COMMENTARY: Kim's Constitutional Nuclear Weapon — When the Bomb Becomes an Inalienable Right

Introduction: turning an arsenal into a constitutional article

An unprecedented legal lock

In September 2023, North Korea had already accomplished the unthinkable by enshrining its nuclear program in its constitution. But on June 24, 2026, The Guardian published a detailed analysis revealing that North Korea had gone even further: a constitutional revision adopted earlier in 2026 granted Kim Jong Un direct constitutional authority over nuclear forces, including the ability to delegate launch authority to a designated military command. This addition transforms not only the possession of nuclear weapons into a constitutional right — it transforms their potential use into a legal act.

This commentary poses a simple but formidable question: what does enshrining nuclear weapons in a constitution actually mean? And what are the consequences for any prospect of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, for future negotiations, and for regional security across the Asia-Pacific? This is not a rhetorical question — it is one that governments, diplomats, and military planners must answer now.

Kim Jong Un's declarations in June 2026

Within this constitutional context, Kim Jong Un reaffirmed on June 24, 2026 that the continuous strengthening of North Korea's nuclear capabilities is "the most just and only path" for navigating an increasingly unstable world. He identified the United States and its allies as mounting threats justifying this arsenal. He also announced his commitment to arming North Korean warships with nuclear missiles, increasing the production of military-grade armaments, and expanding the nuclear stockpile at an exponential pace. The same week, Kim pledged to build two additional warships per year over five years.

What "constitutional nuclear" means in law and doctrine

Irreversibility as a legal objective

Enshrining a nuclear program in a constitution transforms its legitimacy at the level of domestic law. Within the North Korean system, the constitution is the state's foundational law — and since the 2023 revision and its 2026 amendments, it codifies North Korea's right to "develop highly nuclear weapons to ensure its rights of existence" (revised Article 58, per the analysis of Columbia Law School). This constitutional language is deliberate: it renders denuclearization not merely politically undesirable but unconstitutional.

Kim Jong Un himself declared at the time of the 2023 revision that this enshrinement makes North Korea's nuclear status "irreversible." That word — irreversible — is the key to the entire strategy. It is designed to close the debate before it opens, to signal to the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China that any negotiation aimed at eliminating the nuclear program would face a domestic constitutional barrier that even Kim's successor could not bypass without a lengthy and politically costly constitutional process.

The delegation of launch authority: the most alarming clause

The 2026 addition that goes furthest is the provision allowing Kim to delegate nuclear launch authority to a designated military command. Analysts cited by The Guardian interpret this as a safeguard against a decapitation strike — if Kim is killed in a pre-emptive attack, the nuclear program can continue to function autonomously. But this clause carries another implication: it signals that the use of nuclear weapons is no longer necessarily conditional on the decision of a single individual. A delegated military commander, in a crisis context, could trigger a nuclear strike without Kim being physically available to authorize it.

Diplomatic responses and their limits

The official denuclearization position: a declaratory objective with no mechanism

Officially, South Korea maintains denuclearization as the central objective of its policy toward the North. President Lee Jae Myung has made denuclearization a pillar of his administration. In May 2026, Donald Trump and Xi Jinping jointly reaffirmed what they called a "shared goal" of North Korean denuclearization. But the Chinese researchers who accompanied Xi during his visit to Pyongyang made no mention of denuclearization in their readouts of the visit.

That dissonance is telling. Washington and Seoul proclaim denuclearization as the objective. Beijing mentions it in American company but scrubs it from its own communications with Pyongyang. And Pyongyang has made it unconstitutional. The concept of "complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization" (CVID) — once the official Western position — is de facto a formula without operational meaning in the current context.

The shift toward "arms control" as the new reality

Analyst Lee Ho Ryung of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) is cited by The Guardian in a formulation worth quoting directly: while Washington and Seoul would maintain denuclearization as a formal objective, "the practical emphasis would likely shift toward arms control — gradually limiting and reducing the arsenal rather than eliminating it entirely." Her conclusion: "there may be no other path." Coming from an institutional South Korean analyst, this formulation is extraordinarily significant. It signals a gradual acceptance of reality: North Korea is a nuclear-armed state and will remain one.

