considerably amplified by Donald Trump's second term.

Spain, the only negotiated exception

Spain remains the only ally formally exempted from the new 5% target set in The Hague, having negotiated a cap of 2.1% of GDP. Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez called that target unreasonable and counterproductive, a stance that now isolates him within the alliance.

This Spanish exception illustrates the lingering tensions that persist despite the collective satisfaction around the 2% threshold, a reminder that the unity on display in Ankara remains fragile on certain budget files.

The Ankara summit and the new 5% target for 2035

An ambitious deadline that redefines transatlantic solidarity

The summit on July 7 and 8, 2026, in Ankara, Turkey, must assess progress toward the 5% of GDP goal set for 2035, broken down into 3.5% of core defense spending and 1.5% devoted to broader security spending such as infrastructure or cybersecurity. Turkey, hosting the summit, already contributes 2.33% of its GDP and fields the alliance's second-largest army by personnel.

Turkey's geographic position, controlling access between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea through the straits under the Montreux Convention, gives Ankara disproportionate strategic weight relative to its relative budget contribution.

Continued support for Ukraine remains central to the talks

Beyond the budget figures, the summit must also address future aid to Ukraine, still at war against the Russian aggression launched in 2022. NATO's secretary general has himself called this meeting potentially transformational for the alliance's long-term direction.

This convergence between collective rearmament and support for Kyiv shows that the two files are, in practice, inseparable: Russia cannot be deterred over the long run without continuing to back the country bearing the direct brunt of its aggression today.

What this rearmament says about the world to come

The end of a post-Cold War illusion

For nearly three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, much of Western Europe lived on the comfortable illusion that large-scale continental wars belonged permanently to the past. That illusion shattered with the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, forcing an accelerated rearmament that few analysts would have judged plausible just five years earlier.

This strategic awakening, however late, remains preferable to inaction. A Russia that perceives the West as weak and divided is a Russia more inclined to test the limits of collective deterrence.

China is watching this Western precedent closely

This European rearmament has not escaped Beijing's attention, which is watching with interest the West's ability to coordinate against a shared threat. China, with its own ambitions regarding Taiwan, is likely drawing strategic lessons from how Western democracies respond, or delay responding, to a major territorial aggression.

That's one more reason this 2% of GDP milestone reaches well beyond Europe: it sends a signal to every authoritarian regime that might be tempted to exploit a perception of Western weakness, whether in Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, or Pyongyang.

Western defense industry under strain to meet demand

Production lines struggling to keep pace

This massive rearmament doesn't instantly translate into delivered equipment. European and North American defense manufacturers are struggling to ramp up production as fast as government budgets are growing, an industrial bottleneck that, in practice, limits the immediate impact of these added investments on NATO's actual deterrence capacity.

This industrial slowness is a blind spot in the current budget debate: raising spending from 2% to 5% of GDP does no good if factories can't produce the tanks, munitions, and air-defense systems needed within a reasonable timeframe.

An industrial opportunity for the most agile allies

Countries that have managed to quickly modernize their defense industrial base, like Poland with its South Korean partnerships for K2 tanks, find themselves well positioned to equip not only their own forces but also those of less industrially advanced allies.

This dynamic could reshape the industrial map of Western defense over the next decade, benefiting the nations most pragmatic in their military procurement choices.

Conclusion: a necessary rearmament, but a still-fragile unity

A historic milestone that must not mask internal tensions

The collective crossing of the 2% of GDP threshold by all 32 NATO members is an undeniably historic milestone, driven by a belated but real recognition of the threat posed by Vladimir Putin'sRussia. This figure reflects a generational shift for Western democracies long accustomed to underinvesting in their own collective security.

But this displayed unity remains fragile, as shown by the tensions around Spain's exemption or Donald Trump's repeated criticism of certain allies. The Ankara summit will need to turn this budgetary satisfaction into a genuinely coherent collective strategy against mounting threats, from Moscow to Beijing.

The real test still lies ahead

Hitting 2% was yesterday's goal. The real test begins now, on the path toward the 5% set for 2035, a deadline that will demand sustained budget discipline for more than a decade, well beyond the usual election cycles of Western democracies.

Nothing guarantees this momentum will hold if the Russian threat comes to seem less immediate. It's precisely this long-term vigilance that will determine whether this 2025 milestone remains a historic turning point or just a passing surge.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency note

Who I am and my acknowledged biases

I am a columnist, not an international-relations expert certified by an academic institution. My analysis relies on public NATO data and specialized press reporting. My acknowledged bias is pro-West and favorable to deterrent rearmament against Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

I have no financial ties to the defense industry or to the governments cited in this piece.

What I don't know, and my method

I cannot predict with certainty whether all allies will stay on track toward 5% by 2035, or how the transatlantic relationship will evolve under Donald Trump's presidency. My method is to cross-check official NATO figures against several independent journalistic sources before making any claim.

I will correct any factual error flagged in my future columns.

Sources

Primary sources

Factbox — NATO defense spending: Where allies stand ahead of Ankara summit — Anadolu Agency, 1er juillet 2026

Beyond defense spending: what's at stake at NATO Ankara — Global Affairs, 2026

Secondary sources

What defense leaders will discuss at the 2026 NATO summit — Forbes, 1er juillet 2026

With NATO under pressure, Europe undertakes its biggest rearmament since the Cold War — El País, 5 juillet 2026

Aerospace & Defense coverage — Reuters, 2026

2026 Ankara NATO summit — Wikipedia