Kim's motivations: survival, deterrence, and internal legitimacy

The logic of regime survival

Why is Kim accelerating his nuclear program in 2026, when regional tensions are already elevated and the international community is preoccupied with other crises — Iran, Ukraine, the South China Sea? The answer most analysts give is structural: the nuclear bomb is the regime's survival guarantee. The examples of Muammar Gaddafi (who renounced nuclear weapons in 2003 and was overthrown and killed in 2011) and Saddam Hussein are regularly cited in North Korean strategic circles as proof that a leader without nuclear weapons is vulnerable.

Kim has also watched the Iran-United States confrontation of 2026: Iran, which had its own nuclear development program but no operational weapons, sustained significant American and Israeli airstrikes. The lesson Pyongyang draws is identical to the Gaddafi and Saddam lesson: without a complete and credible nuclear deterrent, no regime is safe. The arsenal is not an option — it is an existential necessity as Pyongyang defines it.

Internal legitimacy and national identity

Enshrining nuclear weapons in the constitution also serves an internal legitimacy function. Kim is constructing a North Korean national identity partly defined by nuclear power — "we are the small nation that defied the American hyperpower and built the bomb." This narrative bolsters the regime's legitimacy before a population suffering from chronic economic shortfalls. The nuclear program is framed as the nation's glory that justifies every sacrifice. It is a political communication operation as much as a strategic decision.

Implications for regional security

Japan, South Korea, and the question of indigenous nuclear capability

The expansion of North Korea's nuclear arsenal is generating internal debates in Japan and South Korea about the relevance of their own nuclear capabilities. In South Korea, polling indicates that a majority of the population supports the idea of a national nuclear program. The Lee Jae Myung government has officially rejected this option in favor of the American alliance guarantee — but the debate is live in academic circles and in segments of Parliament. In Japan, the anti-nuclear constitutional tradition remains strong, but the accelerated conventional rearmament and development of long-range strike capabilities reflect a deep re-evaluation of the country's security posture.

The systemic risk is a cascading proliferation effect: if North Korea is tacitly accepted as a nuclear power, other states in the region could reassess their commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is monitoring this dynamic with concern. Non-proliferation experts note that de facto acceptance of a seventh non-NPT nuclear state weakens the global non-proliferation architecture.

American policy in the face of the constitutional lock

Washington finds itself in a strategically awkward position. The old approaches — sanctions, diplomatic pressure, offers of normalization conditioned on denuclearization — have all collided with the nuclear architecture that Pyongyang has built. The Trump-Kim meeting in Hanoi in 2019 broke down on exactly this fundamental issue: Kim would not exchange his full nuclear program for sanctions relief, regardless of how the offer was packaged. Since then, the arsenal has grown, the missiles have acquired new capabilities, and the constitution has transformed nuclear possession into a legally protected act.

What the constitutional article changes for future negotiations

A legal obstacle as a diplomatic signal

The argument advanced by Ho Ryung — that Pyongyang is working to establish the framework under which denuclearization "no longer applies to North Korea" — is confirmed by the constitutional mechanics. Any future North Korean leader who hypothetically wished to negotiate a reduction or elimination of the arsenal would first need to amend the constitution. In a regime where the constitution codifies the personality cult and the ideological foundations of the system, any major constitutional amendment amounts to questioning the regime's foundations themselves. This is a near-irreversible lock by design.

The Pakistani model and its limits as a reference point

Some analysts suggest that an "arms control" model — similar to that applied to Pakistan, a non-NPT nuclear power that was never forced into denuclearization — could be the only realistic option for North Korea. In this scenario, the international community would tacitly accept the arsenal in exchange for commitments against horizontal proliferation and maximum size caps. The fundamental difference from Pakistan is that North Korea does not have the same regional balances or incentives toward moderation that Pakistan does — its nuclear neighbor China is an ally, not a rival.

The North Korean precedent and global proliferation

What Pyongyang teaches states seeking the bomb

The North Korean trajectory — from clandestine nuclear testing to constitutional enshrinement — now constitutes a strategic playbook for any state seeking to escape international pressure. The message is simple and brutal: if you hold out long enough and develop a credible retaliatory capacity, the international community will ultimately accept your status. Iran is watching. So is Myanmar. This precedent is among the most dangerous in the global non-proliferation architecture.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968, rests on a fundamental bargain: non-nuclear states renounce the bomb in exchange for progressive disarmament by the nuclear powers. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 — and suffered no structurally irreversible consequences. This systemic impunity has weakened the non-proliferation regime more than any other event of the past decade. The constitutional enshrinement of June 2026 is its logical endpoint.

Pyongyang, Beijing, and the regional balance in the nuclear age

China facing an uncontrollable but necessary ally

Beijing finds itself in an uncomfortable position it manages through strategic silence. On one side, a nuclear North Korea serves its interests by maintaining a buffer zone between its territory and American forces in South Korea. On the other, a North Korea whose nuclear policy is enshrined in the constitution escapes the informal leverage China exerts through its economic dominance via trade sanctions. The 2026 constitution further limits the argument Beijing could use to push Pyongyang toward moderation.

South Korea and Japan are drawing opposite conclusions from North Korea's nuclear constitutionalization. Seoul, under the pressure of a public opinion that has shifted since the invasion of Ukraine, is publicly reviving the debate over the redeployment of American tactical nuclear weapons on its soil. Tokyo is quietly strengthening its "counter-strike" capability against adversary bases, a doctrine long considered incompatible with Japan's pacifist constitution. The regional spiral is already in motion.

Conclusion: the atomic weapon as irreversible national identity

Denuclearization: a dead objective that hasn't been buried

The enshrinement of nuclear weapons in the North Korean constitution represents the culmination of a deliberate strategy of irreversible entrenchment. This is not a historical accident — it is the result of decisions made over decades by a ruling dynasty that has always viewed the bomb as the condition of its political survival. Today, any serious negotiation must begin from this reality: complete, verifiable denuclearization is a formula without operational meaning in the short and medium term.

What democracies must accept

What Western and Asian democracies must accept is that non-proliferation in North Korea has failed and that tomorrow's policy will need to be built on managing a hostile nuclear state, not eliminating it. This means reinforcing American extended deterrence guarantees for South Korea and Japan, establishing minimal confidence-building mechanisms to prevent miscalculation, and having an honest conversation about the implications of this precedent for global proliferation.

Signed Maxime Marquette, columnist

Columnist's transparency box

What I know and what I admit not knowing

This commentary draws primarily on The Guardian's article of June 24, 2026 and on the analysis published by Columbia Law School on the enshrinement of nuclear weapons in North Korea's 2023 constitution. I do not have direct access to North Korean constitutional texts in their original language — the translations and secondary analyses I rely on may carry translation nuances I cannot fully verify.

My bias

I consider North Korea a deeply repressive regime whose nuclear program represents a genuine threat to regional and global security. This bias runs through my analysis. I also acknowledge that Western policies toward North Korea have largely failed — something that merits the honest self-criticism I have tried to incorporate into this text.

Sources

Primary sources

The Guardian — North Korea's "exponential" nuclear program: why Kim Jong Un is accelerating — June 24, 2026

Chosun — North Korea revises constitution to strengthen Kim's authority over nuclear forces — May 6, 2026

Columbia Law School — The permanent nuclear mandate: the September 2023 constitutional amendment — 2023

Secondary sources

The Guardian — Context on nuclear proliferation and regional escalation risks in 2026 — January 28, 2026

Foreign Policy — Strategic implications of North Korean nuclear proliferation — February 11, 2026

TASS — Russian reaction to Finland's nuclear enshrinement as parallel to the North Korean context — May 4, 2026